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Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies: 
an analysis of representation, interest, consensus, and partisanship at the 
Australian Constitutional Convention 1998, and the Renewal of Canada Conferences 
1992 
 
Dale Kreibig, July 2007 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis evaluates whether including constituents directly in negotiating proposals for 
formal constitutional change at constituent assemblies could improve the rate of formal 
change in Australia and Canada.   
Some analysts argue that there is little or no need for formal constitutional change, 
whilst others argue that the lack of it highlights the need to find new ways to debate 
proposed amendments.  In the 1990s, the Australian and Canadian federal governments 
departed from usual practice and convened constituent assemblies (or mini constituent 
assemblies) to debate the merits of a republic for Australia, and proposals for 
constitutional reform in Canada that became the Charlottetown Accord.  This thesis is a 
case study of those assemblies:  the Australian Constitutional Convention 1998, and the 
Canadian Renewal of Canada Conferences 1992.  
The first chapter establishes that the rate of formal constitutional change in 
Australia and Canada is relatively low, and that informal constitutional change is not 
equivalent to amending the text of a constitution.  Analysis of the literature about why 
proposals put to referenda are rarely ratified in Australia shows that there are no 
compelling answers to this question, and that relatively little attention is given to 
examining the process used to negotiate formal constitutional change. 
The second chapter examines literature about the value of constituent assemblies.  
This review shows that authors disagree about whether, compared to parliamentarians 
convening alone, constituent assemblies are more representative of constituents, more 
likely to generate public interest, more likely to reach consensus, and less likely to 
behave in a partisan way.  This thesis addresses these four questions.  As a first step, the 
terms ‘constituent assembly’, ‘representative’, ‘interest’, ‘consensus’, and ‘partisanship’ 
are defined in a testable form. 
The third to sixth chapters examine the assemblies in context of a detailed analysis 
of the processes of formal constitutional change in Australia and Canada since 
federation.  The research shows that the assemblies were superior for representation, 
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public interest, and consensus.  For the Australian case, analysis of the formal ballots 
shows that parliamentary delegates behaved in a less partisan way than did non-
parliamentary delegates – parliamentarians were more likely to change their votes. This 
finding is qualified by analysis of the assembly debates and other publications, which 
suggests that some parliamentarians did not act in accordance with their preferences in 
the early ballots. The question of partisanship is not answered for the Canadian case 
because an official record of delegates’ preferences was not created and retained.   
The research also suggests that future studies of constituent assemblies should 
explore the question of how responsive governments are to recommendations made by 
assemblies.  The Australian and Canadian assemblies delivered on their promise of 
representativeness, public interest, and consensus, but governments were not responsive 
to some critical recommendations. Preliminary analysis suggests that this may in large 
part explain why Australian and Canadian voters did not approve a republic or the 
Charlottetown Accord when they went to the polls.  
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CHAPTER ONE – FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
A constitution provides foundation rules for the government of groups.  A national 
constitution provides “the basic framework for political life within a state”, a “system of 
laws, rules and fundamental principles according to which a nation ... [is] governed”, 
and a “stable framework for political life” (respectively Federal-Provincial Relations 
Office 1990, 1; CCH Australia 1996, 38; Hurley 1996, 4).  Put simply and elegantly for 
Canada, a written constitution is “a document that formalizes the legal relationship 
between the public and the state” (Abella, Fortier and Lougheed 1992, 2).  
 The foundation rules for a nation may be expressed in one or more documents, 
informal agreements, and judicial interpretation of laws.1  While all of these need to be 
understood to appreciate how a nation is governed, the formal rules are “those rules 
which are incorporated in a legal document which has been given the status of supreme 
law” (Emy and Hughes 1991, 267).  Constitutional law is supreme in the sense that it 
prevails over all other laws, a point made clear in s 52(1) of the Constitution Act 1982, 
as follows:  “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect”.     
Even though constitutions are pre-eminent law, they need to be amended from 
time to time to reflect changes in attitudes and beliefs, to counter the unintended 
consequences of existing provisions, or for greater certainty to entrench parliamentary or 
judicial decisions (Lutz 1995, 242).  Procedures for amending constitutions need to 
accommodate conflicting demand for stability and change, and they tend to be relatively 
demanding.  Lutz’ analysis of amendment procedures in 30 nations produced a 
continuum of difficulty ranging from “parliamentary supremacy” (the normal legislative 
process), to “legislative complexity” such as super-majority ballots, “legislative 
complexity plus state approval”, and “legislative complexity plus a referendum” (1995, 
263-264).  As would be expected, he found that constitutions with less demanding 
amendment rules were amended more frequently (1995, 260-261).  Where durable 
constitutions were amended infrequently, Lutz concluded that governments probably 
relied more heavily on other ways to achieve constitutional change, such as judicial 
                                                 
1
  The phrase ‘informal agreements’ is used rather than ‘constitutional conventions’ to avoid confusion 
with conferences such as Australia’s 1998 Constitutional Convention, which are the subject of this thesis. 
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interpretation and informal agreements (1995, 260-61, 266).  This can lead to 
uncertainty, and a less stable political environment.   
The Australian and Canadian constitutions are relatively durable, both nations 
have experienced considerable difficulty in achieving formal constitutional change, and 
both nations rely to some extent on judicial interpretation and informal agreements.  But 
as Sharman wrote: 
At the very minimum, limited government requires clarity in the specification of basic 
constitutional rules but, as they now stand, the Canadian and Australian constitutions are at best 
palimpsests [erasable slates].  This lack of specificity can only operate to the advantage of those 
groups who operate the institutions of executive government (1990, 226).  
  
Neither nation could be described as politically unstable now, but it is a logical 
possibility.  According to Watts: 
Experience in federations elsewhere … indicates that the repeated refusal to resolve basic problems 
[like the ‘structural’ reforms attempted in Canada] may accentuate internal grievances and 
frustrations cumulatively to the point where eventually disintegration may become unavoidable. 
 
[In Canada] the incremental approach is not likely to move sufficiently quickly to meet the urgent 
concerns  … nonconstitutional adjustment cannot provide the … assurance of constitutional 
safeguards that formal constitutional amendments would. 
 
Does the failure of the 1991-2 attempt at constitutional reform represent the end of the tradition of 
elite accommodation … if so, is there any viable alternative process for constitutional change? … 
Some have advocated a constituent assembly process but … rarely have they been successful 
except in postrevolutionary situations where the establishment of a new political structure is 
unavoidable. Does the lack of a viable alternative process for major constitutional change mean 
then that like some other federations Canada is locked into a basically unalterable status quo … If 
so this is likely to induce resort to extra-constitutional means to achieve major change. What the 
failure of the 1990-92 constitutional review process has done, therefore, is to face Canadians now 
with the need to consider what process, if any, can be developed for dealing effectively with the as 
yet unresolved structural problems of Canada (Watts 1999, 12, 13, 15 respectively). 
 
By this account the lack of formal constitutional change can cause “disintegration”.  If 
the elite accommodation method is no longer acceptable in Canada, then incremental 
change is not fast enough, and informal agreements are not an adequate substitute.  
Given that constituent assemblies rarely succeed except in “postrevolutionary 
situations”, what process options remain?   
This thesis is a comparative study of how Australia and Canada tried 
unsuccessfully to implement major constitutional change in the 1990s.  Proposals for a 
republic in Australia and the Charlottetown Accord in Canada were defeated at the 
polls, despite extensive public consultation, and early indications that these proposals 
would pass.  Public consultation included extensive information campaigns and media 
coverage, and opportunities for parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians to debate the 
merits of the proposals at constituent assemblies, or mini constituent assemblies (see 
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page 38 for a discussion on whether these cases are constituent assemblies).2  This thesis 
assesses the value of constituent assemblies as a means to achieving formal 
constitutional change. 
This chapter lays the groundwork for the thesis.  The first and second sections 
discuss the need for formal change, and the rate of change in Australia and Canada, and 
the third section demonstrates that the Australian and Canadian cases are comparable for 
this thesis.  The fourth and longest section examines a diverse range of explanations for 
why attempts to amend the constitution rarely succeed in Australia, and applies these 
explanations to the republic and Charlottetown cases.  The fifth and final section 
demonstrates the need for the present research. 
THE NEED FOR FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
By some accounts, formal constitutional change is relatively unimportant in 
Australia and Canada.  Russell claimed that in Australia and Canada “judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution and informal intergovernmental agreements did far 
more to change the operation of federalism than formal constitutional amendments” 
(1988, 8).  Russell also wrote that he favoured putting proposals for constitutional 
reform to referenda in Canada because “as a constitutional conservative I also like the 
practical results of the referendum process – at least in Australia where the people reject 
nearly all proposals for change” (1991a, 68).  Across the Pacific, Galligan agreed with 
Russell on the need for formal change, adding with respect to Australia:  “perhaps more 
curious is the unreflective reformist mindset that persists in advocating or expecting 
constitutional reform even though there is not much apparent need for change” (1995, 
118, 120-132).  In 1957, Gough Whitlam (federal Labor parliamentarian 1952-1978, 
prime minister 1972-1975) wrote that the constitution was an obstacle to Labor 
achieving its policy goals (1977 [1957], 16).  Twenty years later he concluded that 
formal constitutional change was important, and obtaining it was “surpassingly 
difficult”, but much could be achieved through judicial interpretation and inter-
government agreement (Whitlam 1977, 2-3). 
A political framework does change without changing the text of a constitution.  
Sawer concluded in 1973:  
[I]in Australia, if enough of the people want something badly enough, and for long enough, and it 
can be achieved through governmental action, they are likely to get what they want, and to do so 
without formal amendment of the Federal Constitution (1973, 213). 
   
                                                 
2
 A ‘see page’ reference refers to a page in this thesis. 
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Russell wrote that in Canada, all that was necessary for many reforms was “political 
will”.  He doubted, nevertheless, that Canadians would be relieved easily of their 
exhaustion with attempts at formal change:  “It will be no more easy for politicians to 
break from these practices than for the intelligentsia to abandon its predilection for 
constitutional solutions to every national problem” (1993b, 37).  Galligan concluded 
“progressive elites and federal governments should stop pestering the Australian people 
with referendum proposals that are unnecessary” (1995, 132).  
If formal change is not necessary, then why do governments try so frequently to 
achieve it?  Why, for example, did Australian governments initiate unsuccessful 
referenda in 1974, 1977, 1984, and 1988 to change the timing and frequency of federal 
elections, and why did Canadian governments undertake fourteen rounds of negotiations 
between 1927 and 1982 to add a local amending formula to the constitution?  Why were 
these changes not achieved through “governmental action”?  Governments continue to 
propose formal constitutional change because the alternatives – informal agreement, 
judicial interpretation, and ordinary legislation – are limited in their effect. 
Informal agreements are an important part of a nation’s constitutional rules.  
According to Sir Ivor Jennings, they are “the flesh which clothes the dry bones of the 
law” (in Marshall and Moodie 1971, 18).  For example, the Australian and Canadian 
constitutions do not define the office of prime minister or responsible government, but 
through a combination of constitutional provisions and informal agreements, the prime 
minister is the leader of the party or coalition with a majority in the house of 
representatives, and between elections this party or coalition governs unless it loses the 
confidence of the lower house.     
Events in Australia in 1975 show how governments can lose office even though 
they have a majority in the lower house.  On 11 November 1975, the governor-general 
John Kerr dismissed Labor prime minister Gough Whitlam and the government, citing 
as his authority s 64 of the constitution (letter to the prime minister reproduced in Kerr 
1978, 359-360).  Section 64 of the constitution reads: 
The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the 
Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish. 
 
Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General.  They shall be 
members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth. 
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Kerr explained in a statement of reasons attached to the letter of dismissal:  
The decisions I have made were made after I was satisfied that Mr Whitlam could not obtain 
supply.  …  There have been public discussions about whether there is a convention deriving from 
the principles of responsible government that the Senate must never under any circumstances 
exercise the power to reject an appropriation bill.  The Constitution must prevail over any 
convention because, in determining the question how far the conventions of responsible 
government have been grafted on to the federal compact, the Constitution itself must in the end 
control the situation (reproduced in Kerr 1978, 360-364, emphasis added). 
 
An intense debate followed about the status of informal agreements, and whether such 
agreements or the text of the constitution should prevail (see esp. Whitlam’s rebuttals in 
Whitlam 1979). 
According to Reid, disputes about the application of informal agreements in 1975 
were “political rhetoric” that blocked constructive debate about why particular practices 
should or should not occur (1977, 245).  Sharman argued that governments were not 
likely to entrench informal agreements because informal agreements were valued for 
their flexibility (1990, 219-220).  The point for this thesis is that informal agreements 
are not a substitute for formal change because they lack the legal force of constitutional 
text.   
Judicial interpretation also alters the political framework.  For example, in 
Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 108 ALR 557, the 
High Court read into the constitution the right to freedom of political communication.  
The court also ruled in Commonwealth v. State of Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625 that the 
federal government could use its external affairs powers to stop the Tasmanian state 
government constructing the Gordon below Franklin dam, which in effect changed the 
federal/state division of powers.  The scope for interpretation is limited, however, 
because rulings can be overturned, and courts need to justify their decisions so they 
cannot find provisions that are not there.  For example, the Australian federal parliament 
could not legislate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples or count them in the 
census until ss 51 (xxvi) and 127 of the constitution were changed in 1967.3   
Legislation is the third means to achieve constitutional change without changing 
the text of a constitution.  For example, the Canadian parliament weakened its role in 
formal constitutional change by passing the Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments 
                                                 
3
 The first peoples of Australia and Canada are referred to in this thesis using different words, depending 
on the context.  ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders’ is used for Australia’s first nations, in accordance 
with their preferences (Department of Communications 2002, 57).  ‘Aboriginal peoples’ is used for the 
Indian, Inuit, and Métis peoples of Canada, which is consistent with the Constitution Act, 1982 s 35.  
When referring to the first peoples of both Australia and Canada, ‘indigenous peoples’ is used, as 
suggested by the Australian government Style Guide (Department of Communications 2002, 58). 
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SC 1996 c 1, with the consent of both houses.  This act provides that the federal 
government will not initiate certain constitutional amendments without the prior consent 
of the governments of Ontario, Québec, British Columbia, and at least two Atlantic and 
two Prairie provinces representing a majority of their populations.  By contrast, Part V 
of the Constitution Act 1982 provides that either house of the federal parliament, or a 
provincial legislature can initiate such amendments.  The 1996 federal act is not 
equivalent to formal constitutional change, however, because it can be repealed 
relatively easily.  
The three informal means to achieve constitutional change are relatively 
impermanent compared to formal change.  Ronald Watts – an advocate of incremental 
and informal constitutional change – put it this way:  “non-constitutional adjustment 
cannot provide the symbolic significance and the assurance of constitutional safeguards 
that formal constitutional amendments would” (1999, 13).  Hence, governments in 
Australia and Canada continue to initiate formal amendments.  For example, the belief 
that the federal tier should provide national welfare schemes led to amendments in 
Australia in 1946 and in Canada in 1940, 1951, and 1960, and changes in attitudes 
towards indigenous peoples were recognised by constitutional amendments of different 
magnitudes in Australia in 1967 and Canada in 1982.  These and other amendments 
demonstrate a capacity for achieving formal change in both countries, but how much 
change is enough? 
WHAT IS A ‘REASONABLE’ RATE OF CHANGE? 
Lutz’ quantitative analysis of formal constitutional change in 30 nations concluded 
that a “reasonable amendment rate” (RAR) was 1.0-1.25 amendments per annum (1995, 
260-261).  Australia has changed its constitution eight times since 1901.  Within a range 
of 0.00 to 7.00, Australia ranked sixth lowest at 0.09, just below France and the USA, 
and just above Spain and Denmark.  The study did not include Canada, but there is little 
doubt that Canada’s amendment rate is relatively low.  As Alan Cairns put it: 
The historical evidence is depressing – the Fulton-Favreau amending formula of the mid-sixties, 
the Victoria Charter of 1971, Bill C-60 of the late seventies, and the four unsuccessful aboriginal 
constitutional conferences of the mid-eighties all join Meech Lake in testifying to the resilience of 
the discredited old order that so many would like to leave behind.  Thus, defeat of reform efforts is 
the basic pattern (1991a, 15). 
 
Opinion varies on how many times the Canadian constitution has been amended.  Later 
in this thesis I will argue that 26 formal amendments were made between 1867 and 
1999.  Using this number in Lutz’ formula, Canada’s amendment rate is 0.20 – higher 
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than Australia, but well below Lutz’ RAR.   
Lutz’ method bears closer examination (1995, 243, 252, 260, 266).  First, an 
amendment rate (AR) was calculated by dividing the number of amendments enacted by 
the age of the constitution in years.  Next, Lutz grouped the cases by AR on an ordinal 
scale from 0 to 2.0+ in increments of 0.25, and an average AR was calculated for each 
group. The AR for two groups with the longest standing constitutions (average 90 and 
100 years for state constitutions) was said then to be “reasonable”.  This method 
produced an RAR for US state constitutions of 0.76-1.0, and an RAR for national 
constitutions of 1.0-1.25.  The method suggests that durability was Lutz’ primary value, 
even though he wrote, “we hope to illuminate this question empirically rather than in an 
a priori manner” (1995, 243).  It is unsettling that amendment rates were “reasonable” 
for just two of 30 nations (Argentina and Norway), but the method demonstrates 
nevertheless that amendment rates for Australia and Canada are relatively low. 
Russell’s more qualitative comparison of Australia and Canada concluded that 
Canada amended its constitution more frequently than Australia did prior to 1982, but 
Australian amendments were more substantial (1988, 7-8).  He highlighted Australia’s 
1928 state debt amendment, which strengthened federal financial control over the states, 
and the 1946 amendment, which granted welfare powers to the federal tier.  Even so, 
Australian reformers may well envy Canada’s 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
while Canadian reformers may well envy Australia’s ‘triple-E’ senate, which has been in 
place since federation, because Canadian senators are appointed by the federal 
government, and they may remain in office until age 75.4  Proposals did not proceed in 
1992 for an elected senate, with an equal number of senators per province that was 
effective in that it could veto house bills (hence triple-E).   
The historical record of repeated attempts to change the Australian and Canadian 
constitutions demonstrates a recurrent perception of the need for change.  It also 
suggests the expenditure of considerable resources in the pursuit of formal change, and 
frustration when it is not achieved. 
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 
This section shows that Australia and Canada are comparable for this thesis, 
despite their many differences.  
                                                 
4
 A bill to change senators’ tenure to eight years was introduced into the senate on 30 May 2006, and read 
for the second time on 20 February 2007.  It will not proceed to the third reading stage until the Supreme 
Court rules on its “constitutionality” (Parliament of Canada 2007). 
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History and institutions 
Australia and Canada adopted written constitutions of a similar type at about the 
same time.  The British North America Act 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 and the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12, s 9 
established federal, constitutional monarchies with Westminster-style parliamentary 
governments (the Canadian constitution 1867 and the Australian constitution 
respectively).  In both cases, federation united European colonies in large, resource-rich 
lands that were occupied by indigenous peoples.   
The federation process proceeded differently in Australia and Canada.  Australia’s 
six states agreed to federate at the same time, and they remain the only states today.  The 
Canadian federation began with the union of the Canada, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick colonies as the provinces of Ontario, Québec, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick in 1867, and expanded gradually to ten provinces and three territories by 
1999.  The federal government negotiated the addition of provinces and territories 
bilaterally – all of the existing provinces and territories did not participate formally in 
the decision.     
Both countries comprise first nations (indigenous peoples) and second nations 
(mainly Europeans).  In Canada, however, there is a third cleavage between peoples of 
English and French origin.  Many of Canada’s recent constitutional debates are 
associated with attempts to accommodate francophone Québec, and Québec’s recurrent 
threat to secede.  There are equivalents in Australia, such as the secession referendum in 
Western Australian in 1933, and the new state referendum in New England in 1967, but 
these initiatives turned more on economics than culture, and they were less enduring.  
The formal and informal constitutional rules are similar in many respects.  A 
governor-general (or governor general) represents the same monarch, and may exercise 
similar reserve powers.  The prime minister is the leader of the majority party or 
coalition in the lower house of a bicameral federal parliament, powers are divided 
between the federal and state/provincial tiers, and the states and provinces have their 
own constitutions, assemblies, and governors (or lieutenant governors).   
Australia and Canada followed a similar path toward independence from Britain.  
For example, the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK) 22 Geo 5, c 4 provided that Britain 
would not legislate for Australia (enacted 1942) or Canada (enacted 1931) unless 
requested to do so, appeals to the British Privy Council were ended in all but theory in 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
9
 
Australia (1986), and in Canada (1949), and a distinct national citizenship was 
introduced in Australia (1949) and Canada (1947).  Australia’s republic debate, 
however, has not occurred on the same scale in Canada.  
There are nevertheless many differences.  Whilst the Australian and Canadian 
federal governments appoint members of the federal judiciary, the Canadian federal 
government also appoints provincial judges.  Attendance at the polls is compulsory in 
Australia, but voluntary in Canada.  Lower house seats are single member constituencies 
in both cases, but Australia uses the majority (preferential) formula while Canada uses 
the plurality (first-past-the-post) system.  Australian voters elect senators for six-year 
terms using a system of proportional representation (since 1949), while the Canadian 
federal government appoints its senators, who may continue in office to age 75 years.  
The Canadian senate has a suspensive veto over house legislation, while the 
Australian senate may reject or amend all legislation except money bills.  This means 
that the Canadian senate can delay but not block most proposals to amend the 
constitution.  This difference is not as significant as it may first appear, however, 
because four Australian proposals for constitutional change were put to referenda in 
1974 without senate approval.  The Australian constitution provides that the Governor-
General may issues writs for a referendum that is approved by one house only (s 128, 
para 2). 
The division of powers is also different.  Residual powers that accrue to the 
federal tier in Canada accrue to the state tier in Australia.  This does not, however, mean 
that Canadian provinces are weak compared to Australian states.  In 1982, Britain 
enacted the Constitution Act 1982 as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11 (the 
Canadian constitution 1982), which included a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Section 33 of the constitution 1982 provides that the provinces can pass legislation that 
is inconsistent with the Charter by invoking the notwithstanding clause.  By contrast, 
Section 109 of the Australian constitution provides that when federal and state 
legislation is inconsistent, federal legislation prevails.  Most importantly for this thesis, 
the Canadian constitution provides a formal role for provincial governments and 
legislatures in amending the constitution, while there is no formal role for states and 
territories in amending the Australian constitution.  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has no equal in Australia.  The 
Australian constitution makes explicit four rights:  acquisition of property by the 
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commonwealth on just terms (s 51(xxxi)), trial by jury for indictable offences (s 80), 
protection from religious regulation and discrimination (s 116), and protection from 
discrimination by state of residence (s 117).  By contrast, Canada’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms entrenches freedom of religion, speech, movement and association, the 
right to vote, freedom from arbitrary detention and discrimination, due process under the 
law, and the right to use either English or French in certain public institutions (part I of 
the 1982 constitution).  It also recognises a number of rights-bearing groups such as 
Aboriginal peoples, women, and language minorities, which, according to Cairns, 
facilitated their participation in debating constitutional change (1991b, 84).  
Rules for amending the constitution 
The Australian constitution provides for its amendment by reference, by inter-
government agreement, and by referenda.   
Section 51(xxxvii) provides that a state parliament can vary the division of powers 
by referring one or more of its powers to the federal government.  This relatively rapid 
and inexpensive mechanism has been used 38 times in 100 years (Department of the 
Parliamentary Library Australia 2001, 7-8).  In 1996, for example, the Victorian 
government referred its industrial relations powers to the Commonwealth.   
Section 51(xxxviii) provides that federal and state parliaments can by unanimous 
agreement “do anything for Australia which only the United Kingdom could do at the 
time of federation”, which arguably includes changing the constitution without a 
referendum.  The section was used to transfer powers over offshore areas from the 
commonwealth to the states via the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth), and 
to sever legal links with Britain by passage of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).   
The two section 51 provisions have not, however, been used to change the text of 
the constitution, perhaps because parliaments that did so would risk an electoral 
backlash, as it would deny electors’ constitutional power under s 128 to veto formal 
change.  In discussing the further possibility that s 15 of the Australia Act could be used 
to change constitutional text without a referendum, Bennett and Brennan concluded that 
parliaments that did so would be “thumbing their nose at the popular sovereignty 
embodied in the referendum provision” (1999, 27). 
The text of the Australian constitution has changed only when electors voting at 
referenda approved amendments that were proposed by the federal parliament, as  
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described in detail in the third chapter.  Section 128 of the constitution provides for its 
amendment where a bill is passed by the senate or the house and approved at referenda 
by a majority of electors and a majority of electors in a majority of states.  Section 128 
para 5 further provides that amendments which affect the proportionate representation of 
states in the federal parliament, or the territorial boundaries of states, must be approved 
also by a majority of electors in the states affected by that amendment. 
Canada’s amendment rules are more complex, and they have changed 
considerably over time.  According to Smith, Canada’s amendment formula is “surely 
one of the most complicated to be found in any constitution in the world” (1991, 71). 
From 1867 to 1949, Britain enacted amendments as requested by the Canadian federal 
government.  From 1895, federal governments consulted parliament before proceeding 
to Westminster, but some amendments were made without consulting the provinces.  
From 1949, section 91(1) of the 1867 constitution provided that the federal legislature 
could enact some amendments without consulting either Britain or the provinces.  
Britain’s role ended in 1982 when its legislature passed the 1982 constitution, which 
now provides that amendments must be approved by the federal government or 
parliament, and one or more provincial governments, depending on the subject of the 
amendment.5  Governments dominate the Canadian rules, and there is no formal role for 
constituents.    
The Australian and Canadian amendment rules have in common a relatively weak 
role for the senate.  In Australia, s 128, para 2 of the constitution provides that proposals 
can be put to referendum with the approval of the senate alone, but this has not 
occurred.  Rather, the governor-general acts in accordance with the wishes of the federal 
government on this subject (Bennett and Brennan 1999, 10, 12).  The governor-general 
did not issue writs for referenda proposals that were passed by the senate alone in 1914, 
and by both houses in 1965 and 1983.  By contrast, the governor-general did grant writs 
for four referenda in 1974 which were approved by the house only (Constitutional 
Commission 1988, 1116).  The Canadian senate can veto amendments concerning the 
federal executive, the house of commons, or the senate that are not specified elsewhere 
in the rules, but in all other cases it has a suspensive veto only.     
The rules for amending the Australian and Canadian constitutions provide a 
dominant role for governments, and a restricted role for the senate.  The Australian rules 
                                                 
5
 All of the Canadian provincial and territorial legislatures are unicameral. 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
12
 
include constituents but not state legislatures, while the Canadian rules include 
provincial governments but not constituents.  Despite these differences, practice 
converged in the 1990s. 
Amendment in practice – Australia 1998-99 and Canada 1990-92 
The proposals for new preamble and a republic in Australia and the Charlottetown 
Accord in Canada were similar in subject scope, process, and outcome.  In subject 
scope, both proposals were major amendments that dealt with foundation issues.  The 
Australian amendments proposed to replace the monarch and governor-general with a 
president chosen by federal parliamentarians, and to add a preamble to the constitution.  
Canada’s Charlottetown Accord included a new Canada Clause, and amendments 
affecting the supreme court, senate, house of representatives, Aboriginal self-
government, the division of powers, federal-provincial financial relations, language and 
culture, recognition of Québec as a distinct society, and the amending formula itself 
(Governments of Canada 1992c).   
The process used to debate the proposals provided direct roles for federal and sub-
national legislatures, and constituents.  In Australia, the 1998 Constitutional Convention 
brought together federal, state and territory legislators, and constituents to debate the 
merits of a republic.  This was only the third time since federation that state politicians 
were included directly in the process – they were included as delegates to the 1942 
Constitutional Convention, and the 1973-85 Australian Constitutional Convention.  The 
five Renewal of Canada conferences in 1992 brought together federal, provincial, and 
territory legislators, constituents, and representatives of Aboriginal peoples to discuss 
federal proposals for amending the constitution.  In the same year Canadians were asked 
for the first time to express their constitutional preferences at a national plebiscite.   
National plebiscites were held in 1898 on prohibition, and in 1942 on conscription, but 
neither of these initiatives proposed formal constitutional change.  There was no legal 
need to involve Canadian constituents in the ratification process in 1992, but there was a 
political imperative to do so because some provinces had provided for plebiscites and 
the public expected to be involved (Meekison 1993, 56; Hurley 1996, 119-120; 
Johnston, Blais, Gidengil et al. 1996, 258-260).  
Diverse techniques were used to facilitate public debates.  The Australian federal 
government added a constituent assembly and sponsored campaign committees to the  
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usual tools of parliamentary inquiries and information programs.  Canadian 
governments initiated parliamentary and non-parliamentary inquiries, call centres, 
information programs, and five constituent assemblies. 
Voters rejected both proposals, by similarly wide margins.  Just 45% approved the 
republic and Charlottetown proposals, and 39% supported the Australian preamble 
(AEC 2001; Elections Canada 1997, 3-4; Directeur Général des Élections du Québec 
1992).  Electors in all of Australia’s six states rejected the republic model that was put 
to referendum;  it was approved only by one of the two mainland territories.  The 
Canadian Accord was rejected by six of the ten provinces, and by one of the two 
territories.  In Australia, a majority preferred a republic in principle, but republicans 
disagreed about the appointment and dismissal procedures for a republican head of state. 
In Canada, pivotal issues were senate reform, and amendments proposed to 
accommodate Québec.    
WHY PROPOSALS ARE NOT RATIFIED 
Australia has long found it difficult to achieve major constitutional change, so 
much so that in 1967 Sawer concluded “Constitutionally speaking, Australian [sic] is 
the frozen continent” (1967, 208).  More than thirty years on, the prospects for formal 
amendment still look bleak – the electorate has approved just eight of the 44 proposals 
put to referenda since federation.  This has produced an extensive literature, but as yet 
no compelling argument about why referenda do not pass (McMillan 1991, 68; Saunders 
1994, 53).  That literature is outlined below, and applied to the republic and 
Charlottetown cases.  The review is arranged thematically under four headings:  timing, 
content, participants, and process. 
Timing 
Some authors concluded that proposals put to referenda are not ratified in 
Australia because initiators believe mistakenly that particular times are more conducive 
to reform.  For example, the Hawke Labor government thought that referenda were 
more likely to succeed at the time of Australia’s 1988 bicentenary (Galligan 1989, 119; 
Galligan 1995, 124; Emy and Hughes 1991, 292).  It was thought also that the republic 
initiatives were more likely to succeed if they coincided with the 2001 bicentenary of 
federation (Hughes 1994, 164; Carnell 1999, 11).  The Yes vote was decidedly low for 
the four referenda in 1988 (mean 34%), and the two referenda in 1999 (mean 42%).  
Whilst the results may have been even worse at less propitious times, these cases 
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suggest that it is unwise to rely on national anniversaries to propel proposals for 
constitutional reform across the line. 
A number of prominent analysts concluded that participants are only motivated to 
agree to comprehensive reforms if there is a crisis.   
Only a defence peril or economic catastrophe of great proportions is likely to change this 
constitutional system, and one would not wish for such events (Sawer, Geoffrey 1967, 208). 
 
I can see constitutional change occurring in Australia only as a result of a major upheaval brought 
about by war or, more likely, a worsening of the current economic crisis.  It was, after all, such 
circumstances that led to the marked increase in central government powers in both the US in the 
30s and Australia in the 40s, and that saw the replacement of the Fourth French Republic by the 
Fifth in 1958 (Altman 1979, 111).   
 
Australia's record of formal constitutional change ... is modest indeed.  But that is only to be 
expected given the absence of revolution, conquest and political dictatorship, as well as regionally 
based ethnic and linguistic communities, and the fact that the Australian Constitution was a fully 
democratic instrument of government from the start (Galligan 1989, 122;  see also Galligan 1995, 
122). 
 
No liberal democratic state has accomplished comprehensive constitutional change outside the 
context of some cataclysmic situation such as revolution, world war, the withdrawal of empire, 
civil war, or the threat of imminent breakup.  A country must have a sense that its back is to the 
wall for its leaders and its people to have the will to accommodate their differences (Russell 1993a, 
106).  
 
While “it seems to be a near-universal rule that constitutions are written in times of 
crisis and turbulence”, there are exceptions such as Sweden in 1974 and perhaps Poland 
in 1997 (Elster 2006, 185).  Australia’s new constitution was ratified in 1899-1900 
without a crisis, though some did argue that the depression of the 1890s was the trigger. 
Further, Jean Chrétien wrote (as Minister of Justice) that Canada’s 1867 constitution 
was not made in crisis conditions (1981, 5).   
The crisis argument is also paradoxical – to wait for a crisis may be to wait too 
long.  Late in 1991, Monahan, Covello, and Batty argued against convening a 
constituent assembly in Canada because “The first difficulty is that there has not (yet) 
been any breakdown in the existing legal order” (1992, 45).  Resnick concluded that if 
English-speaking Canada lacked the will to accommodate Québec’s constitutional 
demands until Québec seceded, there would no longer be a need to pursue those 
constitutional reforms (1997, 118-121).  Watts reinforced the point when he wrote:   
Experience in federations elsewhere that have disintegrated indicates that the repeated refusal to 
resolve basic problems may accentuate internal grievances and frustrations cumulatively to the 
point where eventually disintegration may become unavoidable (1993, 11).   
 
Moreover, crisis conditions tend to induce “threat based bargaining”, rather than 
consensus formation through constructive deliberation about constitutional change 
(Elster 1995, 394). 
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Content 
It is argued that Australian initiatives are not ratified because they propose to 
increase federal powers, because too many issues are included in one question 
(bundling), or because more than one question is put to the vote at the same time.  
Centralism versus federalism 
There is a broad consensus that Australian proposals to increase federal powers do 
not pass (Crisp 1978, 44; Galligan 1995, 129; Thompson 1997, 92; Faulkner and Orr 
2000, 26).  In 1967, however, the highest Yes vote in history (90.77%) allowed the 
federal government to legislate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and 
count them in the census.   
Bennett and Brennan’s more fine-grained analysis of Australian referenda 
distinguished three amendment categories:  “machinery” amendments, amendments that 
increase federal economic powers, and amendments that increase federal social powers 
(1999, esp. 19-20).  Application of these categories to referenda results showed that 
while electors do tend to reject proposals that increase federal economic powers, they 
tend to approve proposals that increase federal social powers.  For example, constituents 
approved the 1946 amendment, which empowered the federal tier to provide welfare.  
The official No case statement for Australia’s republic referendum did argue that 
the proposal would concentrate power at the federal tier by giving federal politicians 
sole power to appoint and dismiss a president (AEC 1999, 11, 13, 15, 25), but this does 
not equate with the centralism argument.  It was not claimed that federal powers would 
increase at the expense of the states.  It was argued instead that the proposal increased 
the power of politicians over electors – the model  “gives power solely to politicians”, 
and is “undemocratic ... denies the people’s basic democratic right to vote on who 
represents them as president” (AEC 1999, 11, 15). 
Nor does the centralism argument apply to the Canadian case because the 
Charlottetown Accord proposed to increase provincial powers (analysis of Governments 
of Canada 1992c).  The provinces would, for example, nominate supreme court judges 
and senators, be represented equally in the senate, be entitled to compensation when 
opting out of federal programs, and exercise power over culture and language, labour 
market development and training, mining, and forestry.  Further, Aboriginal peoples 
would be recognised as having an “inherent right to self-government”, including a 
formal right to participate in some inter-government negotiations.  The Charlottetown 
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Accord would thus curtail, rather than expand, federal powers. 
Bundled questions 
Some authors argued that referenda were less likely to pass in Australia if more 
than one issue was included in a single question (Crisp 1978, 50-51; Sharman 1988, 11; 
Hughes 1994, 160-162).  The negative effect of bundling is demonstrated in results for 
referenda held in 1974 and 1977.  In 1974, the electorate voted down a bill to grant 
constituents in two mainland territories the right to vote in referenda, but in 1977 the 
amendment was approved.  The ballot papers read as follows.   
Proposed law entitled – ...  
[1974:]  An Act to facilitate alterations to the Constitution and to allow Electors in Territories, as 
well as Electors in the States, to vote at Referendums on Proposed Laws to alter the Constitution.  
(AEC 1974, 23) 
 
[1977:]  An Act to alter the Constitution so as to allow electors in Territories, as well as Electors 
in the States, to vote at Referendums on proposed Laws to alter the Constitution.  (AEC 1977, 24) 
[emphasis added to indicate differences] 
 
Both bills proposed to grant territorians the right to vote in referenda, but the earlier bill 
proposed also to lower the threshold for the passage of referenda from “a majority of 
states” to “not less than one-half of the states” (AEC 1974, 22; AEC 1977, 23).  The 
national Yes vote rose from 47% to 78% in 1977 when the question included one 
amendment rather than two.   
Further afield, it was claimed that inclusion of two subjects in the French 
referendum of 1969 “brought about de Gaulle’s decline” (Alderson 1975, 82-83).  The 
question put was:  “Do you approve the Bill ... concerning the creation of regions and 
the renovation of the Senate?”.  De Gaulle saw the referendum as a vote of confidence 
in him, and refused the prime minister’s request for separate questions.  The referendum 
did not pass. 
When Australian voters were asked to agree to extend federal powers over more 
than one subject area in single questions that were put in 1911, 1919, and 1926, these 
proposals did not pass, which supports the proposition that bundled questions do not 
pass.  However, these same proposals were put to referenda again in 1913 as five 
separate questions, and again none was approved.  While it may be the case that 
bundling decreases the chance of success, it does not seem from this evidence that 
putting amendments as separate questions necessarily improves the chance of success. 
Content bundling was not at issue for the republic amendment.  While the republic 
bill did propose 69 text changes (Faulkner and Orr 2000, 26), these amendments were 
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focused narrowly on the minimum changes required to replace the monarch and 
governor-general with a president.   
The Charlottetown Accord was, however, an extreme case of content bundling.  
The Accord was wide ranging in subject scope, as described earlier.  It was also wide 
ranging in that it tried to give something to everyone.  While many Québécois felt it 
gave them too little, many outside Québec felt it gave them too much (Watts 1993, 6; 
Russell 1993a, 226).  The leaders of the First Nations supported the Accord, but their 
constituents were divided – some thought it offered too much, while others thought it 
offered too little (Watts 1993, 6).  In the end, it “was simply too much” (Johnston et al. 
1996, 10, 279).  For Brock, it was comprehensive to a fault – it was an incoherent 
package (1993, 30).  Bob Rae, then premier of Ontario, concluded as follows.   
So it was that after an enormously complex and time-consuming process ... buoyed by polls and 
quietly jubilant in our self-congratulation, we agreed, with scarcely a dissent, to send this all to the 
judgment of the people, confident that in the end they would be well pleased with our efforts.  How 
wrong we were.  I thought that there was something in Charlottetown for everybody.  I had failed 
to understand that there was something for somebody else to get mad at (1997, 220-221). 
 
The Accord “contained something designed to please almost everybody, but in the 
process managed also to offend almost everyone to some degree” (LeDuc and Pammett 
1995, 15).  It was easy for opponents to find something to campaign against.  
Simultaneous questions 
It is argued that Australian referenda are less likely to be ratified when more than 
one question is put at the same time (Crisp 1978, 50-51; Hughes 1994, 160-162; 
Faulkner and Orr 2000, 25).  Of the 44 questions put on 19 occasions, eight passed, 
yielding a success rate of 18%.  Thirty-three of the 36 questions that did not pass (92%) 
were put with other questions, which suggests that simultaneous questions are a 
problem, except that six of the eight questions that did pass in 1910, 1946, 1967, and 
1977 (75%) were put with other questions that did not.  When two questions were put 
on the same day in 1967, the result was 90.8% Yes for one, and 40.3% Yes for the other. 
The simultaneous questions argument does not apply to Canada because the 
Charlottetown Accord was put as one question:  “Do you agree that the Constitution of 
Canada should be renewed on the basis of the agreement reached on August 28, 1992?” 
(Elections Canada 1992a, 7).  In Australia, two questions were put: 
[Republic question:]  A PROPOSED LAW:  To alter the Constitution to establish the 
Commonwealth of Australia as a republic with the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by 
a President appointed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament.  
DO YOU APPROVE THIS PROPOSED ALTERATION? 
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[Preamble question:]  A PROPOSED LAW:  To alter the Constitution to insert a preamble.  DO  
YOU APPROVE THIS PROPOSED ALTERATION?  (AEC 2001). 
 
An unnamed politician claimed in the official referenda pamphlet that the second 
question was put to reduce the chance of success: 
Previous referendums show that multiple questions are more likely to lead to the proposed changes 
being voted down.  ... The proposed Preamble [question] is designed to divert attention from the 
most important [republic question] ... the Prime Minister has used his position to frustrate the 
Republican cause (AEC 1999, 33). 
 
Kim Beazley, then leader of the opposition, said in January 1999 “I am a bit in favour of 
doing it one at a time” (as cited by McGregor and Henderson 1999, 2).  Peter Costello, 
Coalition treasurer, put it much more strongly when he said “My judgment is that the 
greater the number of issues that are put into the referendum, the greater the number of 
opponents there will be” (as cited by Grattan and Peatling 1999, 8).  Malcolm Turnbull, 
chair of the Australian Republican Movement, also opposed the second preamble 
question, but for different reasons.  He said “The one thing I’m even more pessimistic 
about, than the republic vote going down, is us putting up a preamble which recognises 
the Aboriginal history of this country and the people rejecting it – that could be 
catastrophic for this country” (as cited by Dodson 1999, 6).  A report in a different 
newspaper claimed Turnbull also said on the same day that if there were bipartisan 
support for a second question, “then we should do it now” (as cited by Grattan 1999, 6). 
It is conceivable that putting the second preamble question reduced support for the 
republic question, but the results show that electors distinguished between the questions; 
nationally, the Yes vote varied by 6% (45% republic, and 39% preamble).  By state and 
territory, the difference ranged from 4% for New South Wales to 20% for the Australian 
Capital Territory.  McAllister’s analysis of AEC data found a strong correlation between 
the two results (r=0.95), but his analysis of survey data at an individual level found that 
29% of the respondents said they voted differently on the two questions.  He concluded 
“[v]oters clearly distinguished between the two proposals” (2001, 254).  
Content was, nonetheless, crucial.  McAllister rated “the various positive and 
negative aspects of the proposed changes” as the second most important factor in 
deciding the outcome after “attitudes to the link with Britain” (2001, 263), and a 
Herald/AC Nielsen poll just two weeks before the vote showed that only 5% of those 
who intended to vote No were motivated by a desire to retain the Queen as Australia’s 
head of state (in Winterton 2001, 4).  Winterton concluded soon after the assembly 
adjourned “[t]he Convention’s failings are largely attributable to two factors:  
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insufficient attention was devoted to the details of the republican model, and the ARM 
conceded too much to the Prime Minister and other supporters of the McGarvie model 
in a futile attempt to secure their support” (1998a, 7).  About three years later, Winterton 
attributed the referendum outcome to the content of the proposal – even though a clear 
majority of constituents preferred a republic, many republicans voted No because they 
wanted a directly elected president, or because they were not persuaded that the model 
proposed was better than the status quo (2001, 2-4).  
Participants 
When proposals are not ratified at referenda, this is frequently attributed to the 
behaviour and personal qualities of parliamentarians and electors.   
Politicians – bipartisanship 
The strongest theme in the literature is that Australian proposals for constitutional 
change are not ratified at referenda because the two major parties do not agree (Crisp 
1978, 44; McMillan, Evans and Storey 1983, 349, 374; Lumb 1986, 28; Lee 1988, 535; 
Winterton 1994, 11; Hughes 1994, 160-61; Galligan 1995, 128; Craven 2003).  Analysis 
of referenda outcomes does show all proposals that passed were supported by both 
major parties, but other proposals were not ratified despite bipartisanship support.  For 
example, the 1967 nexus question did not pass even though it was supported by Liberal 
prime minister Harold Holt, his National Party deputy John McEwen, and Labor 
opposition leader Gough Whitlam (AEC 1967, 2-10). 
In Australia, a coalition government put the republic question to referendum in 
1999, even though the Liberal prime minister and many of his colleagues opposed it.  
Whilst the Labor opposition had officially supported the idea of a republic since 1991, 
its representatives were divided over how a president should be chosen.  For example, 
the federal Labor leader Kim Beazley supported the model put to referendum, but at the 
1998 assembly, three state Labor leaders (Jim Bacon, Geoffrey Gallop and Peter Beattie) 
supported alternative direct election models, as did federal Liberal minister Peter Reith. 
The divisions were thus inter-party, and intra-party.  The 1999 referenda did not pass, 
which lends support to the bipartisanship argument.   
In Canada in 1992, the Charlottetown Accord was approved by the federal 
Progressive Conservative government, all of the provincial governments representing 
Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, New Democrats, and the Parti Libéral du Québec, 
the leaders of the two territories, and the leaders of four First Nations groups 
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(Governments of Canada 1992c).  It did not, however, pass public scrutiny, despite 
multi-partisan support. 
Bipartisan agreement may be necessary for the passage of referenda and 
plebiscites, but it is not sufficient (Thompson 1997, 92).  As Senator John Faulkner 
wrote in 2003, “While a minimum requirement for constitutional change will be 
agreement on any referendum question by both the Government and the Opposition, I 
am only too aware that any such agreement is no guarantee of success” (2003, 6).   
Politicians – motives 
It cannot be assumed that when proposals are put to referendum, the sole aim is to 
achieve constitutional change.  According to Butler and Ranney, referenda can limit the 
power of parliamentarians, and prevent them acting as representatives, but they can also 
be used by parliamentarians to avoid making decisions;  parliamentarians will use 
referenda when it suits them to do so, even if they have previously argued against 
referenda using a Burkean defence (1994, 260).  According to Galligan, motives for 
initiating referenda include “party ideology, executive whimsy, leadership vision, 
political posturing, symbolic politics, national need or a clever government strategy to 
embarrass the opposition parties” (1995, 114).  Canadian analysts concluded that there 
were at least seven motives for holding referenda and plebiscites, namely:  legitimating 
contentious proposals; de-legitimating proposals to block reforms; justifying a change in 
policy or a failure to deliver on a promise; resolving intra-party differences;  showing 
that another’s claim of majority support is wrong (‘Calling a bluff’);  showing that one’s 
own claim of majority support is right;  and ‘dodging a bullet’ by dissociating an issue 
from the party’s public profile (Johnston et al. 1996, 254-255). 
This wide range of motives for putting proposals to a public vote highlights the 
need for caution when using the words ‘success’ and ‘failure’ to describe outcomes.  If 
the motive is legitimation, justification, or demonstrating majority support, then a 
majority Yes vote is a success.  If the motive is de-legitimation or calling a bluff, then 
from the initiators’ point of view, a public vote does not ‘succeed’ unless it fails to pass. 
If the aim is to resolve intra-party differences, or to dissociate an issue from a party, then 
the outcome matters little.  What matters is that the vote serves as a circuit breaker for 
party room disagreements, or it deflects attention away from a party’s policy.  
The Australian republic proposal was put to constituents by the Coalition 
government despite the prime minister’s support for the status quo, and deep divisions 
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within the ranks of Coalition MPs about whether or not Australia should become a 
republic.  When the 1999 referenda did not pass, it may nevertheless have satisfied four 
motives.  First, the subject was de-legitimised – it could be claimed now that the people 
had said, in a democratic process, that they did not want a republic.  Second, while intra-
party differences might continue in private, publicly there was closure.  Third, given that 
a Labor government initiated the republic debate in 1993, the government could claim to 
have called the opposition’s bluff.  Finally, the Coalition government certainly dodged a 
bullet as public rejection of the republic model reduced the risk that the government 
would lose electoral support because of its anti-republic stance.  To the extent that these 
arguments are valid, the 1999 referendum was a success, at least for the government. 
Motives for putting the Charlottetown Accord to the vote were diverse across the 
federal and provincial tiers.  According to Johnston et al., “the sequence from Meech 
Lake to Charlottetown embodied every tactical move ever seen in referendum history, in 
Canada or elsewhere” (1996, 258).  This is not surprising given the involvement of all 
tiers of government, interest groups, and the public in the long journey from the demise 
of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 to the Charlottetown plebiscite in 1992.  A narrower 
focus suggests the federal government’s aim was legitimation, and dodging a bullet.   
The Mulroney Conservative government’s Meech Lake initiative lapsed when 
provincial assemblies did not ratify it in time, which generated considerable public 
frustration and anger.  If the Charlottetown Accord met a similar fate, then the same 
Conservative government – already unpopular – would pay a high price for any public 
perception that it had again failed to resolve the constitutional debate through inter-
government negotiations.  The provinces had set the precedent for public ratification of 
constitutional issues:  Québec put the question of secession to electors in 1980, and 
announced in 1991 that another vote would be held in 1992;  British Columbia 
legislated for public ratification in 1990 and Alberta and Newfoundland followed suit in 
June 1992 (Hurley 1996, 119-120, 160).6  As Johnston et al. put it, “Would the other 75 
percent [of the Canadian electorate] accept not getting to vote on it as well?” (1996, 
259).  The Federal Referendum Act, which provided for national and provincial 
plebiscites on constitutional change, was adopted on 23 June 1992.   
                                                 
6
 Further legislation includes the Constitutional Amendment Approval Act, RSBC 1996, c 67 for British 
Columbia, and the Constitutional Referendum Act, RSA 2000, c C-25 for Alberta. 
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If constituents approved the Accord, then the government could claim success.  If 
they did not, then the bullet was avoided because constituents, rather than politicians, 
had taken that decision.  Further, if Charlottetown was an unwise reform, then “Voters 
may even have saved the political class from itself ... voters cut the constitutional 
Gordian knot” (Johnston et al. 1996, 4).    
Constituents – knowledge 
It is argued frequently that Australian proposals are not ratified because 
constituents are uninformed about the constitution (Bennett and Brennan 1999, 3, 28).  
Research in the 1990s did show that 87% of 2,504 respondents knew little or nothing 
about the constitution (Civics Expert Group 1994, corrigendum 143), but a limited 
knowledge of the constitution does not necessarily mean that voters are uninformed 
about specific proposals.  The Australian Electoral Commission found that electors who 
had read the official Yes/No case statements for the 1988 referenda were more likely to 
vote No (Hughes 1994, 162-164).  Bennett and Brennan found that referenda results 
indicated electors were discriminating, and consistent in their judgements over time 
(1999, 19-20).  They concluded “it may be simplistic – as well as patronising – to claim 
that most voters do not understand what they are passing judgment upon”.  Galligan 
disagreed with “elites” who argue that the electorate is “ignorant or stupid for rejecting 
referendum proposals” and chose instead to take a position that “respects the will of the 
people and argues that the pattern of mainly negative outcomes is far from 
unreasonable” (Galligan 1995, 111). 
It was nevertheless claimed that the republic proposal was not ratified because  
voters did not, could not, or would not appreciate the merits of the ‘bipartisan’ republic 
model.  Joan Kirner, past Premier of Victoria, attributed the outcome of the republic 
referendum in part to the fact that voters knew little about the constitution (Kirner 
2000).  Malcolm Turnbull said, as chairman of the Australian Republican Movement, 
“there is no point kidding ourselves – the biggest differentiator of yes or no was 
knowledge” (as cited by McGregor 1999c).  George Williams claimed that the 
electorate’s disengagement and ignorance were demonstrated by the success of two 
arguments:  ‘Don’t vote for a politician’s republic’, and ‘Don’t know? – vote no’ (1999, 
15).  A Cameron poll in 1999 concluded that the tendency to vote Yes increased with 
formal education and income (in Steketee 1999, 13-14).  
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By contrast, Irving questioned claims that the republic proposal was not ratified 
for want of knowledge in the electorate, as follows.  
[T]he value of such a finding remains to be explored, since it does not in itself reveal why people 
with lower levels of education reject constitutional change of the type proposed in the 1999 
republic referendum.  And it leaves unexplained the preamble result, with, for example, both ACT 
electorates, where high concentrations of tertiary educated voters are to be found, rejecting the 
preamble (Irving 2007, 113). 
  
George Winterton – a member of the Republic Advisory Committee and delegate to the 
1998 Convention – concluded against the knowledge argument, as follows. 
[T]here is little evidence that voter ignorance, regarding either the Australian government in 
general or the details of the model in particular, contributed substantially to the referendum 
outcome.  The difference in voting patterns between federal electorates can be attributed more 
plausibly to the level of alienation from the political and economic power structures of Australian 
society than to levels of education (2001). 
 
Shanahan made a similar point soon after the vote, and went further to pinpoint the 
primary source for alienation: 
The fault in blaming the lack of education for voters saying no is that, although it has a correlation 
to the electorates, it is not the dominant factor.  Rather than being the cause for a no vote, it is just 
an indicator for the real reason ...  Job security, income and feeling part of the political process are 
the indicators to look for, not some misplaced view that Australia would be a republic overnight if 
everyone was given a university degree (Shanahan 1999a). 
 
McAllister’s quantitative analysis found that while Yes voters were more likely to have 
tertiary qualifications and to know more about the referendum content, knowledge and 
education were less reliable predictors of voting intentions than were attitudes to 
Australia’s links with Britain, personal evaluations of the merits of the republic 
proposal, and interventions by the main interest group leaders (2001, 263).  
My case study of 1998 Convention failed to confirm claims that knowledge was, 
especially for those who supported direct election of a president, a predictor for republic 
preferences (Kreibig 1998).  Knowledge was measured as years of formal education, 
and years elected to local, state, or federal government (Kreibig 1998, 24).  Biographies 
were compiled for the delegates, and constitutional preferences were identified from the 
formal convention ballots, the convention debates, and other sources. Analysis of 
biographical data and constitutional preferences showed that constitutional monarchists 
had about the same amount of post-secondary education as republicans (4.0 years and 
4.2 years respectively), and they had more political experience (8 years and 6 years 
respectively);  constitutional monarchists were more likely to have political experience 
in local government, while republicans were more likely to have political experience in 
state government (1998, 50, 57-58).  Compared to republicans who opposed direct 
election, delegates who favoured it had more formal education, and slightly more formal 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
24
 
political experience (1998, 51).  Overall, this study showed that there was no 
statistically significant association between knowledge and constitutional preferences. 
Canadian studies provide little support for the argument that a lack of education 
and knowledge determined their negative outcome.  Research conducted soon after the 
plebiscite found that “knowledge did not make a voter happier with the Charlottetown 
Accord” (Johnston, Blais, Gidengil et al. 1993, 39).  A more extensive analysis of the 
same data, published three years later, reported that university educated voters were only 
slightly more likely to vote Yes, and that they were only a little more knowledgeable 
about the Accord;  a lack of knowledge did not cause the majority No vote, instead 
“poorly informed voters just dragged an overall negative result further down” (Johnston 
et al. 1996, 280-284).  Finally, LeDuc and Pammett’s analysis using different data found 
that support for the Accord was higher for groups at the bottom and top of the education 
scale (1995, 24-26). 
Opinion is divided about whether electors demonstrate “general awareness and 
good sense ... or ignorance” (Bennett and Brennan 1999, 21).  However, the evidence 
examined in this section supports McMillan’s claim that when initiatives do not pass, 
proponents are likely to cite ignorance and apathy, while opponents are likely to praise 
the electorate’s wisdom (1991, 71).   
Vocal minorities and interveners 
It is claimed that a small but active minority can defeat reforms.  Machiavelli 
warned long ago: 
Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, 
but they keep it with ease.  The difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new rules 
and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security.  And 
it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to 
conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of 
things.  Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old 
conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.  This coolness arises 
partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity 
of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.  
Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like 
partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along 
with them (Machiavelli 1993 [1513], 43-44 ch. 6). 
 
Altman, an Australian analyst, concluded “in any liberal political system it is always 
easier for entrenched minorities to prevent change than it is for even larger majorities to 
bring about change” (1979, 105).  McMillan claimed that even when Australian 
proposals have bipartisan support, opposition was to be expected from interest groups 
that are likely to use the “weapon ... of exaggeration and distortion” in their campaigns 
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(1991, 70-71).  The republic and Charlottetown campaigns were contested fiercely.   
In Australia, opinion was so divided that all of the major interest groups were 
minorities.  Interest groups included the Australian Republican Movement which 
supported a Yes vote, Australians for Constitutional Monarchy and the Australian 
Monarchist League which opposed a republic of any kind, and Real Republic, A Just 
Republic, the Ted Mack group, and Clem Jones’ Queensland Constitutional Republic 
Team which would not support a republic unless the president was directly elected.  
According to McAllister, the leaders of the two main interest groups – Malcolm 
Turnbull for the ARM and Kerry Jones for ACM – exerted more influence on voters 
than did the prime minister or leader of the opposition.  According to Irving, however,  
[i]t may emerge from analysis of the 1999 referendum campaign that the fear of appearing grand 
and ‘visionary’, and the resulting decision to promote only a minimalist republican model, itself 
contributed significantly to failure.  Why change a Constitution when there appears to be no 
compelling reason (2007, 115) 
 
She concluded that the campaign itself was “the most likely single explanation” for the 
negative outcome of the 1999 referendum (2007, 113).  She cited as evidence successful 
referenda that were visionary – the 1898-1900 referenda on federation, and the 1967 
referendum on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Irving 2007, 115). 
In Canada, active and vocal opponents included political parties such as Reform 
(renamed Canadian Alliance in 2000), interest groups such as the Assembly of First 
Nations, and prominent individuals.  Best known for its impact is Pierre Trudeau’s 
‘Maison Egg Roll’ speech.  On October 1, about three weeks before the vote, Mr 
Trudeau delivered a scathing attack on the Charlottetown Accord, arguing that it would 
weaken the federal government, dilute individual Charter rights, hurt minorities, and 
increase provincial inequalities (Trudeau 1992, 14, 16-19, 25-28, 32-33).  According to 
Johnson et al., surveys and polls show that the impact was immediate, strong, and 
negative:  over the following five days, knowledge of Trudeau’s opposition increased by 
about 20% to 70%, and support for the Accord dropped in parallel to about 40% (1996, 
127-129).  Henry’s analysis of Angus Reid polling in October 1992 shows that other 
political leaders were also influential, not always as intended (1993, 6-8).  Pollsters 
asked 3,577 people: 
For each of the following [12] individuals, I’d like to know whether their overall performance, or 
the positions they have put forward, during the course of the referendum campaign has made you:  
more likely to want to vote ‘Yes’, more likely to want to vote ‘No’, or have they had no impact on 
you at all (in Henry 1993, 6). 
   
In Newfoundland, 58% said that Clyde Wells influenced them to vote Yes, but in British 
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Columbia, 59% said Mike Harcourt had no effect.  Québec respondents were influenced 
to vote No by Jacques Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard (43% and 37% respectively), and 
they were influenced to vote Yes by Robert Bourassa (26%).  Nationally, the scores for 
“No Impact” were 50% or more for Preston Manning, Audrey McLaughlin, Jean 
Chrétien, Ovide Mercredi, and Joe Clark.  Nationally, 40% said Pierre Trudeau inclined 
them to vote No, and 34% said Brian Mulroney inclined them to vote No, which was not 
his intention. 
Proposals for comprehensive constitutional reform need to weather the storm of a 
robust debate, which will inevitably provide opportunities for vocal minorities and 
interveners to air their views – not always with the intended effect.    
Process 
The process of formal constitutional change includes the techniques or 
mechanisms used to initiate reforms, negotiate the detailed content, and ratify the 
proposals for reform.  The last stage tends to attract the most attention in Australia 
because it is then that analysts seek to explain the outcomes.   
In Australia, Lumb attributed the referenda record to “the rigidity of the 
amendment requirements” (1986, 753), and Aitkin claimed that it was too difficult to 
win double-majority support (1978, 129-130).  In Canada, Cairns argued that the 
practice of seeking federal, provincial, and public approval for formal constitutional 
change made the process “almost unworkable” (1997, 48).  Yet lowering the threshold 
for enactment would not make a great difference.  For Australia, if majorities were 
required nationally and in three states rather than four, the success rate for past referenda 
would only increase from 19% to 26% (Bennett and Brennan 1999, 18).  If referenda 
passed by national majority alone, the success rate would increase a further 5%, from 
19% to 31% (Thompson 1997, 92).  The republic and preamble referenda would not 
pass in either case.  For Canada, the bar would need to be set very low for the 
Charlottetown Accord to pass public scrutiny – it was approved by four of ten provinces 
and one of the two territories.  If Canada dispensed with the need for public approval, 
history shows that it is not necessarily easy to obtain the consent of first ministers (the 
prime minister and premiers), or their provincial and territorial legislatures.   
Thresholds for ratification are not likely to change in Australia or Canada.  An 
Australian proposal to lower the threshold from four to three states was put to 
referendum in 1974, but it did not pass.  The public role in Canada is not likely to 
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change because some provinces require a public vote, and because the Accord process 
raised expectations about public involvement in future.  Whilst amendments affecting 
single provinces will continue to proceed by bilateral government agreement, it is likely 
that future proposals to change the Charter or national institutions would be put to a 
public vote.  Each time proposals for formal constitutional change are put to 
constituents, parliaments are highly likely to attempt to influence their preferences. 
The Australian federal parliament has used a variety of mechanisms to engage the 
public in constitutional debates.  Information was distributed to households for most 
referenda held since 1913 (HSCLCA 1997, 59; Saunders 2000, 12).  Governments and 
parliaments also instigated commissions of inquiry, parliamentary committees, 
conferences, and conventions that included federal and state parliamentarians, and non-
parliamentarians.  While these activities could generate considerable public interest, this 
did not necessarily translate to success at the polls.  For instance, the 1985-88 
Constitutional Commission received 4,000 “written and oral submissions” (Warhurst 
1995, 42-43), yet the four referenda questions put in 1988 did not pass.  The connection 
between the Commission’s work and the questions put was, however, tenuous 
(McMillan 1991, 68):  the subjects were the same, but the amendments were different.  
McMillan, Evans and Storey’s review of methods used in Australia concluded in 
favour of a constitutional convention because the method was supported by 
parliamentarians and the public, it encouraged community interest, “provided a 
consensus-creating environment”, and was associated with a higher success rate at 
referenda (1983, 345-371).  These authors argued that for all its flaws, “no other method 
is likely to be more successful in initiating [Australian] proposals” (1983, 354).  They 
recommended that up to 112 delegates representing federal, state, and local government, 
and electors (71% appointed and 21% directly elected), should meet once or twice a year 
for five years, and the federal parliament should put to referendum any proposal 
supported by two-thirds of the delegates (1983, 369-370).  
The 1998 Australian Constitutional Convention satisfied some of McMillan et 
al.’s requirements.  While there were more delegates than recommended and a higher 
portion was directly elected, delegates did represent federal, state and territory 
parliaments, local government (indirectly), community interests, and the electorate.  The 
convention sat for two weeks rather than five years, but the agenda was limited also.  
Extensive media coverage appeared to stimulate public interest, as evidenced by 1,058 
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official submissions.  An overwhelming majority of delegates supported a republic in 
principle, and a near majority supported the model that was put to referendum, but the 
republic referendum was lost in all states, and nationally.  
Saunders criticised the convention on a number of fronts (1998, 10-11).  She 
argued that the agenda and hasty preparations for the election and the convention 
generated cynicism and suspicion, as did the non-compulsory postal ballot used to elect 
half the delegates, and the lack of “transparent criteria” for choosing community 
representatives.  Further, the speed with which the convention was organised did not 
allow for adequate preparation.  Some delegates resisted the restricted agenda, and 
claimed that there was insufficient notice of procedural matters (PM&C 1998b, and 
pers. comm. 1998).   
The Canadian government sponsored many opportunities for public participation 
in the Charlottetown debate, largely in response to arguments that the Meech Lake 
Accord lapsed in 1990 for want of meaningful public involvement (Brock 1991; Russell 
1993a, 140-145, 156-157; Watts 1993, 9-10; Hurley 1996, 113-114; Cairns 1997, 60).  
These included four parliamentary inquiries and committees, and five constituent 
assemblies.  This generated “massive public input ... [it was] a veritable orgy of  
participation” (Cairns 1997, 61);  public participation was “unprecedented … [and 
greater than] in any country during this century” (Watts 1993, 5).  According to Hurley,  
The period from June 23, 1990, to March 12, 1992, was marked by the most extensive and multiple 
consultations of the Canadian People ever undertaken. … The referendum expanded the process of 
constitutional change to the broadest level of public participation ever in Canadian history (1996, 
123, 130-131, author’s emphasis). 
 
Even so, constituents did not ratify the Accord.  According to Brock, the Charlottetown 
processes were more open and inclusive than for Meech Lake, but there was too much 
consultation, and governments were not responsive to public input (1993, 30, 32).   
The impact of the process of formal constitutional change on the outcome does not 
attract a great deal of attention in the literature, but there are exceptions.  In 1991, just 
after Canada’s Meech Lake Accord lapsed, Alan Cairns wrote:  “Our recent 
constitutional history confirms that constitutional process and constitutional outcome 
are closely linked” (1991a, 15).  Soon after the Charlottetown Accord plebiscite in 1992, 
Johnston et al. asked 2,533 Canadians how satisfied they were with the Charlottetown 
process.  My analysis of the data from that survey question and the plebiscite results by 
province showed a positive correlation between the two variables (r=0.84), and that 
satisfaction with the process and approval of the Accord tended to decrease east-to-west 
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across the nation.7  Both findings are illustrated in figure 1.1 below.  The R2  value 
adjacent to each trendline indicates its reliability.  Given that an R2 value of 1.0 indicates 
perfect reliability, the east-west vote trend is much more reliable than the east-west 
process trend (R2=0.68 and R2=0.49 respectively).  
Satisfaction with the process ranged from 32% in Québec to 67% in 
Newfoundland, while the Yes vote ranged from 79% for Prince Edward Island to 32% 
for British Columbia.  The difference between the two measures ranged from 1% or less 
for Manitoba and Alberta to 19% for Prince Edward Island.  
 
Charlottetown Accord, satisfaction with the process, and the Yes vote
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Figure 1.1:  Satisfaction with the Charlottetown process and support for the Accord 
 
(Source:  analysis of data from Johnston, Blais, Gidengil et al. 1992-93; Elections Canada 1997 3-4; 
Directeur Général des Élections du Québec 1992) 
 
Correlation between the two variables does not necessarily mean that one caused the 
other, but it does justify further examination of an apparent link between process and 
outcome. 
Summary 
While the lack of bi-partisan support may partly explain why the Australian 
                                                 
7
 I am grateful to Neil Nevitte and Richard Johnston for helping me to access and use this data. 
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republic proposal was not ratified, a majority of Canadians who turned out for the 
plebiscite on the Charlottetown Accord voted No, despite multi-partisan support.  More 
important in both cases was the content of the proposals.  A majority of Australians 
opposed the republic model that was put to referendum either because they preferred 
constitutional monarchy, or because they wanted a republican president to be directly 
elected.  The Canadian proposal was so comprehensive that it was not difficult for 
voters to find something they were unhappy about.  Prominent among these points of 
disagreement were the guarantee to Québec of 25% of the house of commons seats 
regardless of its population, the failure to deliver a directly elected senate, 
dissatisfaction with an equal senate, and provisions made to accommodate Québec and 
the Aboriginal peoples.  Vocal minorities and interveners were active in both 
campaigns, but as noted earlier, this is to be expected in a democratic community.  The 
debate continues about whether electors knew enough about the proposals. 
The lack of success in achieving formal constitutional change is rarely attributed 
to the process used to engage constituents in the negotiation stage.  This may be because 
analysts believe that amending constitutions is necessarily an “elite” process.  That 
would explain why the subject of process is not a strong theme in the literature.  
Improving the process could, however, improve public knowledge of the proposals, 
mediate the impact of vocal minorities and interveners, highlight areas of disagreement 
in time to modify or abandon proposals before the ratification stage, and improve the 
amendment rate.  
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS 
The issue of process is worth investigating because if the same processes are used 
when constitutional disagreements recur, then this invites the same negative outcomes.  
Many Australians continue to prefer a republic in principle to constitutional monarchy, 
and this change cannot be achieved without formal constitutional change.  Issues yet to 
be resolved in Canada include the status of Québec and the Aboriginal peoples in the 
federation, federal institutions, financial relations, and the values which unite Canadians 
(Watts 1993, 4, 12-13).  According to Cook, the “Canadian leadership still has the 
assignment to present Canadians with a proper constitution” (1994, 23).   
In their empirical study of constitutional change processes in Australia, McMillan 
et al. argued that constitutional change required a “popular and political momentum for 
change”, an effective initiating mechanism, and broad agreement in favour of change 
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(McMillan et al. 1983, 374).  Warhurst added “It is not clear whether each of these 
preconditions is equally necessary nor how the three relate to one another” (1995, 48).  
The present research holds that an effective mechanism for negotiating formal 
constitutional change – one that includes the public – is required to bridge the gap 
between initiation and ratification.   
It is not necessarily a problem that a great many initiatives for change are not put 
to voters.  This might demonstrate that initiation and negotiation processes filtered out 
reform proposals that would not be ratified.  A problem is indicated, however, when 
initiatives are rejected during ratification.  At the very least, this involves the 
expenditure of considerable effort, time, and money for little return.  As Saunders 
pointed out: 
While views inevitably differ on the merits of the proposals that have not been approved, the 
referendum record represents a failure, if only in its waste of money and time.  Even more 
seriously, the experience has created a defeatist national attitude towards constitutional review and 
the possibility of constitutional change (2000, 5). 
 
Unproductive debates can also accentuate or even create divisions;  for example, an 
Angus Reid poll in Canada on 15 October 1992 reported that half of the 3,477 
respondents said the plebiscite accentuated “regional and linguistic differences” (in 
Henry 1993, 11).  Further, when politicians agree about major constitutional change and 
the electorate does not ratify it, this signals that representatives and constituents disagree 
about the foundation rules.  According to Saunders, “In a system of representative 
government, the existence of such a gap merits inquiry and appropriate remedial 
action”;  the solution is not to do away with public involvement in ratifying 
constitutional change, but to find better ways for parliaments and electors to work 
together (2000, 25, 4). 
Galligan highlighted the “disjuncture between initiation and ratification” in 
Australia (1995, 112).  Referenda are “controlled” in that the government of the day 
decides whether and when referenda are held, and content is “pro-hegemonic” in that 
proposed amendments are likely to serve the interests of the government of the day 
(Galligan 1995, 113-114, citing Lijphart 1984).  Warhurst claimed that governments and 
parliaments would continue to dominate constitutional reform processes because:  
Constitution making and constitution changing is at heart an elite rather than a mass activity, driven 
by the same forces – Commonwealth and state governments and political parties – as drive other 
policies in our society (1995, 48).   
 
Initiation and negotiation may well be an “elite process”, but ratification in Australia is 
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“a mass activity” because s 128 of the constitution allows voters to veto formal 
constitutional change.  The Canadian constitution does not empower its voters in this 
way, but the precedent has been set for mass participation in debating and approving 
major amendments.  As Saunders put it, the task now is to find ways to forge a closer 
partnership between parliamentarians and voters.   
The Spicer Commission concluded after conducting extensive public consultations 
about Canada’s constitution that governments needed to develop new ways to consult 
constituents, and politicians needed to “greatly increase grassroots consultations in 
developing ideas, policies and programs” (1991d, 13).  Soon after attempts to amend 
Canada’s constitution through the Meech Lake Accord lapsed in June 1990, Simeon 
concluded: 
I do believe that the constitutional debate that is now upon us will no longer focus on incremental 
change within the existing federal system. ... We must consider all options.  We must break the 
mould.  We must seek new ways of identifying issues and new language for discussing them 
(Simeon 1991, 1). 
 
At about the same time, Cairns concluded that public participation in the Canadian 
debates had to involve more than tallying the preferences of active interest group 
members because that “does not satisfy the representational requirements of a legitimate 
process” (1991a, 28-29).  Reflecting some years later on decades of struggle to amend 
the Canadian constitution, he concluded: 
We have travelled from the elitist practices of executive federalism in constitutional matters to an 
awkward relationship between intergovernmental bargaining and public participation via 
referendum ... We have not, however, found a way to bring these two processes into a workable 
relationship that can generate constitutional change... We keep learning what process to avoid 
(Cairns 1997, 51, 61, emphasis added). 
 
Across the Pacific, the Constitutional Centenary Foundation concluded:  “the 
explanation may lie in the way in which proposals for change are developed and 
explained, rather than in the amending procedure itself” (CCF circa 1996, 9).   
This raises the question of how parliamentarians and constituents should debate 
constitutional change in future (Saunders 1989, 32; Brock 1991; Cairns 1991a, 27, 28-
29; Russell 1991b, 68-69; Saunders 1994, 56, 60, 63; Warhurst 1995, 40, 45, 48; CCF 
circa 1996, 9; Cairns 1997, 51; Resnick 1997, 120; Winterton 1998b, 107; Saunders 
1998, 10-11; McKenna 2000, 11; Saunders 2000, 28).  At the end of the nineteenth 
century in Australia, delegates representing disparate and competitive colonies agreed at 
an elected constituent assembly to unite under a federal constitution.  Saunders 
concluded: 
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It is not yet clear what the best mechanism might be.  Our pre-federation history suggests a directly 
elected convention.  Post-federation, every other form of constitutional review has been tried and 
failed.  On the other hand, an elected convention would be a major enterprise:  even more difficult, 
probably, than before (1994).   
 
In 1997, Resnick concluded: 
Whether we like it or not, there is a transparence to constitutional politics [in Canada] that was not 
there before.  The genie has been let out of the bottle:  there are attentive publics on all sides and 
constitutional hawks who will not allow any simple compromise to slip through unopposed.  … 
After the failures of constitutional elitism and intergovernmental negotiation during recent decades, 
we may need a radically different way of addressing our problems.  Any viable approach would 
need to encompass the democratic legitimacy that Alan Cairns referred to in his chapter, or what I 
am tempted to call the more Rousseauean notion of popular sovereignty that has entered Canadian 
political life ever since the Quebec referendum of 1980.  … The most common of these is some 
form of constitutional or constituent assembly, usually elected by the population as a whole, with a 
specific mandate to come up with a new constitution (1997, 114, 120). 
 
Where Resnick wrote that Canada needed to adopt processes that had “democratic 
legitimacy”, Russell wrote that replacing executive federalism with more public 
participation in Canadian constitutional debates was “a democratic mutation”: 
during the constitutional politics of the 1980s, we Canadians made our predicament more 
intractable by undergoing a democratic mutation in our constitutional culture.  This has caused us 
to repudiate the elitist nature of the traditional negotiating process used by the first ministers to 
work the rigid rules built into the Constitution Act, 1982.  Eager as we Canadians now are to do our 
constitutional politics democratically we must recognize that, given our deep divisions, negotiating 
a popular accord will be ever so much more difficult than rejecting an elitist accord (Russell 
1991b, 141-142). 
 
Immediately before the Australian assembly convened in 1998, Winterton (an appointed 
delegate) concluded: 
Australia has tried government-appointed commissions, parliamentary committees and 
parliamentary Conventions, all to no avail in the sense of actual constitutional alteration.  The 
tripartite February 1998 Convention may well represent, to borrow President Lincoln’s aphorism in 
his Annual Message to Congress of 1 December 1862, the ‘last best hope’ for Australian 
constitutional reform (1998b, 107). 
 
However, the 1999 republic referendum did not pass even though a constituent assembly 
debated proposals for a republic in 1998, and Canada’s Charlottetown Accord did not 
pass when it was put to a public vote in 1992, even though five constituent assemblies 
debated federal proposals for constitutional change eight months earlier. 
This thesis evaluates whether including constituents directly in negotiating 
proposals for formal constitutional change at constituent assemblies could improve the 
rate of formal change in Australia and Canada. It does so by a detailed examination of 
the 1998 Australian Constitutional Convention and the 1992 Renewal of Canada 
Conferences.  The next chapter reviews opinions about the value of constituent 
assemblies, and defines key terms in a testable form. 
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CHAPTER TWO – CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES 
 
Governments dominated the process of formal constitutional change in Australia and 
Canada for most of the twentieth century, and they experienced considerable difficulty 
in achieving it.  Some analysts argue that governments need to adopt a more inclusive 
process for debating constitutional change.  In the 1990s, Australian and Canadian 
governments initiated constituent assemblies to debate major reforms, but even then, 
electors did not ratify the amendments that were put to them.  At the end of the first day 
of Canada’s 1992 assembly, Joe Clark (federal minister for constitutional affairs) said 
“If conferences could settle constitutions, we would have solved all our problems long 
ago” (as cited by Flaherty 1992). 
What lessons can be drawn from the Australian and Canadian constituent 
assemblies?  Was it a foregone conclusion that the assembly method would not succeed, 
or was something lacking in the execution?  Should Australia and Canada try to achieve 
constitutional change through constituent assemblies again, or should they not?  This 
chapter reviews opinions about the value of constituent assemblies as a means to 
achieving constitutional change.  Later chapters examine the Australian and Canadian 
assemblies and evaluate them using four questions that arise from this chapter. 
 It was difficult to review the literature on constituent assemblies because there is 
no consensus about what the term ‘constituent assembly’ means (Fafard and Reid 1991, 
v), and because there is a limited amount of theoretical literature on the subject (Elster 
1995, 364).  While it is easy to locate case studies for assemblies across time and space, 
for example, France 1789-91, Germany 1848, 1919, and 1949, Australia 1897-98, India 
1946-49, Newfoundland 1946-47, Namibia 1989-90, South Africa 1994, Australia 1998, 
and Venezuela 1999, it is difficult to find literature about constituent assemblies per se. 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES DEFINED 
According to McMenemy – a Canadian academic – a constituent assembly is “[a] 
group of people with the power to establish or amend a constitution or at least 
recommend changes to authoritative bodies” (2001, 64, emphasis added).  Even though 
this definition is broad enough to include any group authorised by government to 
recommend constitutional change, McMenemy wrote that the Charlottetown Accord 
process did not include a constituent assembly.  In doing so, he did not recognise 19 
groups convened by Canadian governments between 1990 and 1992 to debate proposals 
for constitutional change, and the five Renewal of Canada conferences that are the 
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subject of this thesis. 
A decade earlier, the Canadian Federal-Provincial Relations Office defined 
constituent assemblies more precisely as:   
specially selected bodies representative of society (in the case of unitary societies) or the 
constituent units of a federation chosen to meet on an exceptional basis to devise a full constitution 
or amendments to the constitution or to approve a constitution or a constitutional amendment 
(1990, 18, emphasis added). 
 
This definition is more precise in that it specifies assemblies are representative, special-
purpose groups.  The definition would exclude, for example, legislatures making 
constitutions alone without a specific mandate because they are not “specially selected”, 
and groups like commissions and committees that are too small to be representative, 
except in the Burkean sense.  This definition lacks precision because by including the 
phrase “or to approve” it does not distinguish a plebiscite or a referendum where 
representative constituents, selected through franchise rules, meet “on an exceptional 
basis” to “approve a constitution or a constitutional amendment”.  The authors applied 
the definition loosely when they wrote that Canada’s three federation conferences 
“resembled constituent assemblies”, and the Australian Constitutional Convention 
1973-1985 was an “informal constituent assembly”, because the delegates to these 
meetings were not representative (Federal-Provincial Relations Office 1990, 19). 
 A year later in Canada, the Beaudoin-Edwards Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and the House of Commons defined constituent assemblies broadly as “bodies 
convened for the purpose of writing constitutions or, much less commonly, of 
developing amendments to existing constitutions” (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 43-
51).  The committee noted that people making submissions tended to distinguish 
between “constituent assemblies” comprising members of the public, and 
“constitutional conventions” comprising parliamentarians.   
Patrick Fafard and Darrel Reid’s analysis of cases from the 1700s to the early 
1990s distinguished between groups that make constitutions by how delegates were 
chosen, and sometimes by the nature of their work (1991, 5-6, 11-17).  This yielded five 
types of constituent assemblies: 
1. “directly-elected constituent assembly” elected by the public, often to make new 
constitutions (Newfoundland 1946 and Namibia 1989-90, and the directly elected 
Australian assembly of 1897-98 which the authors classify in error as type 2); 
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2. “indirectly-elected constituent assembly” or “constitutional convention” elected by 
legislatures to make or amend constitutions (USA 1787, Australia 1891, India 1946-
49, Pakistan 1947-56, Germany 1948, and Australia 1973-85);  
3. “constitutional conference” selected in a less formal way to represent governments 
and parties in discussions, often as part of a de-colonisation process (Canada 1864-
66, West Indies 1947-57, Malaya 1948, Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1951-53, Nigeria 
1953, 1954, 1957, and 1958, and Malaysia 1963); 
4. “representative legislative committee” of legislators elected by legislatures 
(Switzerland 1848);  and 
5. “constitutional commission” of notables and experts appointed by governments or 
legislatures (Switzerland 1965 and 1974, Germany 1966 and 1976, Canada 1977-79 
and 1990-91, and Australia 1985-88). 
The authors note that directly elected constituent assemblies (type 1) are “extremely rare 
in practice” (Fafard and Reid 1991, 44).  By contrast, the definitions provided for types 
3 and 5 allow the inclusion of any group, provided it is appointed by government.  
 Jon Elster (2006, 182-183) distinguished four types of assemblies according to 
whether they have a mandate, and who the delegates are:   
1. “constitutional conventions” elected specifically to write constitutions, for example, 
USA 1787, France 1791, Norway 1814, India 1946, and Germany 1949; 
2. “mandated constituent legislatures”, which were elected to govern and to write a 
constitution, for example, France 1945;   
3. “self-created constituent legislatures”, which were elected to govern, then took it 
upon themselves to produce a constitution, for example, Hungary 1989-90;  and   
4. “self-created legislating assemblies” that were elected to write constitutions, then 
assumed for themselves a legislative role, for example, Frankfurt 1848, France 1871, 
Columbia 1991, and Venezuela 1999. 
Types 1, 2, and 4 have a mandate to write a constitution, but type 3 does not.  In all 
types except the first, delegates are legislators, or they assume legislative roles.  
According to Elster, constitutions are usually made by legislatures because it is the “path 
of least resistance” (2006, 197).  The task of making a constitution is assigned to the 
legislature because it exists, or it is about to be created.   
 There is no agreed definition for constituent assemblies, in part because authors 
use the word ‘constituent’ differently.  For some authors, assemblies are constituent in 
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the sense that they are empowered by government to debate constitutional matters – they 
are empowered to constitute a nation.  For other authors, assemblies are constituent in 
the sense that their delegates include constituents.  The word constituent does indeed 
mean either a group “having the power to frame or alter a (political) constitution”, or 
“one of those who elects another as their representative;  an elector” (SOED 1970).   
For this thesis, a constituent assembly is:  (1) a special-purpose group authorised 
by government to debate and recommend constitutional change;  where (2) all delegates 
are empowered to act as equal participants at the assembly;  and (3) at least half of the 
delegates are chosen by constituents, rather than by serving politicians.   
The first criterion of the definition is not contentious because the assembly is not 
authorised to ratify formal constitutional change.  It is important, nonetheless, because it 
distinguishes an assembly convened by government from conferences convened by 
others, for example the Australia Deliberates forum held 22-24 October 1999, just prior 
to the republic referendum.  The second criterion is not contentious because the authors 
reviewed in this chapter probably assumed that assembly delegates would convene as 
equals.  No author said otherwise. 
The third criterion is important because it excludes groups of parliamentarians or 
non-parliamentarians appointed by governments or legislatures to debate formal 
constitutional change alone, because it affords a stronger role to constituents than is 
customary in Australia and Canada, and because most authors reviewed later in this 
chapter did not specify this condition – most are silent on how delegates would be 
selected for a constituent assembly.  Further, three of the five definitions just reviewed 
do not specify a direct role for constituents in constituent assemblies (McMenemy 2001; 
Federal-Provincial Relations Office 1990; Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991).  By contrast, 
Fafard and Reid allow that delegates can be: 
1. elected directly by constituents; 
2. elected indirectly by legislatures;  
3. selected in a less formal way to represent governments and parties; 
4. legislators elected directly by legislatures; 
5. notables and experts appointed by governments or legislatures. 
Elster allows that delegates can be elected to:  
1. an assembly; 
2. a mandated assembly which also governs;  
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3. a legislature which assumes the assembly role without a mandate;  or  
4. an assembly which assumes the role of the legislature without a mandate to do so.   
For Elster, constituent assemblies are always elected. 
Are the Australian Constitutional Convention and the Renewal of Canada 
Conferences constituent assemblies?  Governments appointed half of the delegates to 
the Australian Constitutional Convention (40 parliamentarians and 36 community 
representatives), and constituents elected the other half directly.  For the five Renewal of 
Canada Conferences, governments nominated certain parliamentarians as delegates, and 
specified criteria for selecting the other delegates.  The final composition was, on 
average, 38% experts and interest groups, 35% ‘ordinary Canadians’ (including 17% 
selected randomly from a structured sample), and 27% parliamentarians.   
Both cases are constituent assemblies according to Fafard and Reid’s definition:  
the Australian case is a combination of types 1, 3, and 5, and the Canadian case is a 
combination of types 3 and 5.  Elster allows the inclusion of parliamentarians (type 2 or 
3, depending on whether there was a mandate), and delegates directly elected by 
constituents (type 1), but appointed non-parliamentarians simply do not fit into any of 
his categories.  This means that 76% of the Australian delegates meet Elster’s definition, 
but the figure for Canada is only 27%.  Fitting the two case studies into Elster’s 
definition may turn on whether governments were mandated to negotiate formal 
constitutional change, to choose delegates, and to authorise others to choose delegates 
on their behalf. 
Two prominent Canadian academics, self-described as constitutional 
conservatives, referred to the Renewal of Canada conferences using the phrase “mini 
constituent assemblies”, as follows. 
The mini constituent assemblies were more conciliatory than the premiers and proved a success … 
[The delegates] were Canadians with an extraordinary interest in matters constitutional.  Many 
came with well-formed positions but in a more accommodating mood than the citizens who had 
been invited in the previous round only to kick at the Meech accord from the outside.  Discussing 
constitutional issues in close encounters with Canadians from all parts of the country is far more 
conducive to compromise than ‘spilling out your guts’ at the microphone before a home-town 
crowd.  … The recommended changes [in the Beaudoin-Dobbie Special Joint Committee report], 
for the most part followed the general contours of the discussions in the five public conferences.  
That fact had the potential to give the committee’s recommendations an extra measure of political 
legitimacy (Russell 1993a, 177, 181, emphasis added). 
 
The conferences served almost as mini-constituent assemblies.  Despite their limitations, their 
contribution to the process exceeded all expectations. They helped to identify in broad terms the 
extent and limits of likely public support for the proposed changes. But perhaps their greatest 
contribution was to change the political climate of the country through the emphasis upon 
reconciliation and accommodation which emerged from these conferences (Watts 1999, 6, 
emphasis added). 
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Neither author said how he defined constituent assemblies, or what he meant by “mini”. 
According to these authors, the conferences were not “mini” in the contribution they 
made to the constitutional debates.  They were, however, “mini” in terms of their brief 
duration – each conference convened for no more than three days – and four of the five 
conferences were “mini” because they considered only some of the proposals for 
constitutional change. 
The cases selected for this thesis may be ‘mini constituent assemblies’, rather than 
constituent assemblies.  They are nonetheless landmarks in the evolution of procedures 
for amending the constitution in Australia and Canada.  For the first time since 
federation, parliamentarians, experts, and ‘ordinary citizens’ convened together to 
debate formal constitutional change.  The questions raised in this chapter about the 
value of constituent assemblies are relevant to them.  The answers may help to find a 
way for parliamentarians and constituents to work together to achieve formal 
constitutional change, without the need for a crisis. 
IDEALS VS. REALITIES 
Writing between 1995 and 2005 about constituent assemblies around the world, 
Elster reached a number of conclusions about ideal conditions for making constitutions. 
According to Elster, making constitutions is a process of collective decision-making 
governed by constraints and motives, in which preferences are aggregated, transformed, 
and sometimes misrepresented (1995, 373-393).  Constraints are imposed “upstream” 
when initiators decide how delegates are selected, their roles, the agenda, time limits, 
and procedures.  “Downstream”, delegates constrain themselves by anticipating the 
preferences of those who can veto their work.  Motives that bear on the assembly 
include personal, group, and institutional interests, sudden or permanent passions, and 
reason.  Constitutional preferences are aggregated individually or by delegation, and 
thresholds for consensus vary.  While preferences may be transformed by discussion, 
they may also be misrepresented in bargaining and grandstanding, or by fear of military 
or civil consequences.  In ideal conditions,  
• constitutions are developed by special assemblies rather than legislatures (1995, 395; 
1997, 137; 1998, 117; 2004; 2006, 182); 
• legislatures do not ratify constitutions alone (1995, 395; 1997, 137; 1998, 117); 
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• experts play a minor role only (1995, 395; 1997, 138), “because solutions tend to be 
more stable if dictated by political rather than technical considerations, and lawyers 
are less likely to compromise to obtain consensus” (1995, 395); 
• delegates are elected using a proportional representation system which produces 
more diverse representation of opinions and interests (1995, 395; 1997, 138; 1998, 
117; 2004; 2006, 186-187); 
• assemblies are unicameral (1995, 395; 1997, 138); 
• assemblies convene for a limited time to circumvent “delaying tactics” (1995, 395; 
1997, 138); 
• assemblies convene away from cities and the military to limit the potential for 
violence and fear of it (1995, 395; 1997, 138; 1998, 117); 
• allowance is made for both public and private discussions to limit grandstanding and 
bargaining respectively (1995, 395; 1997, 138; 1998, 117; 2004; 2006, 189-191);  
and 
• to limit the effect of self-interest, new constitutions are not implemented 
immediately (1995, 395; 1997, 138; 1998, 117), but delayed for “say, twenty years ... 
creating an artificial veil of ignorance ... [to] force each framer to put himself ‘in 
everybody’s place’” (1998, 117).  
Elster conceded that it was not realistic to exclude legislatures or delay implementing a 
new constitution (1998, 117).  It is also likely he would concede that not all conditions 
are relevant to Australia and Canada, such as the need to convene away from cities and 
the military to avoid actual or potential violence, but most of them are relevant.  
Assemblies in Australia and Canada in the 1990s met many of Elster’s conditions. 
Special-purpose unicameral assemblies convened for a limited time, legislatures did not 
intend to ratify amendments alone, and the proceedings included public and private 
discussions.  A proportional representation electoral system was used in Australia to 
select half the delegates, but none of the Canadian delegates was directly elected.  The 
assemblies did not meet away from capitals and the military, but as noted earlier, Elster 
may not apply that condition to Australia and Canada.  As to whether experts played a 
minor role, this would depend on how Elster defines “minor”.  It can only be said that 
while experts were included, they were in a minority.  Despite meeting many of Elster’s 
ideal conditions, the reforms that were debated at the Australian and Canadian 
assemblies were not implemented. 
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THE VALUE OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES 
Literature that evaluates constituent assemblies per se is surprisingly sparse.  
According to Jon Elster, there is no “single book or even an article that considers the 
process of constitution-making, in its full generality, as a distinctive object of positive 
analysis” (1995, 364).  Whilst there is no body of theoretical literature about constituent 
assemblies, there are some official reports that deal with the subject, and a sprinkling of 
evaluations by academics and participants.  These works are discussed below, grouped 
together under three headings – advocates, commentary, and opponents. 
Advocates 
Edward McWhinney distinguished four vehicles for making or changing 
constitutions, noting that initiators know that outcomes are influenced by the methods 
they choose. 
1. “Expert commissions” appointed by governments (for example, USSR 1977, 
Switzerland 1974, UK 1969-73, and Canada 1977-79), which could be structured to 
produce predictable results, and tended to be “politically suspect” (1981, 27-28). 
2. Legislatures – a “flexible” method that was compatible with representative 
government, and appropriate for minor or technical amendments (1981, 29-31).   
3. Inter-government agreement – common in federal systems such as Canada and 
Australia, and a method that could cause constitutional “rigidity” where legislatures 
or constituents did not ratify amendments (1981, 31-33). 
4. Elected constituent assemblies, a method that “represents the culmination of the 
constitutional thinking of the Age of Enlightenment” (1981, 33).   
McWhinney’s analysis of constituent assemblies reached three conclusions:  the 
assembly method was to be recommended if there were broad consensus in the 
community on constitutional issues, or sufficient time to develop consensus;  when 
assemblies convene during a crisis, it is easier for experts to judge the public mood and 
draft constitutions to match that context;  and assemblies are likely to produce 
constitutions that are practical and durable (1981, 33-34).   
Elster concluded that assemblies were better than legislatures convening alone, 
albeit “the superiority of conventions [constituent assemblies] is not blindingly 
overwhelming” (2006, 197).  Writing between 1995 and 2006, he supported his 
conclusions with an evaluation of more than 20 cases across three centuries.    
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According to Elster, assemblies tend to be more representative and more 
deliberative, and they produce constitutions that are perceived to be more legitimate.  
They tend to be more representative of constituents’ interests than legislatures because 
they can be elected using a proportional representation system, which encourages 
diversity (2006, 186-187, 189).  By contrast, legislatures are usually elected using a 
system like first-past-the-post because it is more likely to yield a majority government 
which is stable, and in this sense efficient.  Assemblies tend to be more deliberative than 
legislatures because reason is more likely to prevail over private interests and passion, 
and parties and governments are less likely to dominate (2006, 185-186, 189-193).  This 
is partly because legislatures are usually required to convene in public, whilst 
assemblies can use an ideal mix of public and private discussions, which limits the 
bargaining associated with private discussions, and the grandstanding and rhetoric 
associated with public discussions (2006, 189-191).8  Finally, constitutions produced by 
assemblies are perceived to have greater legitimacy, and they tend to be more stable 
(2006, 185-186).   
Elster acknowledged that a convention might compete for power with the 
legislature, as was the case in Columbia and Venezuela in the 1990s.  In both cases, the 
president appointed the conventions, and with the president’s support the conventions 
assumed all or part of the legislature’s functions (Elster 2006, 184).  Elster noted, 
however, that these cases do not provide a basis for concluding against constitutional 
conventions because “the flaws of the existing legislature were so obvious that steps 
were taken to bypass it”, and “the experience of two unstable Latin American countries” 
does not provide a basis for arguing against constitutional conventions (2006, 196-197). 
In 1920, the Australian house of representatives debated a bill for a constituent 
assembly.  Constituents had rejected proposals for conscription put to them at 
plebiscites in 1916 and 1917, and they rejected a proposal to increase federal powers at  
a referendum in 1919.  In this context, Nationalist prime minister William (Billy) 
Hughes announced on 15 April 1920 that his government would introduce a bill for an 
elected constitutional convention to “frame a new Constitution”, in the current session 
(Australian House of Representatives 1920, 15 April 1920, 1235-1237).   
The prime minister claimed electors were more likely to approve amendments 
proposed by an assembly than those proposed by parliament.  At this early stage, there 
                                                 
8
 I recognise that legislatures and assemblies will have private discussions, regardless of rules or customs.  
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was more support than opposition from the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
Australian Country Party (ACP).  Members said that an assembly would be less partisan 
(Tudor ALP, Rogers Nationalist, Jowett ACP, and Bowden Nationalist, in Australian 
House of Representatives 1920, 15 April, 1237-1244).  Jowett (ACP) elaborated the 
point, as follows. 
The great cause of the lack of confidence shown by the people of Australia in proposed alterations 
submitted to referenda in the past has been the fact that each proposal has emanated from a party 
House and as the result of the party system … there is no means by which that confidence can be 
gained except by having the members of it elected directly by the people themselves (Australian 
House of Representatives 1920, 15 April, 1243). 
 
Earle Page (ACP) agreed that electors were more likely to support recommendations 
made by an assembly, suggested that each state should be represented by 10 members, 
and urged the use of a proportional representation election system to improve 
representation (Australian House of Representatives 1920, 15 April 1920, 1237, 1240).  
By contrast, Blakely (ALP) opposed PR on the basis that it would reduce turnout 
because it was a more complicated system, and Fenton (ALP) argued that convening an 
assembly would incur unnecessary expense, and “display our incompetence to carry out 
the work for which we were elected” (Australian House of Representatives 1920, 15 
April, 1241-1243, 1246). 
Hughes did not table his bill until 22 November 1921 – 17 months later.  The 
Constitutional Convention Bill proposed that the assembly convene for up to four 
months with the brief of “proposing such alteration to the constitution as it thinks fit”.  
The 111 delegates would comprise:  18 chosen by the federal parliament (12 house, 6 
senate), three chosen by each of the six state parliaments, and 75 directly elected with 
the preferential system used for the house of representatives (representation by 
population, not PR).  The assembly would report its recommendations to the Governor-
General within four months of its first session, the Governor-General would present the 
report to parliament within 14 sitting days, and the prime minister would introduce 
legislation for amending the constitution within 15 sitting days of receiving the report.   
The bill was read for a second time on 1 December 1921, nine days later, but there 
was virtually no debate (Australian House of Representatives 1921, 1 December, 13472-
9).  Hughes explained the need for constitutional change at length, the difficulties 
experienced in achieving it, and the general support of his proposal by federal and state 
parliamentarians, interest groups, and the press.  He said he was prepared to make the 
assembly entirely elected, and to reduce the number of delegates to 75, but he would not 
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agree to equal representation of each state because it would be “undemocratic”. 
On 5 December 1921, Earle Page (ACP) gave notice of amendments to the bill.  
He proposed that the assembly comprise 72 delegates – 12 elected for each of the six 
states using the Tasmanian PR system – and delegates would be paid three guineas per 
day, plus expenses.  Two three-person committees would be appointed to advise the 
Governor-General on assembly costs, and on duplication of activities between the 
federal and state governments.  Two days later, Hughes withdrew the bill, saying “There 
is no prospect of the bill being passed into law” (Australian House of Representatives 
1921, 7 December, 14260).  He said he would propose amendments in the next session, 
and consider suggestions made by others, but this did not occur.  The sticking points 
appear to have been equal representation of the states, and using a PR electoral system.  
A year later the Nationalist Party lost its house majority, but continued to govern in 
coalition with ACP under the leadership of prime minister Stanley Bruce. 
Robert Garran favoured constituent assemblies for Australia because voters were 
more likely to approve amendments proposed by them (1958, 206-12).  Normatively, he 
argued that if constituents could veto constitutional change, then they should have a 
stronger role in formulating amendments.   
In Australia, it is the people who put the seal of assent on the Constitution, and it seems to me that 
the best chance of getting assents to a systematic plan of amendment is to go back to the people 
(Garran 1958, 210). 
 
Empirically, he concluded that the difficulty Australia experienced in achieving formal 
constitutional change was “the practice hitherto adopted in operating it”, not the 
demanding amending formula.  He wrote:   
I believe that a constitutional revision, framed and proposed to Parliament by a convention elected 
by the people for that purpose, would have a far better chance of acceptance at a subsequent 
referendum than any amendment framed and introduced by the Government of the day (1958, 211). 
  
This conclusion was based on his experience at the federation assembly, and as an 
observer and sometime participant in attempts to change the constitution over the next 
fifty years.  What was needed, according to Garran, was a method that reduced the 
opportunity for parties to manipulate the process for their own ends.  
Garran recommended that the federal parliament legislate to convene a special-
purpose “constituent convention”.  He disputed the opinion allegedly propounded by Sir 
John Latham (as federal Attorney-General) that parliament did not have the power to do 
so, and cited a US precedent (Garran 1958, 209-212).  Such legislation should include in 
advance the entire amending process, from the convention to the referendum, as was 
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done for federation.  All delegates should be elected, and seats should be distributed to 
the states in proportion to the political composition of an hypothetical joint sitting of 
federal parliament.  If the election process deterred qualified notables, then these 
persons could be appointed as non-voting experts.  The convention’s brief should be 
flexible but limited so as not to “create unnecessary alarm”.  Finally, the entire process 
should be publicised widely to generate public interest. 
Garran argued that electors would believe assembly recommendations had greater 
“weight and authority” than those proposed by the government of the day because an 
assembly was less likely to be driven by party politics (1958, 212).  When 
recommendations made by an assembly were put to referendum, they were less likely to 
be “shied at by electors” who did not support the government (Garran 1958, 209). 
John Uhr (2002, 180-181, 189-190) agreed with Garran that if the public can veto 
constitutional change, they should be involved in negotiating it.  He added that the 
assembly mechanism could overcome the “deception and misrepresentation” which was 
to be expected in constitutional debates, and cited as evidence for this point the 1998 
Australian Constitutional Convention, the 1998 Women’s Constitutional Convention, 
and the 1999 Australia Deliberates conference.9  These arguments were part of a 
comprehensive plan to reform the way Australia attempts constitutional change.   
Uhr proposed more funding for public information campaigns, a permanent “all-
party [federal parliamentary] committee on referendums and constitutional change”, and 
a commission to oversee the process.  The commission would be “broadly 
representative” of parties, public opinion, gender, and regions, and it would oversee 
funding, information campaigns, Yes/No committees, plebiscites, constituent 
assemblies, and referenda.  While conceding that it was not possible to respond to every 
improper practice, he argued his reforms – including constituent assemblies – would 
help to limit the impact of misrepresentation on constitutional debates (2002, 194). 
Cheryl Saunders also cited Garran, within her argument that an assembly was 
commendable for its potential to engage electors (1998).  She had earlier suggested an 
elected convention to debate an Australian republic (1994, 63), and subsequently 
criticised the 1998 Convention process.  Her criticism emphasised the inadequate  
amount of time allowed, constraints placed on the debate, and the way delegates were  
                                                 
9
 The Women’s Constitutional Convention, and the 1999 Australia Deliberates conference, were unofficial 
gatherings;  they were not convened by government or parliament. 
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selected (1998, 10-11).  Reflecting on her experience leading the Constitutional 
Centenary Foundation for ten years, Saunders argued that there were two ways in which 
Australia might become a republic:  a respected and trusted leader could champion the 
cause, or the federal government could legislate a comprehensive plan (2002, 209-211). 
Such a plan could include progressive public consultation, perhaps through plebiscites 
and a constituent assembly.  If an assembly were convened, then the entire process 
should be legislated in advance and costs should be controlled.  Delegates should be 
representative of the population, and have the “flexibility to negotiate”.  Sufficient time 
should be allocated not only for delegates to complete their immediate task, but to allow 
for interaction between delegates and voters, and for voters to develop a “sense of 
ownership” of the process (2002, 209-211, 214-215).  Saunders’ recommendations 
turned on the propositions that the current system as driven by parliamentarians was 
“discredited”, and that the Australian public needed to know more about their 
constitution (2002, 208, 206).  
The Constitutional Centenary Foundation argued for a constituent assembly in 
Australia mainly because it would generate more public interest (CCF 1993, 1).  CCF 
suggested than an assembly should comprise 60-80 persons who were “broadly 
representative”:  the assembly should reflect the geographic distribution of constituents, 
it should include indigenous peoples, and it should not include a “significant” number of 
serving politicians and active party members (CCF 1993, 3-4).   
Peter Bayne argued that the assembly method should be tried by Australia’s 
Northern Territory because it could generate interest and consensus, and operate 
independently of governments (1988, 120-123).  He compared the Northern Territory’s 
long quest for statehood to Alaska’s struggle to become a state by negotiating with the 
US federal government, and attributed Alaska’s final success to the assembly of 1956.  
Statehood was proposed in 1916, but very little progress was made until the late 1940s 
when the Alaska legislature convened a bipartisan non-parliamentary committee.  
Negotiations with the US continued to be unproductive, so in 1955, Alaska legislated 
for an assembly whose brief it was to draft a constitution.  The idea of an assembly was 
dismissed earlier because it was thought it would cause unnecessary delays.  All of the 
assembly’s 55 delegates were directly elected in a poll that was not run on party lines, 
and they were representative of the non-indigenous population.  They convened away 
from the seat of government for 75 days (including a two-week recess), used a mix of 
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public and private discussions, and produced a constitution that was approved by all but 
one delegate. The assembly generated “considerable” public interest. When the 
constitution was put to referendum, the Yes vote was 85%, and Alaska became the 
forty-ninth state of the USA on 3 January 1959. 
JV Clyne and Roger Gibbins (1981) recommended the assembly method for 
Canada at the time when the federal government was proceeding to enact major 
amendments unilaterally.  These authors provided a long list of advantages and 
disadvantages for assemblies, as follows.  Constituent assemblies could be superior 
because:   
• delegates are more diverse and more representative;   
• the assembly has a clear mandate;   
• delegates can concentrate on the task at hand, free of party politics and bargaining;  
• delegates are more likely to raise fresh ideas;   
• public participation is higher;   
• the constitutions produced by assemblies are more likely to reflect public 
preferences, not just those of the government;  and  
• voters are more committed to constitutions produced by assemblies (1981, 10-15). 
On the negative side for Canada at that time:   
• the idea of convening an assembly is radical, and if it did not succeed, the 
consequences would be severe; 
• first ministers would not agree to convene an assembly because it has long been 
their prerogative to initiate and approve formal constitutional change 
• an assembly would lack authority unless it was approved by all first ministers;  
• unlike the first ministers, assembly delegates are not accountable at subsequent 
elections;   
• an assembly may not be able to deal with the complexity of current arrangements;   
• decisions made by majorities at an assembly may disadvantage minorities, and 
neglect provincial concerns;  and  
• subsequent attempts to ratify assembly proposals by referenda could accentuate 
divisions (1981, 18-24).   
Clyne and Gibbin concluded on balance that Canada should hold an assembly “as a way 
out of the endless indecision of constitutional stalemate … to force the hands of the first 
ministers, or for them to allow the appearance of their hands being forced” (1981, 36).   
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Clyne and Gibbin (1981, 38-41) recommended direct election of 110 assembly 
delegates using a proportional representation system.  Delegates would convene in 
private for six months, submit their recommendations to the federal and provincial 
legislatures, reconvene three months later to refine its proposals, then put them to 
electors at a referendum held within a year of the assembly’s first session.  The 
referendum campaign would be limited to 30 days, and official Yes and No groups 
would receive public funding.  The assembly’s proposals would be implemented if a 
national majority, plus majorities in eight of the 11 provinces and territories voted Yes 
(counting the Yukon and Northwest territories as one unit).  If electors did not ratify the 
proposals, the assembly would reconvene for six months, then put a revised package to 
the vote.  If it did not pass a second time, the assembly would be dissolved.  
Lorne Nystrom and Lynn Hunter, federal NDP parliamentarians, advocated a 
constituent assembly for Canada in 1991 in their minority report to the Beaudoin-
Edwards Special Joint Committee (1991, 74-76).  They argued that a constituent 
assembly should be convened because it would be more legitimate, more representative, 
and more credible than the “tradition of elite accommodation”, and it would allow 
constituents to engage in discussion and have some impact on the outcomes.  They 
noted that 158 submissions made to the committee supported the idea of a constituent 
assembly while just 23 opposed it, and polls reported that a “significant majority” of 
Canadians favoured the idea.  The alternative was for constituents to simply vote Yes or 
No at a plebiscite or referendum, or to make submissions to hearings that were ignored.  
Nystrom and Hunter’s ideal assembly would comprise parliamentarians and non-
parliamentarians in equal measure, with equitable representation of women, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders, regions, disabled persons, language minorities, racial-ethnic 
minorities, and others whose opinions are usually under-represented.  The assembly 
would hold hearings across the country, and recommend amendments to legislatures for 
ratification under the existing amendment rules.  
About two years after Australia’s republic referendum was defeated, George 
Winterton published the following four-step plan for resurrecting the Australian republic 
debate. 
1. A joint parliamentary committee prepares legislation for a republic plebiscite, 
including detailed outlines of republic options, with input from state 
parliamentarians as required. 
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2. Constituents indicate at a plebiscite whether they prefer a republic or constitutional 
monarchy, and indicate their preferences in rank order for a number of republic 
models (see also Winterton 1998b, 102 for a similar recommendation made just 
before the 1998 assembly convened).  The question passes if a double majority votes 
Yes.  The preferred model is the one supported by a national majority, and 
preferences are distributed only if no model secures a majority on first preferences.10 
3. A constituent assembly (“constitutional convention”) convenes to draft legislation 
for the preferred republic.  Constituents elect two-thirds of the delegates, and one-
third are parliamentarians.  The agenda provides for adjournments to allow for 
public discussion and feedback. 
4. The federal government puts the assembly’s recommendations to referenda, with 
minimum alteration (Winterton 2001, 22-25). 
Winterton noted that a joint parliamentary committee could complete step 3, but 
favoured a constituent assembly because it would “ensure greater public input into the 
essential process of constructing the detailed model” (2001, 24).  His views are 
noteworthy because he was a member of Labor’s 1993 Republic Advisory Committee, 
and he was appointed by the Coalition government to attend the 1998 assembly.  At the 
assembly, he supported the model that was put to referenda (Kreibig 1998, 102).  
Philip Resnick supported the idea of a constituent assembly for Canada if Québec 
voted to secede, or to prevent a third vote on secession in Québec.  He wrote: 
Would an assembly … prove successful in cutting the Gordian knot?  … No one can say for sure.  
But given the checkered history of constitutional discussions in this country over the past 25 years; 
given the near melt-down of Canada last October [when the result for Québec’s second vote on 
sovereignty was 50.58% No];  given the diminishing returns of the process of consociational 
elitism by which we have been debating constitutional matters until now;  why not give the 
Constituent Assembly proposal a try? (1996, 51). 
    
He advised that an assembly should not be initiated unless the public, interest groups, 
and federal and provincial politicians were in favour of it (1997, 52).  Earlier he warned 
that in the long-term, the results were mixed, for example, outcomes were better for 
India in 1946-49 and Brazil in the 1980s than they were for France in 1789-95 and 
1945-46, and Germany in 1919 (1996, 50).   
Resnick proposed that an elected assembly which was representative of opinions, 
                                                 
10
 On 26 September 2001, Senator Natasha Stott Despoja introduced the Republic (Consultation of the 
People) Bill 2001 which proposed a plebiscite on a republic. It reached the second reading stage that day, 
but died on the notice paper in 2002.  Under this proposal, voters would answer Yes or No to two 
questions:  “1. Do you want Australia to become a republic? [and] 2. If most Australians decide they want 
a republic, do you want the opportunity to choose from different republic models?”. 
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parties, groups, interests, and regions convene for 12 to 18 months.  He wrote that 
delegates should be elected using a proportional representation system, but he also wrote 
that the assembly should include representatives of the political parties (1996, 50-51).  
This may mean that some seats would be reserved for governments, parliaments, and/or 
parties.  The assembly’s agenda would be “open-ended”, amendments proposed by the 
assembly would be put to referenda, and passage of them would be conditional on 
achieving national and regional (rather than provincial) majorities (1996, 51-52).   
According to Resnick, “a bold gamble may be the only way ahead” in Canada, and 
for politicians, an assembly may be “a way of getting the constitutional albatross off 
their backs ... as the more lucid among them may well come to recognize” (1996, 51, 
52).  A year later, he suggested again that a constituent assembly should be convened for 
Canada, but doubted that this would happen unless there was there was a “sense of 
crisis”, which could be triggered by a majority vote for sovereignty in Québec, “some 
new twist or turn in the endless language debate in Quebec”, or “growing feistiness in 
Western Canada” (Resnick 1997, 120-121, 115).   
Commentary 
Soon after the Meech Lake Accord lapsed, a discussion paper issued by the 
Federal-Provincial Relations Office raised three options for amending the Canadian 
constitution:  inter-government agreement (the current “legislative model”);  referenda 
to approve amendments;  and constituent assemblies to negotiate change (1990, 10-30). 
The paper concluded that something more than inter-government agreement was 
required.  Given the common complaint about exclusion of the public from the Meech 
Lake debate, “Hearings at an early stage, perhaps on principles before any agreement on 
form and substance is ‘locked in,’ appear to be preferable” (1990, 12). The authors 
argued that the Australian case showed that the use of referenda could be compatible 
with representative government, but it also showed that inter-government agreement 
was still required for passage of amendments, and that holding referenda did not 
necessarily increase public participation (1990, 15-16).  
In discussing the constituent assembly option, the report cited meetings in 
Charlottetown, Québec, and London that led to Canadian federation in 1867, and the 
Australian Constitutional Convention of 1973-85 (Federal-Provincial Relations Office 
1990, 19-30).  With few exceptions, legislatures selected legislators as delegates to the 
Canadian and Australian conferences, but this still satisfied the authors’ definition of 
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constituent assemblies (see page 35).  The report concluded that such meetings could 
provide an opportunity for specialist consultations free of the political imperatives that 
influence members of parliament, and foster inter-government agreement, but it would 
not increase public participation.  Without increased public interest and participation, 
outcomes were not likely to change.  Further, before Canada convened an assembly 
there were many complex issues to resolve, such as how to choose delegates, whether to 
represent provinces equally or by population, the threshold for consensus, and the 
weight that the assembly’s recommendations would carry in legislatures. 
Opponents 
 The Beaudoin-Edwards Special Joint Committee of the Canadian parliament 
recommended against constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions in Canada, 
despite overwhelming support for the idea.  Submissions in favour of assemblies argued 
that they were more representative, more legitimate, and less partisan, and that they 
would encourage participation and consensus (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 44-45).  
By contrast, opponents claimed that it would be difficult to form truly representative 
assemblies, elected delegates would be partisan “elites” who would neither encourage 
public participation nor be accountable, assemblies were no more likely to reach 
agreement than were parliamentarians, the process would be time consuming, and a new 
mechanism was not needed because first ministers had demonstrated they were able to 
amend the constitution (1991, 45-46).   
The Committee concluded that while it was no longer acceptable for first 
ministers to negotiate constitutional change behind closed doors, the assembly 
mechanism was not viable because an assembly would be no more representative than 
were members of parliament, participation would not increase beyond electing 
delegates, and elected delegates would not be accountable at subsequent elections (1991, 
47-51).  Further, delegates who were elected on party tickets would be partisan, while 
those elected for their position on the issues would not have a mandate to compromise.  
A majority of the committee concluded that a special-purpose elected assembly offered 
no advantages.  Rather than hold an assembly, the majority view was that governments 
should convene a federal joint parliamentary committee whose membership was “of 
sufficient number to be representative of the Canadian population” (Beaudoin-Edwards 
SJC 1991, 50-51).  Governments should also consult the public – particularly 
Aboriginal groups and minorities – early enough to allow proposals to be amended 
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(Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 55). 
Janet Ajzenstat, a Canadian academic, opposed constituent assemblies for Canada 
on theoretical and practical grounds.  Calling on liberal democratic theory, but not citing 
it, she asserted that the public should not be involved in major constitutional debates 
because constitutional law should be beyond the reach of day-to-day politicking, 
otherwise constitutional rules could be manipulated “by the players while they are on the 
ice” (1994, 112-3).  In other words, people who are bound by constitutional rules should 
not decide what the rules are.  The term ‘participants’ seems to exclude parliamentarians 
who also ‘skate on the ice’.  Empirically, she argued that public participation in 
Canada’s debates had increased since the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
entrenched rights for certain groups, which had produced an increased number of 
constitutional demands that were increasingly difficult to reconcile, and a consequent 
decline of confidence in government (1994, 118-119).   
Ajzenstat dismissed the idea that representative constituent assemblies might 
mediate the influence of groups, citing as evidence a meeting of twelve delegates that 
was organised by Maclean’s magazine and Harvard University academics in 1991 
(1994, 123).  She did not mention the Renewal of Canada Conferences sponsored by 
governments early in the following year – conferences that two academics referred to 
using the phrase mini constituent assemblies (Russell 1993a, 177; Watts 1999, 6).    
Peter Russell supported the idea of a constituent assembly for Canada.  He argued 
that constituent assemblies were “more democratic”, and amendments approved by 
assemblies were more likely to be passed by legislatures.  He cited as evidence 
assemblies in the United States, Canada, and Australia in the 1780s, 1860s, and 1890s 
respectively (1991b, 150).  Canadian legislatures would decide how delegates were 
selected, the assembly would convene for up to two months, and adjourn and meet 
privately as required.  Voting rights would attach to each federal and provincial 
delegation rather than to individuals, and the outcome would not be binding on 
legislatures (1991b, 152-153).   
Russell did not, however, support the idea of direct public participation at 
assemblies.  Rather, members of the public would be involved in discussions before the 
assembly convened to add “legitimacy” to the process, and ratify amendments if this 
was necessary to resolve deadlocks (1991b, 149-150).  Whilst he did not explain in the 
1991 article why the public should be excluded from assemblies, in later discussions  
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(pers. comm. 1 November 2001) he asserted that negotiating constitutional change was 
necessarily an “elite process” – this was an “iron law”.  Further, parliamentarians should 
not be excluded from assemblies because they had given so much to public life, and had 
made so many personal sacrifices.   
Fafard and Reid also opposed the use of constituent assemblies to resolve 
Canada’s contemporary constitutional debates (1991).  The authors drew on a large 
number of cases ranging from Canada and Australia in the nineteenth century to 
Malaysia in 1963.  They concluded that even though it was a more inclusive process and 
many Canadians supported the idea, an assembly was unlikely to succeed in Canada.  
Assemblies tended to be “highly partisan affairs” that were not productive unless there 
was a sense of crisis and broad community consensus about constitutional change before 
assemblies convened (1991, 45-47).  They argued that convening an assembly in Canada 
without those preconditions would invite further frustration with the process of 
constitutional change.  The call for more public participation could instead be satisfied 
by referenda, which would avoid the risk of a power struggle between an assembly and 
the legislatures.     
Shortly before Canada convened its assemblies, Monahan, Covello, and Batty 
advised against doing so because there was no broad consensus about constitutional 
change, and there was no crisis to motivate delegates to reach a consensus (1992, 45-46, 
51).  Both factors were preconditions for success, according to their analysis of 
constituent assemblies (broadly defined) in Spain, Australia, Germany, and 
Newfoundland, which is summarised below.   
The Spanish assembly of 1977-79 comprised all 600 members of the Cortes, 
empowered by King Juan Carlos to draft a new constitution for public ratification 
(Monahan et al. 1992, 13-19).  The death of Francisco Franco had triggered a crisis – a 
“political vacuum” – which needed to be filled, and there was a general consensus that 
the new form of government should be democratic.  The Cortes completed its task in 
about 16 months using a mix of public and private discussions.  Small, closed meetings 
in May and October 1978 were crucial to reaching consensus on the draft.  Constituents 
ratified the constitution on 6 December 1978.   
According to Monahan et al., state governments initiated the Australian 
Constitutional Convention because they wanted to reform provisions for revenue 
sharing (1992, 19-26).  It comprised 110 representatives from the federal, state, and 
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territory parliaments, and local government, it convened six times between 1972 [sic] 
and 1985, six [sic] of its recommendations were put to referenda, and three “relatively 
minor proposals” passed.11  The assembly “failed” because it “became just another 
opportunity for partisan disagreement”, it was not triggered by a crisis, it had an 
“interminable lifespan”, and there was no public support for constitutional change 
(Monahan et al. 1992, 25-26).  The last conclusion is curious, given that the public 
approved three amendments (of eight amendments approved at referenda since 1901).  
Calling these three amendments “relatively minor proposals” is also curious, given that 
one amendment enfranchised electors in the two mainland territories to vote at 
referenda, and another entrenched the informal agreement that senate vacancies are 
filled by a person of the same party as the elected senator.  If this provision had been in 
place earlier, the parliament may not have been deadlocked on the supply bill, and the 
Governor-General may not have dismissed the prime minister in 1975. 
The Allies initiated the German Parliamentary Council of 1948-49 to draft a new 
constitution to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of Hitler’s government (Monahan et al. 
1992, 26-32).  Its 70 delegates were 65 people chosen by länder governments, and five 
delegates from the Soviet zone as non-voting observers.  The council convened in the 
last quarter of 1948, but by January 1949 it was struggling to reach agreement.  The 
final consensus was forged in “[a]n informal and secretive process” by just five 
delegates and three experts.  This constitution was approved by the council, länder diets, 
and Western Allies, and came into force on 23 May 1949. 
The Newfoundland assembly of 1946-1947 was initiated by Britain, which 
administered Newfoundland after self-government was suspended in 1934 for financial 
reasons (Library and Archives Canada 2007c).  According to Monahan et al., 45 
delegates were selected in a first-past-the-post election to recommend a new form of 
government to put to constituents (1992, 32-38).  The assembly convened on 11 
September 1946, and provided its report to Britain 16 months later.  A majority 
preferred “a return to responsible government [under Britain] and an economic 
association with the U.S.”, but Britain forbade consideration of independence for 
Newfoundland, or negotiating with the United States on any subjects, even trade.  In 
February 1948, the assembly recommended that constituents be permitted to choose 
                                                 
11
 According to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
the Australian Constitutional Convention convened for the first time in 1973, and five of its 
recommendations were put to referenda (HSCLCA 1997, 3, 134). 
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between self-government and continued administration by Britain, but not union with 
Canada.  According to Monahan et al., Britain added the union option and constituents 
adopted it, which “demonstrates the fact that public sentiment diverged from the 
dominant view in the convention” (1992, 37-38).  According to resources provided by 
Library and Archives Canada (2007c), two referenda were held.  When constituents 
voted on 3 June 1948, the result was 44.6% for responsible government, 41.1% for 
union with Canada, and 14.3% for British administration – no option attracted a 
majority.  On 22 July 1948, a slim majority voted for union (52.3%) rather than a return 
to responsible government.   
Monahan et al. concluded from their analysis of these four cases that a constituent 
assembly was worthwhile:  if it was triggered by a crisis at a time when there was broad 
consensus in the community about constitutional change;  the assembly was “elected” 
not “appointed” (authors’ emphasis);  it was “dominated by organized political parties 
and their leaders”;  and the agenda included private deliberations (1992, 51-52).  The 
authors did not say how party dominance could be obtained when constituents elected 
all of the delegates.  Nor did they say how such an assembly of politicians could avoid 
the outcome they cite for the Australian case – “just another opportunity for partisan 
disagreement” (Monahan et al. 1992, 25). 
McMillan, Evans, and Storey supported special-purpose conventions for initiating 
constitutional change in Australia, provided that most delegates were federal and state 
parliamentarians (1983, 364-370).  They proposed that a convention of up to 112 
members meet once or twice a year for five years, and that the federal parliament put to 
referenda any proposals supported by two-thirds of the delegates (1983, 369-370).  
Electors would choose about one-third of the delegates using a proportional 
representation electoral system, and the remainder would be chosen by and from federal, 
state, and territory legislatures, and local government.   
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In reaching this conclusion, McMillan et al. made the following general points, 
and attributed them to others who they did not name.  
• Parliamentarians would be more likely to have the political skill and time required to 
reach consensus on constitutional change. 
• Proposals for constitutional reform would not succeed unless parliamentarians 
approved of them, so they needed to be involved in the process. 
• A parliamentary convention would be less expensive than an assembly.   
• Electors were less deferential now to “opinion leaders” than they were when the 
federation assembly was held. 
• An assembly would not increase interest or public participation because “Australia is 
not a popular democracy ... however romantic the idea of a popular Convention may 
seem, it will no more excite the interest, imagination or participation of the people 
than other political events do now” (McMillan et al. 1983, 354-358). 
It is not possible to research these arguments further because the authors did not provide 
citations for them, and could not do so when this thesis was written (McMillan, pers. 
comm. 2004).  This is understandable, perhaps, as the book is more than 20 years old.    
The Australian Constitutional Commission issued a discussion paper in 1987 in 
which it invited submissions on alternative methods that could be used to initiate, 
negotiate, and ratify formal constitutional change in Australia, including constituent 
assemblies (1987, 19-20).  In its final report, the Commission noted it received “very 
few submissions” on this topic, and went on to recommend against “a standing 
convention or commission” that was empowered to initiate constitutional change (1988, 
861-864).  The Commission conceded that such a body might generate fresh ideas, 
increase participation, debate issues more thoroughly, and produce proposals for change 
that were more likely to be approved by voters, but concluded that it would be more 
expensive than the Commission’s preferred option of allowing state parliaments to 
initiate amendments, and it would “bypass the democratically elected parliament”. 
Discussion 
Authors who hold opposed views usually emphasise different points to support 
their positions, but this is not the case here.  With few exceptions, authors make 
contradictory claims on the same points, as summarised below.  
• Advocates claimed that constituent assemblies were more representative of the 
electorate than were parliamentarians convening alone, whilst opponents claimed 
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they were not (Clyne and Gibbins 1981; Nystrom and Hunter 1991; Elster 2006;  cf. 
Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991).  In the Australian parliament in 1920, one advocate 
said that a PR electoral system should be used to increase representativeness 
(Country Party MP Earle Page in Australian House of Representatives 1920, 15 
April, 1238), while another said that doing so would reduce turnout because it was a 
more complicated system (Labor MP Arthur Blakely in Australian House of 
Representatives 1920, 15 April, 1243). 
• Advocates claimed that constituent assemblies increased public interest and/or 
participation in constitutional debates, whilst an opponent and one commentary 
claimed they did not (Clyne and Gibbins 1981; Bayne 1988; Nystrom and Hunter 
1991; CCF 1993; Winterton 2001; Saunders 2002;  cf. Federal-Provincial Relations 
Office 1990; Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991). 
• Advocates and one commentary claimed that constituent assemblies could 
encourage consensus or be less partisan, whilst opponents claim this is not the case 
(Labor MP Frank Tudor and Nationalist MPs Eric Bowden and Edmund Jowett in 
Australian House of Representatives 1920, 15 April, 1237, 1243-1244; Garran 1958; 
Clyne and Gibbins 1981; Federal-Provincial Relations Office 1990; Bayne 1988; 
Elster 2006;  cf. Fafard and Reid 1991; Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991; Monahan et 
al. 1992).  Two opponents added that as participation increased in Canada, so did 
the number of irreconcilable demands (Ajzenstat 1994; Monahan et al. 1992, 46-47). 
• One advocate concluded that delegates at constituent assemblies were less likely to 
have any immediate personal interest in the outcome, and they were less likely to 
privilege the legislature in the new constitution, whilst two opponents argued against 
assemblies (in part) because they were not accountable to constituents after the 
assembly was dissolved (Elster 2006;  cf. Clyne and Gibbins 1981; Beaudoin-
Edwards SJC 1991). 
In addition, advocates argued: 
• if the public could veto constitutional change, then they should participate in 
negotiating it (Garran 1958; Saunders 1998; Uhr 2002);  
• constituent assemblies made constitutions that were more practical and durable, or 
more stable, or electors perceived them to be more legitimate (McWhinney 1981; 
Elster 2006; Clyne and Gibbins 1981; Nystrom and Hunter 1991);   
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• voters were more likely to approve amendments made by assemblies (Nationalist 
prime minister Billy Hughes and Country Party MP Earle Page in Australian House 
of Representatives 1920, 15 April, 1235 and 1238 respectively; Garran 1958;  and 
by inference from their claim that assemblies are more ‘credible’, Nystrom and 
Hunter 1991);  
• public participation at assemblies was more substantive than making submissions to 
inquiries, or voting at plebiscites and referenda (Nystrom and Hunter 1991); and  
• the assembly mechanism allowed for greater control of deception and 
misrepresentation (Uhr 2002).   
According to three Australian and Canadian advocates, the constituent assembly method 
should be tried in Australia and Canada because other methods have failed (for 
Australia, Saunders 1994;  and for Canada Resnick 1996;  and Clyne and Gibbins 1981). 
Three opponents claimed that it would be more expensive to convene a constituent 
assembly (Labor MP James Fenton in Australian House of Representatives 1920, 15 
April, 1246; Constitutional Commission 1988; Monahan et al. 1992). 
This review does not include opinions about constituent assemblies that are not 
sustained or supported with evidence or argument.   For example, two papers presented 
by Robertson and Scott at the After Meech Lake Conference in November 1990 put a 
case for and against convening a constituent assembly in Canada, as follows. 
This proposal [for a constituent assembly] is advanced as a start for my own thinking about what 
should be done.  It is in no sense a fully fleshed out concept.  … most of all it is founded on the 
proposition that Meech Lake failed not merely because Canadians are cynical about politicians or 
dislike backroom brokering, but because Canadians themselves are not obliged to directly address 
the hard choices that constitution making in a country like Canada requires.  For me the most 
compelling argument in support of Meech Lake was that it represented the best that we Canadians 
could do in the year 1990 in addressing an important national problem.  I was convinced that this 
was so, but most Canadians were not.  As I say, I am not at all certain that a convention of the type 
I propose will reproduce a better result or a fuller consensus, but I am certain that it will achieve 
some level of satisfaction that the public interest is being protected and the sense in the Canadian 
public mind that the proposals at hand are the best we as a nation can do (Scott, Ian 1991, 256-
257).   
 
I have grave doubts about approaching our problem by means of a national constitutional 
convention that would throw our doors open to all sorts of intellectually ingenious schemes of 
theoretical possibility.  Confederation was a nearly miraculous achievement.  It has produced 
enormous benefits for Canadians.  We should, I think, view with caution any method of arriving at 
constitutional change that would vest the task in some new and untried agency, whether elected or 
not.  We are not revolutionary France nor are we the postrevolutionary Thirteen Colonies, rejecting 
a past seen as vile and repressive and setting up something totally new.  We are a country with a 
history of great accomplishment trying to retain as much as we can of the benefits that 123 years of 
political experience and economic development have given us.  In short, we should build on what 
we have and not throw it away without any guarantee we can substitute something better 
(Robertson, Gordon 1991, 233).  
 
These examples are noteworthy for novelty and passion respectively.  Scott, a member 
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of the Ontario legislature, supported the idea of an assembly in part because constituents 
would be less cynical about politicians and their work after they discovered how 
difficult it is to negotiate formal constitutional change. 
THE TWO CASE STUDIES 
The Australian Constitutional Convention 1998 and the Renewal of Canada 
Conferences 1992 were similar in that they were special-purpose groups empowered by 
government to debate and recommend constitutional change, delegates included non-
parliamentarians chosen by non-parliamentarians, those delegates participated as equals 
in decision-making, and serving parliamentarians were not a majority.  Further, the 
assemblies were debating constitutional change of a similar order, the deliberations were 
publicised widely, and constitutional amendments were put to a public vote. 
The assemblies were different in some respects.  First, whilst federal governments 
initiated the assemblies, delegates were chosen using different methods.  In Australia 
about half of the delegates was appointed by governments and parties, half was elected 
by constituents, and one parliamentary delegate was chosen by random selection 
(PM&C 1998a, 17).  By contrast, none of the Canadian delegates was elected.  On 
average, 27% of the delegates to the five conferences were ex-officio members (mainly 
parliamentarians) who were nominated by governments, 38% were experts and 
members of interest groups, and 35% were individuals who were chosen as “‘ordinary 
Canadians’”.  About half of the individual delegates were chosen by random selection 
from a structured list of qualified volunteers (Harrison 1992, 10, 23-26).   
The second difference is the number of delegates.  The Australian convention 
comprised 152 delegates meeting as one assembly, whilst the five Canadian conferences 
comprised a total of more than 1,100 delegates at five assemblies.  Lastly, whilst the 
most or all of proceedings were public in both cases, there is no written transcript or 
official record of voting at the Canadian conferences.  This means that the primary 
sources cannot be subjected to the same kind of analysis.  There are nevertheless 
sufficient data to test many of the claims about the value of constituent assemblies. 
THE FOUR THESIS QUESTIONS 
The four questions for this thesis are whether the Australian and Canadian 
assemblies were superior in terms of:  (1) representation, (2) interest, (3) consensus, and 
(4) partisanship, compared to parliamentarians negotiating formal constitutional change 
alone.   
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Representativeness, interest, consensus, and partisanship are key concepts that 
need to be defined here because most of the authors reviewed in this chapter did not 
define what they meant by these terms, and those that did suggested different 
definitions.  For example, Elster argued that constituent assemblies elected using a PR 
electoral system would be more representative – they would “promote free and 
unconstrained deliberation among all concerned parties with a large variety of interests 
represented … a variety of opinion” (Elster 2004, 6-7, emphasis added).  By contrast, 
the Beaudoin-Edwards Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of 
Commons concluded that an assembly would not be more representative because:   
No white middle-aged man can claim to represent, politically, all white middle-aged men, because 
white middle-aged men disagree strongly among themselves over almost any conceivable political 
issues.  The same applies to other groups, whether they are based on gender, ethnicity, occupation, 
income level or any other sociological category (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 47-48, emphasis 
added). 
 
Elster and Beaudoin-Edwards both defined representative in terms of groups:  for Elster 
the variables were interests and opinions about constitutional change, whilst for the 
Beaudoin-Edwards SJC, the variables were personal characteristics such as gender.  
These authors reached diametrically opposed opinions about representativeness, using 
different conceptions of what the word meant.   
KEY CONCEPTS DEFINED 
  It is not surprising that most of the authors reviewed in this chapter did not define 
the key concepts that were at the heart of their arguments about the value of constituent 
assemblies.  Each of the four terms is an important concept within the study of politics, 
and each term is difficult to define.  In this section, other literature is used to explore the 
difficulties, then definitions are adopted, and the selection of those definitions is 
justified.  The definitions are not presented here as authoritative.  Rather, they are 
presented as valid and reliable foundations for the thesis. 
Representativeness 
Hanna Pitkin (1967) mapped four conceptions of representation, which she called 
formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and acting-for.  According to Pitkin’s analysis: 
• the formalistic view holds that a person is a representative if s/he is authorised to 
take decisions on behalf of constituents, and constituents are bound by their 
decisions, a view associated with the work of Thomas Hobbes; 
• the symbolic view holds that a person is a representative if constituents believe the 
person represents them, as may be the case with a monarch or a governor-general;  
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• the descriptive view holds that representativeness is measured by how well 
representatives mirror the personal characteristics of their constituents;  and 
• the acting-for view holds that a person is representative if s/he acts in the interest of, 
or on behalf of, their constituents. 
Pitkin concluded that each concept of representation was inadequate because on its own 
it did not address some important aspect of representation.  Formal and symbolic views 
were inadequate because they did not describe what representatives did.  The descriptive 
view “may well be chimeral, and therefore dangerous” (1967, 86) because resemblance 
was not a sound qualification:  there was an endless range of characteristics that could 
be represented, an emphasis on descriptive diversity would reduce a legislature’s ability 
to reach agreement, and “[i]n the realm of action, the representative’s characteristics are 
relevant only insofar as they affect what he does” (1967, 142).   
According to Pitkin, the acting-for view was superior in that it dealt with the 
representative’s activities, but authors within this school of thought differed about 
whether representatives act “instead of … in the interests of … as a subordinate, on 
instructions, in accordance with the wishes of another” (1967, 139).  Despite this 
deficiency, Pitkin favoured the acting-for school, concluding “If ‘to represent’ as an 
activity is to have a substantive meaning, it must be ‘to act in the interest of’ or ‘to act 
according to the wishes of,’ or some such phrase” (1967, 208).   
Pitkin arranged the four concepts of representation in an hierarchy that revealed 
her preferences, as follows.  An ideal representative was a person who acted in our 
interest in public affairs.  If differences were irreconcilable, then we chose people who 
were descriptively like us to put our case.  Failing that, someone we believed in stood 
for us, symbolically.  As a last resort, we accepted representatives who were formally 
authorised in that role, in which case, “We can continue to obey, although we feel 
abused, or continue to remove a series of accountable representatives from office, 
although none of them serves our interest” (1967, 213). 
In a conference paper delivered in 1997, Przeworski defined representation 
exclusively in terms of Pitkin’s acting-in-the-interest-of ideal (1997, 1).  He provided 
four answers to his question of why a representative would choose to act in the interest 
of constituents, as follows. 
1. Representatives are “public spirited … [and] remain uncorrupted by power”; 
2. constituents choose “good candidates”; 
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3. constituents threaten to oust representatives that do not serve their interests;  or 
4. checks and balances within the institutions of government ensure that they do. 
These questions demonstrate that the acting-for conception has little relevance to this 
thesis.  Items 1 and 2 cannot be decided without making value judgments about the 
representatives, and items 3 and 4 have limited relevance to delegates who do not stand 
for re-election, or remain in office for an extended period.  
Pitkin’s four conceptions are not mutually exclusive.  All types of representatives 
may be formally authorised, constituents may feel symbolic attachment to any type of 
representative, a descriptive representative may mirror constituents’ opinions, and an 
acting-for representative may mirror constituents’ other personal characteristics.  The 
common ground between descriptive and acting-for representation is evident in 
Beaudoin-Edwards SJC report, referred to earlier in this chapter.  In recommending 
against constituent assemblies, the committee addressed at length the many claims that 
assemblies improved representation, as follows. 
One of the central arguments in favour of constituent assemblies is that they could be composed so 
as to contain a cross-section of Canadian society, and would thus provide better representation than 
other mechanisms.  … Our concern with this approach is that it assumes that political 
representation must involve sociological representation:  that only members of any particular group 
can speak for that group.  … The only person who can represent an individual, politically, is a 
person who broadly shares the political values and policy commitments of that individual.  … We 
do not say, here, that sociology is irrelevant to politics.  It is a reasonable supposition that people 
whose values are significantly formed by their experiences as ethnic minorities, people in poverty, 
or members of other interests groups will, on the whole, find their most compelling representatives 
among others who have shared those experiences.  This means that a process of political 
representation dominated by members of any particular social, economic or other particular interest 
may appropriately be viewed with suspicion.  It does not mean, however, that political 
representation can be, as it were, constructed artificially through some magic combination of socio-
economic, ethnic, gender, vocational and other representatives.  Ways need to be found to ensure 
that their voices are heard, and that they receive adequate responses, when the particular interests 
of minorities are at stake in constitutional change (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 47-48).    
 
The authors conceded that political values, experience, and identity were linked, and 
that “[t]he only person who can represent an individual, politically, is a person who 
broadly shares the political values and policy commitments of that individual”, but they 
rejected a new assembly process that could facilitate the inclusion of persons who 
‘mirror’ the constitutional preferences of those they represent. 
Nearly thirty years after Pitkin, Anne Phillips published a staunch defence of 
descriptive representation, and coined the phrase “the politics of presence”.  Phillips 
argued that the slippery slope argument about the need to represent an endless range of 
characteristics was misleading.  The point was not to mirror the community, but to 
identify and address systematic exclusion and disadvantage, and to ensure that those 
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voices were heard when representatives debated public policy.  There was no guarantee, 
of course, that a person who resembles another would act like them.   
If we were to be strict in our definitions, we would have to say that representatives only ‘really’ 
represent their constituents on the issues that were explicitly debated in the course of the election 
campaign.  On everything else, the representatives have to fall back on their own judgment or their 
own prejudice.  ... Whether these candidates are male or female, black or white, recent or long-ago 
migrants, can then become of major significance (Phillips 1995, 43). 
 
For Phillips, “It is more a question of challenging existing exclusions, and opening up 
opportunities for different issues or concerns to be developed” (1995, 55).  As Marian 
Sawer put it in 1999, “All mirrors distort and the point is not to remove all distortions, 
only those that produce undesirable effects in terms of representation and 
responsiveness” (1999, 98).  Personal (descriptive) characteristics matter because 
opinions are formed at least in part by identities and experiences.  
For this thesis, representativeness is measured using both the descriptive and 
acting-for conceptions of representation.  The formalistic conception is not used because 
it is meaningless here – all delegates to the Australian and Canadian assemblies were 
authorised directly or indirectly to represent constituents, and constituents were in some 
sense bound by delegates’ decisions.  The symbolic conception is not used because that 
conception is more amenable to use where just one person such as a monarch or a 
governor-general represents the community, and data are not available to determine 
whether constituents identified emotionally with the delegates who represented them.   
Descriptive characteristics are included in the analysis according to their 
relevance, and whether data are available.  Relevant characteristics include the 
geographic distribution of delegates by place of residence (because the results of 
referenda and plebiscites are tallied by state and province), and variables that are 
claimed to correlate with constitutional preferences – place of birth, age, gender, and 
formal education.  The spread of constitutional preferences among delegates and 
constituents are also compared, which incorporates ‘acting according to the wishes of’ 
school.  The ‘acting in the interest of’ concept of representation (the Burkean model) is 
not used because the writer would need to make value judgments about which 
constitutional option best served constituents’ interests. 
Public Interest 
How can we know if an assembly generated more public interest?  In the 
Australian case, how can we claim there is much interest at all, when many Australians 
do not know they have a constitution, and many think the constitution includes a bill of 
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rights?  The 1996 Australian Election Study Survey, for example, found that 29% agreed 
with the statement “The constitution can only be changed by the High Court” 
(McAllister 2002, 94).  This is an extraordinary finding given that just eight years 
earlier, 94% of Australian electors attended the polls to cast their votes on four 
proposals to amend the constitution. 
The Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 1999 was designed, in part, to 
gauge interest in the 1998-99 constitutional debate.  This survey, conducted immediately 
after the referenda were held, asked 3,431 people seven questions to measure their 
interest in the republic debate, and in politics in general.  The questions were: 
• Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what’s going on in politics? 
• In the weeks leading up to the polling day, how much attention did you pay to reports about 
the referendum in newspapers ... ? 
• ... did you follow the referendum news on television ...? 
• And did you follow the referendum campaign news on the radio? 
• And how much interest would you say you took in the referendum campaign overall? 
• And over the last few weeks how much would you say you have discussed the referendum with 
family, friends or others? 
• Would you say you cared a good deal about the outcome of the referendum ...? (Gow, Bean 
and McAllister 2000, 2-6). 
 
Analysis of the answers to these questions showed that respondents were slightly less 
interested in the referenda campaign than they were in politics generally (78% and 81% 
respectively answered ‘a good deal’ or ‘some’), most respondents followed media 
coverage, or discussed the referendum with others (range 52% for radio, to 78% for 
discussion with others), and 71% ‘cared a good deal’ about the outcomes of the 
referenda (Gow et al. 2000, 206).  The survey does not answer the question posed in this 
thesis, however, because it was not designed to measure public interest in the republic 
assembly compared to other constitutional inquiries.  The study is useful, nonetheless, 
for suggesting reported behaviour as a measure of interest rather than other proxy 
measures, such as media coverage and the participation of interest groups. 
For this thesis, interest is measured by the number of public submissions made to 
the assemblies, and public attendance at assembly sessions.  These data are compared to 
similar data for constitutional conferences where parliamentarians or their nominees 
convened alone;  other relevant data are considered as appropriate.    
Consensus 
Literally, the word consensus means unanimity –  “[g]eneral concord of different 
organs of the body in effecting a given purpose … Agreement in opinion” (SOED 1970, 
374).  A more recent edition of the same dictionary defined the word less rigorously to 
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mean “agreement or unity of opinion, etc;  the majority view, a collective opinion” 
(SOED 2002, 491).  It is difficult to find a definition in specialist politics dictionaries, 
but under an entry for consensus, Jaensch and Teichmann wrote: 
The theories of consensus and its close relative, pluralism, assume that all competing interests and 
groups are in principle reconcilable, whereas more recent research and observation (not to mention 
common sense) suggests that they may not be, and that attempts to satisfy all groups’ claims can 
produce a degree of systemic overload leading to immobilism (Jaensch and Teichmann 1992, 57). 
 
They did not define the word consensus directly, but they did suggest that consensus 
was unanimity, and added that the pursuit of it could cause serious problems because 
bargaining, for example, was required to reach unanimity.   
Jane Mansbridge covered the subject differently in Beyond Adversary Democracy 
(1980, 31-33), where she defined consensus to mean:  
a form of decision making in which, after discussion, one or more members of the assembly sum up 
prevailing sentiment, and if no objections are voiced, this becomes agreed-on policy (1980, 32).   
 
She noted “[t]he decision rule of consensus also baffles most people who think in 
adversary terms”.  According to Mansbridge, a consensual process does not include 
formal voting or techniques like bargaining, which could lead to Jaensch and 
Teichmann’s “systemic overload”.  Rather,  
[g]roups that are accustomed to using consensus find it hard to recognize and to legitimate conflicts 
of interest by allowing bargains, distributing benefits proportionately, taking turns, or making 
decisions by majority rule(Mansbridge 1980, 33).   
 
The Australian assembly did not function under “the decision rule of consensus”, but it 
did frequently reach agreement in the manner described by Mansbridge.  On many 
occasions delegates agreed to adjourn or to adopt particular procedures, and they did so 
without voting or bargaining – one or more people made a suggestion, there was no 
disagreement, so the suggestion was adopted.  By contrast, the formal decisions were 
made by casting votes (undoubtedly with a fair measure of background bargaining), and 
the assembly did not agree unanimously to any proposition that was put to them in a 
formal ballot.   
For this thesis, the question is whether the Australian and Canadian assemblies 
were better able to reach consensus about constitutional change than would have been 
the case if parliamentarians convened alone.  This is a relative question, which can be 
answered using the following method.   
If every member of a group supported or opposed a proposition, then it reached 
consensus, as defined by Mansbridge.  If no group achieved this outcome, then the 
group that was better able to reach consensus is the group where the highest proportion 
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of members agreed to support or oppose a proposition.  If, for example, a proposition 
was put to three groups, and the Yes vote was 65% for group A, 60% for group B, and 
58% for group C, then the group that was better able to reach consensus is group A, 
because more of its members were of one mind.  If the Yes vote was 70% for group A, 
60% for group B, and 10% for group C, then group C is better able to reach consensus 
because more of its members were of one mind – 90% voted No.   
The word consensus is used in this thesis so as not to lose sight of the possibility 
that parliamentarians and constituents could reach unanimous agreement on 
constitutional rules that bind them.  As noted by Bayne above, 98% of delegates to the 
Alaskan assembly, and 85% of the voters, agreed on their constitution in 1956.  Closer 
to home, 91% of Australian voters agreed to change the constitution in 1967 to count 
‘aboriginals’ in the census and to allow the federal government to legislate for them.  
More recently, 88% of the delegates to the 1998 Australian Constitutional Convention 
agreed that a republic proposal should be put to referendum (PM&C 1998b, 992-994), 
and when the Constitution Alteration (Establishment of a Republic) Bill 1999 passed the 
lower house on 9 August 1999, the Yes vote was 94%.  At the Renewal of Canada 
Conferences in 1992, delegates “with almost no exception” opposed federal proposals to 
entrench a requirement for the Bank of Canada to preserve price stability (Government 
of Canada 1992, M17).  The Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC also disagreed with the proposal, 
and the first ministers did not pursue it.  In 1992, all of Canada’s first ministers agreed 
to 54 proposals about constitutional change (analysis of Governments of Canada 1992a; 
 and Governments of Canada 1992c). 
Partisanship 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles defined the word 
partisan as follows:  
n. An adherent or supporter of a party, person, or cause;  esp. a zealous supporter;  a prejudiced, 
unreasoning, or fanatical adherent. …  
adj. Of, pertaining to, or characteristic of a partisan;  supporting a party, esp. zealously;  
prejudiced, one-sided (SOED 2002, 2108).   
 
An earlier edition of the same work dated the first use of the term “partisan politics” to 
1882 (SOED 1970, 1439), but the term is rarely defined in specialist politics 
dictionaries.  It is not defined in two Australian politics dictionaries that are common 
sources for tertiary students (Jaensch and Teichmann 1992;  and Robertson, David 
1985).  Even in specialist academic journals, the word is used without any attempt to 
define it.  Authors of an article titled “On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call voting:  
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The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999” did not define the word partisanship, 
but the way they used the phrases “party influence” and “party pressure” suggested this 
was what they meant by partisanship (Cox and Poole 2002).   
Fortunately, Magill’s dictionary of social sciences terms included an entry for 
partisanship, where it is defined to mean “Behaviour of politicians in support of the 
principles or interests of their own political party” (Magill 1995, 2215 vol 5).  Riemer 
discussed representation 40 years ago using a typology which classified parliamentarians 
as “trustees”, “delegates”, “partisans”, or “politicos” (1967, 1-7), and observed then that 
writers meant different things when they used these words.  According to Riemer, 
authors could mean:  trustees acted according to what they thought best served 
constituents’ interests, or they were “conceited, unresponsive, phoney aristocrat[s]”;  
delegates voted according to the majority opinion of their constituents, or they were 
“fearful, spineless lackey[s] of the multitude”;  partisans followed the party line, or they 
were “cowardly, party rubber-stamp[s]”;  politicos adopted one of the three other types 
to suit the circumstances, or they were “wishy-washy, cynical Machiavellian[s]” 
(Riemer 1967, 1-2).12  As was the case for Magill, the core of these interpretations was 
party loyalty.  
The differences between the definitions in the SOED, Magill, and Riemer 
highlight the slipperiness of the word, and perhaps why the authors reviewed in this 
chapter did not define what they meant by it.  According to one definition in the SOED, 
a partisan is a person who is biased, unyielding, and even bigoted, whilst according to 
Magill and the classification scheme in Riemer, a partisan is a person who follows or 
supports a political party.  Both usages are current.  Who is to judge whether a person is 
following others, or following their own convictions.  Naturally enough, people join 
groups that share their views.   
For this thesis, definitions from Magill and Riemer are adapted to define a partisan 
to be a person who does not waver from a constitutional option.  The thesis question 
then becomes whether the non-parliamentary delegates at the assemblies changed their 
constitutional preferences more or less often than did the parliamentary delegates.   
The rider about judging whether a delegate is a follower applies, along with an 
                                                 
12
 When the word delegate is used in this thesis for people who convened to debate constitutional change, 
neither of these meaning is intended.  La Nauze noted that officially, members of the 1891 National 
Australian Federation Convention were “delegates” (as they were in 1998), whilst members of the 1897-
98 National Australasian Convention were “representatives”, but the terms were used “indifferently” 
(1972, vii).  I chose “delegate” to simplify discussion of representation and representativeness.  
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acknowledgement that it may not be valid to apply a definition centred on party politics 
to delegates who do not participants in constitutional debates as members of political 
parties.13  Arguably, the definition is applicable to the Australian case because 26% of 
the delegates were serving parliamentarians with party allegiances (excluding one 
independent), and 50% were directly elected using campaign statements that declared 
their views on Australia becoming a republic.  That does, however, leave out 24% of the 
members (the community representatives appointed by the federal government) whose 
party or known position on the constitution was not necessarily a factor in the decision 
to choose them as delegates.  While it may not be valid to measure their partisanship 
using a definition derived from an analysis of party politics, the definition proposed 
above is adopted for want of an alternative.  The issue does not arise for the Canadian 
case, because the question about partisanship could not be answered.   
The next four chapters discuss the process of federation, and constitutional change 
in Australia and Canada since federation (chapters three and five), and evaluate the use 
of the constituent assembly method to debate proposals for an Australian republic in 
1998, and the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 (chapters four and six). 
                                                 
13
 I am indebted to David Adams for making this point. 
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CHAPTER THREE – AUSTRALIA 
 
This chapter examines the process of formal constitutional change in Australia from the 
federation conference of 1890 to the republic referendum of 1999.  It provides context 
for the 1998 assembly, most particularly for the use of the constituent assembly method 
to achieve federation, and the extent to which the public was involved in debating 
formal constitutional change.   
The first section outlines landmark events in the process of federation from 1890 
to 1900, then evaluates some different opinions about the importance of public 
participation in the debates.  The second section outlines the rules for changing 
Australia’s constitution, and Australia’s many attempts to achieve change.  The number 
of constitutional referenda that were held is covered briefly, but explanations for why so 
many proposals were not ratified are not covered because this subject was examined in 
the first chapter.  
The third section examines the frequency and outcomes for 14 federal 
constitutional inquiries in detail.  The question here is whether inquiries are an effective 
way to achieve formal constitutional change.  An analysis of the association between 
these inquiries and the 44 questions put to referenda shows that when questions are put 
to referenda as recommended by an inquiry, they are twice as likely to pass, compared to 
amendments that are not recommended by inquiries.  It is acknowledged, however, that 
this conclusion may be unreliable because it is based on 14 cases only.   
FEDERATION 
 The Commonwealth of Australia was created by an act of the British Parliament.  
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) was passed by the British 
parliament on 5 July 1900, received royal assent on 9 July 1900, and was proclaimed on 
17 September 1900.  On 1 January 1901, the ninth clause of that Act came into force as 
Australia’s constitution, uniting six self-governing British colonies under a federal 
umbrella.  This formal legal outline may suggest that federation was a British affair, but 
this was not the case.  The Australian constitution was almost entirely home-grown – it 
was the product of an “earthy process” (Crisp 1978, 5).  Further, the Australian journey 
to federation through initiation, negotiation, and ratification was long, and procedurally 
diverse (see figure 3.1 at page 71).   
For as many as fifty years, colonial parliamentarians, legal experts, notables, and 
British subjects debated the merits of federation.  According to Crisp, an early sign that 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
70
 
federation was coming was the British Privy Council’s recommendation in 1849 that 
inter-colonial trade should be free of differential tariffs;  another was the formation of 
the Federal Council of Australasia in 1885 (1978, 3, 5-7).  The council was a federal 
style body, but the colonies were not bound to participate, and some did not.  The 
council also lacked financial and executive powers, and its legislative powers were 
limited (Parkes 1890, 3; Quick and Garran 1976, 111-112; La Nauze 1972, 2-4).  La 
Nauze described the council as “no more than a kind of stamping-machine”, responsive 
to colonial wishes, and subject to Britain’s legislative veto (1972, 3).  Crisp concluded 
that the council was “shadowy, never fully representative, and consequently ineffectual 
... [a] whited sepulchre which held its last (eighth) biennial session in 1899 and sank 
into oblivion” (1978, 6-7).  La Nauze maintained the council was important, 
nonetheless, but it suffered by comparison with the federation which was formed just 
two years after the last council meeting (1972, 3-4). 
Henry Parkes, five times premier of New South Wales, advocated federation at the 
1867 inter-colonial conference (Quick and Garran 1976, 103-104; Headon 1998b, 23).  
According to Crisp, the time Parkes spent in Canada between 1882 and 1884 may have 
influenced his decision (1978, 7), but Garran claimed the link was tenuous (1958, 90).  
There is, nevertheless, some evidence that events in Canada did influence the Australian 
founders.  In 1889 Charles Kingston, premier of South Australia, cited the Québec 
meeting of 1864 to support his argument that an enlarged Federal Council was an 
appropriate forum for negotiating a federal division of powers (La Nauze 1972, 5).  In 
the same year, Parkes wrote to Duncan Gillies, premier of Victoria:  “The scheme of 
federal government, it is assumed, would necessarily follow close upon the type of the 
Dominion Government of Canada” (Quick and Garran 1976, 118-119).   
On 24 October 1889, Parkes told his constituents at Tenterfield in New South 
Wales that a parliamentary convention should debate federation.  He called for   
a convention of leading men from all the colonies, delegates appointed by the authority of 
Parliament ... to devise the constitution which would be necessary for bringing into existence a 
federal government with a federal parliament ... a parliament of two houses, a house of commons 
and a senate ... [whilst leaving colonial governments] just as effective as now in all local matters 
(Sydney Morning Herald 1889).14 
 
                                                 
14
 Parkes’ version of the speech (1890, 1-6) differs from the one that is published in the Herald (and 
reproduced in Halliday 1999).  While Parkes wrote “Some of the reports of these speeches were very 
imperfect ... No attempt has been made to supply these deficiencies” (1890, vii), the Herald version 
includes a more strident criticism of the Federal Council and the NSW Parliament, a defence of free trade, 
and a promise of electoral reform that are not found in his version.  Text cited here appears in all versions. 
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In 1901 Quick and Garran called this address a “famous speech” (1976, 118).  Garran 
made a similar claim more than fifty years later when he wrote “some sort of a report [of 
the speech] was flashed over Australia, and ... it rang like a trumpet-call” (1958, 91).   
The mechanisms used to achieve federation were diverse – they covered the full 
spectrum from unilateralism at Westminster, to multi-lateral negotiations between 
colonial parliamentarians, to binding referenda (see figure 3.1 below, and table 3.2 on 
page 83).  Between 1890 and 1900, colonial parliamentarians and constituents gathered 
to debate the issue formally on at least nine occasions, and constituents turned out for 
ten referenda to deliver their judgement on two draft constitutions, but Australia did not 
become a federation until 1901, five years after Parkes died.   
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Figure 3.1:  Federation timeline 1890-1900 
 
An early landmark in the journey to federation was the 1890 Federation Conference, 
which convened at Melbourne from 6 February.  Its delegates were 13 premiers and 
ministers – two each from New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, South 
Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria, and one from Western Australia.  The conference 
resolved to consider union, and to hold a constitutional convention.   
Next, the 1891 National Australasian Federation Convention (NAFC) convened in 
Sydney from 2 March to 9 April, with Henry Parkes in the chair.  Its delegates were 45 
legislators, seven from each of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, 
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Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, and three from New Zealand;  this was the 
last time that New Zealand participated in Australia’s federation debates.  NAFC 
produced a draft constitution, the Commonwealth Bill of 1891.  Soon after, the bill was 
“set aside” for six years due to a lack of public interest and political will, changes in the 
political composition of legislatures, and faltering leadership from New South Wales 
(La Nauze 1972, 87-90; Quick and Garran 1976, 143-159).  Even so, Parkes’ leadership 
at NAFC earned him the title ‘Father of Federation’, according to Garran (1958, 91).   
Unprecedented public participation provided the spur for inter-government 
negotiations, which continued for the remainder of the journey.  In 1893, two years after 
NAFC, the New South Wales and Victorian Federation Leagues invited representatives 
of civic groups and local government to meet at the New South Wales border town of 
Corowa to debate federation for two days.  Some 72 members of federation interest 
groups, commercial interest groups, and local government accepted the invitation (see 
table 3.1).  As Quick and Garran explained it, harsh economic times stimulated public 
interest in federation:  “the people began to wake up to the fact that the ‘fad of 
Federation’ with which politicians and Parliaments had been dallying so long, meant the 
salvation of Australia” (1976, 150).  Perhaps people hoped that financial cooperation 
across a new federation would lift the colonial economies out of depression – through 
free trade and uniform customs, for example.  The delegates at Corowa resolved in 1893 
that an elected constituent assembly should be held, and that a draft constitution should 
be put to referenda.  Delegates also drafted enabling legislation for the colonial 
parliaments.  Quick and Garran claimed that Corowa’s forward plan for federation was 
crucial to the achievement of federation.  Most of the colonial leaders had agreed at the 
1895 Premiers’ Conference to hold an elected constituent assembly and a referendum, 
but it was some time before practical steps were taken to implement that decision.  
In the meantime, a second unofficial conference convened at Bathurst in New 
South Wales in 1896.  The People’s Federal Convention comprised 211 delegates who 
were invited to participate by extra-parliamentary groups.  The convention agreed that 
the 1891 draft constitution should be adopted as a starting point for assembly debates.   
Official preparations for the National Australasian Convention (NAC) – the 
constituent assembly – began in earnest in 1897.  Four governments kept to the original 
agreement and called elections for ten seats each, while Queensland decided not to send 
delegates, and the Western Australian legislature chose its ten delegates directly.  
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
73
 
According to Crisp, Queensland did not participate because it was preoccupied with 
disagreements about the influx of “non-white” migrants, and the Queensland parliament 
did not agree on who the delegates should be (1978, 8-9).  The Western Australian 
parliament appointed its delegates because it (or at least the colony’s “‘ruling classes’”) 
was concerned about the influence of newly arrived colonists on an election result;  the 
population of Western Australia had almost quadrupled between 1890 and 1900, and 
many of these new arrivals were known to be relatively radical (Crisp 1978, 9-10).    
Competition for seats at the 1897 assembly was not strong by today’s standards, 
with fewer than four people standing for each vacancy.  The New South Wales election 
was the most competitive with five candidates on average for each vacancy, while the 
Victorian election was the least competitive with about three candidates for each 
vacancy;  by contrast, there were about eight candidates for each seat at the 1998 
assembly.  All but six of the 50 candidates elected to NAC were serving 
parliamentarians, though non-parliamentarians did stand for election.15     
The NAC convened for about 17 weeks in three sessions that were held between 
22 March 1897 and 17 March 1898.  The first session convened at Adelaide – less than 
three weeks after the election – and adjourned some six weeks later, having resolved 
that the colonies should federate.  The second session convened at Sydney on 2 
September for about three weeks of further debate, negotiation, and redrafting of the 
1891 draft constitution.  The third and final session convened at Melbourne on 20 
January 1898, agreed on a draft constitution some eight weeks later, and adjourned for 
the last time on 17 March 1898.  This assembly used an open process, compared to the 
inter-government meetings that preceded it in 1890, 1891, and 1895.  All three sessions 
of NAC were open to the public and the media.     
The 1898 draft was put to referenda in four colonies in June 1898, when it passed 
in three colonies but did not pass in New South Wales.  Even though the result for the 
New South Wales was 71,595 Yes (52%) and 66,228 No (48%), the Yes vote fell short 
of the threshold of 80,000 votes required in that colony (Scott, Ernest 1953).  After the 
1899 Premiers’ Conference amended the second draft to better suit New South Wales 
and Queensland (Quick and Garran 1976, 220), the third draft was put to referenda in  
                                                 
15
 The exceptions were James Walker and Bernard Wise (NSW), Josiah Symon, Patrick McMahon Glynn, 
and James Henderson (South Australia), and John Quick (Victoria). 
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five colonies during 1899, and it passed.  Western Australia did not put the proposal to 
referendum at this stage. 
Unilateralism was the hallmark of the final stage of the journey.  In accordance 
with a resolution of the 1900 premiers’ conference, six delegates representing the six 
colonial parliaments (including Western Australia and Queensland) carried the 1899 
draft to Westminster for approval.  Approval was granted, but only after it was 
amended, despite protests from the colonial delegation (Quick and Garran 1976, 228-
249; La Nauze 1972, 248-269).  Westminster insisted, for example, that the Australian 
constitution must include a right of appeal to the British Privy Council, and on this they 
prevailed, via section 74.  It was to be another 86 years before the Australian and British 
parliaments passed the Australia Acts of 1986, which made the Australian High Court 
the final court of appeal against judgments delivered by state and territory courts (ss 11, 
16).  State supreme courts could still apply to the High Court for leave to appeal against 
judgments delivered by superior courts about inter-state or federal-state powers (“inter 
se” matters), but according to Saunders, “The High Court has made it clear that 
certificates will no longer be given” (1997, 82-84). 
Enabling legislation was passed by the British parliament on 5 July 1900, and 
received royal assent on 9 July.  Western Australia – Australia’s reluctant founding 
colony – held its referendum on 31 July and voters approved the constitution.  This was 
just before the constitution was proclaimed in September, but not soon enough to 
include Western Australia in the preamble. 
Discussion 
Federation was achieved through a mix of inter-government agreement, public 
participation, and supra-national intervention, but which particular people and events 
were critical to success?  Was it Henry Parkes’ “famous speech” at Tenterfield in 1889, 
or was it the unprecedented public participation in the debate?  The importance of 
public participation is particularly relevant to this thesis because federation was 
achieved through a constituent assembly. 
The importance of Henry Parkes 
Historical accounts differ about the importance of both Henry Parkes and public 
participation.  Some authors claim Henry Parkes was the “Father of Federation” 
(National Library of Australia c. 2001;  but not Parliamentary Library 2001).  In 1893 
Parkes was described by a contemporary as “one of the most consistent supporters of the 
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[federal] movement in Australia” (Wilson 1893, 5).  Critics dispute this claim, however, 
arguing that public knowledge of his 1889 Tenterfield oration was limited, and that his 
support for federation was erratic.  The media did give scant attention to the speech, 
except for comprehensive coverage in The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney Morning 
Herald 1889, 8).  According to Shaw and Fredman, it is unlikely that the speech inspired 
much interest in federation beyond the New South Wales colony (Shaw 1990, 6-8; 
Fredman 1963, 62).   
Parkes’ commitment to federation was intermittent and self-interested, according 
to his critics.  Blainey wrote “He liked to elevate federation as his first priority only 
when it suited his own political agenda in Sydney” (2000).  While acknowledging the 
importance of Parkes’ correspondence with premiers in 1889, Shaw claimed that the 
lack of progress on federation in the early 1890s was due in large part to Parkes’ 
inaction when he was premier, and more generally to his “singularly intermittent” 
interest (1990, 5, 8, 10).  In October 1891 Parkes resigned his seat in the New South 
Wales assembly without securing the passage of enabling legislation through the 
assembly, even though he had chaired NAFC, provided a draft constitution to it, and 
concluded that the negotiated outcome was “a wise, temperate, and successful 
compromise” (Quick and Garran 1976, 123-126, 141).  La Nauze defended Parkes’ 
inaction, attributing it to his tenuous hold on power at the time (1972, 89).  He governed 
from June to October 1891 only with the support of Labor members who were elected 
for the first time in the colony that year.  Martin claimed he feared that opponents would 
make much of his spending time on the federation issue rather than on other pressing 
matters (c. 2000);  indeed, as New South Wales premier in 1889, Parkes declared that 
local government was his first priority (Shaw 1990, 5).  This does not explain, however, 
why he declined an invitation to lead a delegation to Corowa in 1893 (Fredman 1963, 
63), and why he “stood aloof” in the same year when the Australasian Federation 
League was formed, saying that the idea was his (Quick and Garran 1976, 152).  By 
1895 Parkes had returned to the New South Wales assembly, and proposed federation 
again, though not as premier (Quick and Garran 1976, 158). 
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This evidence supports the conclusion reached here that Parkes’ role in federation 
was not pivotal, and that his commitment to federation was erratic.  As Crisp wrote so 
colourfully: 
He did not, however, now climb the nearby New England mountains and return with the 128 
Sections of the Commonwealth constitution rounded and polished upon tablets clutched in his 
arms.  Instead, the political leaders of the Colonies and others less eminent sweated for a decade in 
their drafting and in the campaigns for their adoption (1978, 7 emphasis added). 
 
As Blainey put it, “Parkes, at his best, was the grandfather of federation – no more – and 
at times he was the saboteur of federation” (2000). 
If there were a need to single out an individual whose work was pivotal in 
achieving federation, then a prime candidates would be John Quick.  In 1893, he 
established the Bendigo Federation League and served as its president, attended the 
1893 Corowa conference and there suggested a constituent assembly and referenda, 
drafted enabling legislation for the colonial legislatures, attended the 1896 convention, 
and was elected to the 1897-98 assembly;  he was awarded a knighthood in 1901 was 
“awarded a knighthood for his services to federation and in particular as originator of 
the procedure adopted for the enabling legislation for federation, which he had initiated 
at the Corowa conference” (Stephen 2004, 72-75).  In 1901 he published with Robert 
Garran The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, a comprehensive 
guide to the debates and the outcomes (Quick and Garran 1976).    
Was federation a ‘popular’ process? 
Authors differ also on whether federation was a ‘popular’ process, and about the 
importance of public participation to achieving federation.  The question is highly 
relevant to this thesis because many of the arguments about the value of constituent 
assemblies, reviewed in the second chapter, turn on whether increasing public 
participation in the process of formal constitutional change would have a positive or 
negative effect. 
Was federation a ‘popular’ process, and what does ‘popular’ mean?  The word 
‘popular’ is used in some of the discussions about the federation processes, but it is not 
defined directly (for example, Quick and Garran 1976, 150; Macintyre 1998b, 76; Hirst 
1998, 80-82; McMillan et al. 1983, 355-356).  The authors’ contexts, and the common 
meanings of the word are sufficient, nevertheless, to infer a definition. ‘Popular’ derives 
from the Latin popularis and populus, meaning “the people” and hence in law 
“Affecting, concerning, or open to all or any of the people;  public; esp. in action” 
(SOED 1970, 1545-1546).  Authors who use the word when they discuss constitutional 
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change often distinguish popular processes from parliamentary, government, and inter-
government processes, which suggests that ‘popular’ processes are those where the 
participants are members of the public rather than serving parliamentarians.  Recent 
historical reviews confirm this interpretation.  De Garis attributed the term ‘popular 
movement’ to Quick and Garran’s 1901 Annotated Constitution, and interpreted it to 
mean “the initiative [for federation] was taken by the people as opposed to politicians” 
(de Garis 1993, 101-102).  Irving elaborated: 
But the idea that ‘the people’ meant ‘not the politicians’ was not simply an obvious antonym ... in 
this time against the background of growing claims for participation and demands for broader 
political rights ... ‘People’ is a shorthand way of saying that certain processes must take place, 
processes inviting, indeed, requiring public debate, processes which cannot proceed on the 
parliament's initiative alone, without evidence of consent outside political elites (1997, 7, 9). 
 
According to Irving, then, public participation was essential to achieving federation.   
Writing just after federation, Quick and Garran claimed that some of the changes 
made to the constitution between 1891 and 1898 were due to “the more complete 
popular impulse of the later stages of the federal movement” (1976, 135, 150-165, 255-
260).  In 1972, La Nauze drew on Quick and Garran heavily, writing “The historical 
sections of [Quick and Garran’s] work ... are still the best formal summaries” of 
federation processes (1972, v), but he did not refer to Corowa in his book, and referred 
to Bathurst only indirectly (1972, 95).  While the historical accounts of federation in 
both works are of equivalent length (Quick and Garran 261 pages, La Nauze 288 pages), 
Quick and Garran devoted some 20 of the pages of their book to the popular movement 
(7.66%), but La Nauze barely mentioned it (less than 0.03%).  He did not index or name 
the Corowa conference at all, referring to it only briefly on page 90, as follows. 
In July of that year [1893] a plan for reviving the active consideration of a constitution was 
propounded by a Victorian lawyer, John Quick, and others may have had similar ideas.  
 
The Bathurst conference is indexed to page 95, where he wrote:   
Pamphleteers, statisticians, the great Sir Samuel Griffith himself, most recently the unofficial 
‘People’s’ Federal Convention meeting in November 1896 at Bathurst in New South Wales, had 
discussed the difficulties of devising a scheme for the equitable distribution of the ‘surplus’ 
revenue of a Commonwealth to which the sole power of imposing custos duties would pass.   
 
These cursory references suggest that he gave little or no weight to public participation 
in the federation debates, beyond voting at referenda.  To be fair, he did write in his 
preface “My second purpose is to provide such aid as I can to the future author of a 
much-needed general history of the ‘federal movement’ [emphasis added]”, but earlier 
on the same page he wrote that the book was “about the making and the makers of the 
Constitution” (La Nauze 1972, v, emphasis added).  The first quotation justifies a 
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minimum coverage of Corowa and Bathurst in the expectation that others would fill the 
gap, but the second quotation requires at least some cover of the Corowa and Bathurst 
conferences.  
Other authors claim that the 1895 Premiers’ Conference was “the pivotal event” in 
the 1890s, not the Corowa or Bathurst conferences (de Garis 1993, 107), and that the 
Bathurst conference was not significant because the premiers had already decided to 
hold an elected convention, and put the constitution to referendum (Macintyre 1998b, 
78).  The premiers had indeed taken that decision, but they did not implement it until 
after the Bathurst conference – a delay of some 22 months. 
Without the unofficial Corowa Conference, federation may have stalled for longer 
than four years following the 1891 Federation Convention.  Indeed, the 1891 draft 
constitution had lapsed when the New South Wales and Victorian Federation Leagues 
initiated the Corowa Conference in 1893.  In 1895, the issue of an elected constitutional 
convention was back on the table at the premiers’ conference.  The premiers resolved to 
hold an elected convention, but did little or nothing to fulfil that promise until the newly 
formed Bathurst Federation League convened the 1896 conference, and reminded 
parliamentarians again about public interest in federation (Australasian Federation 
League 1897, 14).  Less than four months after the Bathurst conference, convention 
elections were held, and the first session of the National Australasian Convention 
convened.  The sequence of events suggests that public participation provided the 
necessary impetus for the federation journey.   
Quick and Garran attributed some of the text of the constitution to public 
participation (1976, 135, 287).  Irving linked the final form of section 41 (the franchise), 
section 113 (state regulation of liquor), the preamble, and the oath of office to the 
participation of women in the debates (1996, 15-16).  By contrast, 50 years after 
federation Garran credited women with only a traditional wifely role when he wrote: 
Perhaps, in dealing with the Fathers, it would not be amiss to say a word or two about the Mothers 
of Federation who kept the home fires burning while their husbands were engaged with the 
attractions of this new venture.  They had a rather thin time (Garran 1958, 197). 
 
Women were, in fact, active as individuals, and as members of groups in the late 1890s. 
Women were active on both sides of the federation debate (Irving 1995, 68-74; 
Irving 1996, 5-8).  They campaigned for female suffrage, control of alcohol and opium, 
and recognition of God in the constitution.  They signed petitions, wrote letters to the 
press, attended public meetings, and voted in South Australia and Western Australia.  
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Maybanke Wolstenholme campaigned for federation through the Women's Federal 
League, which she formed in 1898;  opposite her were the anti-federalist orators Rose 
Scott and Belle Golding representing the Womanhood Suffrage League.  According to 
Irving, an intensive pro-federation campaign waged by the Hay Women’s Federal 
League before the second New South Wales referendum may have tipped the scales 
toward federation.  Women in two states also voted, and one stood for office.  Women 
could vote and stand for election to the South Australian legislature from 1894, and the 
federal parliament from 1902, but women were not so empowered for the remaining five 
state legislatures until 1923 (Cass and Rubenstein 1996, 119). 
Women were also prominent as individuals.  Catherine Helen Spence stood for 
election as a South Australian delegate to the 1897 assembly unsuccessfully, although 
she won more than 7,000 votes (Cass and Rubenstein 1996, 117).  She argued that her 
campaign was frustrated by Kingston’s claim that her candidature was unconstitutional, 
and other jibes such as James Hutchison’s call for her name to be removed from the “10 
best men” list (Spence 1997 [1910], 81).     
Critics of the popular process thesis also argue that parliamentarians engineered 
public support, and participants were not representative of the wider community.  
According to Macintyre, the Corowa and Bathurst conferences “[stand] in the received 
history of Australian federation as an expression of the popular movement for 
federation” (1998b, 77), but both were orchestrated by leading parliamentarians, and 
“stage-managed” to achieve desired goals (Macintyre 1994, 10; Macintyre 1998a, 10;  
also Headon 1998b, 26-27;  for evidence, see de Garis 1993, 103-105).  This claim is 
supported to a point by the evidence, because parliamentarians did lead the formation of 
the two main pro-federal interest groups – the Australian Natives Association, and the 
Australasian Federation League (Wilson 1893, 3-4; Quick and Garran 1976, 151-152).  
However, analysis of the Corowa and Bathurst conference proceedings shows that only 
eight delegates attended both meetings (Corowa Conference 1893, 6-7; Australasian 
Federation League 1897, 6-11).  If the conferences were “stage managed”, one would 
expect that at least some individuals would attend both meetings, and that more than 10 
people from the Victorian colony would attend the Bathurst conference.  
Parliamentarians were a minority at both gatherings – they comprised 8% at Corowa, 
and 9% at Bathurst. 
Bannon argued that Bathurst delegates were not representative of the population;  
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“the ‘people’ of the Bathurst People’s Convention were really the people of New South 
Wales” (1998, 74;  see also Quick and Garran 1976, 163).  But 60 years after attending 
the Bathurst Convention, Robert Garran wrote:  
its personnel was thoroughly representative - there were lawyers, doctors, clergymen, farmers, 
pastoralists, merchants, shopkeepers, Members of Parliament, journalists, professors, civil servants, 
and even an undertaker - almost everyone, in fact, who was interested enough to want to be there 
(1958, 108). 
 
It might be concluded from these citations that Garran changed his mind about 
representation, some time between writing with Quick in 1901 and writing alone in 
1958, but that is not the case.  The 1901 work said the conference was unrepresentative 
because New South Wales dominated the Bathurst conference, whilst in 1958 Garran 
emphasised delegates’ diverse occupations, not where they lived.  
  Bannon is correct to claim that Corowa and Bathurst delegates were not 
representative of population distribution across the colonies at the time (see table 3.1).   
Table 3.1:  Corowa and Bathurst federation conference participants 
 
 Column percent 
 Corowa 1893 
(n=72) 
Bathurst 1896 
(n=211) 
By group 
- Federation Leagues 
- Australian Natives’ Association 
- Progress Committee 
- Local government 
- Chamber of Commerce 
- Commercial Travellers' Association 
- “Invited guest” 
- Progress Association 
- Others 
 
63 
11 
7 
3 
3 
1 
- 
- 
13 
 
24 
8 
- 
43 
1 
2 
15 
2 
6 
By colony   
- Victoria 
- New South Wales 
- South Australia 
- Queensland 
- Tasmania 
- Western Australia 
57 
43 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10 
86 
1 
1 
0.5 
0.5 
Serving parliamentarians 8 9 
 
Note:  the ‘Others’ category includes groups of fewer than three delegates, and one unaffiliated Bathurst delegate.  
(Source:  analysis of lists in Corowa Conference 1893, 6-7;   and Australasian Federation League 1897, 6-11) 
 
All of the Corowa delegates were from New South Wales and Victoria, and 96% of the 
Bathurst delegates represented the same two colonies, even though “delegates were 
invited from leagues and organizations of all kinds  `throughout Australia” (Quick and 
Garran 1976, 163).  The Corowa and Bathurst conferences were unrepresentative in  
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other ways, too.  Analysis of the conference lists shows that:   
• most Corowa delegates were listed as members of pro-federation interest groups; 
• almost all delegates represented organised interests (the exceptions at Bathurst were 
a small contingent of “invited guests”, and just one unaffiliated delegate);   
• federation leagues dominated Corowa (63%, down to 24% at Bathurst);  and 
• local government delegates dominated Bathurst (43%, up from 3% at Corowa).     
The most serious deficiencies were the under-representation of four of the six colonies, 
women, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait islanders. 
The argument about representation rises or falls on whether representation is 
measured in relative or absolute terms.  Conference delegates certainly did not mirror 
the demographics of the colonies.  All of the delegates were white men, despite the fact 
that women were enfranchised in South Australia in 1894, and there was some form of 
franchise for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in four colonies from the 1850s.  By 
contrast, if representativeness is considered in relative terms, the picture is different.  
There is ample evidence to support Hirst’s claim that Australian federation was more 
inclusive of constituents than was the case elsewhere at the time, especially in Canada 
and the United States (1998, esp. 82).   
The public participated at two unofficial conferences, and these conferences made 
a difference to federation outcomes.  Constituents elected NAC delegates, debates were 
comparatively open, and citizen participation made a difference to the text of the 
constitution.  Finally, political leaders looked to citizens to legitimate the Constitution 
by submitting it to ten referenda, and they enshrined a citizen veto over future formal 
constitutional change in section 128 of the constitution. The founders also instituted an 
elected rather than an appointed upper house.   
Quick and Garran wrote in 1901 that federation was secured by a judicious mix of 
an elected convention, referenda, and colonial legislative processes which: 
secured popular interest ... conciliated the Parliaments by giving them a voice in initiating the 
process, a voice in criticizing the Constitution before its completion, and a voice in requesting the 
enactment of the Constitution after acceptance.  In other words, whilst necessarily assigning to a 
single body, representative of all the colonies, the task of framing the Constitution in the first 
instance and finally revising it, it ensured that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the several 
colonies should be consulted at every stage – in initiation, in deliberation, and in adoption.  And 
lastly, by making statutory provisions in advance for every step of the process, it ensured that the 
matter once begun should be brought to an issue.  No fuller security could have been given that the 
Constitution would be based upon the will of the people and of the people’s representatives (1976, 
160). 
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As Blainey put it:  
 
[N]o all-powerful cause spurred on the federal campaign. Even if there was one dominant cause, its 
existence cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt ... The constitution of 1901 was a web of 
compromises. In the past 100 years, those federal leaders who tried to change the constitution, and 
failed, usually overlooked that truth (Blainey 2000).  
 
That “web of compromises”, and federation itself, was the direct result of participation 
by colonial parliamentarians, and constituents.  The federation process was relatively 
popular in that much of the nineteenth century journey to federation was more inclusive 
and more open than was usual in Australia or elsewhere at the time. Constituents played 
a pivotal role in achieving federation.  They did so by initiating two unofficial ‘peoples 
conventions’ which kept the subject of federation on the political agenda, by 
participating directly in the constituent assembly of 1897-98 which produced Australia’s 
constitution, and by ratifying the constitution at referenda.  The federation process, and 
section 128 of the constitution, set the pattern for public involvement in changing the 
constitution in the twentieth century. 
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Table 3.2:  Landmarks on the road to federation, 1889-1900 
 
 
Date  
 
Event 
 
Participants 
 
Outcome 
 
1889 Oct 24  
 
Tenterfield Address 
 
Henry Parkes, NSW premier 
 
Suggested an appointed constitutional convention 
 
1890 Feb 6-14 
 
 
Federation Conference, Melbourne 
 
13 Australian and NZ premiers and ministers (two each from NSW, New 
Zealand, Qld, SA, Tasmania and Victoria, one from Western Australia) 
 
Resolved to consider union, and to convene the 1891 
Convention 
 
1891 Mar 2-Apr 9 
 
 
National Australasian Federation 
Convention, Sydney (NAFC) 
 
45 members of the colonial and New Zealand legislatures  
(7 each from NSW, Qld, SA, Tasmania, Victoria and WA, 3 from NZ)  
 
Agreed on a draft constitution, later to lapse 
 
1893 Jul 31-Aug 1 
 
Federation Conference, Corowa 
 
72 delegates representing the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria. 
 Sponsor: NSW and Victorian Federation Leagues.  
 
Recommended an elected convention, and that a draft 
constitution be put to referendum 
 
1895 Jan 29 
 
Premiers’ conference, Hobart 
 
Colonial premiers 
 
Majority agreed to a convention and referendum 
 
1896 Nov 17-21 
 
 
People’s Federal Convention, 
Bathurst 
 
213 delegates, mostly from local government interest groups:  NSW 182; 
Victoria 21; South Australia 3;  Queensland 3;  WA 3;  and Tasmania 1. 
 
Agreed to adopt the 1891 draft constitution as a starting 
point 
 
1897 Mar 4 
 
Convention elections 
 
Electors of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria 
 
Delegates elected to National Aust’asian Convention 
 
1897 Mar 22-May 5 
1897 Sep 2-24 
1898 Jan 20-Mar 17 
 
National Australasian Convention 
(NAC), three sessions at Adelaide, 
Sydney, and Melbourne 
 
50 colonial delegates: 10 each from NSW, SA, Tas, Vic, and WA;  none 
from Qld or New Zealand.  WA delegates chosen by the WA leglislature, 
all others elected by constituents.  All but six were parliamentarians.  
 
1st session:  decided to federate 
2nd session:  further debate, negotiation and drafting 
3rd session:  second draft constitution agreed 
 
1898 Jun 3-4 
 
Referenda, four colonies  
 
Electors of Vic, Tasmania, and NSW June 3, electors of SA June 4  
 
Fed. bills approved in Vic, Tas, and SA, but not NSW 
 
1899 Jan29-Feb 2 
 
Premiers’ conference, Melbourne 
 
Premiers 
 
Third draft constitution, amendments to suit NSW 
 
1899 Apr-Sep  
 
Referenda, five colonies 
 
Electors of South Australia (Apr 29), New South Wales (Jun 20), 
Victoria and Tasmania (Jul 27), and Queensland (2 Sep) 
 
Federation bills approved 
 
1900 Jan 24-27 
 
Premiers’ conference, Sydney 
 
Colonial premiers 
 
Decided a colonial delegation would go to Westminster 
 
1900 Mar-May 
 
Westminster negotiations 
 
Representatives of the six colonies, and Westminster  
 
Constitution amended and enacted 
 
1900 Jul 31 
 
Referendum, one colony 
 
Electors of Western Australia 
 
Federation bill approved 
 
1901 Jan 1 
 
Australia’s constitution in force 
 
(Sources: Quick and Garran 1976; La Nauze 1972; Crisp 1978, 7-12; Saunders 1997, 3-6; Macintyre 1998a; Bannon 1998; Bennett 1999, 4-5; National Library of Australia 2000; Parliament of Australia 2000) 
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CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION 1901-1999 
Australia began the twentieth century with a constitution that the founders hoped 
would endure, and it did.  At the end of the century, the constitution was little changed, 
despite continuous efforts to do so – forty-four proposals for constitutional change were 
put to referenda on nineteen occasions, but just eight amendments passed.  TC Winter 
concluded in his 1973 report to the federal Labor government: 
It is simply an unfortunate fact of circumstance and of history that causes Australia to be 
electorally one of the last provincials, living in an age of startling national development, still 
using an old pianola-roll constitution: very little harmony, a great deal of noise and full of holes 
(Winter 1973, 10, author’s emphasis).. 
 
There are some holes in the constitution, but is the noise caused entirely by those holes? 
Arguably, frequent unsuccessful attempts to change the constitution create more noise 
than do the constitutional defects themselves.  Is the constitution defective because it 
does not cede more power over employment to the federal tier (put to referenda in 1911, 
1913, 1919, 1926, 1944, and 1946), or because the constitution does not provide for 
simultaneous senate and house elections (put to referenda in 1974, 1977, 1984, and 
1988), or because freedom of association and employment extends to members of the 
Communist Party (referendum 1951)?  The matter of simultaneous elections is 
particularly curious – in the space of just 14 years, Labor and non-Labor governments 
put the same amendment to voters on four occasions.   
This section examines the way formal constitutional change was attempted in 
Australia between 1901 and 1999.  The rules for formal constitutional change are 
outlined, then the key events in initiating and negotiating constitutional change are 
examined.  The role played by inquiries is examined in detail, and they are evaluated for 
their effectiveness as a means to achieve formal change.  Arguments about why so many 
proposals for amending the constitution were not ratified at referenda are not covered 
here because those arguments were reviewed in the first chapter.   
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Rules for amending the constitution 
There are no formal rules for negotiating constitutional change beyond the rules 
that govern the passage of bills through the parliament, but the constitution does contain 
specific provisions for initiating and ratifying constitutional amendments.  The text of 
Australia’s constitution is changed only when electors voting at referenda support a 
federal bill for change.  Section 128 of the Constitution provides as follows.  
• A bill that proposes constitutional change can be put to referenda between two and 
six months after it is passed by an absolute majority of both houses of the federal 
parliament (paragraph 1). 
• If one house does not pass the bill, the initiating house may put the bill again after 
three months;  if it does not pass then, the Governor-General may agree to put the 
bill to referenda (par. 2). 
• Electors enrolled to vote in house elections may vote at referenda;  since 1977 this 
includes electors in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern 
Territory (NT) – the two mainland territories – because they are represented in the 
house of representatives (pars 1, 2, 3, 6). 
• Parliament decides the manner of the vote (par. 3). 
• Constitutional amendments are carried if they are approved by a national majority 
including the two mainland territories, and by a majority of states (par. 4).     
• Proposals to change the representation of original states in federal parliament or the 
geographic boundaries of states must be approved also by a majority of electors in 
the states affected by the amendment (par. 5). 
• Referenda outcomes are binding, that is, when proposals for constitutional change 
pass referenda, the constitution must be amended (par. 4). 
Only the federal parliament can initiate an amendment – there is no formal role for sub-
national assemblies or constituents.  Further, a bill approved by the senate alone would 
not be put to referendum, despite the provisions of par. 2, because by informal 
agreement, the Governor-General would not issue writs without ministerial consent 
(Evans 2004; Bennett and Brennan 1999, 10-12).  By contrast, amendments were put to 
referenda in 1974 without senate agreement.   
Federal referenda were regulated by federal Referendum (Constitution Alteration) 
Act 1906, and its replacement the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 
(Saunders 2000, 9; HSCLCA 1997, 59-60).  Voting at referenda became compulsory in 
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1924.  The legislative and electoral rules for referenda are like those that apply at the 
federal tier generally, with these exceptions:  
• voting occurs on a Saturday, provided that a state or territory election is not held on 
the same day;  
• electors vote Yes or No to the name of the bill; 
• when opinion is divided in the parliament, parliamentarians who vote for and against 
the bill may produce Yes and No case statements of up to 2,000 words; 
• the Electoral Commission sends the Yes and No case statements and the draft legal 
texts to electors by mail at least two weeks before the vote (this has been done 
consistently since 1937);   
• the Electoral Commission may provide additional educational information (since 
1984);  and 
• for the republic referendum in 1999 only, the public education program was more 
extensive, and interest groups received public funding and wrote the official case 
statements (Saunders 2000, 9-13). 
With few exceptions, these procedures applied throughout the twentieth century. 
Constitutional change in practice 
The chronology included as table 3.5 (see page 110) lists landmark events in the 
process of initiating, negotiating, and ratifying constitutional change in Australia from 
1901 to 1999.  Initiation events generate ideas for change;  for example, the 1927-29 
Royal Commission’s brief was to conduct a broad review of the constitution.  
Negotiation events debate particular ideas;  for example, the 1998 Constitutional 
Convention debated proposals for a republic.  Ratification events are the referenda at 
which proposals for change may be approved.  The table is different from those found in 
existing texts because it includes in the one chronology for the entire century the main 
official events for each of the three stages of constitutional change, the participants, and 
the outcomes.  Further, the events are linked where possible, for example, the table 
notes which inquiry recommendations were subsequently put to referenda.   
Ratification 
Ratification activity was erratic, but ever present, with at least one proposal for 
constitutional change put to referenda in every decade (see figure 3.2).  From federation  
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to the end of the twentieth century, 44 questions were put to referenda, and eight passed. 
These amendments provided that: 
1. senate terms begin in July rather than January (1906, amend s 13); 
2. the federal tier can assume state debts generally, rather than only those debts which 
existed at the time of federation (1910, s 105); 
3. federal and state tiers can make binding agreements about state debts (1928, s 
105A); 
4. the federal tier can pay a broader range of welfare payments (1946, s 51(xxiiiA)); 
5. the federal tier can legislate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, and count 
them in the census (1967, ss 51(xxvi), repeal 127); 
6. casual senate vacancies are filled by persons who are members of the former 
senator’s party (1977, s 15); 
7. territory electors who are represented in federal parliament can vote at referenda 
(1977, s 128);  and 
8. federal court judges must retire at age 70 (1977). 
Half of these amendments changed the division of powers (1910, 1946, 1967), or 
affected federal/state financial relations (1928). 
Periods of peak activity were the second decade when 12 questions were put on 
five occasions, and the eighth decade when 10 questions put on three occasions (see 
figure 3.2 below). 
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Figure 3.2:  Frequency of inquiries and referenda 1901-1999 
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Crisp noted in 1978 that more referenda were held when Labor was in office (1978, 44). 
 The pattern continued in the 1980s when the Hawke Labor government put six 
proposals to referenda.  Labor governed for about 30% of the twentieth century (1910-
1914, 1929-31, 1943-49, 1972-75, and 1983-96), during which time Labor put more 
than 60% of all referenda questions.  
Labor governments were not, however, more successful in achieving formal 
constitutional change.  Just one of Australia’s eight successful referenda was put by 
Labor – the Chifley government’s proposal in 1946 for the federal tier to provide a 
broader range of social security benefits.  By contrast, the Fraser Coalition government 
put four proposals to referenda in 1977, and three of these amendments passed.   To be 
fair, the 1977 proposals were not on the same scale as Labor’s single reform.  The three 
amendments that passed in 1977 entrenched provisions to fill casual senate vacancies 
with persons from the same party (an informal agreement for many years, but one that 
was breached in 1975), voting rights for some territory electors at referenda, and a 
mandatory retirement age for judges.  As important as these changes may be, they do not 
equate with the payment of national social security benefits.  
Initiation and negotiation 
Most proposals for constitutional change were initiated when a bill for a 
referendum was introduced in parliament, but this did not necessarily mean that a 
referendum would be held.  Between 1901 and 1988, some 109 bills did not pass or 
lapsed, and governments proposed 61 of these bills (Constitutional Commission 1988, 
1123).  For example, in 1930 the house passed a government proposal to allow the 
parliament to enact formal constitutional change without referenda, but the bill lapsed 
after the second reading in the senate where the opposition had a majority (Sawer in 
Galligan 1995, 97).  Many non-government bills lapse, of course, because the 
opposition and minor parties lack the numbers in the house to pass such bills.  Crisp 
concluded that non-government bills were “ordinarily moved for propaganda or tactical 
purposes” (1978, 43-44), but in 1989 Senator Macklin insisted that attempts by the 
Australian Democrats to introduce citizen initiatives over a ten year period were sincere 
(1989, 43-46).  The latter view is supported by Walker’s account of the history of 
introducing citizen initiatives and vetos in Australia (1993). 
Governments also initiated constitutional change by convening 14 ad hoc inquiries 
in the twentieth century – ad hoc in the sense that they were outside the usual 
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parliamentary processes, and the timing of them was irregular.  Governments convened 
one inquiry in each of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth decades, five in the eighth 
decade, three in the ninth decade, and three in tenth decade (see figure 3.2).  It might be 
argued that the frequency was less erratic than this, because the 1973-85 Australian 
Constitutional Convention was one inquiry, not six, but ACC is counted as six inquiries 
for two reasons.  Governments and delegates varied considerably during this period, and 
the interval between ACC sessions was as long as four years and nine months.  
The 14 inquiries are further distinguished by whether they were briefed to initiate 
ideas for change generally, or to consider particular proposals.  The following nine 
inquiries convened to consider constitutional change generally: 
• 1927-29 Peden Royal Commission;  
• 1956-59 Joint Committee on Constitutional Review (JCCR); 
• 1973-85 Australian Constitutional Convention (ACC) in six sessions;  and 
• 1985-88 Constitutional Commission. 
The following five inquiries convened to consider particular proposals: 
• 1934 Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers on Constitutional Matters;  
• 1942 Constitutional Convention on post-war reconstruction powers; 
• 1973 TC Winter inquiry on federal power over prices and incomes; 
• 1993 Republic Advisory Committee;  and 
• 1998 Constitutional Convention on a republic and new preamble. 
The remainder of this section reviews the work of these inquiries.  The aim is to assess 
the contribution they made to achieving constitutional change. 
Broad inquiries convened by the federal parliament 
The Bruce Nationalist government convened the Peden Royal Commission in 
1927 to conduct a broad review of the constitution, with a particular focus on federal 
powers.  The Commission’s formal brief was: 
to inquire into and report upon the powers of the Commonwealth under the Constitution and the 
working of the Constitution since Federation;  to recommend constitutional changes considered to 
be desirable;  and, in particular to examine and report upon the following subjects from a 
constitutional point of view:- Aviation, Company law, Health, Industrial powers, Interstate 
Commission, Judicial power, Navigation law, New States, Taxation, and Trade and commerce. 
(Royal Commission on the Constitution 1929, v). 
 
The commission comprised seven members including the chair, John Beverley Peden, 
who was a member of the New South Wales Legislative Council (the upper house).  The 
other six commissioners were two federal senators, a public servant, a solicitor, a state 
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president of the Employers’ Federation, and the secretary of the ALP’s Federal 
Executive (Royal Commission on the Constitution 1929, 1).  According to Saunders, the 
Bruce government wanted to convene a parliamentary select committee, but the 
opposition would not agree to the composition proposed for such a committee (2000, 
15). 
The Commission convened for 198 days between August 1927 and December 
1929, held public hearings in the capitals and four regional centres, and heard 339 
witnesses (Royal Commission on the Constitution 1929, 2-3).  The commission 
submitted its report to the Scullin Labor government just a few days after parliament 
was dissolved for an election.  The report made 30 recommendations, none of which 
were pursued in the short term (JCCR 1959, 5).  A proposal to allow parliament to 
amend the constitution without referenda did reach the second reading stage in the 
senate, but it was not supported by a majority of the commissioners (Saunders 2000, 
15).  
In the longer term, some of the commission’s recommendations were addressed, 
as follows (Royal Commission on the Constitution 1929, 248, 252, 261, 267, 270). 
• A proposal for new federal powers over aviation was put to a referendum in 1937 by 
the Lyons United Australia Party government (non-Labor) in accordance with an 
agreement reached at the 1934 conference of commonwealth and state ministers, but 
it did not pass. 
• A proposal to introduce a proportional representation election system for the senate 
was implemented legislatively by the Chifley Labor government in 1949, but it is 
not entrenched in the constitution. 
• The commission recommended an amendment to entrench a requirement for High 
Court judges to retire at age 72 years.  In 1977 the Fraser Liberal government 
proposed that judges retire at age 70, and this referendum question passed. 
Two other proposals were put to referenda against the commission’s recommendations. 
• A proposal for new federal powers over marketing was put to a referendum in 1937 
by the Lyons United Australia Party, but it did not pass. 
• A proposal to count Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in the census and allow 
the federal parliament to legislate for them was put to a referendum in 1967 by the 
Holt Liberal government, and it passed with a record Yes vote.  In 1929, however, 
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the commission concluded “on the whole the States are better equipped for 
controlling aborigines than the Commonwealth”. 
Another two amendments that were considered by the commission (one recommended 
and the other not recommended) were put to referenda eight years after the inquiry 
adjourned, but neither amendment passed.   
The 1927-29 inquiry had little effect on achieving constitutional change because 
only the proposal to increase federal powers over aviation and marketing can be 
connected directly with the commission, and it did not pass. McMillan, Evans and 
Storey concluded harshly that it:  
produced a hopelessly polarised report ... and no serious attempt was ever made to implement any 
of its recommendations ... it would appear that the conclusions of any such body always run the 
risk, in the real world, of remaining no more than academic (McMillan et al. 1983, 349).   
 
By contrast, members of the next inquiry wrote that the Peden Royal Commission’s 
report provided “most useful source material” (JCCR 1959, 5).   
The second general inquiry was the parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Constitutional Review (JCCR), which convened from 1956 to 1959, under the Menzies 
Liberal-Country government.  Its broad brief was: 
to review such aspects of the working of the Commonwealth Constitution as the Committee 
considered it could most profitably consider, and to make recommendations for such amendments 
of the Constitution as the Committee thinks necessary in the light of experience (JCCR 1959, 189). 
  
The committee was multi-partisan in composition, and the audience in the public gallery 
was diverse.  When the final report was submitted in 1959, the committee comprised 14 
members representing four parties (seven Labor, five Liberal, one Country Party, and 
one Country and Democratic League), along with the prime minister and the leader of 
the opposition as ex-officio members who did not attend (JCCR 1959, 1; Saunders 
2000, 18).  Meetings were open to the public, but only in the early stages. The 78 people 
who attended committee meetings did so as individuals, and as representatives of 
interest groups and four state parliaments (JCCR 1959, 210-211).  Interest groups 
included employers, primary producers (sugar cane, grain, egg, and dairy products), and 
three groups which lobbied for the formation of new states (the New State for North 
Queensland Movement, the Capricornia New State Movement, and the New England 
New State Movement).  Following a disagreement with Labor members about the extent 
of federal powers, the committee resolved to meet in private and limit public 
participation to invited guests only (JCCR 1959, 190).   
The JCCR’s report listed scores of recommendations, and provided draft 
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amendments for many of them, but it did not stimulate debate in parliament.  Just one of 
its recommendations was put to referendum eight years after the report was tabled, and a 
further five recommendations were put to referenda in the following 18 years.  These 
amendments proposed to:   
• break the nexus between the house and senate (1967); 
• add new federal powers to regulate prices (1973); 
• hold house and senate elections at the same time (1974 and 1977); 
• reduce the threshold for passage of referenda to a national majority and majorities in 
three states (1974);   
• set electoral boundaries by population, not the number of electors (1974);  and  
• fill casual senate vacancies with members of the same party (1977) (JCCR 1959, 
esp. 56, 34-38, 170-172, 42).16 
Only the 1977 casual vacancies referendum passed, but this recommendation is more 
directly attributable to the Australian Constitutional Convention, which made the same 
recommendation in 1976.  According to Jack Richardson, the committee’s secretary, 
very few of its recommendations were taken up because government MPs were unhappy 
about the amount of change proposed (as cited in McMillan et al. 1983, 347-348). 
 The third to eighth broad reviews were conducted by the Australian Constitutional 
Convention (ACC), which convened six times between 1973 and 1985.  The Victorian 
state government suggested this inquiry in 1969 as a states only conference 
(Parliamentary Library 1988, 623-627).  The idea was taken up in February 1972 by 
state Attorneys-General who decided to include MPs from the federal parliament and 
mainland territories, and representatives of local government with limited speaking and 
voting rights.  The Coalition was in power federally when the idea for a convention was 
first floated, but Labor was in office when four of the six sessions convened. 
There were some positive signs in 1973 that the convention might herald a new 
era of cooperation between federal and state governments on constitutional reform 
(Ryan 1977, 4-5), but this did not last.  The Liberal premiers of Victoria and New South 
Wales said in 1973 that they saw the convention as an opportunity to both improve the 
financial autonomy of the states, and provide to the federal government the additional 
                                                 
16
 McMillan et al. also attributed a 1967 referendum to this inquiry (1983, 347).  While the JCCR did 
recommend an amendment to count “aboriginals” in the census, it did not recommend empowering the 
federal parliament to legislate for “aboriginal” persons.  An amendment that included both provisions was 
put to referendum in 1967, and it passed.     
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powers it needed to manage the national economy.  In a pre-emptive move, however, 
Labor prime minister Whitlam announced at the first session that his government would 
put to referenda proposals to increase federal powers over prices and incomes (Ryan 
1977, 14).  Just two months after the ACC adjourned in September 1973, electors voted 
down both amendments, with minorities in all states. 
The boycotts of 1975 were a further indication of discord.  The full complement of 
110 delegates convened for the first session in 1973:  16 federal parliamentarians, 12 
state parliamentarians from each state, three local government representatives from each 
state, and two local government delegates from each of the two mainland territories 
(Legal and Constitutional Committee 1985, 18-21).  The second session was scheduled 
to convene in 1974 with 112 delegates, which included for the first time two delegates 
from the NT assembly, and two delegates from the ACT assembly in place of two 
delegates representing ACT local government.  Participants disagreed, however, about 
the political composition of the convention, and the second session was postponed.  
When the second session convened from 24-26 September 1975 at Melbourne, it did so 
without 48 Liberal-National Country Party delegates from the federal parliament, NSW, 
Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia.  William Hewitt, a Liberal delegate 
representing Queensland, later attributed Queensland’s boycott to “the emphasis” placed 
on recognising local government in the constitution (Hewitt 1977, 21). 
The 1975 session modified prime minister Whitlam’s 1974 bill for the mutual 
reference of powers which had lapsed, and recommended that this idea be put to a 
referendum.  Less than two months after the second session adjourned, the Governor-
General dismissed the Labor government.     
The third session convened at Hobart on 27-29 October 1976, with the Fraser 
Coalition government in power in Canberra.  This convention confirmed agreements 
that were forged at the second session, and reached further agreements that led directly 
to the four proposals that were put to referenda in 1977, three of which passed.  The 
fourth to sixth sessions continued to reach agreements on amendments, but only one of 
these agreements can be linked directly to a referendum – the 1984 proposal to allow 
voluntary exchange of legislative powers, which did not pass.  There was no seventh 
session because the Hawke Labor government decided to convene a constitutional 
commission instead (Sawer, Geoffrey 1988, 98), despite opposition from Labor and 
non-Labor delegates (Saunders 2000, 16-17). 
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The six sessions of ACC made more than 130 recommendations by majority vote, 
five of which were put to referenda between 1977 and 1984 (HSCLCA 1997, 3).  Four 
recommendations made by the 1976 session were put to electors:   
• hold house and senate elections on the same day (1977, did not pass);   
• fill casual senate vacancies with members of the same party (1977, passed);   
• allow some territory electors to vote in referenda (1977, passed);  and 
• federal judges retire at age 70 (1977, passed).  
In addition, the 1983 session’s recommendation for the voluntary exchange of 
legislative powers between the two tiers of government was put to a referendum in 
1984, but it did not pass.     
 The last broad inquiry was the Constitutional Commission of 1985-88, convened 
by the Hawke Labor government (HSCLCA 1997, 3-4; Constitutional Commission 
1988).  This inquiry sat for 85 days, including 67 days of public hearings.  Its delegates 
were six commissioners and 37 members of five committees.  When it convened, the 
commissioners were four legal experts (Sir Maurice Byers in the chair, Justice Toohey 
until 1986, Professor Enid Campbell, and Professor Leslie Zines), Gough Whitlam, 
former Labor prime minister, and Rupert Hamer, former Liberal premier of Victoria 
(Constitutional Commission 1988, v).  Its terms of reference were as follows. 
To inquire into and report, on or before 30 June 1988, on the revision of the Australian 
Constitution to: 
(a) adequately reflect Australia’s status as an independent nation and a Federal Parliamentary 
democracy; 
 (b) provide the most suitable framework for the economic, social and political development of 
Australia as a federation; 
(c) recognise an appropriate division of responsibilities between the Commonwealth, the States, 
self-governing Territories and local government;  and 
(d) ensure that democratic rights are guaranteed (Constitutional Commission 1988, vi). 
 
The Commission submitted a preliminary report on 27 April 1988, and a final report on 
30 June 1988.  According to Saunders, “While the Commission did not recommend a 
new Constitution, its report covered almost every aspect of the existing one” (2000, 16). 
The Hawke Labor government issued writs on 25 July 1988 for four referenda.  
One of the commission’s proposals was put to the vote as recommended, and another 
three were put in an amended form, as summarised below.  
• Recommendation:  change the house term from three to four years, with the senate 
term twice that of the house, and hold house and senate elections on the same day.  
Amendment put:  change the house term from three to four years, fix the senate term 
at four years fixed, and hold senate and house elections on the same day. 
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• Recommendation:  require that each member of the house represent at least 100,000 
electors, and entrench representation provisions for territories and new states.   
Amendment put:  inter alia, for the senate, the house, and state and mainland territory 
elections, the number of electors in each electorate will vary by no more than 10% 
from the average electorate size. 
• Recognise local government by adding to the constitution a new clause 119A – put 
to referendum as recommended. 
• Recommendation:  entrench new freedoms and rights related to conscience, 
movement, discrimination, “cruel and inhuman treatment”, “unreasonable search or 
seizure”, arbitrary arrest, and the legal processes following arrest, and amend 
existing provisions for trial by jury, acquisition of private property by governments, 
and freedom of religion.   
Amendment put:  entrench rights related to trial by jury for certain offences, 
acquisition of private property by governments on just terms, and freedom of 
religion (Constitutional Commission 1988, 305, 303-304, 317, 318-322; AEC 2001). 
This was the only “formal response” to the commission’s work (HSCLCA 1997, 4).   
Each proposal that was put to referenda in 1988 was voted down in every state.   
According to Galligan, these proposals were not ratified because the commission 
received little support from the Hawke Labor government, and because the reforms were 
opposed strongly by the federal Coalition and the states, especially Queensland and 
Tasmania – the states preferred to continue debating constitutional change at ACC 
(Galligan 1995, 128).  
Specific inquiries convened by the federal parliament 
The federal parliament convened five inquiries to negotiate particular proposals 
for constitutional change.  These were the 1934 Conference of Commonwealth and 
State Ministers on Constitutional Matters, the 1942 Constitutional Convention, the 1973 
inquiry into powers over prices and incomes, the 1993 Republic Advisory Committee, 
and the 1998 Constitutional Convention. 
The 1934 Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers on Constitutional 
Matters convened in Melbourne on 16-28 February 1934 (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 1935).  Delegates were 22 senior members of federal and 
state governments representing five political parties: the United Australia Party, a 
precursor to the Liberal Party (eight federal delegates, and three for New South Wales), 
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Labor (two each for Queensland and Western Australia), the UCC/United Country Party 
coalition (three for Victoria), the Liberal Country League (two for South Australia), and 
the Nationalist party (two for Tasmania).  According to Garran, who was recalled from 
retirement to help formulate the agenda and write briefing papers, state parliamentarians 
were not happy with the membership structure, and felt the conference should be 
delayed to allow for further discussions (1958, 207-208).   
Some authors concluded that this inquiry was entirely unproductive.  Russell 
claimed that the conference was not productive because the participants could not reach 
any agreement on reforms (1988, 10).  McMillan et al. wrote that the conference 
“foundered on the rock of the States’ unwillingness to concede any further powers to the 
Commonwealth” (1983, 349-350).  A close reading of the primary text reveals, 
however, more of a patchwork of agreements and disagreements.   
The states were disappointed by the federal government’s response to their 
requests for further financial aid to cater for the consequences of the depression.  While 
the federal government did offer to return to the states the power to tax incomes, the 
states were not at all keen to take up this offer.  While the conference was in session,  
Garran penned this ditty to summarise those events: 
We thank you for the offer of the cow, 
But we can’t milk, and so we answer now –  
We answer with a loud resounding chorus: 
Please keep the cow, and do the milking for us (1958, 208). 
 
Some states were also disappointed about their own quest for constitutional change.  For 
example, Tasmania stood alone with its proposal to widen the scope for appeals to the 
British Privy Council (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 66-69).   
As he opened the conference, prime minister Lyons expressed reservations about 
embarking on constitutional change when the world was in the grip of an economic 
depression (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 7).  He went on, 
nevertheless, to outline 12 areas where the constitution could be improved, and to ask 
the states to support constitutional change in seven subject areas, either by reference or 
by referenda (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 10-12).  This would 
entail granting to the federal tier powers over navigation, industrial relations (minimum 
wages and standard hours), films, aviation, wireless broadcasting, and the control of 
dissidents, and expanding the High Court’s jurisdiction in corporate matters.  The states 
agreed unanimously to increase federal powers over aviation and fisheries, with some 
minor qualifications.   
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On the subject of aviation, the federal government sought “full power to legislate 
with respect to aircraft and air-navigation”. The six states had previously agreed at the 
1920 premiers’ conference to grant powers over aviation by reference to the Nationalist 
government, but only Queensland and Tasmania passed the required legislation; 
Victoria and South Australia passed amended acts, and the bills debated by the New 
South Wales and Western Australian parliaments did not pass (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 53, 74-75).  At the 1934 conference, Western 
Australia and Tasmania gave their full support to this proposal, but the other four states 
qualified their consent.  New South Wales agreed, provided the handover of air services 
for medical purposes was completed in a satisfactory way.  Victoria and South Australia 
approved concurrent, but not exclusive, federal powers.  Queensland agreed, as long as 
the federal government did not interfere with state ownership of aircraft.  Prime minister 
Lyons assured the delegates twice that his government did not seek exclusive powers 
over aviation (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 53-55). 
On fisheries, the federal government explained that it needed concurrent powers 
over fisheries inside territorial waters so it could ratify the International Convention on 
whaling (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 61-62).  The six states 
supported the proposal, to some extent.  South Australia, Western Australia, and 
Tasmania gave unqualified support, New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland 
supported the proposal with respect to whaling only, and Queensland asked the federal 
government to consider the need to legislate for trochus shells as well (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 1935, 62-63). 
Voting at this conference did not proceed along party lines.  While the New South 
Wales UAP government approved four of seven proposals put by the federal UAP 
government, the Victorian UAP coalition government approved just two proposals.  By 
contrast, the Queensland and Western Australian Labor governments approved five of 
the seven proposals.  This is remarkable given that in December 1931, a little more than 
two years earlier, Joe Lyons resigned from the Scullin Labor ministry, led the formation 
of UAP, and went on to win government from 1931 to 1939, when he died in office 
(Henderson 2000, 154-155). 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
98
 
The Lyons UAP government put the proposal for new federal powers over 
aviation to a referendum in 1937, but only Victoria and Queensland approved it, and the 
proposal for new powers over fisheries was not put to the vote.  Thus the 1934 
conference did not achieve formal constitutional change, but this was not because the 
states would not agree to any of the proposals put by the federal government.   
The second exercise in negotiating constitutional change originated in the ordinary 
legislative process.  In October 1942, the Curtin Labor government introduced a bill into 
the federal parliament for a referendum on post-war reconstruction powers (Sawer, 
Geoffrey 1963, 140).  That bill was referred to a bi-partisan Joint Select Committee, 
which suggested the 1942 Constitutional Convention.  When the inquiry convened at 
Canberra on 24 November, prime minister Curtin said that his aim was:  
to alter the Constitution by empowering the [federal] Parliament [by reference] to make Laws for 
the purpose of post-war reconstruction, and by guaranteeing religious freedom and freedom of 
expression” (Commonwealth of Australia 1942, iv-v). 
 
The 24 delegates were 12 federal parliamentarians (eight MPs and four senators), and 
the premier and leader of the opposition from each of the six states.  Not only were the 
federal/state numbers balanced, but party representation was also split evenly between 
the Labor and non-Labor parties (analysis of Commonwealth of Australia 1942, iii).  At 
the time, Labor was in power federally, and in four of the six states.   
Delegates agreed unanimously to refer specific powers to the federal government, 
by agreement, in accordance with s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1942, 152-154).  This agreement would continue for five years after the end of 
World War II, and it would allow the federal government to legislate for a wide range of 
subjects:  employment;  marketing commodities;  companies, trusts, and monopolies;  
prices;  production;  foreign exchange;  borrowing and investment;  aviation;  rail 
gauges;  national public works;  national health;  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders; 
 family allowances;  and providing assistance to war veterans and the dependants of 
veterans and deceased veterans.  Delegates agreed that once this reference was in force, 
it could be broken only if a majority of state electors so agreed at a referendum.   
The states committed to pass legislation to give effect to these changes.  A 
commonwealth powers bill was introduced into parliament by each of the six state 
governments, but it passed in New South Wales and Queensland only (Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics 1944, 64).  Victoria passed the bill, but provided that it 
would not come into force until the five other states enacted their legislation.  South 
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Australia and Western Australia legislated to refer a different set of powers to the 
federal tier, and the Tasmanian upper house declined to pass the bill.  Two years later, in 
February 1944, the Curtin Labor government legislated to put the same proposal to 
referendum, with a proposal to entrench freedom of speech, expression, and religion 
(Sawer, Geoffrey 1963, 171-172), but it did not pass.  Ironically, the proposal was 
approved by a majority of electors in South Australia and Western Australia only – the 
two states whose governments had legislated to refer different powers. 
In 1973, Labor prime minister Gough Whitlam initiated the third specific inquiry 
when he appointed Terry C Winter to report on federal powers over prices and incomes. 
Winter had been an executive member of the Australian Council of Trades Unions 
(Whitlam 1973, 1).  The prime minister asked him to answer the following questions. 
1. In the light of international experience and policies adopted by Governments overseas, what 
are the deficiencies in the powers of the Australian Government in developing policies 
against inflation? 
2. What options would be available to the Australian Government if the referendum on prices 
were carried alone, if that on incomes were carried alone, or if they were both carried.  In the 
light of Australia’s particular traditions of wage and price determination, how should the 
Australian Government exercise powers granted to it in each of the three possible outcomes, 
and how would they be related to more general economic and fiscal policies? 
3. What advantages would there be for the management of the Australian economy and the 
attainment of the Government’s social objectives, i.e. to what use could these powers be put 
other than in the context of general inflationary situation? (Winter 1973, 30). 
 
This appointment was made after the government had legislated to hold a referendum 
proposing that the federal government acquire powers over prices and incomes – writs 
were issued on 12 November 1973.  Winter, the sole member of the inquiry, was asked 
to advise what the consequences would be if the government were granted powers over 
prices alone, incomes alone, or both.  The letter of appointment instructed Winter to 
consult with three commonwealth departments, and five individuals, which he duly did. 
In his report, Winter agreed that the federal government should have powers over 
both prices and incomes (Winter 1973, 11-12, 27), and he outlined how the government 
might exercise control over prices, incomes, or prices and incomes.  The subject was put 
to referendum on 8 December 1973, but it did not pass;  none of the six states recorded a 
majority.  Given that the inquiry was appointed after writs were issued for the 
referendum, and the report was tabled in parliament just 11 days before the referendum, 
it was bound to have little or no influence on achieving formal constitutional change.   
The final two specific inquiries were convened to debate the question of an 
Australian republic.  A republic debate had ebbed and flowed in Australia since 
European settlement, and well before federation as a constitutional monarchy in 1901, 
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but this was the first time that governments initiated formal debates on the subject.   
The Labor party resolved at its national conference in June 1991 that Australia 
should become a republic by 2001, the centenary of federation (Winterton 1994, I-1).  
On 24 February 1993, Labor prime minister Paul Keating announced that his party 
would support a republic in its election campaign that year.  Labor was re-elected to 
govern on 13 March, and on 28 April it announced the appointment of the 1993 
Republic Advisory Committee (RAC 1993a, iv).   
The 1993 Republic Advisory committee (RAC) was briefed to provide an options 
paper on how Australia could become a republic with “minimum constitutional 
changes”, but not to recommend whether Australia should become a republic, or a 
preferred type of republic.  The brief required that the committee report on the need for 
a head of state, the head of state’s powers, and provisions for appointment, and 
dismissal.  It mentioned specifically the need to consider whether a republican president 
should be appointed by the federal government alone, by the federal government with 
endorsement from the federal parliament, by an electoral college of federal and state 
parliamentarians, or whether the head of state should be elected by federal 
parliamentarians or constituents. 
The federal Labor government appointed seven members to the committee.  
Initially, these were the chair Malcolm Turnbull (then chair of the Australian 
Republican Movement, since 2004 a federal Liberal MP), Nick Greiner (former Liberal 
premier of New South Wales), Susan Ryan (former federal Labor senator), George 
Winterton (law academic), John Hirst (history academic and convenor of the Victorian 
branch of the Australian Republican Movement), Lois O’Donoghue (chair of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission), and television journalist Mary 
Kostakidis (RAC 1993a, 11).  All state premiers were invited to nominate delegates, but 
only two states did so.  In May the prime minister responded by adding two state 
appointments:  Glyn Davis (politics academic), and Namoi Dougall (solicitor).   
The Committee went to considerable lengths to encourage public participation 
(RAC 1993a, 15-18).  In May, an issues paper and a copy of the constitution was 
published and distributed to a diverse range of public and private organisations.  The 
committee then promoted the issues paper in the media, established a free telephone 
inquiry line, and convened public meetings in eight capital cities and 13 regional 
centres.  As a result of these efforts, the telephone enquiry line received about 1,500 
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calls, and 10,000-20,000 copies of the issues paper were distributed by mail and at 
meetings.  In addition, 33 persons made submissions to public meetings at the 
committee’s behest, and a further 417 individuals and organisations lodged relevant, 
unsolicited submissions (RAC 1993b, 329-341).  
The committee’s report was tabled in parliament on 5 October 1993.  It concluded 
that Australia could readily become a republic, as follows. 
The establishment of an Australian republic is essentially a symbolic change, with the main 
arguments, both for and against, turning on questions of national identity rather than substantive 
changes to our political system (RAC 1993a, 151). 
 
The report outlined five ways in which a republic president could be selected:   
• The prime minister could select the president.  To avoid perceptions of partisanship, 
the committee suggested the process could be managed by a constitutional council.   
• The federal parliament could select the president by special majority vote, after 
receiving nominations from the prime minister, a special-purpose external 
nominations group, or parliamentarians themselves.  The committee advised that 
whilst this arrangement could address the need for bi-partisanship, an open 
nomination process might deter suitable candidates.  It also recommended that the 
prime minister should be permitted to make one nomination only.  
• An electoral college could select the president.  The committee warned, however, 
that this would not overcome the risk of partisanship.   
• The president could be selected by popular ballot.  Support for popular election may 
be high, but this method would be costly, it would invite party politics, and the 
process might discourage worthy candidates.  If this method was chosen, the 
president’s powers must be codified (RAC 1993a, 65-74). 
The committee advised that if the prime minister selected the republic president, this 
would represent the least change to current convention.   
Labor did not put the question of a republic to referendum before it lost office to 
the Coalition in 1996, but prime minister Keating kept the subject alive by his 
continuous advocacy.  Keating announced to parliament on 7 June 1995 that it was now 
government policy for Australia to become a republic by the centenary of federation in 
2001, and the government would put the question of a republic to referendum in 1998 or 
1999 (Australian House of Representatives 1995, 7 June, 1434-1441).  His 
government’s preference was for the prime minister to nominate a president, with the 
support of two-thirds of a joint sitting of both houses of the federal parliament.   
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Several prominent constitutional monarchists claimed that Keating’s push for a 
republic was not sincere;  it was instead a matter of political expediency.  David Flint 
claimed that Keating raised the republic issue to divert attention from economic 
problems (1995), an approach that is reminiscent of criticisms levelled at Henry Parkes’ 
erratic efforts for federation in the nineteenth century.  According to Atkinson, a 
republic was the means by which Labor could make the transition from a “paternalist 
State ... [to a] proactive, managerial, and amoral state” (1993, 45, 48-49, 53, 64, 114, 
122-124).  Atkinson equated the crown with Rousseau’s benevolent law giver – 
impartial, enduring, a moral guardian, and the people’s kind, legitimate, trustee – and a 
“nuisance” to republicans who welcomed globalisation and commodification of national 
resources.  Two of Keating’s biographers did not reach a similar conclusion, but they 
did concede that for Keating “it was [politically] more useful to be in favour of a 
republic than to have a republic” (Edwards 1996, 526-529), and that his emphasis on 
“big picture” issues like a republic contributed to the perception that Labor had lost 
touch with the electorate (Gordon 1996 [1993], 241-242, 346-347).   
The idea that Australia might officially debate a republic became a bipartisan issue 
when Alexander Downer, as leader of the Coalition opposition, suggested on 10 
November 1994 that an assembly might convene to debate a republic (PM&C 1998a, 
13).  Seven months later, and the night before prime minister Keating delivered his 
republic speech, John Howard pledged as leader of the opposition that a Coalition 
government would convene a constituent assembly to debate a republic, and more. 
Tonight I recommit the Coalition to having a People’s Convention in 1997 to examine to [sic] the 
Australian Constitution.  Not only will the Convention examine the various proposals for an 
Australian Republic, but it will also have the scope and the authority to examine any other 
proposal to alter the Australian Constitution ... Our goal is to give the Australian people the 
Constitution they want.  Mr Keating’s goal is to give the Australian people the Republic he wants 
(Howard 1995, 20, emphasis added). 
 
The next day, Keating claimed that a convention would not be productive.  He said:  
The Parliament alone can formally decide what is put in a referendum.  At most, any suggested 
convention can only be a consultative device and, in obvious ways, an elitist one (Australian House 
of Representatives 1995, 7 June).   
 
He cited as evidence for this conclusion the limited outcomes from the ACC, and the 
Royal Commission that followed it.  Clearly, Keating misunderstood Howard’s plan. 
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In the lead up to the 1996 federal election, the Coalition again promised to hold a 
“People’s Convention” in 1997 to debate a republic.  Its Law & Justice policy, released 
in February 1996, said: 
The current Constitutional arrangements have served Australia well ... however ... many 
Australians are attracted to the idea of a republic ... A Liberal and National Government will in 
1997 establish a People's Convention to debate the whole issue (Liberal and National Parties of 
Australia 1996). 
 
The scope had narrowed in the preceding seven months, from a debate about a republic 
and “any other proposal to alter the Australian Constitution”, to a debate about the 
“whole issue” of a republic.  Again, it promised to convene an assembly, but it did not 
support the idea of Australia becoming a republic.  Malcolm Turnbull wrote later that 
the Coalition’s motive was to “get the republic issue off the agenda” (1999, 13).  
Headon claimed the policy was a “knee-jerk defence [to Labor policy, and once elected 
to office] a bit of an embarrassment for constitutional monarchist Howard” (1998a, 26). 
 This may be why enabling legislation for the convention was not introduced in 
parliament until a year after the Coalition came to office.   
Prime Minister Howard announced on 12 September 1996 that a constitutional 
convention would convene from 2 to 13 February 1998 in Canberra (PM&C 1998a, 17). 
Six months later in parliament, he announced the convention’s brief, as follows. 
The convention will provide a forum for discussion about whether or not our present constitution 
should be changed to a republican one. In particular: 
 
- whether or not Australia should become a republic; 
- which republic model should be put to the electorate to consider against the status quo; and 
- in what time frame and under what circumstances might any change be considered. 
 
In establishing the convention, I am conscious of the view among many Australians in favour of a 
change to a republican form of government. Equally, I am conscious that the existing constitution 
has served Australia well, providing stable and effective democratic government. There are 
sincerely held views on both sides which deserve full debate in public view.  The commitment to 
hold the convention does not represent any decision by the government that a change is necessary 
or desirable, nor any dissatisfaction with the workings of the current system ... this convention 
should deal only with the question of the head of state and, therefore, any possible change to a 
republican form of government (Australian House of Representatives 1997, 26 March, 3061). 
 
Again, the convention’s scope was truncated, from debating “the whole issue” of a 
republic, to “deal only with the question of the head of state and, therefore, any possible 
change to a republican form of government”.  Again, the government made it clear that 
it did not advocate an Australian republic. 
The government decided that half of the 152 delegates would be parliamentarians 
and community representatives selected by governments and parliamentary parties (one 
independent member was chosen by random selection), and half would be elected 
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directly by constituents (PM&C 1998a, 16-18).   
Delegates assembled on 2 February 1998 in Canberra.  On the last two days of the 
assembly, they indicated their constitutional preferences by voting in formal ballots.  
Depending on the ballot question, options were Status Quo (no constitutional change), 
one of four republic models, No Model, or Abstain.  On the last day of the convention, a 
clear majority agreed that Australia should become a republic (59% Yes, 34% No, 7% 
Abstain), and that the question should be put to a referendum (88% Yes, 11% No, 1% 
Abstain).  However, neither a simple nor an absolute majority supported the Turnbull 
republic model that was put to referendum.  When delegates were asked in the fifth 
ballot whether the Turnbull model should be adopted, the result was 50% Yes (exactly), 
47% No and 3% Abstain.  When asked in the eighth ballot whether the Turnbull model 
was preferred to Status Quo, the result was 48% Yes, 38% No, and 14% Abstain.  The 
eighth ballot was the last chance for delegates to agree on one republic model, and they 
were deadlocked.   
Winterton, who attended the assembly as a community representative, predicted 
such an outcome shortly before it convened.  
[E]ach of the three groups participating in the Convention should contribute a different dimension 
to its proceedings. The popularly elected delegates will primarily bring passion and commitment to 
the various shades of public opinion on the republican issue; the parliamentary representatives 
embody political experience and, one hopes, a facility for compromise, with the Commonwealth 
government presumably determined to prevent the Convention it proposed and established from 
descending into acrimonious deadlock and shambles; and the appointed delegates may offer a less 
passionate range of community views together with some legal and governmental experience. They 
may exert a moderating influence on the passionate commitment of the elected delegates; but this 
may represent an unduly optimistic perspective (1998b, 104-105). 
 
The circumstances surrounding the deadlock are discussed when the assembly is 
examined in detail in chapter 4.    
Delegates also debated whether the constitution should be changed to include a 
new preamble.  The assembly did not draft a preamble, but it did specify 21 matters that 
should be included (PM&C 1998a, 46-47).  A year later, the prime minister announced 
that a preamble would be put to referendum with the republic question, and that he 
himself would draft it (McGregor 1999b), with assistance from the poet Les Murray 
(Slattery 1999; Shanahan 1999c).  When the prime minister’s preamble was approved 
by the Coalition party room and released to the media on 23 March, it attracted 
considerable press coverage, and criticism.  Much of the criticism centred on the limited 
recognition of indigenous peoples, and the gender implications of using the word 
“mateship” (Grattan and Kingston 1999; Peatling 1999; Shanahan 1999b).  For these 
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critics, the offending text was: 
Since time immemorial our land has been inhabited by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, who 
are honoured for their ancient and continuing cultures. … We value excellence as well as fairness, 
independence as dearly as mateship (Grattan and Kingston 1999). 
 
Les Murray said that the prime minister was happy to refer to “honouring Aboriginal 
stewardship” (Dore 1999), and that he warned the prime minister about using the word 
mateship, “But he loved the word and he was the boss” (as cited by Shanahan 1999b).  
The senate, however, was less inclined to yield to the prime minister’s preferences – the 
preamble was re-written before the senate passed it on 12 August 1999 (Shanahan 
1999d).  In the course of parliamentary negotiations, the two extracts just cited became: 
… honouring Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation’s first people, for their deep 
kinship with their lands and for their ancient and continuing cultures which enrich the life of our 
country … valuing independence as dearly as the national spirit which binds us together in both 
adversity and success. 
 
Even with these changes, the final preamble fell well short of the assembly’s 
recommendations (see chapter 4). 
On 6 November 1999, the republic model and preamble were put to referenda.  
The result was 45.1% Yes for a the republic, and 39.3% Yes for the new preamble (see 
table 3.3 below).   
Table 3.3:  Results for the republic and preamble referenda 
 
Turnout
% Total Informal Informal % Yes No Yes % No %
Republic
New South Wales 92.3% 3,948,714 34,772 0.88% 1,817,380 2,096,562 46.4% 53.6%
Victoria 95.2% 3,016,737 28,063 0.93% 1,489,536 1,499,138 49.8% 50.2%
Queensland 94.6% 2,108,694 14,642 0.69% 784,060 1,309,992 37.4% 62.6%
Western Australia 94.7% 1,114,326 9,500 0.85% 458,306 646,520 41.5% 58.5%
South Australia 96.0% 986,394 8,950 0.91% 425,869 551,575 43.6% 56.4%
Tasmania 96.3% 315,641 2,857 0.91% 126,271 186,513 40.4% 59.6%
Australian Capital Territory 95.3% 202,614 1,553 0.77% 127,211 73,850 63.3% 36.7%
Northern Territory 85.0% 91,880 852 0.93% 44,391 46,637 48.8% 51.2%
Republic National 95.1% 11,785,000 101,189 0.86% 5,273,024 6,410,787 45.1% 54.9%
Preamble
New South Wales 95.2% 3,948,482 39,144 0.99% 1,647,378 2,261,960 42.1% 57.9%
Victoria 95.3% 3,016,716 30,341 1.01% 1,268,044 1,718,331 42.5% 57.5%
Queensland 94.6% 2,108,659 16,174 0.77% 686,644 1,405,841 32.8% 67.2%
Western Australia 94.7% 1,114,455 10,436 0.94% 383,477 720,542 34.7% 65.3%
South Australia 96.0% 986,535 10,325 1.05% 371,965 604,245 38.1% 61.9%
Tasmania 96.3% 315,664 3,343 1.06% 111,415 200,906 35.7% 64.3%
Australian Capital Territory 95.3% 202,618 1,696 0.84% 87,629 113,293 43.6% 56.4%
Northern Territory 85.0% 91,906 1,015 1.10% 35,011 55,880 38.5% 61.5%
Preamble National 95.1% 11,785,035 112,474 0.95% 4,591,563 7,080,998 39.3% 60.7%
Votes cast Valid votes cast
 
 
(Source:   AEC 2000, 71, 77, 83) 
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National support for the preamble was almost 6% lower than support for the republic.  
More than six years after he co-authored the first version of the preamble, poet Les 
Murray said “They rewrote it, and the people took it out and shot it ... it was the 
merciful thing to do with the rewrite, yes” (as cited by Neill 2006).  For the republic 
question, only the Australian Capital Territory recorded majority support.  Elsewhere, 
the Yes vote was highest in Victoria at 49.8%, and lowest in Queensland at 37.4%.  
Support for the preamble was also lowest in Queensland, at 32.8%.  Turnout was almost 
the same for both questions, and the informal rate was slightly higher for the preamble 
question at 0.95%.  These informal rates are the lowest ever recorded for national 
referenda.  Prior to 1999, the range was 1.3% to 17.6% before voting became 
compulsory in 1924, and 1.3% to 8.0% since 1924.    
Even though the referenda did not pass, from a broader perspective the 1998 
Constitutional Convention may have been one of the most successful constitutional 
inquiries ever held in Australia because both of its recommendations – to put a republic 
and a preamble to referenda – were implemented by the government of the day. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Australian inquiries contributed little to achieving formal constitutional change 
because in most cases, governments did not act on their recommendations.  Of the 
hundreds of recommendations made by inquiries in the twentieth century, just 15 were 
put to referenda as recommended, and of those 15, just three amendments passed.  But 
should the success of inquiries be measured by how many recommendations are passed 
at referenda, and if so, with what should those outcomes be compared?  According to 
Ireland (1995), inquiries are not successful if the yardstick is achieving formal 
constitutional change, but they do provide a public forum for discussing constitutional 
change, and they “meet their terms of reference”.  
It may seem a small achievement that just 15 of the hundreds of recommendations 
made by inquiries were put to referenda, but these 15 referenda questions represent more 
than one-third of the 44 questions put in the twentieth century.  Further, 20% of these 
questions passed, compared to 17% of referenda questions put by parliament without 
recommendations from inquiries.  On this evidence, it seems that Australia’s modest 
record for formal constitutional change would be even lower without the contribution 
made by inquiries.  For these statistics, however, the net was cast wide to include all 
inquiries, and to attribute referenda to them wherever possible. A less generous 
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approach, but a more realistic one, is taken in the next section.   
Of the 14 inquiries reviewed above, two are eliminated because they were not 
asked to recommend constitutional change.  The 1973 Winter inquiry into prices and 
incomes is not included in the next analysis because the inquiry was briefed after the 
government issued writs for the referendum.  The second inquiry eliminated from the 
second analysis is the 1993 Republic Advisory Committee.  Like the Winter inquiry, it 
was not asked to recommend whether formal change should be proposed.  Instead, the 
committee’s brief was to report on how Australia could become a republic with 
minimum formal constitutional change.  Other referenda that were credited to inquiries 
earlier are excluded now because the time between the inquiries and the referenda is too 
long to justify a causal link.  For example, four of the five referenda questions credited 
to the 1956-59 JCCR were put to the vote more than ten years after it submitted its final 
report.  In the second analysis, referenda are attributed to inquiries if recommendations 
were put to electors within six years.  This period is chosen because it allows an 
incumbent government two terms in office to put its proposals to constituents.  When 
the data are recast in this way, the original list of 14 inquiries and 15 recommendations 
is reduced to 12 inquiries and ten recommendations, three of which were approved.   
The results of the second analysis are shown below in table 3.4.  If the number of 
recommendations put to referenda is the measure of success, then the 1976 session of 
ACC is the clear leader.  Four recommendations made by the 1976 ACC were put to 
referenda in 1977, and three of them passed.   
Table 3.4:  Inquiry recommendations put to referenda 
 
Referenda 
Inquiry Delegates Put Passed 
1934 Conference 22 Federal and state ministers 1 0 
1942 Convention 24 Federal and state MPs 1 0 
1976 ACC 112 delegates:  16 federal MPs, 72 state MPs, 4 territory 
MPs, and 20 representatives of local government 
4 3 
1983 ACC The same as the 1976 ACC 1 0 
1985-88 Royal 
Commission 
Six commissioners:  four legal experts and two retired 
Labor leaders 
1 0 
1998 Constitutional 
Convention (the 
assembly) 
152 delegates:  36 federal, state, and territory 
parliamentarians; 40 community representatives; and 76 
elected delegates 
2 0 
 
Note:  Recommendations made by the 1975 and the 1976 sessions of ACC are credited to the 1976 session 
because 48 of the 112 delegates did not attend the 1975 session. 
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No other inquiry comes close to this achievement for the number of recommendations 
put to referenda, whether or not those amendments passed.   
If the success of an inquiry is measured instead by what proportion of its 
recommendations was put to referenda, then the 1998 Constitutional Convention (the 
assembly) is the clear leader.  This group recommended that two questions be put to 
referenda, and both questions were put.  By contrast, less than 10% of the 
recommendations made by ACC in 1976 were put to referenda.  This second method of 
measuring success may be fairer to inquiry members because none of the inquiries 
examined here was asked to consider whether voters were likely to approve their 
recommendations. 
This second analysis increases the success rate for inquiries to 30%, compared to a 
success rate of 15% for amendments put by parliament without recommendations from 
inquiries.17  It can thus be concluded from this data that referenda questions are twice as 
likely to succeed if they are recommended by inquiries.  Why would this be the case?  It 
may be that inquiries receive more publicity, which increases public engagement, and 
the likelihood that voters will support the proposals at the polls.  Perhaps inquiries are 
perceived by the public to be more credible than parliaments, and this increases voters’ 
willingness to endorse changes that are recommended by inquiries.  This possibility is 
reminiscent of Garran’s point (outlined in the last chapter) that recommendations made 
by constituent assemblies are less likely to be “shied at by electors” who do not support 
the government (1958, 209).  It could also be because inquiry members are less 
constrained in the recommendations they can make because they are not bound to act on 
party lines.  There is sufficient information to explore these possibilities for the 1976 
ACC and the 1998 Constitutional Convention.   
How do the 1976 ACC and the 1998 assembly compare for publicity, credibility, 
and constraint?  The assembly was publicised widely, and its sessions were public, 
whilst the ACC sessions were closed.  If we follow Garran’s argument, the assembly 
was more credible because half its members were not parliamentarians, compared to just 
20 of 112 delegates to ACC.  As to constraint, it is difficult to distinguish ACC and the 
convention.  Any constraint imposed by party discipline at ACC would apply equally to  
                                                 
17
 The figure for amendments put without recommendation from an inquiry was earlier said to be 17%.  
This figure reduces here to 15% because amendments made by some inquiries that were put to referenda 
more than six years after the inquiries adjourned are attributed to parliament. 
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parliamentarians at the assembly, and it would apply to the assembly’s elected delegates 
via the positions they took on the republic question when they stood for election.  Prima 
facie, the only delegates not constrained in this way were 20 local government 
representatives at ACC, and 36 community representatives at the assembly.  Given that 
these groups comprised just 18% and 14% of each group respectively, it is not likely 
that in relative terms a lack of constraint determined the success of the ACC or the 
assembly.  On this analysis, the assembly is the clear leader for publicity and credibility, 
but it was a little more constrained than ACC.   
It is logical to conclude that when there is more publicity, the public are more 
likely to know that an inquiry made recommendations, and this may increase the chance 
that governments will put recommendations to referenda.  When that is done, proposals 
for constitutional change may be more credible in the eyes of voters when they arise 
from inquiries than when parliamentarians negotiate amendments alone.  Size and 
composition may also be a factor for success – the ACC and the convention stand out as 
the largest and most diverse inquiries.   
None of these favourable circumstances were sufficient, however, to ensure that 
the republic and preamble proposals debated by the assembly were approved at 
referenda.  The next chapter examines the assembly in detail to answer the four thesis 
questions.  
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Table 3.5:  Landmarks in the process of constitutional change, 1901-1999 
 
Date/s Event Participants Outcome 
1906 Oct. 12 Referendum: Q1 senate terms begin in July not January (s13) Deakin Protectionist govt, turnout 50% Q1 Yes;  majorities in all states. 
1910 Apr 13 Referenda: Q1 federal powers to fund states on a fixed per capita 
basis, rather than distribute 75% of net federal revenue (s87);  Q2 
federal powers to assume state debts (s105) 
Deakin Protectionist govt, turnout 62% Q1 No;  majority Yes 3 states, national No.   
Q2 Yes, majority 5 states (not NSW), national Yes. 
1911 Apr 26 Referenda to extend federal powers (s51):  Q1 over commerce and 
industrial relations;  Q2, to nationalise monopolies 
Fisher Labor govt, turnout 53% Q1-2 No;  majority Yes WA, national No. 
1913 May 31 Referenda to extend federal powers (s51) over:  Q1 trade and 
commerce; Q2 corporations;  Q3 industrial disputes;  Q4 trusts;  Q5 
monopolies;  Q6 railways industrial relations 
Fisher Labor govt, turnout 74% Q1-6 No;  majority Yes Qld, SA, and WA, national No. 
1919 Dec 13 Referenda to extend federal powers (s51) for up to 3 years over:  Q1 
trade & commerce, corporations, industrial relations, and trusts;  
and Q2 nationalisation of monopolies 
Hughes Nationalist govt, turnout 71% Q1-2 No;  Yes majorities Vic, Qld, and WA, national No. 
1926 Sep 4 Referenda to extend federal powers (s51) over:  Q1 commerce, 
unions, and employer organisations;  Q2 essential services 
Bruce Nationalist govt, turnout 89% 
(compulsory voting from 1924) 
Q1-2 No;  Yes NSW and Qld, national No. 
1928 Nov 17 Referendum Q1 allow federal/state agreements re assumption of 
state debts (new s105A) 
Bruce Nationalist government, turnout 94% Q1 Yes;  Yes in all states and nationally. 
1927-29, 
Aug-Dec 
Peden Royal Commission on the Constitution, broad brief to 
recommend constitutional change, with specific mention of 
reviewing Commonwealth powers 
Convened by Bruce Nationalist govt, report to 
Scullin Labor govt;  7 members, including JB 
Peden NSW MLC (chair), Senator PP Abbott, 
EK Bowden MP, and DL McNamara MLC; 
198 sitting days, public hearings in capitals 
and 4 regional centres, 339 witnesses. 
Recommendations under 30 heads.  Favoured:  fed powers 
over aviation (Q1 1937, No), and senate elected by PR 
(legislated in 1949).  Opposed exempting marketing laws 
from s.92 (Q2 1937, No), and new federal powers to 
legislate for Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders (Q2 
1967, Yes).  
1934 Feb 
16-18 
Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers on 
Constitutional Matters, Melbourne 
Federal and state ministers One agreement put to referendum in 1937 as Q1, which 
did not pass.   
1937 
Mar 6 
Referenda:  Q1 new federal powers over aviation (s51);   
Q2 marketing laws exempt from s.92 (new s92A) 
Lyons United Australia Party govt, turnout 
94% 
Q1 No;  Yes in Vic. and Qld, national No.   
Q2 No;  No all states. 
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Date/s Event Participants Outcome 
1942  
Nov 24- 
Dec 2 
Constitutional Convention to consider entrenching freedom of 
religion and expression, and new federal powers for post-war 
reconstruction, assistance to war veterans, employment, marketing, 
corporations, trusts, monopolies, prices, production, foreign 
exchange, aviation, rail gauges, national public works, health, 
family allowances, and Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders 
Curtin Labor govt.  Delegates were 24 MPs:  
12 federal (8 House, 4 Senate), 12 state 
(premiers and opposition leaders);  by party, 
12 Labor and 12 non-Labor.   
Unanimous agreement 2 Dec 1942 to legislate to increase 
federal powers by reference under s.51(xxxvii), in effect 
for 5 years after WWII.  Repeal or amendment would 
require referendum with passage by national majority.  
Only NSW and Qld passed enabling legislation, but this 
proposal was put to referendum in 1944 as Q1. 
1944  
Aug 19 
Referenda:  Q1new federal powers for five years (many like those 
sought in 1911 & 1942), and new “democratic rights” (ss51, s60A) 
Curtin Labor government, turnout 97% Q1 No;  Yes in SA and WA, national No. 
1946 Sep 28 Referenda for new federal powers (s51) to:  Q1 provide social 
services (welfare);  Q2 organise marketing of primary produce;  
and Q3 regulate industrial wages and conditions 
Chifley Labor government, turnout 94% Q1 Yes;  Yes all states;   Q2 No;  Yes in NSW, Vic and WA, national No.   
Q3 No;  Yes in NSW, Vic and WA, national No. 
1948 May 
29 
Referendum Q1 for new federal powers to control rents and prices 
(s51) 
Chifley Labor government, turnout 94% Q1 No;  No all states. 
1951 Sep 22 Referendum Q1 for new federal powers to ban Communist Party 
and limit employment of communists (new s15A) 
Menzies Liberal government, turnout 96% Q1 No;  Yes in  Qld, WA and Tas, national No. 
1956-59 Joint Committee on Constitutional Review (JCCR), broad brief to 
review of the Constitution as it saw fit; reported in 1958 and on 25 
Nov 1959 
Menzies’ Liberal-Country government:  14 
federal MPs (10 house, 4 senate; 7 Labor, 5 
Liberal, 1 Country, 1 CDL);  77 visitors.  
Scores of recommendations. No immediate action, but 6 
recommendations put in next 20 years (one twice):  1967 
Q1, 1973 Q1, 1974 Q1 & Q2, 1974 Q3, 1977 Q1 & Q2. 
1967 May 
27 
Referenda:  Q1 break house nexus (ss24-26);  Q2 new fed powers 
to legislate for ‘Aboriginals’ and count in census (ss51(xxvi), 127) 
Holt Liberal government, turnout 94% Q1 No;  Yes in NSW, national No.   
Q2 Yes;  Yes all states and nationally (91%). 
1973 to Nov TC Winter’s inquiry into Commonwealth powers to control  prices 
and income, in context of inflation. 
Whitlam Labor government, TC Winter as 
sole member 
Recommended new federal powers over prices and 
incomes.  Put in 1973, did not pass. 
1973 Sep   
3-7 
Australian Constitutional Convention 1973-85 (ACC) 1st session, 
Sydney.   
Initiated by Vic. state govt under federal 
Labor govt:  110 delegates (16 federal and 72 
state MPs, four territory reps, and 18 from 
local govt with limited participation rights). 
Wide ranging discussion of possible reforms.  Four 
standing committees formed.   
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Date/s Event Participants Outcome 
1973 Dec 8 Referenda, new federal powers (s51) over prices (Q1), and 
incomes (Q2) 
Whitlam Labor government, turnout 93% Q1-2 No;  No all states. 
1974      
May 18 
Referenda:  Q1 house and senate elections on same day 
(ss7,9,12,13,15);  Q2 pass referenda by majorities in 3 not 4 states, 
territory electors vote at referenda (s128);  Q3 electorate size by 
population not electors (s29);  Q4 federal powers to borrow for, 
and provide finance to, local govt (s51) 
Whitlam Labor government, turnout 96% Q1-4 No;  Yes in NSW only. 
1975  
Sep 24-26 
ACC 2nd session, Melbourne Whitlam Labor govt:  69 delegates;  boycott 
by 48 Coalition MPs from the federal and 
NSW, Qld, Vic, and WA parliaments. 
Some resolutions adopted;  these were confirmed at the 
third session.   
1976 Oct 
27-29 
ACC 3rd session, Hobart Fraser Liberal govt: 134 delegates, similar 
structure to the 1st session 
Further resolutions.  Four recommendations put to 
referenda in 1977;  three questions passed, one did not. 
1977 May 
21 
Referenda:  Q1 concurrent senate/house elections (ss7,9,12,13,15); 
Q2 casual senate vacancies filled by members of same party (s15); 
 Q3 territory electors vote in referenda (s128);  Q4 judges retire at 
70 years of age (s72) 
Fraser Liberal govt, turnout 92% Q1 No;  Yes in NSW, Vic, and SA, national Yes (66%).  
Q2-4 Yes;  Yes all-states and national (77%, 78%, 80%). 
1978 26-28 
Jul 
ACC 4th session, Perth Fraser Liberal govt:  similar structure to 3rd 
session 1976 
Inter alia, agreed that if the Senate refused supply again 
after a double dissolution, the budget would be presented 
to the Governor-General for assent.   
1983  
Apr 26-29 
ACC 5th session, Adelaide Hawke Labor govt:  163 delegates, similar 
structure to 3rd session;  Labor MPs from 
Queensland boycotted the session. 
Recommended inter alia, High Court power to advise, 4- 
year terms for the house and 8 for the senate; and 
interchange of federal/state powers, put in 1984, No. 
1984 Dec 1 Referenda:  Q1 senate terms variable not fixed, and concurrent 
senate/house elections (ss7,12,13,57);  Q2 allow voluntary referral 
of legislative powers between federal and state tiers (s51(xxxvii), 
new s108A&B) 
Hawke Labor govt, turnout 94%.  Q2 
originally proposed by Labor PM Whitlam in 
a March 1974 bill which lapsed in the Senate 
(Ryan 1977, 12-13) 
Q1 No;  Yes NSW, Vic, national, NT and ACT.           
Q2 No;  No all states and NT, Yes ACT. 
1985 29 Jul-
1 Aug 
ACC 6th and final session, Brisbane. Hawke Labor govt, similar structure to 3rd 
session 1976 
Overall, more than 130 recommendations, four questions 
put in 1977 (Q2-4, Yes), one put in 1984 (Q2, No).   
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Date/s Event Participants Outcome 
1985-88 Constitutional Commission, appointed to conduct a broad review 
of the Constitution, including but not limited to the division of 
powers and “democratic rights”.     
Hawke Labor govt:  6 members, plus 37 
members of five committees;   extensive 
public hearings, 686 submissions. 
Reported May and July 1988.  More than 100 
recommendations, and 44 draft bills.  Four subjects put to 
referenda 1988 (three in amended form), none passed. 
1988 Sep 3 Referenda:  Q1 senate terms 4 years max. not 6 fixed, fixed house 
terms 4 years not 3, concurrent elections (ss7,9,12,13,14,28);  Q2 
increase federal powers over electorate size and boundaries, 
entrench provisions re boundaries, franchise, and vote weights for 
state/territory elections (ss8,29,30,41, repeal s25, new 
ss197A,122A,124A-H&J);  Q3 recognise elected local government 
in state legislation (new s119A);  Q4 trial by jury for some 
offences, states/territories acquire property on just terms, extend  
powers on religion to states/territories (ss80,116, new 115A&B) 
Hawke Labor government, turnout 92% 
Writs issued 25 July 1988. 
Q1, 3 and 4 No;  No all states and territories.   
Q2 No;  Yes in ACT only. 
 
1993 May-
Oct 
Republic Advisory Committee, convened to advise how Australia 
could become a republic with minimum constitutional change. 
Keating Labor govt, 9 members:  3 
academics, 2 lawyers, 2 ex-MPs (1 Labor, 1 
Liberal), 1 ATSIC, 1 media presenter;  22 
public meetings, 417 written submissions. 
Advised that Australia could become a republic by 
replacing the monarch and governor-general with an 
Australian head of state;  outline of options for head of 
state powers, selection, and dismissal, and the impact of a 
republic on the states. 
                    
                    
 1997 
Constitutional Convention elections Howard Coalition govt, non-compulsory 
postal ballot, turnout 45%, informal 2.2% 
76 delegates elected to 1998 Constitutional Convention 
(20 NSW, 16 Vic, 13 Qld, 9 WA, 8 SA, 6 Tas, 2 ACT,   
2 NT). 
1998 Feb 2-
13 
Constitutional Convention, Canberra Howard Coalition govt:  152 delegates, half 
elected, half appointed (36 community 
representatives and 40 state and federal 
parliamentarians);  1,058 written 
submissions. 
A republic supported by 80% of the delegates;  one of 
four republic models favoured by 48% of delegates 
voting in the last ballot.  This model put to referenda in 
1999. 
1999 Nov 6 Referenda:  Q1 replace the monarch and governor-general with a 
president (ss1-5,7,15,17-19,21,23,28,32-35,37,42,44,56-63,70,72-
74,83,85,103,117,126, 128, schedule 1, new 59-63, 126-127, 
schedule 2);  Q2 preamble (new s.125A) 
Howard Coalition government;  turnout 95%; 
 informal Q1 0.86%, Q2 0.95% 
Q1 No;  Yes in ACT only. 
Q2 No;  No in all states and territories. 
 
(Sources:  Royal Commission on the Constitution 1929; Commonwealth of Australia 1942; Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics 1944, 62-66; Senate Select Committee 
1950; JCCR 1959; Borchardt 1965, 54-55, 99; Borchardt 1973; Borchardt 1986, 101, 110-111; AEC 1976, 66-69; Legal and Constitutional Committee 1985; Constitutional 
Commission 1988; RAC 1993a; RAC 1993b; HSCLCA 1997; Ireland 1995; JSCRR 1999; Parliamentary Library 1999; AEC 2001)
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CHAPTER FOUR – THE AUSTRALIAN ASSEMBLY 1998 
 
The 1998 Constitutional Convention may have been the most successful 
constitutional inquiry held in the twentieth century, but was it superior to 
parliamentarians negotiating constitutional change alone?  This chapter examines the 
assembly in detail to answer the four questions raised in the second chapter.  Was it 
more representative, did it generate more public interest and consensus, and was it less 
partisan?  These four key concepts, and the way they are measured, were defined and 
described fully in the second chapter. 
Representation is evaluated by comparing data for assembly delegates with 
comparable data for the population and electors.  Public interest is evaluated by 
comparing the number of people who made submissions to the assembly, or attended its 
sessions, with similar data for parliamentary inquiries.  Consensus and partisanship is 
evaluated by examining the extent to which parliamentary and non-parliamentary 
delegates agreed at the assembly about whether Australia should become a republic, and 
how their preferences changed over time.  Analysis of these indicators shows that the 
assembly was more representative, it generated more public interest, and it was better 
able to reach consensus, but it was not less partisan. 
DELEGATE SELECTION 
Parliamentarians were appointed directly to 40 seats.  This group comprised 20 
federal parliamentarians, 18 state parliamentarians, and the chief ministers of the two 
mainland territories.  Allocation of the 20 federal seats to the parliamentary parties 
“broadly reflected the balance of representation of the parties across both Houses of the 
Commonwealth Parliament” (PM&C 1998a, 17), hence the Coalition chose 12 
delegates, Labor chose six, the Australian Democrats chose one, and one of eight 
independent members was chosen by random selection.18  For each of the six state 
parliaments, delegates were the premier, the leader of the opposition, and one 
parliamentarian chosen by the premier.  Representation by party was 23 Coalition, 13 
Labor, two Democrat, one Greens, and one independent.  
Community representatives were appointed to 36 seats.  The federal government 
invited the public to volunteer or nominate others as candidates, and 850 nominations 
were received.  The names of nominees were not published.  The Convention report  
                                                 
18
 The independent parliamentarians asked for this method to be used (PM&C 1998a, 17) 
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explained that the government chose its community representatives to: 
ensure that a wide diversity of skills and experience was represented and that groups which might 
not have been adequately represented in the [assembly] election outcomes were afforded the 
opportunity to participate (PM&C 1998a, 16).   
 
The government was particularly concerned to include Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders, women, representatives of every state and territory, and young people.   
Seats for the 76 elected delegates were distributed among the states and territories 
to be “broadly in proportion with the number of seats for each [state and territory] across 
both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament” (PM&C 1998a, 17).  This compromise 
between representation-by-population and equal representation for each state was 
perhaps borrowed from Robert Garran.  In 1958 he concluded that a bicameral assembly 
could satisfy the need for “rep-by-pop” and the federal principle, but this would be “too 
elaborate” (Garran 1958, 211).  He proposed instead that an assembly should mirror a 
joint sitting of parliament.  
Constituents chose elected delegates in a postal ballot in November and December 
1997.  It used a senate-styled, proportional representation system, where expression of 
second and subsequent preferences was optional (AEC 1998, 15-16, 76).  Ballot papers 
listed the names of groups and individuals standing for each state and territory;  of the 
609 candidates, about two-thirds stood as members of 80 groups, and 176 ran as 
individuals.  Electors could vote for one group of candidates above the line, or for one 
or more groups or candidates below the line;  85.4% voted above the line, compared to 
94.4% at the 1996 federal election.  This may indicate greater interest in, or a stronger 
preference for, individual candidates than is usual for parliamentary elections. 
The convention election was unusual in three respects:  electors voted by mail 
rather than in person, the names of all candidates were listed in a separate booklet rather 
than on the ballot paper, and voting was not compulsory.  This was the first time since 
1922 that electors were not required to attend the polls for a federal ballot, and turnout 
was 49.6%.  This was higher than it was for local government elections in the 1960s and 
1970s when turnout was about 30%, but lower than the last non-compulsory federal 
ballot in 1922, when 58% turned out to vote. 
THE AGENDA 
The rules of debate at the assembly and an agenda were circulated to delegates in 
advance, and agreed on the first day.  Generally, business flowed from the public 
chamber, to in-camera working groups and the resolutions group, then back to the 
chamber where final resolutions were determined (PM&C 1998c, 143-144; PM&C 
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1998a, 21-23).  Analysis of the notice papers (PM&C 1998c, 2-12) shows that 90 hours 
were allocated to plenary sessions, of which 55% was spent in debate or hearing reports 
from working groups and the resolutions group, 38% was used for “general addresses”, 
and 7% was used for preliminary business.  The time allocated to general addresses was 
provided for delegates to speak to the question “Should Australia become a republic?”, 
and all but 20 of the 176 delegates did so.  Whilst attendance in the chamber for general 
addresses was often low – in part because delegates were participating in working 
groups – the speeches provide a wealth of information about the delegates themselves, 
and why they took the positions they did on the question of an Australian republic. 
Working groups debated in-camera, and presented their provisional resolutions to 
plenary sessions.  Provisional resolutions that were supported by at least 25% of the 
delegates were referred to the resolutions group, which met in-camera and drafted the 
final plenary resolutions.  These resolutions were presented to plenary sessions for 
debate, amendment, and adoption, as the delegates saw fit.  The resolutions group 
comprised 11 delegates who were chosen by the assembly’s non-voting chair and deputy 
chair from a list of 25 volunteers (PM&C 1998b, 81-82).   
Most of the working groups were anticipated in the original agenda, whilst others 
were formed when ten or more delegates agreed to discuss a particular subject.  In all, 
25 working groups convened to debate the topics listed on table 4.1 below.   
Delegates were free to join any working group, provided they produced arguments 
in support of their topic.  A member of group D could not, for example, argue for direct 
election because that group’s topic was “Prime ministerial appointment, with or without 
a special council”.  The only other limit on participation was imposed by the timetable, 
which prevented a delegate joining two working groups on the same broad topic because 
the groups met at the same time.  A number of delegates did, however, join more than 
one working group on different topics.  Total membership of the working groups was 
227, ranging from just three members for group N which presented arguments for the 
proposition “There should be simultaneous change across all States if a national 
majority agrees to change to a republic”, to 17 members for group C which argued for 
the appointment of a president by a special majority of parliament.  Working groups 
usually convened when delegates were delivering general addresses in the chamber. 
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Table 4.1:  Assembly working groups 
 
Subject Working Group Topic Members 
Preamble & 
transitional 
clauses 
H(i) Preamble and transitional clauses generally 
H(ii) Retain “humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God” 
H(iii) Recognise prior occupation of Australia by indigenous peoples 
H(iv) Recognise citizens’ rights 
16 
5 
12 
9 
Head of 
state’s 
powers 
1. Same powers as the Governor-General, no provisions for conventions 
2. Same powers, reference to unspecified conventions for reserve powers 
3. Same powers, and a written, non-binding statement of conventions 
4. Same powers, codified reserve powers as binding rules 
5. Same powers, and the defects of alternative republic models 
6. Broader powers  
7. Lesser powers which are codified 
7 
5 
5 
15 
15 
4 
11 
Head of 
state’s 
appointment 
& dismissal 
A. Popular election with open nominations 
B. Popular election with parliamentary nominees 
C. Parliamentary appointment by special majority 
D. Prime ministerial appointment, with or without a special council 
E. Present system, and the defects of other alternatives 
F. Nomination through a special council, then popular election 
11 
7 
17 
13 
9 
9 
Other issues I. How to maintain debate about constitutional reform 
J. Head of state’s oath of allegiance 
K. National flag and coat of arms 
L. Dual citizenship and the head of state 
12 
6 
8 
7 
Effect on 
the states 
M. States to decide independently whether they become republics 
N. If there is a national majority in favour, states become republics 
O. As (N), but there must also be a majority in all states 
P. Current links between states and Crown, and criticism of options M-O 
11 
3 
5 
5 
 
(Source:  PM&C 1998c, 146-177) 
 
The Preamble 
The assembly made 21 recommendations for a new preamble, just nine of which 
were included in the preamble that was put to referendum.  The preamble that was 
passed by parliament is reproduced on table 4.2 below in the left pane, with the 
assembly’s recommendations aligned by subject in the right pane.  The differences are 
highlighted in bold font.   
The preamble that was put to referendum did not mention a republic at all.  This 
may have been done in anticipation of the possibility that the electorate would support 
the preamble, but not a republic, in which case the new preamble could still be 
implemented.  The same cannot be said for the other omissions.   
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Table 4.2:  The preamble put to referendum and the assembly’s recommendations 
 
PREAMBLE PUT TO REFERENDA ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATIONS1 
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of 
Australia is constituted as a democracy with 
a federal system of government to serve the 
common good. 
Reference to the people of Australia having agreed to 
reconstitute our system of government as a republic (9); 
Reference to “Almighty God” (2); 
Reference to the origins of the Constitution, and 
acknowledgement that the Commonwealth has evolved 
into an independent, democratic and sovereign nation 
under the Crown (3); 
Recognition of our federal system of representative 
democracy and responsible government (4); 
We the Australian people commit ourselves 
to this Constitution: 
Introductory language in the form “We the people of 
Australia” (1); 
Concluding language to the effect that “[We the people 
of Australia] asserting our sovereignty, commit ourselves 
to this Constitution” (10). 
proud that our national unity has been forged 
by Australians from many ancestries; Recognition of Australia’s cultural diversity (7); 
never forgetting the sacrifices of all who 
defended our country and our liberty in 
time of war; 
 
upholding freedom, tolerance, individual 
dignity and the rule of law; 
Affirmation of the rule of law (5); 
Affirmation of the equality of all people before the law 
(11); 
honouring Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders, the nation’s first people, for their 
deep kinship with their lands and for their 
ancient and continuing cultures which 
enrich the life of our country; 
Acknowledgement of the original occupancy and 
custodianship of Australia by Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders (6);  
Recognition that Aboriginal people and Torres Strait 
Islanders have continuing rights by virtue of their status 
as Australia’s indigenous peoples (13). 
recognising the nation-building 
contribution of generations of immigrants; Recognition of Australia’s cultural diversity (7); 
Mindful of our responsibility to protect our 
unique natural environment; 
Affirmation of respect for our unique land and the 
environment (8); 
supportive of achievement as well as equality 
of opportunity for all; Recognition of gender equality (12); 
And valuing independence as dearly as the 
national spirit which binds us together in 
both adversity and success. 
 
 
 
PROPOSED NEW S 125A ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATION 
The preamble to this Constitution has no 
legal force and shall not be considered in 
interpreting this Constitution or the law in 
force in the Commonwealth or any part of 
the Commonwealth. 
Care should be taken to draft the Preamble in such a way 
that it does not have implications for the interpretation of 
the Constitution (14).  Chapter 3 of the Constitution should 
state that the Preamble not be used to interpret the other 
provisions of the Constitution (15). 
 
Note 1:  a number in brackets after each recommendation indicates whether the assembly resolved that it 
“should” be included (numbers 1-10) or it should be “considered for inclusion” (numbers 11-13).   
 
(Source:  analysis of PM&C 1998a, 46-47) 
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There are four important differences between the prime minister’s preamble and 
the assembly’s recommendations, as follows. 
• Australians would pledge to “commit ourselves to this Constitution”, without 
“asserting our sovereignty”.   
• The preamble would recognise “the nation-building contribution of generations of 
immigrants” in times past and “unity” now, but it would not recognise continuing 
“cultural diversity”.  The Coalition government remains averse to the idea of 
celebrating diversity – seven years after the preamble was put to referendum, it 
announced plans to replace the word “multiculturalism” with something more in 
keeping with “increasing integration and responsibility among migrants” (Hart 
2006, emphasis added).   
• The constitution would honour indigenous peoples for their “deep kinship with their 
lands” and “ancient and continuing cultures which enrich the life of our country”, 
but it would not mention “original occupancy and custodianship of Australia”, or 
“continuing rights”.  McGregor reported in 1999 that the prime minister said he did 
not include the words custodianship or stewardship because “the concept might be 
too far ahead of public opinion” (as paraphrased by McGregor in 1999a, 6). 
Australians would be “supportive of achievement as well as equality of opportunity for 
all”, without any “affirmation of the equality of all people before the law” or 
“recognition of gender equality”.  By contrast, the Canada Clause proposed in 1992 
would entrench Aboriginal self-government, and equal rights for women, and the clause 
would be justiciable (see chapter six).  
Debating a republic 
In plenary sessions, delegates debated the merits of constitutional monarchy and 
four republic models (PM&C 1998a, 44-45, 124-132; PM&C 1998b, 878-879).  Those 
who opposed all proposals to change the constitution voted Status Quo when this was 
offered in the third ballot, and in other ballots they voted No Model or Abstain.  Other 
delegates voted for one or more of the republic models, No Model when their favoured 
models were eliminated, or Abstain.  Abstain was a formal voting option – the Chair 
explained just before the third vote how delegates should mark their ballot papers to 
record an abstention (PM&C 1998b, 878).    
 The four republic models were coded A to D, but were more commonly referred to 
by the names of delegates who proposed them.  Hence model A was the Gallop model 
(proposed by Geoff Gallop, leader of the opposition in Western Australia, premier 2001-
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2006), B was the Hayden model (proposed by Bill Hayden, former federal Labor 
minister, and Governor-General 1989-96), C was the McGarvie model (proposed by 
Richard McGarvie, Governor of Victoria 1992-97), and D was the Turnbull model 
(proposed by Malcolm Turnbull, barrister and merchant banker, chairman of the 
Australian Republican Movement, chair of the 1994 Republic Advisory Committee, and 
federal Liberal MP since 2004).  These models differed about how a republic president 
would be selected and dismissed.   
 The president was selected by popular ballot in the Hayden and Gallop models.  In 
the Hayden model, electors chose the president from among candidates who qualified to 
run for office by showing that 1% of the electorate supported them.  In Gallop, 
nominations were called from the public, parliament selected three or more candidates 
from these nominees, then the electorate chose the president.   
The other two republic models did not select a president by direct election.  In the 
McGarvie model, a three-person constitutional council was appointed by government to 
receive nominations in confidence.  The prime minister received a confidential report 
from the council, then named the president who need not be a nominee.  In the Turnbull 
model, a committee appointed by parliament received nominations from the public, then 
the prime minister named a candidate who need not be a nominee.  The prime minister’s 
nominee became president if the leader of the opposition and two-thirds of a joint sitting 
of federal parliament ratified the nomination.  The Turnbull model specified that there 
would be no parliamentary debate about the nominee prior to the vote. 
The procedures for dismissal varied also.  In the Hayden model, the president 
could be dismissed by the prime minister with the consent of a majority of both houses 
of parliament.  In the Gallop model, the president could be dismissed by an absolute 
majority of the house of representatives.  In the Turnbull model, the prime minister 
alone could take a decision to dismiss the president, but that decision had to be ratified 
by a majority of the house within 30 days.  If the House declined to ratify the decision, 
the president was not restored automatically to office.  In the McGarvie model, the 
prime minister alone could dismiss the president. 
These five constitutional options – constitutional monarchy and the four republic 
models – are ordered on a continuum in figure 4.1 below according to the number of 
people who participate directly in selecting a president.  Participation is lowest in 
constitutional monarchy and the McGarvie model because the prime minister alone can 
choose the president.  Participation is higher in the Turnbull model because appointment 
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is subject to the consent of the leader of the opposition and two-thirds of the members of 
federal parliament.  Participation is higher again in the Gallop and Hayden models 
because the president is selected by popular ballot.  The Hayden model is less 
constrained than the Gallop model because parliamentarians do not screen nominations.  
 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
McGarvie 
Micro Republic 
Turnbull 
Mini Republic 
Gallop 
Midi Republic 
Hayden 
Maxi Republic 
          
 
Figure 4.1:  Constitutional preference continuum  
(Source:  Kreibig 1998, 40) 
 
The continuum also indicates the amount of constitutional change entailed in the options 
– from no change at the left, to the most change at the right. 
On the last two days of the assembly, delegates cast formal votes for the five 
options shown in figure 4.1.  All of the ballots, and the options offered in them, are 
listed below in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3:  Formal ballots and voting options 
 
Ballot Topic Ballot options 
1, day 9 Republic model elimination round 1 Hayden, Gallop, McGarvie, Turnbull, no model, abstain 
2, day 9 Republic model elimination round 2 Gallop, McGarvie, Turnbull, no model, abstain 
3, day 9 Republic model elimination round 3 McGarvie, Turnbull, status quo, no model, abstain 
4, day 9 Republic model elimination round 4 McGarvie, Turnbull, no model, abstain  
5, day 10 Should the Turnbull model be adopted? Yes, no, abstain 
6, day 10 Should Australia become a republic? Yes, no, abstain 
7, day 10 Transitional & consequential issues  Yes, no, abstain 
8, day 10 Is Turnbull preferred to status quo? Yes, no, abstain 
9, day 10 Should a referendum be held? Yes, no, abstain 
 
(Source:  PM&C 1998b, 873-884, 929-930, 946-948, 962-965, 992-994) 
 
Ballots one to four, which were held on the ninth day, were designed to eliminate the 
less popular republic models.  There was little or no time for deliberation, negotiation, 
or even contemplation between these ballots because they were run back-to-back in less 
than 75 minutes, during which time the options were not debated.   
The results for ballots one to five, and eight, are shown in table 4.4.  On the tenth 
and last day, delegates were asked in ballots five and eight if they preferred the Turnbull 
model.  Support for the Turnbull model decreased by three votes between the fifth and 
the eighth ballot, to 73 of 152 votes, or 48%. The flow of votes was four from Yes to 
Abstain, two from Yes to No, and three from No to Yes.  In addition, 15 votes flowed 
from No to Abstain, and one vote flowed from Abstain to No. When the Turnbull 
republic model was put to voters at a referendum in 1999, the Yes vote was 45.1%. 
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Table 4.4: Assembly ballots and flow of votes 
 
 
 
     A 
Gallop 
     B 
Hayden 
      C 
McGarvie 
      D 
Turnbull 
    Not 
Turnbull 
   No  
Model 
Status 
  Quo 
 
Abstain 
 
Total 
Ballot 1 27 4 30 59  31  0 151 
Flow from B 
Flow from D 
+2 
+1 
-4 
 
+1 
 
 
-1  
+1 
   
 
 
Ballot 2 30 
 31 58  32  0 151 
From A 
From C 
From D 
From No Model 
-30 
 
 
-9 
+13 
 
-1 
 +11 
 
 
-31 
+2 
+9 
+1 
+31 
+4  
Ballot 3  
 22 70  12 43 4 151 
From No Model 
From Status Quo 
From Abstain  
 
 
+10 
+1 
+1 
+1 
 -1 
+32 
 
-43 
 
 
-1 
 
Ballot 4  
 32 73  43  3 151 
From C19 
From D 
From No Model 
From Abstain 
  -31 +4 
-3 
 
+1 
+25 
+1 
+43 
+2 
 
 
-43 
 +2 
+2 
 
-3 
 
Ballot 5  
  
75 71 
 
 4 150 
From D 
From Not D 
From Abstain 
   -6 
+3 
+2 
-18 
+1 
  +4 
+15 
-1 
 
Ballot 820  
  
73 57 
 
 22 152 
 
(Source:  reproduced from Kreibig 1998, 38, with some amendments) 
 
The results for the six ballots are shown in closed boxes under eight columns, one for 
each option that was offered in the ballots.  The number of votes for each option is 
shown in the rows which are formatted as closed boxes, while data for the movement of 
votes is shown in rows between the closed boxes.  For example, the two rows between 
the closed boxes for ballot 1 and ballot 2 show:  when the Hayden model was eliminated 
in the first round, the four delegates who had voted for it (-4) cast their votes in the 
second ballot for Gallop (+2), McGarvie (+1), and No Model (+1);  another delegate 
changed their vote from Turnbull (-1) to Gallop (+1).  Where cells are shaded, this 
means that the option was not offered in that ballot.  
                                                 
19
 One vote did not transfer because Anderson voted for model C in ballot 4 but did not vote in ballot 5. 
20
 The flow of votes does not reconcile from ballot five to ballot eight because two delegates who voted in 
ballot eight did not vote in ballot five, namely Anderson (against Turnbull model D), and McNamara (for 
Turnbull model D).  
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REPRESENTATION 
The assembly was a diverse group.  Its delegates included residents of every state 
and mainland territory.  The age range was wide at 18 to 85 years, about one-third of the 
delegates were women, and 9% were born abroad.  By occupation, the delegates were 
students, retirees, parliamentarians, religious leaders, engineers, commercial executives, 
interest group leaders, academics, legal practitioners, journalists, public servants, and 
farmers and graziers, together with an artist, a film producer, a medical doctor, a hotel 
licensee, an Olympic athlete, and one unemployed person.  Certainly a diverse group, 
but was it representative?   
Descriptive data for the assembly delegates were compiled from official 
documents, autobiographies, biographies, publications, and speeches, and from personal 
communications with the delegates.21  Data for delegates’ gender, age, formal education, 
aboriginality, and place of birth were compared to data for the Australian population 
drawn from the 1996 census.  While census data are imperfect for the present purposes 
because they include minors and people who are not eligible to vote, equivalent data for 
electors are not published.  Data for delegates’ place of residence were compared with 
data for electors that were compiled by the Australian Electoral Commission just prior 
to the 1999 referenda.  Analysis of place of residence is shown separately below to 
simplify the presentation. 
Place of residence 
The results for place of residence are shown in table 4.5 below, in two parts.  The 
top half of the table shows the proportion of electors, parliamentarians, and delegates for 
each state and territory, expressed as a percentage.  The lower half of the table shows the 
disproportions for each state and territory, which is calculated by subtracting the 
percentage of electors or federal parliamentarians from the percentage of delegates.  A 
negative number in the disproportions section indicates under-representation, while a 
positive number indicates over-representation.   
The lower half of the table shows that the three largest states were under-
represented at the assembly, while the three smaller states and both mainland territories 
were over-represented.  The ‘All delegates to electors’ line shows that New South Wales 
was under-represented by 10%, Victoria by 6%, and Queensland by 3%, while the other 
states and territories were over-represented by up to 5.5%.   
                                                 
21
 I gathered most of this data for my honours thesis (Kreibig 1998).  For this thesis, I updated it, added to 
it, and repeated the analysis. 
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Table 4.5:  Representation of place of residence 
 
 
NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT 
Group by state or territory (row %)         
Electors 33   26 18 9 8 3 2 1 
Federal Parliament 28 22 17 12 11 8 2 1 
Assembly Delegates         
- All delegates 23 20 15 13 14 8 4 4 
- Parliamentarians 20 15 10 15 23 10 5 3 
- Community representatives 19 22 17 11 11 6 6 8 
- Elected 26 21 17 12 11 8 3 3 
         
 Disproportions (points difference)1         
 All delegates to electors -10.4 -5.8 -2.9 3.0 5.5 5.3 2.2 3.1 
Parliamentary delegates to electors -13.5 -10.5 -8.0 5.5 14.2 7.4 3.3 1.6 
Community representatives to electors -14.0 -3.3 -1.3 1.6 2.8 2.9 3.8 7.5 
Elected delegates to electors -7.1 -4.5 -0.9 2.3 2.2 5.3 0.9 1.8 
Elected delegates to federal parliament -1.5 -0.9 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.4 1.7 
 
(Sources: electors AEC 2000, 53;  parliament Parliamentary Library 1996;  data for delegates gathered 
from Kreibig 1998, 15) 
 
Note 1:  a negative number is under-representation, and a positive number is over-representation. 
 
The breakdown of the disproportions by delegate group for each state and territory 
shows that the highest disproportions were found for parliamentarians and community 
representatives.  Parliamentarians under-represented Victoria and Queensland by 10% 
and 8% respectively, and they over-represented Western Australia, South Australia, and 
Tasmania by 5%, 14%, and 7% respectively.  Community representatives under-
represented New South Wales by 14%, and they over-represented the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory by 4% and 7% respectively.  The disproportions 
tended to be smaller for elected delegates. 
The disproportions for parliamentary delegates occurred in part because federal 
seats were allocated by seniority and portfolio, not state affiliation.  For example, 
parliamentarians affiliated with South Australia were over-represented by 14%, but this 
figure was inflated by two South Australians who were appointed because of their roles 
in the federal parliament at the time:  Natasha Stott Despoja was appointed as leader of 
the Australian Democrats, and Nick Bolkus was appointed as opposition shadow 
attorney-general and minister for justice with specific responsibility for the republic 
debate.  If the people who held these two parliamentary positions at the time resided in 
New South Wales, then over-representation for South Australia would improve from  
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14% to 9%, and under-representation for New South Wales would improve from 13% to 
8%.  The point to draw from this example is that small changes in the state affiliation of 
particular parliamentary delegates would produce relatively large changes in the results. 
 The disproportions for community representatives are more difficult to explain, as 
 the federal government was free to ensure when it selected these delegates that the 
geographic spread was equitable.  There is a strong negative correlation between the size 
of the state and territory electorates and the disproportion rate, which ranges from the 
under-representation of New South Wales by 14% to the over-representation of the 
Northern Territory by 7%.  Again, small changes to the allocation of seats across the 
states and territories would produce a much more equitable result.  If, for example, one 
delegate was allocated to each of the two territories and the balance of three delegates 
were allocated to New South Wales, then the territories would still be over-represented 
by 1% to 2%, but the under-representation figure for New South Wales would improve 
from 14% to 6%.  Clearly, the government was not concerned about the geographic 
representation of electors when it chose its community representatives. 
 For the elected delegates, the geographic distribution was not consistent with 
either the senate, where each state has an equal number of seats, or the house of 
representatives, where population determines how many seats are allocated to each state. 
The penultimate line of the table compares the number of electors in each state and 
territory with the number of elected seats allocated to each state and territory.  It shows 
that the three larger states were under-represented by up to 7%, and the other states and 
territories were over-represented by up to 5%.  In 1996, the government announced “The 
elected delegates will be divided between the States and Territories, broadly in line with 
the composition of the Commonwealth Parliament” (Minchin 1997;  see also PM&C 
1998a, 17) – such a distribution would mirror the composition of a joint sitting of 
parliament.  The last line of the table shows that this objective was achieved, broadly.  
While NSW, Victoria, and Queensland are still under-represented, the differences are 
much smaller (1.5%, 0.9%, and 0.1% respectively).  These margins are so small that 
changing the distribution of seats would not improve the outcome overall.  For example, 
if one seat changed from the Northern Territory to NSW, then NSW is over-represented 
by 1.1%, but Northern Territory is under-represented by 1.3%.  The over- and under-
representation of states and territories is illustrated in figure 4.2 below, which shows 
that overall, elected delegates were more representative of the geographic spread of 
electors than were parliamentarians, or community representatives. 
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Figure 4.2:  Representation of place of residence by state and delegate group 
 
While comparisons do not favour the elected group in every case – for example, 
community representatives were more geographically representative for Tasmania and 
Victoria – in general, the differences were smallest for elected delegates.  Community 
representatives were, in turn, more representative than parliamentarians.  Representation 
of electors by place of residence would have been much worse if these parliamentarians 
had convened alone.     
Gender, age, education, aboriginality, and place of birth 
The results for gender, age, formal education, aboriginality, and place of birth are 
summarised in table 4.6 below.  The last two columns of the table show that the 
assembly delegates were not representative of selected population demographics.   
• Median age for delegates was 50 years – five years higher than the estimate for all 
residents of voting age. 
• Two-thirds of the delegates were men, which means that women were under-
represented by a margin of about 17%. 
• Delegates were almost twice as likely to have a post-school qualification (81% cf. 
42% respectively). 
• Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders were over-represented (5% cf. 2%). 
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• Delegates were much less likely to be born abroad (9% cf. 26%).   
Table 4.6:  Representation of gender, age, education, aboriginality, and place of birth 
 
Delegates  
 
Characteristic  
MPs 
Community 
Representatives 
 
Elected 
 
All 
 
Population 
  
 
   
Gender (% men)1 83 50 65 66 49 
Age (median years)1 50 54 50 50 45 
Education, post-school qualification (%)2 77 75 85 81 42 
Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders (%) 0 10 4 5 2 
Born abroad (%) 3 19 8 9 26 
      
 
(Sources:  population ABS 1998, B03 and B17;  delegates, data adapted from Kreibig 1998;   and PM&C 
1998a, 62-113) 
 
Notes: 
1 Census data for 1996 are adjusted to exclude overseas visitors and persons who probably were not 18 
years old, but the data still includes persons who were not registered to vote. 
2 While the differences for education may be overstated because census data are for persons aged 15 years 
or more and the youngest assembly delegate was aged 18 years, five of the delegates (3% of the assembly) 
were students who did not as yet have a post-school qualification. 
 
Women, youth, and people born abroad were under-represented, delegates were more 
highly educated, and Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders were over-represented. 
Further analysis of median age shows that Labor parliamentarians were more 
representative than their Coalition colleagues (48 years and 52 years respectively), and 
women were more representative for age than men (44 years and 52 years respectively). 
Women parliamentarians were representative for age at median 45 years, but women 
who were elected or appointed as community representatives were not.   
  Elected delegates were more likely to be born abroad than were parliamentary 
delegates (8% and 3% respectively), and the gender balance was better for elected 
delegates than it was for parliamentarians (65% and 83% men respectively).  Elected 
delegates were, however, more likely to hold tertiary qualifications than were 
parliamentarians or community representatives (76%, 64%, and 61% respectively).   
The disparities were less marked for community representatives than for either 
parliamentarians or elected delegates, except for aboriginality and age.  This better result 
was consistent with the Coalition’s declared intention to achieve broad representation 
when it selected these delegates (Minchin 1997, 2).  The community group was very 
nearly representative for gender at 50% men, its members were less likely to have a 
tertiary degree (61%), and more of them were born abroad (9%).  The median age for 
community representatives was, however, four years higher than it was for either 
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parliamentarians or elected delegates.  This is noteworthy, given that the Coalition 
emphasised the need to include youth when it chose its community representatives. 
The answer to the question of descriptive representation is a mixed one. 
Appointed delegates were the most representative group for gender, formal education, 
and place of birth, but they were least representative for aboriginality and age.  Elected 
delegates were most representative for aboriginality, and they held the middle ground 
for representation of gender and place of birth, but they were least representative for 
formal education.  Parliamentarians were most representative for age (by less than one 
year), and the result for formal education was only a little higher than it was for 
community representatives, but parliamentarians were least representative for gender, 
place of birth, and aboriginality.  In brief, non-parliamentarians were more 
representative than parliamentarians for four of the five features examined here.  
Constitutional preferences 
The question of whether the assembly better reflected electors’ constitutional 
preferences is answered by comparing responses to two equivalent questions.  In the 
eighth assembly ballot, delegates voted Yes, No, or Abstain to the statement:  
that this Convention supports the adoption of a republican system of government on the bipartisan 
appointment of a President model [the Turnbull model] in preference to there being no change to 
the Constitution (PM&C 1998b, 982). 
 
The model mentioned was the model put to referendum.  Voters at the referendum were 
required to answer Yes or No to the statement: 
A PROPOSED LAW:  To alter the Constitution to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a 
republic with the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by a President appointed by a two-
thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament (AEC 2000, 9). 
 
The exact form of the referendum question was the subject of heated debate over what it 
did and did not say, and how this would prejudice the outcome.  The Joint Select 
Committee on the Republic Referendum recommended changing the long title of the 
Bill to “A Bill for an Act to alter the Constitution to establish the Commonwealth of 
Australia as a republic, with the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by an 
Australian President”.  This amended title said that the president would be Australian, 
but not that parliament chose the president (JSCRR 1999, vii). 
Results for the assembly ballots and the referendum are shown below in table 4.7. 
 The top half of the table shows the proportion of electors and delegates who supported 
the model by state, expressed as percentage.  The bottom half of the table shows 
variations in support, calculated by subtracting the percentage of electors who supported 
the republic model from the percentage of delegates who supported it, so a positive 
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number indicates that delegates were more supportive, and a negative number indicates 
delegates were less supportive. 
The national results for electors and delegates were remarkably similar.  The 
national figures on the first two lines of table 4.7 show that 45% of electors and 48% of 
delegates supported the Turnbull republic model.  This suggests that the assembly as a 
whole was successful in representing electors’ preferences.     
 
Table 4.7:  Representation of preferences 
 
 Support for the Turnbull republic model 
Group NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas National1
Support (row percent2) 
Electors 46.4 49.8 37.4 41.5 43.6 40.4 45.1
All Delegates 48.6 53.3 21.7 42.1 61.9 50.0 48.0
Parliamentary delegates  62.5 66.7 25.0 50.0 77.8 75.0 62.5
Community representatives 42.9 50.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 38.9
Elected delegates 45.0 50.0 30.8 44.4 50.0 33.3 44.7
        
Variation between delegates and electors (percentage points)  
All delegates 2.2 3.5 -15.7 0.6 18.3 9.6 2.9
Parliamentary delegates 16.1 16.9 -12.4 8.5 34.2 34.6 17.4
Community representatives -3.5 0.2 -37.4 -16.5 6.4 9.6 -6.2
Elected delegates -1.4 0.2 -6.6 2.9 6.4 -7.1 -0.4
 
(Sources:  delegates, PM&C 1998b, 983-984;   electors, AEC 2000, 77) 
NOTES: 
1. The national total includes territories, which is how referenda votes are counted. 
2. Support is the portion that voted Yes at the referendum, or the eighth assembly ballot. 
 
By state and delegate group, however, there were some stark differences.  Support for 
the Turnbull republic model by both electors and delegates was relatively strong in New 
South Wales and Victoria, moderate in Western Australia and Tasmania, polarised in 
South Australia, and weak in Queensland.  South Australian delegates recorded the 
highest support at 62%, and also the highest discrepancy because support from South 
Australian electors lagged well behind at 44%.  Queensland recorded the lowest support 
figures overall at 37% for electors, and 22% for delegates.  The gap between 
Queensland delegates and the convention as a whole was startling, at more than 26%. 
The ‘All Delegates’ line on the lower half of the table shows that for each state 
except Queensland, delegates were more supportive of the Turnbull republic model than 
were electors.  The smallest variation in this pattern was recorded for Western Australia 
where the difference was just 0.6%.  The largest variation was found for South Australia 
where the difference was 18.3%.  For Queensland, delegates were much less likely to 
support the Turnbull model than were electors in that state – by a margin of almost 16%.  
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Analysis of preferences by selection shows that parliamentarians were much more 
likely to support the Turnbull republic model than were electors.  Across all the states, 
63% of the parliamentary delegates supported it, compared to 45% of electors. Again 
with the exception of Queensland, variations for parliamentarians by state were 
consistently positive, ranging from 8% for Western Australia to 34% for South 
Australia, and 35% for Tasmania.  For Queensland, the variation was –12%;  
parliamentary delegates for Queensland were less likely to support the Turnbull model 
than were Queensland electors, and they were of course much less likely to support the 
model than were other parliamentarians at the assembly.  For parliamentarians, support 
of the Turnbull model by state ranges from 25% for Queensland, to 50% for Western 
Australia, to 78% for Tasmania – a difference of up to of 53%. 
 The results by state for community representatives are the most diverse.  While 
preferences for the Victorian community representatives almost matches electors 
(variation +0.2%), and the variation for New South Wales is just –3.5%, the variations 
for the other states ranges from +6.4% for South Australia to –37.4% for Queensland.  
The last result is the most marked for any group examined here.   
Elected delegates represented electors’ preferences most accurately, with a 
national variation of just +0.4%.  This is remarkable given that turnout for the assembly 
election was only 49.6%.  This result makes it difficult to claim that the interests of 
particular preference groups were not represented in the assembly election, especially 
considering that the variation for elected delegates state-by-state was also generally less 
than it was for parliamentarians, or for community representatives (mean variation -
0.9% elected, +16.3% parliamentarians, and –6.9% community representatives).  
Variations were identical, however, for elected delegates and community representatives 
for Victoria and South Australia.  Figure 4.3 below illustrates the results. 
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Figure 4.3:  Variation in support for the Turnbull republic model by state 
Note:  Variation is delegates voting Yes less electors voting Yes, expressed as a percent. 
 
Elected delegates were more representative of electors’ views as expressed at the 
referendum.  While community representatives reflected electors’ preferences well in 
three states, generally they were much less likely to favour the republic model than were 
electors.  Parliamentarians in every state except Queensland were more likely to support 
the Turnbull model than were community representatives, elected delegates, or electors. 
 If these parliamentarians debated a republic alone, the Turnbull model would have been 
carried with a Yes vote of 62.5% nationally, and majorities in four of the six states. 
A comparison of the results for parliamentarians, community representatives, and 
elected delegates shows that elected delegates were the most representative for 
constitutional preferences, place of residence, and aboriginality.  Community 
representatives were most representative for gender, place of birth, and formal 
education.  For each facet of representation examined here, parliamentarians were the 
least representative group;  the disparities were especially marked for aboriginality, 
gender, and place of birth.  The Australian assembly was more representative than it 
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would have been if these parliamentarians had debated this constitutional change alone. 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
Members of the public made more than 1,000 written submissions to the assembly 
and the government (PM&C 1998a, 52), and lodged an unknown number of 
submissions directly with the delegates.  As a measure of interest, this compares 
favourably with the 1988 Constitutional Commission, which received 686 submissions 
(Constitutional Commission 1988, 911-912), and the 1993 Republic Advisory 
Committee, which received 417 submissions (RAC 1993b, 331-341).  It is more 
relevant, however, to compare the assembly with occasions where parliamentarians 
convened alone.   
The Joint Select Committee on the Republic Referendum convened in 1999 to 
review the Constitution Alteration (Establishment of Republic) 1999 bill, and the 
Presidential Nominations Committee Bill 1999.  The committee comprised 12 members 
of the house of representatives and six senators, split evenly between government and 
non-government parties.  Its brief was to “inquire into and report on the provisions of 
bills introduced by the Government to give effect to a referendum on a republic” 
(JSCRR 1999, x).  The committee received 122 written submissions (JSCRR 1999, 137-
142), which is just 12% of the number received by the assembly.  This was a modest 
result, given that the committee issued 200 requests for submissions, and “advertised 
widely … in newspapers in metropolitan and regional areas” (JSCRR 1999, 3). 
People also demonstrated interest in the assembly by attending inquiries in person. 
 Demand for public seats was so high that access to the gallery was rationed.  Even so, 
people queued for seats, and up to 300 visitors crowded into the public gallery each hour 
to witness the debates (PM&C 1998a, 54).  This result cannot be compared to the 
JSCRR inquiry, however, because the secretariat did not record the number of people 
who attended its sessions – it is not customary to do so (Claressa Surtees, then secretary 
of the committee, pers. comm. 2 June 2006).  Fortunately, data for attendance at one 
recent constitutional inquiry are available.  In 2003 the Coalition government convened 
an inquiry into s 57 deadlock provisions, called for submissions, and held eight 
meetings in the capital cities between October and December.  In answer to a question 
on notice from a Labor MP, the prime minister advised that about 237 people attended 
these eight meetings – attendance ranged from fewer than 15 people in Canberra, 
Adelaide, and Darwin, to about 60 in Melbourne (Australian House of Representatives 
2004, 2 March, 25696).  The inquiry was abandoned soon after because public interest 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
133
 
was considered to be too low.  Seccombe noted that apart from a lack of interest, the 
proposals met with “overwhelming political opposition” (Seccombe 2004, 5). 
Behaviour at the referenda also indicated that interest was high.  As mentioned 
earlier, the informal rate was the lowest ever recorded for Australian referenda.  The 
turnout was also relatively high at 95.1% for both questions.  This is the third highest 
turnout ever recorded, and the highest turnout for a referendum since 1951. 
Each of these indicators suggests strongly that the assembly generated more 
interest than would be the case if parliamentarians debated constitutional change alone. 
CONSENSUS  
This section answers the question about consensus by comparing the votes cast by 
parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians in the nine formal ballots that were held at 
the assembly.  The ballots and the choices offered in them were listed earlier in table 
4.3.  The table is repeated below for the reader’s convenience.  
Table 4.3:  Formal ballots and voting options 
 
Ballot Topic Ballot options 
1, day 9 Republic model elimination round 1 Hayden, Gallop, McGarvie, Turnbull, no model, abstain 
2, day 9 Republic model elimination round 2 Gallop, McGarvie, Turnbull, no model, abstain 
3, day 9 Republic model elimination round 3 McGarvie, Turnbull, status quo, no model, abstain 
4, day 9 Republic model elimination round 4 McGarvie, Turnbull, no model, abstain  
5, day 10 Should the Turnbull model be adopted? Yes, no, abstain 
6, day 10 Should Australia become a republic? Yes, no, abstain 
7, day 10 Transitional & consequential issues  Yes, no, abstain 
8, day 10 Is Turnbull preferred to status quo? Yes, no, abstain 
9, day 10 Should a referendum be held? Yes, no, abstain 
 
(Source:  PM&C 1998b, 873-884, 929-930, 946-948, 962-965, 992-994) 
 
The first four ballots were designed to eliminate all but one of the four republic models. 
The four models were included in the ballots because their proponents had demonstrated 
support from at least ten delegates.   
The Turnbull republic model received more Yes votes in the fourth ballot than did 
any other republic model, so the fifth ballot asked delegates whether they preferred it to 
the other three republic models.  The eighth ballot asked a different question, namely 
whether delegates wanted to adopt the Turnbull republic model rather than leave the 
constitution unchanged.  The sixth ballot tested support for a republic in principle, and 
the ninth ballot asked whether a referendum should be held.  The seventh ballot asked 
delegates to vote on forty-six transitional and consequential resolutions that would arise 
if Australia became a republic, including such diverse subjects as the preamble, 
membership of the Commonwealth, and withdrawing currency that bears the Queen’s 
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image.  The level of support for each ballot option by group is detailed below in table 
4.8.   Each cell shows the proportion of delegates that chose each option.  The results 
show that unanimity was achieved twice, both times by parliamentarians.  In the last 
ballot all parliamentarians agreed that a republic referendum should be held (positive 
unanimity), and in the first ballot no parliamentarians supported the Hayden republic 
model (negative unanimity).   
Table 4.8:  Support for ballot options by ballot and delegate group 
 
Support by Delegate group (%) 
Ballot MPs Community Elected All 
1 Elimination round 1     
 - Hayden 0.0 5.6 2.6 2.6 
 - Gallop 23.1 2.8 22.4 17.9 
 - McGarvie 38.5 36.1 2.6 19.9 
 - Turnbull 38.5 41.7 38.2 39.1 
2 Elimination round 2     
 - Gallop 23.1 5.6 25.0 19.9 
 - McGarvie 38.5 38.9 2.6 20.5 
 - Turnbull 38.5 38.9 38.2 38.4 
3 Elimination round 3     
 - McGarvie 23.1 33.3 1.3 14.6 
 - Turnbull 59.0 38.9 43.4 46.4 
 - Status quo 15.4 25.0 38.2 29.1 
4 Elimination round 4     
 - McGarvie 38.5 41.7 2.6 21.2 
 - Turnbull 61.5 41.7 44.7 48.3 
5 Should the Turnbull model be adopted? 60.5 52.8 43.4 50.0 
6 Should Australia become a republic? 67.5 41.7 61.8 58.6 
7 Transitional & consequential issues  79.5 63.9 64.0 68.0 
8 Is Turnbull preferred to status quo? 62.5 38.9 44.7 48.0 
9 Should a referendum be held? 100.0 97.2 76.3 87.5 
 
     
 
(Source: analysis of PM&C 1998b: 873-884, 929-930, 946-948, 962-965, 982-984, 992-994) 
 
Abstain is counted as a negative vote because (as mentioned earlier) it was a 
formal voting option in every ballot, and because in this particular context there is no 
reason to suspect that delegates who voted Abstain wanted to record a positive vote for 
any other option that was offered.  The latter point is demonstrated by the following 
exchange between an appointed delegate and the deputy chair, just before the eighth 
ballot.  In that ballot, delegates were asked whether they preferred the Turnbull model to 
the status quo.  Delegates could vote Yes, No, or Abstain. 
The Most Reverend PETER HOLLINGWORTH – … I and others here find ourselves between 
a rock and a hard place.  The problem lies in the way the motion has been formulated in the sense 
that it asks the members of this Convention to make a clear statement about whether they prefer the 
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bipartisan model republic hastily drawn together yesterday to the status quo.  … It was in the spirit 
of compromise that I felt that it must be supported [earlier], even though it would not be my 
preference.  The point I want to make is that I and others are now confronted with a real moral 
dilemma.  If we are forced to make a choice between the status quo, which is tried, tested and 
known, and a bipartisan [Turnbull] republican model which contains a number of procedural 
problems that are unresolved, I regret to say that I would have to abstain from the proposal, even 
though I had done some prior work in developing the compromise which is before the Convention. 
Hence the moral dilemma about which I seek advice. 
 
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN – I am in no position to rule on moral dilemmas.  You are infinitely better 
placed than I am. 
 
The Most Reverend PETER HOLLINGWORTH – Can I make it clear that I am forced by the 
motion to abstain from voting (PM&C 1998b, 981-982).   
 
Clearly, Hollingworth did not want to vote for the Turnbull model, or against it.  In this 
context, Abstain cannot possibly mean Yes.  Nor can it mean that delegates did not care 
enough to vote, as may be the case with some public polls. 
The extent of consensus by delegate group is easier to identify using figure 4.4, 
which is included on the next page.  Each set of three bars represents an option that was 
offered in a ballot, with the ballots re-ordered to bring together results for the same 
options.  For example, all of the results for the McGarvie model are together, labelled as 
ER1 for the first elimination round, ER2 for the second elimination round, and so on. 
The results for parliamentarians, community representatives, and elected delegates are 
plotted against each option as a shaded bar that indicates a positive or negative result:  
results above 50% are plotted on the positive y-axis, and results below 50% are plotted 
on the negative y-axis.  Hence the group with the longest bar on the y-axis is the group 
that was better able to reach consensus on that option.  For example, on the question of 
whether Australia should become a republic (the sixth ballot), 68% of parliamentarians 
and 62% of elected delegates voted Yes.  These results are plotted on the positive axis 
because the Yes vote was higher than the No vote.  By contrast, 58% of the community 
representatives voted No in that ballot, which is plotted as on the negative axis because 
there were more No votes than Yes votes.  For this ballot, parliamentarians were better 
able to reach consensus than were community representatives or elected delegates.  The 
group that came closest to either positive or negative consensus on each option is further 
highlighted with an asterisk immediately above or below the x-axis.   
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*An asterisk adjacent to the X-axis marks the group that came closest to achieving unanimity on that option 
Figure 4.4:  Consensus by ballot and delegate group 
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All of the results are negative until the third elimination round.  Negative unanimity was 
almost achieved five times when less than 3% of the community representatives voted 
for Gallop in the second ballot, and less than 3% of the elected delegates supported 
McGarvie in the first, second, third, and fourth ballots.  Clearly, elected delegates did 
not want the McGarvie model.  
Most parliamentarians supported Turnbull from the third elimination round, and 
maintained their support for that option for the remaining ballots.  By contrast, a 
majority of elected delegates did not at any time support one constitutional option.  A 
majority of community representatives supported Turnbull in the fifth ballot, but just 
39% of these delegates supported it in the eighth ballot.   
Which group, then, was better able to reach consensus?  If we look only at positive 
majorities, the clear answer is parliamentarians, because they reached majority 
agreement on a republic, transitional issues, a referendum, and one republic model.  But 
deciding this question by examining positive majorities only would ignore, for example, 
the preferences of every delegate who did not want Australia to become a republic.  
Such an analysis would be flawed. 
Analysis of all outcomes shows that community representatives and elected 
delegates were better able to reach consensus more often than parliamentarians.  Figure 
4.4 shows that the tallies were highest when community representatives voted: 
• against Gallop in the first and second elimination rounds;  and  
• against Turnbull in the third elimination round.   
The tallies for elected delegates were highest when they voted: 
• against McGarvie in the first, second, third, and fourth elimination rounds; and  
• against Turnbull in the first and second elimination rounds.   
The tallies for parliamentarians were highest when they voted: 
• against Hayden in the first elimination round;  
• for Turnbull in the fourth elimination round, and in the fifth and eighth ballots; 
• against status quo in the third elimination round; 
• for a republic, for transitional and consequential issues, and for a referendum.   
Non-parliamentarians were better able to reach consensus nine times, while 
parliamentarians were better able to reach consensus eight times.   
Non-parliamentarians were better able to reach consensus than were 
parliamentarians, but the results for individual ballots was sometimes very close.  The 
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results for the Turnbull model in the second elimination round was community 
representatives -61%, parliamentarians -61.5%, and elected delegates -62%, a difference 
overall of just 1%.  For six of the 17 options that are shown on figure 4.4, the variation 
across the three groups was 3% or less.  The data allow the conclusion, nevertheless, 
that non-parliamentarians were better able to reach consensus at the Australian assembly 
than were parliamentarians.    
PARTISANSHIP 
This section answers the last question that arose from the literature reviewed in the 
second chapter, namely, was the Australian assembly less partisan than it would have 
been if parliamentarians debated this constitutional change alone?  As explained in the 
second chapter, the question is answered by establishing what proportion of the 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary delegates change their preferences during the 
course of the assembly.  The less partisan group is the group that includes more 
delegates who changed their preference votes.   
In the analysis that follows, constitutional preferences are identified using seven of 
the nine formal ballots (for a list of the ballots, see table 4.3 on page 133), and 
statements made by the delegates at the assembly and elsewhere.  One parliamentary 
delegate (Pat McNamara) is not included because he did not attend for six of the eight 
ballots, and he did not address the convention, so his preferences cannot be determined. 
Two of the ballots are not used because they do not necessarily indicate delegates’ 
preferences.  When delegates were asked in the seventh ballot to vote on transitional and 
consequential issues that would arise if Australia became a republic, the vote was split 
Yes, No and Abstain across constitutional monarchists, and republicans.  Similarly, 
when delegates were asked in the ninth ballot whether a referendum should be held, 
again the votes were split across the preference groups.  This is not surprising given that 
some constitutional monarchists and republicans supported a referendum because they 
believed electors should decide the issue, some constitutional monarchists voted No 
because they did not want a republic of any kind, and some republicans voted No 
because they did not support a referendum on the Turnbull republic model.  
Analysis of the ballots showed that parliamentarians exhibited less partisan voting 
behaviour than did non-parliamentarians – the results are summarised in table 4.9 
below.  The top half of the table shows the distribution of partisan delegates by selection 
and constitutional preference, while the bottom half of the table shows the voting pattern 
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for each constitutional preference.  Data in the last column at the top of the table show 
that 74% of the parliamentarians voted in a way that indicates partisanship, compared to 
84% of the non-parliamentarians – a substantial difference of 10%.  
Table 4.9:  Partisans by delegate group and constitutional preference 
 
 Partisans’ constitutional preferences 
 Const. 
Monarchy Status Quo McGarvie Turnbull Gallop Total 
Selection (row %)       
Parliamentarians - 15.4 20.5 38.5 - 74.4 
Non-parliamentarians 26.8 3.6 7.1 36.6 9.8 83.9 
- Community rep’s 11.1 8.3 19.4 33.3 2.8 75.0 
- Elected delegates 34.2 1.3 1.3 38.2 13.2 88.2 
All delegates 19.9 6.6 10.6 37.1 7.3 81.5 
Voting patterns       
Ballot 1 – elimination No model McGarvie 
Hayden 
McGarvie Turnbull Gallop  
Ballot 2 – elimination No model McGarvie 
No Model 
McGarvie Turnbull Gallop  
Ballot 3 – elimination Status 
quo 
Status quo McGarvie Turnbull No model/ 
Status quo 
 
Ballot 4 – elimination No model McGarvie 
No Model 
McGarvie Turnbull No model  
Ballot 5 – Turnbull  No No No/Abstain Yes No  
Ballot 6 – republic  No No Yes/No/ 
Abstain 
Yes Yes  
Ballot 8 – Turnbull  No No No/Abstain Yes No/Abstain  
 
(Source: analysis of PM&C 1998b: 873-884, 929-930, 946-948, 962-965, 982-984, 992-994) 
 
Further analysis of the voting patterns for parliamentarians showed that the favourable 
result for partisanship is largely attributable to the Labor delegates.  Table 4.10 below 
shows the proportion of parliamentarians who were committed (did not change their 
preferences), moderate (changed their preferences once), and equivocal (changed their 
preferences more than once).   
Table 4.10:  Parliamentary support for the Turnbull model by party 
 
 Liberal National Coalition ALP Democrats Greens 
Indep- 
endent Total % 
Committed 5 0 5 9 1 0 0 15 38% 
Moderate 2 0 2 4 1 1 0 8 21% 
Equivocal 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 5% 
Opposed 8 5 13 0 0 0 1 14 36% 
Total 17 5 22 13 2 1 1 39  
          
Partisans 13 5 18 9 1 0 1 29  
% Partisans 76% 100% 82% 69% 50% 0% 100% 74%  
 
(Source: analysis of PM&C 1998b: 873-884, 929-930, 946-948, 962-965, 982-984, 992-994) 
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Excluding Democrats, Greens, and independent delegates because these contingents are 
so small, ALP delegates achieved the lowest score for partisanship of 69%, compared to 
76% for the Liberals, 100% for the Nationals, and 82% for the Coalition (Liberals and 
Nationals combined).  The difference for partisanship between parliamentarians and 
community representatives was less than 0.6% (see table 4.9), but this contingent was 
too small to bring the overall result for non-parliamentarians anywhere near the result 
for parliamentarians.  The voting pattern for each preference group is explained below. 
The 30 constitutional monarchy partisans voted against every republic option in 
every ballot.  This group comprised 26 elected delegates, and four community 
representatives appointed by the federal government.  All but two of the elected 
delegates published official campaign statements that opposed constitutional change 
explicitly.  The exceptions were members of the Safeguard the People group, which 
published a statement expressing caution about constitutional change, but not ruling out 
a conservative republic model.  
The 16 McGarvie partisans voted for McGarvie in elimination rounds one to four, 
then against Turnbull when it was offered alone in the fifth and eighth ballots.  This 
group comprised eight parliamentarians (seven Coalition and one independent), seven 
community representatives, and one delegate elected to the assembly using a campaign 
statement that said he was undecided about whether Australia should become a republic. 
The 56 Turnbull partisans voted for Turnbull in ballots one to four, five and eight, 
and for a republic in ballot six.  By selection, 15 were parliamentarians (five Liberal, 
nine Labor, and one Democrat), 12 were community representatives, and 29 were 
elected (27 for the ARM and two ungrouped). 
The 11 Gallop partisans voted for Gallop when it was available in the first and 
second ballots, then did not vote for any other republic option, but they did vote for a 
republic in the sixth ballot.  This group comprised 10 elected delegates who had 
promoted direct election in their election campaigns, and one community representative.  
Finally, the ten Status Quo partisans voted McGarvie, Hayden, Status Quo, and 
No Model in the four elimination rounds, then No to Turnbull, and No a republic in the 
fifth, sixth, and eighth ballots.  The group comprised six Coalition parliamentarians 
(including the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, and the Queensland premier 
who represented the National Party), three community representatives (including Bill 
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Hayden, former federal Labor minister and governor-general 1989-96), and one delegate 
elected on a constitutional monarchy ticket.  It does not seem that these delegates belong 
to one group because their votes were so different, and they did change their votes.  
Nine of the 10 delegates voted McGarvie, Status Quo, then McGarvie again, while the 
tenth member voted Hayden, No Model, Status Quo, then No Model. This group are 
united, however, by voting against Turnbull, against a republic, and for Status Quo.  
They are grouped together for this reason, and because statements made by them in the 
debates and elsewhere show that they did not prefer a republic of any kind.   
In his opening address, prime minister Howard asked delegates to vote for a 
republic of some kind so that it could be put to referendum:   
[T]he major goal of this Convention should be to reach a clear view on which republican model 
ought to be pitted against present arrangements at a constitutional referendum (PM&C 1998a, 3 
emphasis added).   
 
Despite his aversion to a republic, he followed his own urgings and voted McGarvie, 
Status Quo on the one occasion it was offered, McGarvie again, then No to a republic.  
Seven other members of this group did the same, and five of them made it clear before 
they cast their votes for the McGarvie model that they did not favour a republic of any 
kind. 
[T]his Convention is trying to come up with a conclusion that it can put to the people, but do not 
interpret that for one moment as any weakening on the side of the people who want to retain the 
status quo (Boswell, federal Coalition MP in PM&C 1998a, 417). 
 
As one who sees it as his role to defend our constitutional arrangements I believe that this 
Convention must settle on an alternative model for our head of state, one that can be put before the 
Australian people… the National Party does not believe that a strong enough case for change has 
been made (Anderson, federal Coalition MP in PM&C 1998a, 534). 
 
We are here to discuss what sort of republic we should have, what actual proposal should be put to 
the Australian people ... Of these three models, [McGarvie] is the most attractive, albeit an ugly 
bunch (Borbidge, state Coalition MP in PM&C 1998a, 49). 
 
[Given the] real complexities and drawbacks [of a republic] ... the Convention should nevertheless 
focus on the three [republic] models (Fischer, federal Coalition MP in PM&C 1998a, 250).   
 
[on the third day:]  my preference is clearly to retain, at least for the time being, the system we 
know … I have some sympathy with his [McGarvie’s] scheme, but so far I am not convinced 
[and on the eighth day:]  I am sure a decision on a republican model will emerge, but I am unlikely 
to prefer it to the present system  (Blainey, community representative in PM&C 1998a, 222-223, 
766).  
 
Denver Beanland, the last state Coalition parliamentarian in this group, criticised direct 
election and the McGarvie model, and urged delegates three times to consider selecting 
a president using an electoral college – if Australia became a republic – because this 
would be consistent with the federal principle (PM&C 1998a, 215-217, 367, 541-544).  
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The two non-parliamentary members of the group did not clarify their preferences in the 
debates.  Joan Moloney, a community representative, spoke once for about two minutes, 
in which time she suggested an electoral college should select a republic president 
(PM&C 1998a, 550).  Michael Castle, elected on a constitutional monarchy ticket, did 
not address the assembly.   
It is not surprising that almost all of the Status Quo partisans voted in the first 
instance for the McGarvie republic model.  When the constitution is read with informal 
constitutional agreements, there is little or no functional difference between it and the 
McGarvie model because the monarch is not active in Australian affairs, and the prime 
minister chooses the governor-general (see esp. Howard, Newman, Craven and 
McGarvie in PM&C 1998b, 4, 609, 990, 588, 842).  Winterton argued that the 
McGarvie model was not a republic at all (PM&C 1998b, 685).  Richard McGarvie, 
who proposed the model, said he sided with neither monarchists nor republicans, and he 
abstained from the last ballot which asked whether a referendum should be held (PM&C 
1998b, 936;  also McGarvie 1999, 91).  
It may seem odd to include Bill Hayden in the Status Quo group, given that he 
proposed the most radical republic model.  He voted for his model on the one occasion 
it was offered in the first ballot, then voted No Model, Status Quo, No Model, No to 
Turnbull, and No to a republic.  By contrast, the three other delegates who voted for the 
Hayden model in the first ballot went on to vote for other republic models.  This could 
be read to mean that for Hayden it had to be a Hayden republic, or no republic, but 
statements made by him paint a different picture. 
Hayden has repeatedly denied he is a republican.  He made that clear in an address 
to the National Press Club in 1996 (Hayden 1996a), and elaborated on it in an 
autobiography published in the same year.  In that work he wrote that Australia was 
already independent, and that becoming a republic would be entirely symbolic:   
For my part I can see no point in embarking on a spirited, time-consuming, resource-hungry hard-
sell campaign to enable a bit of tarting up of a vehicle which not only do we already own but 
performs quite effectively (Hayden 1996b, 548). 
 
He argued at length against proposals for direct election of a republic president, then 
concluded “I am obviously not a militant republican.  Neither am I a deferential royalist” 
(Hayden 1996b, 559).  He restated his position on the second day of the assembly:  
My preferred position is the status quo.  I am not here as an ideologue from the republicans or from 
the constitutional monarchists.  I am a pragmatist …I am not a republican.  If I were, however, I 
would support the ‘whole Monty’ as they say these days. …But I am not a republican (PM&C 
1998b, 180, 183). 
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Just before the first ballot, Patrick O’Brien (an elected delegate who supported direct 
election) asked Hayden whether he would vote for his own model.  Hayden replied: 
I do not belong to the constitutional monarchy group.  I have never been to one of their meetings.  I 
have never joined them.  I have consistently said I stand for the status quo because I am worried 
about the implications of processes of change.  Those worries are still there but I have no problem 
at all in voting for this.  The dismissal procedure satisfies a worry I did have about a demagogue.  
But, if it is defeated, I am not going to vote for the other half-bred sorts of things that have been 
put forward because they are gratuitously offensive to the Australian public and what it rightly 
expects to happen (PM&C 1998b, 837). 
 
By his own account, then, Hayden was not a republican. 
Given that Hayden was not a republican, why did he propose a radical republic 
model?  A benign explanation can be gleaned from the speech he delivered on the ninth 
day when he presented his model to the assembly, and from the quotation just cited.  He 
proposed a direct election republic model because he believed that the public wanted 
direct election, so it should be debated (PM&C 1998b, 833-838).  Like other members 
of the Status Quo group, he heard the prime minister’s call to support a republic model 
of some kind.  On the ninth day, Hayden said: 
Geoffrey Gallop made the observation that I am both radical and conservative at the same time.  
There has often been some truth to that.  … where it is safe and proper to be radical I am prepared 
to do so and when it is going to be dangerous then I will be conservative.  If I believe that the 
changes being proposed are going to be dangerous, then I will be conservative about them but if I 
can see a break for change, given the fact that the Prime Minister asked us to come up with 
something, then I will be radical (in PM&C 1998b, 869, emphasis added). 
 
It was safe to propose his model because it was most unlikely to succeed, as he 
acknowledged.  Republic models were not debated unless they were supported by at 
least ten delegates.  Hayden obtained ten signatures to support his model, but just before 
the first ballot he announced that he did not expect his supporters to vote for it (PM&C 
1998b, 833).  This is understandable, given that three of his supporters were elected on 
constitutional monarchy tickets (Bradley, Panopoulos, and Wilcox), and the final 
signatory was Geoffrey Blainey who is known to support the status quo (Blainey 1992; 
Blainey 1994;  Blainey in PM&C 1998b, 766).   
DISCUSSION 
Why was the Turnbull republic model put to referendum when a majority of the 
delegates did not support it?  In 1996, the Coalition’s Law and Justice Policy said: 
If a consensus emerges from the People’s Convention regarding the Head of State, that consensus 
will be promoted by the Government at a Constitutional referendum.  If no consensus emerges, 
then the Australian people will be asked to vote on a series of options for changes to establish 
which of them they desire (Liberal and National Parties of Australia 1996, emphasis added). 
 
By any conventional understanding of the word consensus as agreement, this meant that 
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if at least a majority of delegates supported a particular republic model, then that model 
would be put to referendum.  If they did not, then a multiple-choice plebiscite would be 
held.  On the first day of the Convention, however, the prime minister announced: 
if clear support for a particular republican model emerges from this Convention my government 
will, if returned at the next election, put that model to a referendum of the Australian people before 
the end of 1999.  ... If this Convention does not express a clear view ... the people will be asked to 
vote in a plebiscite which presents them with all the reasonable alternatives.  A formal 
constitutional referendum, offering a choice between the present system and the republican 
alternative receiving most support in the plebiscite, would then follow.  It is the hope of my 
government that this Convention will speak with sufficient clarity to obviate the need for a 
plebiscite (PM&C 1998b, 3 emphasis added). 
 
Between 1996 and 1998, the threshold for a referendum changed from “consensus” to 
“clear support” or “clear view”.  While it was not at all clear what “clear support” or 
“clear view” meant, it was clear at this point that if the convention did not reach a “clear 
view”, then a plebiscite would be held to offer electors more than one alternative to 
constitutional monarchy.   
Just before the eighth ballot, where delegates were asked if they preferred the 
Turnbull republic model to status quo, the prime minister rose without prompting to 
remind delegates of his position.  He is cited here in full, to avoid misrepresentation. 
Mr HOWARD – Mr Deputy Chairman, I start my brief remarks by taking the Convention back to 
the charge I gave it at the beginning, because I think some of the words that I then used have, either 
through inadvertence or on some occasions deliberately, been misrepresented.  What I said – and I 
think it is very important for the vote that is to take place in a moment and also later on this 
afternoon;  I will repeat the words in that speech – was: 
 
I inform the Convention that if clear support for a particular republican model emerges from this 
Convention my government will, if returned at the next election, put that model to a referendum …  
 
Let me repeat that:  if there is clear support for a particular republican model, we will put it to 
referendum. 
 
I want to make it very plain that I chose those words deliberately.  They were meant to convey a 
very clear and unmistakable meaning.  I want to repeat them the moment before the vote is taken. 
 
I also repeat again – this is well known – that I have been a supporter of the present system for 
many years.  My party knew my position when it made me its leader in 1995.  The Australian 
people knew my position when they elected my government to power in March 1996.  I have never 
disguised, in the interests of responding to what may appear to be majority support for a particular 
proposition, a point of view that I cannot in conscience embrace. 
 
I remain opposed to change because I honestly do not believe that Australia would be a better 
country if we abandoned the present constitutional system.  That is my honestly held belief. I find it 
a curious notion in this debate that in some way a mark of leadership is to repudiate something 
which, deep down in your heart, you believe in, in the name of responding to what is the current 
transient, perhaps enduring, support for a particular point of view. 
 
I can respect the strength of feeling of people like Phil Cleary.  He may disagree with me on many 
things – and he does on just about everything, I think – but I can respect his point of view.  I said to 
people when this Convention started that I wanted it to be an occasion for plain speaking.  I have 
not disguised my view. 
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I do not support the present system out of some nostalgia for a British past nor for the singing of 
‘God save the Queen’ or for something that is now distant.  I support it because, through an 
accident of history and the maturity of the Australian people, we have embraced to ourselves a 
system of government that has given us a coherence and a stability that are the envy of this world.  
In the true Burkian [sic] tradition of honourable conservatism – and I think honourable 
conservatism as well as constructive conservatism are important on these occasions – I believe it is 
eminently consonant with a democratic, inclusive future for Australia to maintain that system 
(PM&C 1998b, 980-981).  
 
Even at the eleventh hour, and despite the prime minister’s declared intention, it is not 
clear what the prime minister meant by “clear support”.  It is clear only that he intended 
his original words, and this subsequent explanation, to “convey a very clear and 
unmistakable meaning”, and that he did not support Australia becoming a republic.     
When the chair declared the Turnbull model carried in the eighth ballot, by 73 
Yes, 57 No, and 22 Abstain, some delegates objected.  Patrick O’Brien said: 
it is not a majority of the delegates … I, maybe mistakenly – I am not challenging the chairman’s 
ruling anymore – did believe that whatever went to the people would have to receive the votes of at 
least a majority of delegates.  I know for a fact that some delegates here understood that in 
abstaining they were actually voting, and that happens to be the case (PM&C 1998b, 987). 
 
Eric Bullmore asked the prime minister why the result did not trigger a plebiscite.  
Again, the exchange is cited in full to ensure accurate representation of both speakers. 
Mr BULLMORE – Is it possible for me to ask the Prime Minister to clarify what he said leading 
up to this, before he convened the Convention and before the election?  He also made a statement 
on plebiscites if we did not reach a consensus here.  Could he maybe clarify for us on the 
consensus?  
 
Mr HOWARD – The language that I used very deliberately and very carefully in my opening 
speech at the beginning of the Convention was ‘clear view’.  As I said a moment ago, when you 
have a combination of 89 out of 152 voting generically for a republic, and clearly the republican 
model attracting the most support at this Convention is the one that has been adopted, in those 
terms I am satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the charge given to the Convention has been 
fulfilled.  I think the matter ought to now be remitted to the Australian people for their verdict. 
 
Mr BULLMORE – The question was:  what was the position on a plebiscite? 
 
Mr HOWARD – The position on the plebiscite was that, if there had not been a clear view in 
support of a particular republican model, then we would have had a plebiscite.  But there is a clear 
view in support of a particular republican model;  therefore we do not need a plebiscite.  I do not 
want to have a plebiscite and I will not have a plebiscite (PM&C 1998b, 991 emphasis added). 
 
It seems that when the prime minister said on the first day that the threshold for a 
referendum was “a clear view” or “clear support for a particular republican model”, he 
meant “most support”, not any kind of majority support.  When he explained on the last 
day just before the eighth ballot what he meant by “clear view”, he already knew that the 
Turnbull model had received more support than had any other republic model.  It is 
reasonable in these circumstances to conclude that he had decided to hold a referendum 
before he knew the result of the eighth ballot. Would he hold a referendum if the result 
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of the eighth ballot was 45% Turnbull, 50% status quo, and 5% abstain?  In theory he 
would, because the Turnbull republic model would still have more support than any 
other republic model, even though in both scenarios a majority did not vote for it.  
Why did the prime minister oppose a plebiscite so strenuously, saying “I do not 
want to have a plebiscite and I will not have a plebiscite”?  Why did he decide instead to 
put to referendum a model that was not supported by a majority of the delegates?  What 
were his options?  The government could hold a referendum or a plebiscite, or declare 
that neither was appropriate in the circumstances.  Politically, the last option was not 
viable for a government returned to office less than two years earlier, after 13 years in 
opposition.  If the government did not hold a public vote on a republic, it would surely 
stand accused of intentionally blocking transition to a republic, especially given that the 
prime minister’s opposition to a republic was so well known.  If the government 
authorised a plebiscite, more than one republic model would be offered, and one of 
these models would entail a directly elected head of state.  By all accounts, such a model 
would be popular, and it might well carry the day.   
A summary of results for republic opinion polls from 1966 to 2006 is presented as 
figure 4.5.  The green and red bars indicate, on average, how many respondents said that 
they supported or opposed a republic, while the dotted line indicates how many 
respondents said they were undecided.  The two (curved) polynomial trendlines, which 
smooth the peaks and troughs in the Yes and No results, indicate that support for a 
republic exceeded opposition for the first time in 1992, peaked in 1996, and fell away a 
little from 1997 to 1999.  While advocates were not a majority in 1999, as they were in 
1996-1998, they still outnumbered opponents.  For nine polls conducted in 1999, the 
results were an average of 48% Yes, 42% No, and 10% undecided.  When pollsters 
asked respondents in February 1998 whether they preferred a monarchy or a republic 
with a directly elected president, the result was 52% for a republic, 37% opposed, and 
11% undecided.  To the extent that this poll is valid and reliable, a referendum or 
plebiscite that offered a directly elected president in 1999 would have passed.  When he 
opened the assembly, the prime minister said he knew polls indicated “overwhelming 
public support for the popular election of a president” (PM&C 1998b, 3).22 
                                                 
22
 According to the polls, support for a republic rose from 48% in 1999 to 52% in 2000 and 2001, then 
declined to 46% in January 2006, about 9% above the peak of 55% in 1996.  An ARM poll of its 
members in 2002 found “a fairly even break between those who support direct election … and those who 
support parliamentary election” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2002). 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
147
 
This evidence supports the idea that the government put the Turnbull model to a 
referendum rather than hold a plebiscite because it saw that path as a way to close the 
republic debate without becoming a republic.  
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(Sources:  data from 1966 to February 1999 are from Warhurst 1999, attributed there to George Winterton for 1953-1994, and the Sydney Morning Herald and the 
Australian newspapers from 1994 to February 1999.  Data from March 1999 were obtained from the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian) 
 
Figure 4.5:  Republic opinion polls 1966-2006 
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Quite apart from poll data and the results at the assembly, some expert opinions 
lend support to the proposition that the prime minister did not believe the Turnbull 
model would pass at referendum.  In 1999 Malcolm Turnbull published an account of a 
private conversation he had in July 1996 with John Howard, and two other Coalition 
parliamentarians (Nick Minchin, and Tony Abbott).  According to Turnbull, he urged 
the prime minister to hold a plebiscite on a republic, and not convene an assembly at all; 
 if the result of the plebiscite was favourable, parliament could then devise a suitable 
republic model (1999, 17-18).  According to Turnbull: 
Howard did not want to do anything of the kind.  His concern was to stop a republic from 
happening.  He wanted to keep the republicans fighting on two fronts:  against monarchists who 
wanted no change and against other republicans who wanted a different sort of republic. 
 
I tried, as I did on so many occasions, to appeal to his sense of political responsibility.  Surely, 
even as a monarchist, he had a vested interest in the best republican model’s [sic] being presented 
to the people.  Surely, as Prime Minister, he should have a hand in framing the model and be able, 
at least, to assure voters that it was safe and workable. 
 
These lofty arguments did not make much headway.  He remained as cheerfully cynical as ever.  At 
our meeting in July 1996 he tried to provoke me by saying, ‘How would you feel if we had a 
plebiscite asking whether they wanted a President chosen by Parliament or by the people?  You’d 
hate that, because they would not support your model.’  He grinned at his clever proposal (Turnbull 
1999, 18).23 
 
George Winterton – an appointed delegate to the convention – wrote in 1998: 
The Convention's failings are largely attributable to two factors:  insufficient attention was devoted 
to the details of the republican model, and the ARM conceded too much to the Prime Minister and 
other supporters of the McGarvie model in a futile attempt to secure their support (1998a, 7).  
 
Winterton predicted before the referendum that it would not pass because the model was 
flawed.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The four questions posed in this thesis have now been answered for the 1998 
Constitutional Convention, as follows.   
• The assembly was more representative of electors’ personal characteristics and 
constitutional preferences than it would have been if the parliamentarians had 
convened alone.  Community representatives were most representative for 
population demographics (place of birth, gender, and formal education), while 
elected delegates were most representative for place of residence, aboriginality, and 
                                                 
23
 Malcolm Turnbull was elected to the federal parliament as the Liberal member for Wentworth in 2004.  
He was appointed Minister for the Environment and Water Resources from 30 January 2007 by prime 
minister Howard.  According to Phillip Adams, Howard “gave his show pony a white horse – Turnbull 
could save Australia from thirst and that climate change crap. … He’s got no support from the 
parliamentary heavies.  … Too often Turnbull is forced to echo his PM’s evasions and back-sliding when 
you know he’d prefer to charge right in” (Adams 2007). 
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electors’ constitutional preferences.  Parliamentary delegates were least 
representative for all categories except age:  median age was 50 years for both 
parliamentarians and elected delegates, and 54 years for community representatives. 
• The assembly generated more public interest than did parliamentary inquiries into 
the constitution, or constitutional inquiries conducted by specialists who were 
appointed by the federal parliament.   
• Non-parliamentarians were better able to achieve consensus than were 
parliamentarians, but the margin of difference was small. 
• Parliamentarians, especially the Labor parliamentarians, exhibited less partisan 
behaviour in the ballots than did non-parliamentarians, and the margin of difference 
was large.    
These results suggest that electors chose delegates who shared their constitutional 
preferences rather than their demographic characteristics, and these delegates expressed 
those preferences, and stood by them, hence partisanship was highest for elected 
delegates.  The government chose community representatives to better reflect some 
population demographics, but these delegates were less likely to share electors’ 
constitutional preferences than were the elected delegates.  The results signal how 
difficult it is to achieve demographic, geographic, and preference representation at the 
same time.   
In the final analysis the most important variable is constitutional preferences, 
because it is electors’ constitutional preferences, as expressed at referenda, which 
determine whether formal constitutional change is ratified.  Elected delegates’ 
preferences varied from the referendum result by no more than 7.1%, compared to a 
variation of up to 34.6% for parliamentarians and 37.4% for community representatives. 
 If these parliamentarians had decided the question of a republic alone, the proposal 
would have passed with a national majority, and a majority in four of the six states.  By 
contrast, a majority of voters rejected the republic proposal, as did a majority of the 
elected delegates that voters had chosen to represent them at the assembly. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - CANADA 
 
Australia and Canada share a history of European settlement of lands occupied by 
Aboriginal peoples, but the history of the geographic and constitutional development of 
the two federations is different.  All of Australia’s colonies were British from the arrival 
of the first fleet in 1788.  By contrast, Canada’s early European settlements were 
frequently the subject of violent struggles between the British and French settler nations, 
and territorial disputes with others.  Whilst all six Australian colonies joined the 
federation in 1901, the Canadian union began as four provinces in 1867 and expanded to 
ten provinces and two territories over the next 82 years.  The creation of Nunavut as a 
self-governing Canadian territory for Aboriginal peoples in 1998 increased the total to 
ten provinces and three territories.   
This chapter begins with an outline of early European settlement of Canada, to 
provide context for a discussion of the process of federation and confederation, and to 
indicate some of the origins of continuing tensions between English and French 
speaking communities.  It draws on materials provided by Library and Archives Canada 
(2007f), except where indicated otherwise.  The second section examines the process of 
formal constitutional change from 1867 to 1999.  It shows how the process changed 
over time, and examines in detail the long-standing question about the need for 
provincial consultation and consent. 
EUROPEAN PRE-FEDERATION HISTORY 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, Britain and France had claimed almost all 
of the eastern half of Canada.  The British claimed Newfoundland Island in 1583, and 
established colonies there from 1610, but abandoned them by about 1660 (Baker 2003, 
4).  From 1670, the British granted extensive lands around Hudson Bay to the Hudson 
Bay Company for commercial purposes.  In 
the seventeenth century, the French 
established colonies in present-day New 
Brunswick (1604), Nova Scotia (1605), and 
Québec (1609), and assumed control of 
Newfoundland despite British protests (1662).  
England and France went to war over 
Canadian territory in 1689 and again in 1702.  
Figure 4.1:  Canada circa 1740xx 
Figure 5.1:  Canada circa 1740 
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The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht passed control of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and 
Newfoundland to the British.  In 1719, the French established a permanent settlement on 
Prince Edward Island.  Figure 5.1 shows the extent of territorial disagreements circa 
1740:  yellow areas were French, tan areas were British, and green areas were in dispute 
(Natural Resources Canada 2003a).   
After the British defeated the French in the 1754-1760 war, the 1763 Treaty of 
Paris ceded to Britain all French lands except St. Pierre Island and Miquelon Island.  
The British intended to assimilate the French, albeit with some accommodations such as 
protection of the French language, freedom to practise Catholicism (though the 
franchise was denied to Acadian Catholics in the late 1700s), and self-government 
through the Québec Act of 1774.  In 1755, the British deported French-speaking 
Acadian people across the border to British colonies in the United States because they 
would not swear allegiance to Britain.  In 1776, Britain transferred ownership of Prince 
Edward Island lands to absentee British landlords, by lot. 
In an attempt to settle continuing disputes between French and British residents, 
the British divided Québec in 1791.  Upper Canada (now Ontario) was mainly English 
speaking with a common law system, while Lower Canada (now Québec) was mainly 
French speaking with a civil law system.  Each colony had its own assembly, with an 
upper house appointed by the Governor.  When these measures failed to quell civil 
unrest, the British passed the 1840 Act of Union, which reunited Upper and Lower 
Canada as the Province of Canada, comprising Canada East and Canada West.  The Act 
provided for the retention of a civil/common law distinction, and equal representation of 
East and West Canada (even though Québec had a larger population), but English was 
the only official language until 1848.  For more than 25 years, the province of Canada 
operated as a dual system with considerable difficulty.  East and West Canada could 
obstruct legislative initiatives proposed by the other side because each colony had the 
same number of seats in the house of assembly, and there were practical difficulties in 
alternating the capital between Toronto and Québec City.   
When the United States declared war on the British in Canada in 1812, British and 
French colonial forces responded.  The United States withdrew in 1813, and the Treaty 
of Ghent was signed at the end of 1814, but not before Washington DC was “raided and 
burned” (Library and Archives Canada 2006, 2).  In July 1866 – less than a year before 
federation – the US House of Representatives passed a bill to annex all Canada Lands.  
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Étienne-Paschal Taché, Premier of Lower Canada, said in the Canada province 
parliament:  
If the opportunity [Confederation] which now presented itself were allowed to pass by unimproved, 
whether we would or would not, we would be forced into the American Union by violence, and if 
not by violence, would be placed upon an inclined plain [sic] which would carry us there insensibly 
(Taché, in Canada Province 1865, 3 February, 6, as said). 
 
By contrast, concerns in the Australian colonies at the end of the nineteenth century 
about French and German activities to the near north of Australia (Garran 1958, 89; 
Stephen 2004, 27) are relatively insignificant.  Nevertheless, the Canadian and 
Australian colonies shared an expectation that federation could improve their 
economies, infrastructure, and defence.  
FEDERATION 1867 
The idea of a Canadian federation was realised with much less public involvement 
than was the case in Australia.  It was achieved through a series of inter-government 
conferences, the most important of which were held at Charlottetown, Québec City, and 
London between 1864 and 1866 (Library and Archives Canada 2007f).   
The Atlantic colonies initiated the 1864 meeting to discuss a Maritime union 
between New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island.  When Canada asked 
to be included, the parties agreed they could attend, but only as observers (Library and 
Archives Canada 2007a, 2).  The participants did not think Newfoundland was 
interested in union, and that colony made its request too late to arrange for a delegation 
to attend.  The four other colonies sent 23 representatives to a conference at 
Charlottetown on 1-9 September 1864.  New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince 
Edward Island were each represented by five delegates, and the Canada province sent 
eight delegates (Waite 1970, 25-27).  Most of the delegates from Prince Edward Island 
were opposed to union, but they were encouraged by an offer of financial assistance to 
buy back land from British landlords.  The delegates resolved that the subject of a union 
had merit, and adjourned for further discussions in Québec City a month later. 
Representatives of all five colonies convened at Québec City on 10-27 October 
1864 to debate the details of federation (Library and Archives Canada 2007d).  
Representation was uneven, with 12 delegates for Canada (six each for Canada East and 
Canada West), seven for New Brunswick, five for Nova Scotia, seven for Prince 
Edward Island, and just two for Newfoundland.  Canada was a full participant this time, 
while Newfoundland had observer status because its two delegates were not authorised 
to reach any agreements on behalf of their colony.  Anti-union sentiment ran high in 
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Figure 5.2:  Canada 1867 
Newfoundland, with anti-unionists raising fears about Québec, taxes, and conscription.  
The constituents of Newfoundland elected a pro-union government to power in 1865, 
but the legislature voted that year to defer debating union.  The Prince Edward Island 
delegation found that the offer of funds to buy back land from absentee landlords was no 
longer part of the agreement.  Many of its constituents, and five of its seven newspapers, 
opposed union;  in May 1866, the legislature passed a resolution against union, and 
rejected a later offer to restore funding for land purchases.  Despite these difficulties, 
delegates agreed to 72 provisions for a federal union between “the [two] Canadas … 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, … [with] Provision being 
made for the admission … of Newfoundland, the North-West Territory, British 
Columbia and Vancouver” (Library and Archives Canada 2007e).   
A delegation of 16 men representing Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia 
went to London in 1866 to ask Britain to enact the constitution (Library and Archives 
Canada 2007b).  While in London, the delegates drafted the bill, and negotiated the final 
text.  Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia led an anti-union group which lobbied the Colonial 
Office, to no avail.  In a period of less than seven weeks, the legislative cycle was 
completed.  The federation bill was passed by the house of lords on 26 February 1867 
and the commons on 8 March “with very little debate”, and it received royal assent on 
29 March 1867 (Library and Archives Canada 2007b, 2; Hurley 1996, 10).  The British 
North America Act 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 (the 1867 constitution) created the 
federal Dominion of Canada, comprising the provinces of Ontario, Québec, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick. 
CONFEDERATION 1870-1999 
Geographically, the formation of Canada 
was incremental, compared with Australia’s 
quantum leap.  Figure 5.2 to the right shows 
that the 1867 union included only a small part 
of the eastern side of what is now Canada 
(Natural Resources Canada 2003b).  The 
remaining areas (shaded yellow) were British 
possessions.  Over the next 38 years, a further 
five provinces and two territories were formed 
from British possessions and admitted to the union.   
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The British purchased Hudson Bay Company lands in 1869, and amalgamated 
them with adjoining areas to create the North-Western Territory.  Britain transferred 
control of the Territory to Canada in 1870, at which time Canada admitted it to the 
union as the province of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories.  A year later, British 
Columbia joined the union as the sixth province, followed by Prince Edward Island in 
1873 – on better terms than were offered in 1866.  The Northwest Territories reduced in 
size again when parts of it became the Yukon territory in 1898, and the provinces of 
Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905.  This expanded the union to nine provinces and two 
territories.   
Newfoundland, which declined to join the union in 1867 because it was not 
satisfied with the financial arrangements, did so in 1949 following a constituent 
assembly and two plebiscites.  Finally, Nunavut became Canada’s third territory in 
1999.   
CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION 1867-1999 
The Rules for amending the constitution 
The rules for amending the constitution changed considerably over time.  The 
founders could not agree on an amending formula in 1867, so Britain assumed this 
authority, but it did not act unilaterally (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 136).  According to Guy 
Favreau (1965, 11-16), federal minister of justice, four principles governed the process 
of formal constitutional change from 1871 to 1964.  First, the federal government 
initiated amendments, and Britain enacted them with few, if any, alterations.  Second, 
whilst Canadian governments initiated amendments unilaterally for most of the first 
three decades despite protests in federal parliament, from 1895 Britain required the 
consent of the Canadian parliament, usually indicated by joint or several addresses to the 
crown.  Third, Britain would not respond to requests for amendments from provinces.  
For example, it declined to respond in 1868, 1869, 1874, and 1887.  Fourth, the 
Canadian parliament would not seek amendments “directly affecting federal-provincial 
relationships without consultation and agreement with the provinces”.  The fourth 
principle is contentious because ‘consultation’ and ‘agreement’ are not defined.  
From 1949, section 91(1) of the 1867 constitution allowed the federal parliament 
to enact some amendments without consulting Britain or the provinces.  This facility did 
not extend to amending requirements for the parliament to meet at least once per year, 
and hold elections at least every five years, or amendments concerning exclusive 
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provincial powers, the powers of the provincial legislatures, schools, and use of the 
English and French languages.   
Britain’s role in amending Canada’s constitution ended in 1982 when its 
parliament passed the Constitution Act 1982 as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
(UK) c.11 which came into force on 17 April 1982 (the Canadian constitution 1982).  
Since that time, the senate, the house of commons, or a provincial legislature can initiate 
an amendment (s 46).  Thresholds for ratification vary according to the subject of the 
amendment, as follows.   
1. Unanimous agreement between the federal and provincial governments is required 
to change provisions for the monarch, governor general, lieutenant governors, 
minimum representation of provinces in the lower house, use of the English and 
French languages in all provinces, the composition of the Supreme Court, and the 
rules for amending the constitution (s 41). 
2. Amendments that do not affect all provinces require bilateral or multi-lateral 
agreement between the federal government and the legislatures of provinces 
concerned (s 43). 
3. The federal parliament alone can change provisions concerning the federal 
executive, the house of commons, and the senate that are not specified elsewhere 
in the amendment procedures (s 44). 
4. All other amendments require the consent of the federal government and seven of 
the ten provincial governments, provided those provinces represent at least 50% of 
the national population as enumerated in the most recent census (ss 38, 42).  This 
7/50 rule applies to amendments that create new provinces, extend provincial 
boundaries into territories, change the proportionate representation of provinces in 
the senate and house of commons, change the senate’s powers or how senators are 
chosen, and provisions for the Supreme Court other than changes to its 
composition.   
Such an amendment cannot be enacted in less than 12 months unless every 
provincial legislature approves it, or signifies its dissent (s 39(1)).  This provision 
means that a province which wanted to dissent from certain types of amendments, 
and thereby be entitled to the opting out provisions of s 38(3), would not be 
surprised by the enactment of an amendment because the 7/50 rule was satisfied 
before that province had officially declared its dissent.  An amendment lapses if 
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the 7/50 rule is not satisfied within three years of the day on which the first 
provincial legislature approves it (s 39(2)). 
5. A province can opt out of a 7/50 amendment that would otherwise reduce its 
powers, rights, or privileges (s 38).  If such an amendment transfers powers over 
education and culture to the federal tier, provinces that opt out are entitled to 
federal compensation (s 49).  
The senate can veto amendments of the third type above;  otherwise, it has a 180-day 
suspensive veto only (s 47).  There is no formal role in any amendment procedure for 
the territories.  Nor is there any formal role for constituents.  By contrast, Australian 
constituents have an absolute veto over proposals for formal constitutional change, 
exercised at referenda. 
Constitutional change in practice 
 This section does not begin with a clear statement of how many times the 
Canadian constitution has been amended, as was done for the Australian case, because 
authors reach different conclusions on this point.  When Clokie raised the question more 
than 60 years ago, he warned “Such being the paradoxical state of the Canadian 
constitution, its problems challenge every student of government” (1942, 3).  That 
challenge must be met, however, because the thesis cannot review the process of formal 
constitutional change without first establishing a credible account of the number of  
times the constitution has been amended.    
How many times has the constitution been amended? 
Analysis of an annotated copy of the constitution published by the Department of 
Justice yielded the longest list of constitutional changes between 1867 and 1999 (2001). 
 The preface explained that the annotations covered “direct amendments” which 
changed the text of the 1867 or 1982 constitution, “indirect amendments” which did not 
alter either text, and comments on sections that were spent or probably spent 
(Department of Justice Canada 2001, foreword).  The authors did not provide a 
consolidated list of changes, and they did not say what type of change was covered in 
each footnote, but that information can be derived from the note, and the acts and 
instruments referred to in it.  For example, note 7 to s 5 of the 1867 constitution said 
that British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland joined the union in 
1871, 1873, and 1949 respectively by orders in council (cabinet decisions) in accordance 
with ss 146-147.  A close reading of those orders shows that the text of the constitution 
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did not change, so these are “indirect amendments”, which are not counted as 
amendments in this thesis.  That general rule applies only until 1982 because in that year 
this text was added to the constitution: 
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. 
 (2) The Constitution of Canada includes 
 (a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act; 
 (b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule;  and 
 (c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).  
 
The schedule referred to under (2)(b) includes the orders in council admitting the three 
provinces mentioned above, so subsequent alteration of the terms of union for 
Newfoundland in 1987, 1997, and 1998, and Prince Edward Island in 1994 are counted 
as amendments in this thesis.24  Analysis of all 108 footnotes and related instruments 
shows that the text of the 1867 and 1982 constitutions changed 26 times between 1867 
and 1999.  Table 5.1 lists each amendment by year, sections affected, the nature of the 
amendment, the instruments used to secure it, and the parties who consented to the 
amendment.   
The amendments listed in table 5.1 do not reconcile with other accounts.  For the 
period 1867 to 1949, table 5.1 lists seven amendments, but Gérin-Lajoie (1950) cites 15, 
and Favreau (1965) and Russell (1988) cite 18.  These discrepancies are reconciled in 
the next section.  The names of many acts were changed by the 1982 constitution, but 
the original names are retained in tables 5.1 and 5.2 and the discussion to make it easier 
for readers to validate the reconciliation to sources published before 1982. 
                                                 
24
 The name of Newfoundland changed to Newfoundland and Labrador in 2001 (Government of Canada 
2001). 
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Table 5.1:  Direct amendment of the Canadian constitution 1867-1999 
 
Section affected(1) Agreed by federal government and …(3) In 
force 1867 Act 1982 Act Amendment Amending instrument(2) UK HC Sen Provinces 
1875 18 - Provide that the parliament may legislate for its privileges, 
immunities, and powers, provided they do not exceed those  
of the British parliament when such legislation is enacted 
Parliament of Canada Act, 1875, 
38-39 Vict., c.38 (UK) Yes No No None 
1893 Enacting, 
2, 4 
- 
 
Repeal the enacting clause, and reference to royal heirs and 
successors;  repeal s4 in part, leaving in place the meaning of 
the name Canada 
 
51 - House of commons:  change the basis on which seats are 
distributed from a particular census to “subsequent” census  
 
42-43,25, 
127, 
81,89,88  
- Repeal provision for the first commons election, the 
requirement for senators to be summonsed by royal warrant, 
protocols for colonial parliamentarians accepting 
appointment to the senate, provision for the timing of the first 
election and legislative session in Ontario and Québec after 
union, and reference to the New Brunswick assembly 
completing its term   
 
145 - Repeal provision for constructing an inter-colonial railway 
Statute Law Revision Act 1893, 56-
57 Vict., c.14 (UK) 
 
UK alone 
1907 118 - Vary federal grants paid to the provinces Constitution Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, 
c.11 (UK) Yes Yes Yes All 
1915 21,22,26-
28,147 
- 
Senate:  increase from 72 to 96 seats (maximum 104, 110 if 
Newfoundland is admitted); change the number of equally 
sized divisions from 3 (Ontario, Québec, Maritime) to 4 
(Ontario, Québec, Maritime, Western); and increase the 
number of senators the monarch or governor general can add 
 from 3-6 to 4-8, allocated equally across the senate divisions 
 51A  - House of commons:  provide that every province will have at 
least as many seats in the commons as it does in the senate 
Constitution Act, 1915, 5-6 Geo. V, 
c.45 (UK) Yes Yes Yes None 
1940 91(2A)  - Add exclusive federal powers over unemployment insurance Constitution Act, 1940, 3-4 Geo. VI, 
c.36 (UK) Yes Yes Yes All 
1946 51(1) - House: increase to 255 seats, allocated by population;  
allocate 1 seat to Yukon and 1 to any other territory that is 
not part of a province 
British North America Act, 1946, 9-
10 Geo. VI, c.63 (UK) Yes Yes Yes None 
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Section affected(1) Agreed by federal government and …(3) In 
force 1867 Act 1982 Act Amendment Amending instrument(2) UK HC Sen Provinces 
1949 91(1), 91A  - Parliament can change the constitution by legislation, but not 
provisions for exclusive provincial powers, schools, English 
and French languages, minimum sittings of parliament, and 
maximum parliamentary terms 
British North America (No. 2) Act, 
1949, 13 Geo. VI, c.81 (UK) Yes Yes Yes None 
1950 118 - Repeal provision for federal grants to provinces as spent Statute Law Revision Act, 1950, 14 
Geo. VI, c.6 (UK) UK alone 
1951 94(A) - Add concurrent federal powers over old age pensions British North America Act, 1951, 
14-15 Geo. VI, c.32 (UK) Yes Yes Yes All 
1952 51(1) - House:  increase to 263 seats;  no province to lose 15% or 
more seats by this adjustment, or have fewer seats than did a 
less populous province; allocate 1 seat to Yukon 
British North America Act, 1952, SC 
1952, c.15 Yes Yes Yes None 
1960 99 - Provide that superior court judges retire at age 75 Constitution Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. II, c.2 
(UK) Yes Yes Yes All 
1964 94A - Broaden concurrent federal powers over pensions Constitution Act, 1964, 12-13 Eliz. 
II, c.73 (UK) Yes Yes Yes All 
1965 29(2) - Senate:  senators retire at age 75 Constitution Act 1965, SC, 1965, c.4 Yes Yes Yes Not applicable 
1974 51(1) - House:  allocate 75 seats to Québec, plus 4 seats every 10 
years;  add new formulae for determining the number of seats 
allocated to other provinces 
Constitution Act, 1974, SC 1974-75-
76 c.13  Yes Yes Yes None 
1975 51(2) - House:  add 1 seat for Yukon, and 2 seats for Northwest 
Territories 
Constitution Act (No. 1), 1975, SC 
1974-75-76, c.28 Yes Yes Yes None 
1975 21,22,28 - Senate: increase from 102 to 104 seats (increase maximum 
from 110 to 112);  allocate 1 seat to Yukon, and 1 to 
Northwest Territories 
Constitution Act (No. 2), 1975, SC 
1974-75-76 c.53 Yes Yes Yes None 
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Section affected(1) Agreed by federal government and …(3) In 
force 1867 Act 1982 Act Amendment Amending instrument(2) UK HC Sen Provinces 
1982 20 repeal 1-34 Add a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including provisions 
that:  provinces can legislate notwithstanding the Charter 
(s33);  federal and provincial parliamentary terms do not 
exceed five years except “In time of real or apprehended war, 
invasion, or Parliamentary insurrection” (s4);  and parliament 
must sit at least once every 12 months (s5) 
 - 35 Entrench rights for Aboriginal peoples 
 - 36 Entrench a commitment to redress provincial inequalities 
 - 37  Convene a first ministers’ conference within a year on the 
constitution, including Aboriginal issues in consultation with 
them;  include territories on matters that affect them;  and 
repeal s37 when s37.1 comes into force 
 91(1) repeal 38-44,46-
49 
Change the rules for amending the constitution;  provide that 
when some provinces transfer powers over education or 
culture to the federal tier, other provinces are compensated 
 92(1) repeal  45 Change provisions for amending provincial constitutions 
 92A 50,51 Grant provinces exclusive powers over non-renewable 
natural resources, forestry resources, and electrical energy 
 1 52-61, 
schedule 
Declare the primacy of the constitution and define it, rename 
certain acts, delay implementing s23(1)(a) for Québec until 
its legislature authorises it, and provide for the repeal of 
ss50-51, and the adoption of a French language version of the 
constitution and the equality of it  
Canada Act 1982, (UK) c.11, 
Constitution Act, 1982 (Can) Yes Yes Yes 
9/10 provinces  (not 
Québec) 
1984 - 25(b), 
35(1,3-4) 
Change wording of Aboriginal rights section, clarify “treaty 
rights” and provide that they apply to men and women  
 - 37.1,54.1 
add, 61 
amend 
Hold two first ministers’ conferences on the constitution by 
April 1987, including Aboriginal issues;  include Aboriginal 
peoples and territories for matters that affect them 
Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1983 n/a  Yes Yes 
9/10 provincial 
legislatures (not 
Québec), territories, 
and four Aboriginal 
organisations 
1986 51(1) - House:  determine seats per province by census, provided 
that no province loses seats 
Constitution Act 1985 
(Representation) n/a Yes Yes Not applicable 
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Section affected(1) Agreed by federal government and …(3) In 
force 1867 Act 1982 Act Amendment Amending instrument(2) UK HC Sen Provinces 
1987 Newfoundland Terms of 
Union 1949 
Extend rights and privileges for education to the Pentecostal 
Assemblies  
Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1987 n/a Yes Yes 
Newfoundland 
legislature 
1993 - 16.2 Provide for the preservation and promotion of English and 
French linguistic communities in New Brunswick 
Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1993 (New Brunswick 
Act) 
n/a Yes Yes New Brunswick legislature 
1994 Prince Edward Island 
Terms of Union 1873 
Change references to a steam service to a fixed crossing, 
allow provincial tolls for the use of the Confederation Bridge 
Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1993 (Prince Edward 
Island) 
n/a Yes Yes Prince Edward Island legislature 
1997 Newfoundland Terms of 
Union 1949 
Specify Newfoundland’s powers over education, schools, 
school boards, and religious instruction 
Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1997 (Newfoundland 
Act) 
n/a Yes No Newfoundland legislature 
1997 93A - Exempt Québec from the limits to exclusive provincial 
powers over education that are listed in s93 
Constitution Amendment, 1997 
(Québec) n/a Yes Yes Québec legislature 
1998 Newfoundland Terms of 
Union 1949 
Grant Newfoundland exclusive powers over education Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1998 (New. Act) n/a Yes Yes 
Newfoundland 
legislature 
- Schedule Add Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut), which includes new 
boundaries for Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut 
21,28 - Senate:  increase from 104 to 105 seats (raise maximum from 
112 to 113);  allocate 1 seat to Nunavut 
1999 
51(2) - House:  allocate 1 seat to Nunavut, reduce Northwest 
Territories’ allocation from 2 seats to 1 seat 
Constitution Act 1999 (Nunavut), SC 
1998, c.15 n/a Yes Yes 
Plebiscites in 
Northwest 
Territories 1982 and 
1992, and 
agreement with Inuit 
peoples  
 
(Sources: Department of Justice Canada 2001; Gérin-Lajoie 1950, xiv-xxv, 61-129; Favreau 1965, 8-16; Russell 1988; Hurley 1996, 277-283; Maton 2000; Okalik 2001, and the 
acts and other instruments cited in these sources) 
 
Notes: 
1. The Constitution Act, 1867, and the Constitution Act, 1982. 
2. The schedule to the 1982 constitution changed the name of many of these acts.  This table uses the original names to make it easier for the reader to validate and reconcile 
commentaries published before 1982. 
3. Parties are Britain (UK), the Canadian house of commons (HC), the Canadian senate (Sen), and the provinces. 
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Different conclusions in Gérin-Lajoie, Favreau, Russell, and this thesis suggest 
different views about which documents comprise the constitution, and what constitutes 
an amendment.  Clokie offered the following explanation for why authors disagree. 
Such a review [of British legislation for Canada] should show that it is impossible to speak in terms 
of definitive “constitutional amendments”.  There is no reason for expecting Canadian legislation 
to have the neatness and orderliness of the numbered American amendments or to be capable of 
systematic insertion at the correct place in the Act of 1867 in the Australian manner ... the 
haphazard method found here is a consequence of using the British Parliament as a constituent 
authority.  In the largest sense, it arises wherever a legislature is the constituent body and the same 
problem - What statutes are constitutional amendments? - is to be met with in New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Ireland (1942, 9). 
 
For Clokie, the source of the problem was the “haphazard” amendment process.   
Gérin-Lajoie provided a comprehensive and persuasive account of his reasoning.  
His list of 15 amendments to 1949 included six of the seven amendments shown on 
table 5.1 (the amendments table), plus nine other constitutional changes shown on table 
5.2 (the changes table).  He explained that the process of identifying amendments to the 
Canadian constitution is not simple or straightforward because: 
[t]he phrase “Amendments to the Constitution” applied to the Constitution of Canada does not 
convey a definite meaning.  The Constitution of Canada is not made up of a document called the 
Constitution and of a definite set of amendments... They may be classified as constitutional 
documents only by looking at their contents.  … This process obviously involves a large amount of 
interpretation and personal judgment which hardly leads to absolute certainty (1950, 47-48, 
emphasis added). 
 
His list of amendments differs from the one adopted in this thesis because his definition 
of the constitution is broader, and his definition of an amendment is narrower. 
For Gérin-Lajoie, the Canadian constitution comprised “fundamental” written 
laws that could not be changed by Canadian legislatures acting alone (1950, 23).  A 
constitutional change was an amendment if it:  changed the text of a safeguarded 
document or added new documents to it;  “required an act of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom because it could not have been achieved by any other means”;  and signalled 
“the moving from one constitutional position to another which is repugnant to, or goes 
beyond, the terms of the Constitution” (1950, 48-49).  
The first criterion requires that amendments change or supplement documents that 
are “safeguarded against repeal or amendment by the unilateral action of any legislative 
body in Canada”.  The safeguarding mechanism from 1931 was s 7(1) of the British 
Statute of Westminster, 1931 (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 6), which reads:  “Nothing in this Act 
shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North 
America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder”.  Gérin-
Lajoie counted the granting of powers over natural resources to Manitoba, British 
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Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan by the Constitution Act, 1930 (UK) because it 
was a safeguarded act.  As he explained it:     
This further amendment to the Constitution did not embody any new provision in the text of the 
British North America Act, 1867.  Moreover, it did not in the slightest degree affect that act.  … 
[but it is] an amendment to the (safeguarded) acts of the Parliament of Canada … [and is thus] an 
amendment to the Constitution as defined at the outset of this work (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 91).  
 
Each of the nine constitutional changes listed against Gérin-Lajoie on the changes table 
varied a safeguarded act.  The two changes listed for 1943 and 1949 did not alter the 
text of safeguarded acts, but they still count for him because they introduced alternatives 
to ss 51, 93, and 121 of the 1867 constitution.  These changes do not count as 
amendments for this thesis, however, because they did not alter the text of the 1867 
constitution. 
The second criterion provided that constitutional changes are not amendments 
unless British legislation was required.  This explains why, for example, Gérin-Lajoie 
did not count the admission to the union of Yukon (1898), Alberta (1905), and 
Saskatchewan (1905) by Canadian legislation alone.  These constitutional changes do 
not count as amendments in this thesis either, but for a different reason – the text of the 
1867 constitution did not change. 
Gérin-Lajoie’s third criterion required that an amendment signal the adoption of a 
different constitutional position, which is why he did not count the repeal of obsolete or 
spent provisions in 1893 and 1927.  Safeguarded documents were changed, and British 
acts were required, but Canada’s constitutional position did not change because the 
provisions were already obsolete or spent.  The 1893 change does count as an 
amendment in this thesis, however, because it did alter the text of the 1867 constitution. 
 The 1927 change is not counted because neither the Statute Law Revision Act, 1927 
(UK) nor the act which it repealed – the British North America Act, 1916, (UK) – 
changed the text of the 1867 constitution.   
In brief, the surplus of eight amendments for Gérin-Lajoie comprises nine changes 
that he counted because safeguarded acts other than the 1867 constitution were altered, 
and one amendment that he did not count because it did not signal the adoption of a 
different constitutional position. 
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Table 5.2:  Other constitutional changes, 1867-1949 
 
Year Constitutional change 
Gérin- 
Lajoie 
1950 
Favreau 
1965 
Russell 
1988 Instrument 
1870 Admit Rupert’s Land and North-
Western Territory as Northwest 
Territories 
No Yes Yes Rupert’s Land and North-Western 
Territory Order in council 23 June 
1870 
1871 Confirm admission of Manitoba 
in 1870, and federal powers to 
form provinces from territories, 
alter boundaries with provincial 
consent, and provide for federal 
representation of provinces 
Yes Yes Yes Unilateral federal government 
request, British North America Act, 
1871, 34 and 35 Vict., c28 (UK) 
1871 Admit British Columbia, and 
allocate 3 senate seats 
No Yes Yes British Columbia Terms of Union, 
order in council 16 May 1871 
1873 Admit Prince Edward Island No Yes Yes Prince Edward Island Terms of 
Union, order in council 26 June 
1873 
1886 Grant federal powers to provide 
federal representation to 
territories  
Yes Yes Yes1 Joint address, British North 
America Act, 1886, 49 & 50 Vict., 
c35 (UK) 
1889 Extend the boundaries of Ontario Yes No No Joint address, address by Ontario 
legislature, and Canada (Ontario 
Boundary) Act, 1889 (UK) 
1895 Provide that parliament can 
appoint a senate deputy speaker 
in the speaker’s absence 
Yes Yes Yes Federal legislation and Canadian 
Speaker (Appointment of Deputy) 
Act, 1895, 59 Vict., c.3 (UK) 
1916 Extend parliament’s term past 
five years during World War I 
Yes Yes Yes Joint address, British North 
America Act, 1916, 6-7 Geo. V, 
c.19 (UK) 
1927 Repeal obsolete provisions that 
were enacted in 1916 
No Yes Yes Statute Law Revision Act, 1927 
(UK) 
1930 Natural resources provisions 
extend to Manitoba, British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan 
Yes Yes Yes Joint address, as agreed with the 
four provinces, Constitution Act, 
1930, 20-21 Geo. V, c26 (UK)2 
1931 Add federal power to legislate 
extra-territorially, and 
federal/provincial power to repeal 
UK law except for the British 
North America Act 
Yes Yes Yes Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 
Geo. V. c4 (UK), consultation with 
Commonwealth members, and 
Canadian joint address 
1943 House of commons: delay 
adjusting size according to 1941 
census until after World War II 
Yes Yes Yes Joint address, British North 
America Act, 1943, 6-7 Geo. VI, 
c30 (UK);  protest from Québec 
1949 Admit Newfoundland, allocate 6 
senate and 7 house seats; make 
special provisions for education 
and religious instruction, and the 
distribution of margarine 
Yes Yes Yes Terms of Union by consent of the 
federal and Newfoundland 
governments, two Newfoundland 
referenda, joint address, 
Newfoundland Act, 1949, 12-13 
Geo. VI, c22 (UK)  
(Sources:  Gérin-Lajoie 1950;  Favreau 1965;  Russell 1988) 
 
Notes:   
1. Russell (1988, 24) listed a change in 1896, which is counted here as the 1886 amendment of similar intent. 
2. Gérin-Lajoie wrote that none of the four provinces affected by this amendment objected to it when it was raised 
in 1927 (1950, 91-93), whilst Favreau claimed that one province was not consulted (1965, 13). 
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Favreau (1965, 4-7) described 24 amendments for the period 1867-1964, 
compared to 12 that are listed on the amendments table.  He counted all 12 amendments 
on the changes table, including the repeal of obsolete or spent provisions in 1893, which 
Gérin-Lajoie did not count.  The surplus of 12 changes comprises eight of the nine 
changes attributed to Gérin-Lajoie (not the 1989 extension of Ontario’s boundaries), 
plus four changes that Gérin-Lajoie did not count.  The four extra changes are the repeal 
of obsolete and spent provisions (1927), and the admission by order in council of 
Northwest Territories (1870), British Columbia (1871), and Prince Edward Island 
(1873) in accordance with s 146 of the 1867 constitution.    
According to Russell (1988, 7), there were 23 amendments for the period covered 
by Favreau (1867-1964).  He did not provide a list, but it is possible to construct one 
from the text on pages 5 and 6, and from footnotes 5, 7 to 11, and 13 to 15 on pages 24-
25.  Analysis of these portions of the article shows that for the period 1867-1981, 
Russell counted 27 changes, compared to 16 on the amendments table.  The surplus of 
11 comprises the 12 alterations listed on the changes table, minus the repeal of obsolete 
provisions in 1950, which Russell did not count.  The only difference between Favreau 
and Russell is that Favreau counted this amendment, whilst Russell did not.  It is not 
clear why Russell did not include it – it would not be that he followed Gérin-Lajoie’s 
reasoning, because he did count the repeal of obsolete and obsolete or spent provisions 
in 1893 and 1927.  Nor is it clear why Favreau and Russell did not follow Gérin-Lajoie 
and count the extension of Ontario’s boundaries in 1889. 
Despite the differences, this analysis of Department of Justice, Gérin-Lajoie, 
Favreau, and Russell confirms that table 5.1 lists every formal amendment made to the 
1867 constitution between 1867 and 1981.  The table also includes, from 1982, every 
formal amendment of the Canadian constitution, as defined by s 52 of the 1982 
Constitution.  
Analysis of the content of these 26 amendments shows that with the exception of 
the 1982 amendment, a little over two-thirds were enacted to change the division of 
powers (nine amendments, groups two and three below), or the size or composition of 
the federal parliament (eight amendments, group one below).  
1. Eight amendments varied the size or composition of the house or the senate (1915, 
1946, 1952, 1974, twice in 1975, 1986, and 1999). 
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2. Six amendments changed the powers for some but not all provinces over schooling, 
religious instruction, language, and bridge tolls (one in 1987, 1993, 1994, two in 
1997, and 1998).   
3. Three amendments provided federal powers to legislate for social security (1940, 
1951, and 1964). 
4. One amendment changed the way federal grants to provinces were calculated 
(1907). 
5. Two amendments set a retirement age for judges and senators (1960 and 1965 
respectively). 
6. One amendment empowered the federal parliament to legislate for its privileges, 
immunities, and powers (1875). 
7. Two amendments repealed spent or obsolete provisions (1893 and 1950). 
8. One amendment empowered the federal tier to make some constitutional 
amendments without recourse to Britain or the provinces (1949). 
9. The 1982 amendment:  defined the constitution;  changed the procedures for 
amending federal and provincial constitutions;  added a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms;  ceded to the provinces powers over non-renewable natural resources, 
forestry resources, and electrical energy;  and provided for Aboriginal rights, a first 
ministers’ constitutional conference, redressing provincial inequalities, and 
compensating provinces when the federal tier assumed powers over education or 
cultural matters in other provinces. 
10. One amendment in 1984 changed the wording of Aboriginal rights, and entrenched a 
further first ministers’ conference on constitutional matters. 
Without doubt, the 1982 amendment is the most substantial one, so much so that it 
overlaps most of the other categories.  
The process of formal constitutional change 
The question of consultation and consent is a contentious and perennial procedural 
issue – when Canada amends its constitution, who should be consulted, and whose 
consent is required?   
The lack of consultation is not controversial for four of the 26 amendments.  
Britain did enact two amendments unilaterally in 1893 and 1950, but these amendments 
merely repealed obsolete or spent provisions.  The Canadian parliament did not consult 
Britain or the provinces when it entrenched a retirement age for judges in 1965, and 
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when it altered the composition of the house of commons in 1986, but it was 
empowered to do so by s 91(1) of the 1867 constitution and s 44 of the 1982 
constitution respectively.  However, the federal government did not consult the 
parliament when it enacted the first amendment in 1875 to provide for parliament’s 
privileges, immunities and powers, and it altered the terms of union for Newfoundland 
in 1997 despite the senate’s refusal to pass the bill.   
The record for provincial consultation is more complex.  Setting aside the four 
uncontroversial amendments mentioned in the last paragraph, the government did not 
seek provincial consent for eight of 22 amendments:   
• six amendments to vary the size or composition of the house or the senate in 1915, 
1946, 1952, 1974, and twice in 1975; 
• an amendment in 1865 to allow the federal parliament to legislate for its privileges, 
immunities, and powers;  and   
• an amendment in 1949 to allow parliament to make some constitutional changes 
alone. 
When it did seek the consent of the provinces for the remaining 14 amendments:    
• five were enacted with the consent of all provinces in 1907, 1940, 1951, 1960, and 
1964;  
• seven amendments that affected some but not all provinces were enacted with the 
consent of the provinces directly affected in 1987, 1993, 1994, 1997 (twice), 1998, 
and 1999, in accordance with s 43 of the 1982 constitution;  and 
• two amendments in 1982 and 1984 were approved by all provinces except Québec. 
This quantitative analysis shows that the federal government consulted the provinces 
more often than not (14 of 22 amendments), and when it did, the provinces usually 
agreed (12 of 14 amendments).  This conclusion is, however, a simplification. 
The following outline of the passage of nine amendments illustrates the extent and 
nature of disagreements over time.  
• The 1875 amendment to empower parliament to legislate for its privileges, 
immunities, and powers was secured despite protests in the federal parliament 
(Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 58-60; Favreau 1965, 11).  The federal government asked 
Britain to enact the amendment without informing the parliament, and in Britain the 
Parliament of Canada Act, 1875 passed without debate.  In the Canadian parliament 
in 1876, the Conservative opposition claimed that when it was in power five years 
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earlier, the commons agreed to an opposition motion that the constitution would not 
be amended without a joint address.  The Liberal prime minister conceded that the 
parliament had reached such an agreement. 
• The 1907 amendment changed federal grants to the provinces (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 
78-82; Favreau 1965, 12; Hurley 1996, 19).  The British parliament enacted the 
amendment in accordance with a joint address and the consent of all provinces, but 
not before Britain responded to a provincial protest.  According to Gérin-Lajoie 
(1950, 74-83), the premier of British Columbia withdrew his approval for the 
amendment in 1906 because the federal government denied his request for a special 
extra grant.  He travelled to Britain and lodged a formal complaint about both the 
grant, and inclusion in the amendment of a finality clause which said that the new 
scale of grants “shall be a final and unalterable settlement of the amounts to be paid 
yearly to the several provinces”.  While he did not obtain an extra grant, Britain 
excised the finality clause from the amendment.  According to Gérin-Lajoie, this 
was the only time that British altered an amendment because a province objected.  
British Columbia did not subsequently signal its consent to the amendment, but as 
Gérin-Lajoie wrote, “there is no conclusive evidence that the bill in its final form 
was still opposed by Premier McBride” (1950, 83). 
• The 1915 amendment changed the size and structure of the senate and the house, 
without consulting the provinces.  No objections were raised to the senate 
amendment (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 84-85; Favreau 1965, 12-13), but the proposal was 
controversial because under the new arrangement the Maritime provinces would lose 
seats in the commons (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 87-89; Chrétien 1981, 6-7, 39-41).  The 
subject was discussed at provincial conferences in 1910 and 1913, but it was not 
resolved.  A special joint committee of the parliament recommended in 1914 that 
each province should have at least as many seats in the commons as it did in the 
senate.  The committee changed representation for British Columbia in response to 
submissions from that province, but it did not yield to arguments by the premier of 
Prince Edward Island that it should retain the six commons seats allocated to it when 
it joined the union in 1873.  A senate motion to require provincial consent before 
enacting the amendment was lost on division.  The house approved a joint address 
requesting the amendment in 1914, but the senate did not agree until it was put again 
in 1915.  While the federal government did not consult the provinces about the final 
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form of the amendment, according to Gérin-Lajoie (1950, 88) there is no record of 
any province objecting to it.   
• The 1940 amendment to provide exclusive federal powers over unemployment 
insurance was enacted with the agreement of all the provinces, but during the course 
of debating the amendment in the house, prime minister Mackenzie King questioned 
whether it was necessary to obtain consent from the provinces (Hurley 1996, 20-21). 
• The 1946 amendment increased the size of the house.  It was secured by a joint 
address, despite official protests by the Québec government, and a motion put by the 
federal opposition calling for consultation with the provinces;  that motion was 
defeated by 108 to 48 votes (Gérin-Lajoie 1950, 118-119; Favreau 1965, 13).  The 
parliament initiated similar alterations to the size or composition of the senate or the 
house in 1952, and 1974, and twice in 1975, without consulting the provinces.  
When the size of the commons increased again in 1986, the rules had changed.  
Provincial consent was not required unless an amendment changed the “principle of 
proportionate representation” of provinces in the house or the number of senators 
allocated to each province, or if it caused a province to have more senators than MPs 
(constitution 1982, ss 42(1)(a), 42(1)(c), and 41(b) respectively). 
• The 1949 amendment empowered the Canadian parliament to make some 
amendments to the constitution without consulting Britain or the provinces.  
According to Gérin-Lajoie (1950, xiv-xix), the government did not consult the 
provinces about this amendment, despite protests from the federal leader of the 
opposition and some provincial governments.  The prime minister offered to meet 
with the provincial premiers to devise a local procedure for amending sections of the 
constitution that were not covered by the amendment, but the premiers of Québec, 
Alberta, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan declined the invitation, or raised 
objections.  The prime minister said in an address to the parliament that just as he 
saw no need to consult the provinces about provisions in the federal constitution that 
concerned the federal parliament alone, he did not expect the provinces to consult 
him about amending their constitutions.  
• The 1982 amendment was an omnibus package.  On 5 November 1981, all 
provinces except Québec approved it.  On 25 November 1981, Québec issued a 
decree to announce “Quebec formally vetos the Resolution”, and initiated legal 
action in the Court of Appeal for Québec which is discussed further below.  The 
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amending legislation passed the house on 2 December 1981, the senate on 8 
December, and Westminster on 25 March 1982.  It received royal assent on 29 
March, and came into force on 17 April 1982.  A special joint committee convened 
from 6 November 1980 to 9 February 1981, and its public hearings were televised 
(Federal-Provincial Relations Office 1990, 4);  this was the first time the public was 
consulted directly about constitutional change.  There were no public hearings on the 
final package, however, and at the provincial level, only the Alberta assembly 
debated it – for one day (Federal-Provincial Relations Office 1990, 7; Hurley 1996, 
62-65).   
• The 1984 amendment changed the wording of Aboriginal rights and mandated two 
first ministers’ conferences on the constitution.  It was enacted under the 7/50 rule 
with the consent of the federal parliament, representatives of four Aboriginal 
organisations, and all provinces and territories except Québec.  The Québec 
government said it did not necessarily disagree with the content of the amendment, 
but it would not participate in the consultation process until the federal government 
met its constitutional demands (Hurley 1996, 90-92).   
• A bilateral amendment in 1997 varied the Newfoundland terms of union to provide 
differential powers over education, schools, and religious instruction.  The 
Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1997 (Newfoundland Act) records that the 
Newfoundland legislature approved it on 31 October 1995, and the federal house of 
commons passed it twice – on 3 June 1996, and again on 4 December 1996, after the 
senate exercised its suspensive veto.  Newfoundland voters also approved it at a 
plebiscite in 1995 (Maton 2000). 
In brief, Britain changed one amendment in response to protests from British Columbia 
in 1907, and the Canadian parliament was similarly responsive to British Columbia in 
1915.  By contrast, the Canadian senate did not agree to the Newfoundland amendment 
of 1997, and Québec did not consent to four amendments in 1946, 1949, 1982, and 
1984.  Québec’s dissent is enduring, and unlimited.  When the federal government 
fulfilled Québec’s request for an amendment to exempt it from s 93 of the 1867 
constitution in 1997, Québec declared in the proclamation that its consent to that 
amendment “in no way constitutes recognition by the National Assembly [the Québec 
legislature] of the Constitution Act, 1982, which was adopted without its consent”.   
Québec took the issue of provincial consent to the courts in 1981.  On 25 
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November 1981, the Québec government asked the Court of Appeal for Québec to rule 
on whether by informal agreement the federal parliament could resolve to amend the 
constitution without Québec’s consent, and whether it could do so despite Québec’s 
objections.  The court heard the appeal on 15-17 March 1982, and dismissed it in a 
unanimous judgment delivered on 7 April 1982.  The Attorney General for Québec filed 
an appeal against the decision with the Supreme Court on 13 April – just four days 
before the federal government proclaimed the 1982 amendment.   
In Re: Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1982] 2 SCR 793, the 
question put to the Supreme Court was identical to the one put to the Court of Appeal 
for Quebec. 
Is the consent of the Province of Quebec constitutionally required, by convention, for the adoption 
by the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada of a resolution the purpose of which is to 
cause the Canadian Constitution to be amended in such a manner as to affect: 
(i)  the legislative competence of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec in virtue of the 
Canadian Constitution; 
(ii) the status or role of the Legislature or Government of the Province of Quebec within the 
Canadian federation; 
and, does the objection of the Province of Quebec render the adoption of such resolution 
unconstitutional in the conventional sense? (at 798-799). 
 
The Supreme Court heard the case on 14-15 June 1982, and dismissed it in a unanimous 
judgment handed down on 6 December 1982. 
The appellant submitted that by informal agreement, amendments such as those 
proposed in 1981 required the consent of all the provinces, or in the alternative, Québec 
had a unique power of veto over such amendments (at 801).  The respondent, the 
Attorney General of Canada, submitted that the court should not answer the appellant’s 
question because it was a “purely political question”, which was now moot;  if the court 
answered the question, it should answer in the negative for reasons given in Re: 
Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753 (the first reference), or because 
the process adopted by the Canadian government in 1981 satisfied the conditions set 
down in that judgment (at 805-806).  The court resolved that it would answer the 
question “to dispel any doubt over it” (at 806).   
In the first reference, the court ruled that parties wishing to establish the existence 
of conventions needed to cite precedents and reasons, and show that actors believed they 
were bound by them.  In the second reference, Québec cited as positive precedents 
amendments enacted with the consent of all provinces in 1930, 1931, 1940, 1951, and 
1964, and as negative precedents proposals abandoned in 1951, 1960, 1964, and 1971 
(at 803).  Québec submitted further that an amendment which affected a provincial 
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legislature had never been enacted without the consent of that province (at 803-804).  As 
to reasons, Québec submitted that the federal principle required unanimity, and the 
duality principle required that Québec have a veto over certain amendments (at 804).  
As to belief, Québec submitted that belief could be inferred from the precedents and 
reasons just cited (at 804-805).   
The court upheld the decision reached in the first reference that a convention of 
unanimity did not exist.   
That some of the actors in the precedents had accepted the rule of unanimity is not doubted and 
was recognized by this Court in the majority opinion at p. 904 of the First Reference.  But this is 
not enough.  Other important actors declined to accept the unanimity rule, as indicated in the 
majority opinion at p. 902 of the First Reference.  The opinion expressed in the First Reference that 
there existed no conventional rule of unanimity should be re-affirmed (at 812).   
 
While some actors certainly believed that such a convention existed, others did not.   
On the question of whether Québec had a unique right of veto over constitutional 
change, Québec submitted that it had acquired such a right by the principle of duality, 
defined as follows. 
In the context of this reference, the word “duality” covers all the circumstances that have 
contributed to making Quebec a distinct society, since the foundation of Canada and long before, 
and the range of guarantees that were made to Quebec in 1867, as a province which the Task Force 
on Canadian Unity has described as “the stronghold of the French-Canadian people” and the 
“living heart of the French presence in North America”.  These circumstances and these guarantees 
extend far beyond matters of language and culture alone:  the protection of the British North 
America Act was extended to all aspects of Quebec society – language, certainly, but also the 
society's values, its law, religion, education, territory, natural resources, government and the 
sovereignty of its legislative assembly over everything which was at the time of a “local” nature (at 
813). 
 
The court ruled that the appellant “failed completely to demonstrate compliance with the 
most important requirement for establishing a convention, that is, acceptance or 
recognition by the actors in the precedents” (at 814).  When the first amendment was 
enacted under the new rules in 1984, Québec withheld its consent. 
The Meech Lake Accord 1987-1990 
The Québec Liberal government announced on 9 May 1986 – six months after it 
won office – that Québec’s objections to the constitution would be overcome when the 
five amendments specified in its election campaign statement of February 85 were 
enacted (Federal-Provincial Relations Office 1990, 8-10; Maton 1995).  These 
amendments would recognise Québec as a distinct society, increase provincial powers 
over immigration, allow provinces to nominate Supreme Court judges, limit federal 
spending powers, and provide to Québec a veto over future amendments (Hurley 1996, 
108-109).   
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All of the first ministers agreed on 30 April 1987, at Meech Lake, that they would 
consider Québec’s request.  On 3 June, they approved a legal text for amendments to:  
• recognise Canada comprises French and English-speaking communities and Québec 
is a distinct society, commit the parliament and provincial legislatures to preserving 
French and English-speaking communities, and commit Québec to preserving and 
promoting its distinct society; 
• fill senate vacancies for a province with persons nominated by that province; 
• negotiate binding federal/provincial agreements on immigration that are consistent 
with national standards and objectives, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
• choose members of the Supreme Court from among provincial nominees, and ensure 
that at least three of the nine justices are members of the Québec bar, and are 
nominated by Québec; 
• pay federal compensation to provinces that opt out of national shared cost programs 
in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, as long as those provinces provide like 
programs; 
• convene a first ministers’ conference on economic matters at least once per year; 
• when one or more, but not all provinces, transfer powers to the federal tier, pay 
federal compensation to the other provinces; 
• change the amending formula to require the consent of all federal and provincial 
legislatures to amend provisions for the Queen, governor general, lieutenant 
governors, powers of the senate, selection of senators, distribution of senate seats, 
guaranteed minimum representation of provinces in the house, the principle of 
proportionate representation in the house, the use of the English and French 
languages, the Supreme Court, expansion of provinces into territories and creation 
of new provinces, and the amendment rules (subjects shown in italics were then 
governed by the 7/50 rule);  
• hold a first ministers’ conference on the constitution at least once per year from 
1988 (Governments of Canada 1987). 
Some amendments required unanimous federal/provincial agreement, while others were 
governed by the 7/50 rule.  Unanimity was required, however, because the first ministers 
agreed to the amendments as a package.  This meant that all federal and provincial 
legislatures had to ratify the Meech Lake Accord within three years, and all but two of 
the eleven legislatures did so (Hurley 1996, 271-272).   
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Québec passed its legislation just 20 days after the first ministers approved the 
legal text.  The house of commons passed it about two months later, and again on 22 
June 1988, after making amendments to satisfy the senate.  Within a year of Québec 
giving its consent, the federal parliament and five provinces had approved it.  By the 
two-year mark, only eight provincial legislatures had passed enabling legislation.  When 
the New Brunswick legislature ratified the accord on 15 June 1990 – just 12 days before 
the deadline expired – the provincial tally remained at eight because the new Liberal 
government in Newfoundland rescinded that legislature’s approval on 5 April 1990.  In 
Manitoba, where the accord was most unpopular, the legislature introduced a bill to 
ratify it on 16 December 1988, but withdrew the bill on 19 December (Monahan 1991, 
234, 292).  Federal/provincial negotiations continued until the first ministers issued a 
final communiqué on 9 June 1989.  At this stage, there was not enough time for 
Manitoba to hold public hearings on the final bill, as required in that province.  The 
minority Conservative government could have moved to alter the requirements for 
hearings and debates by a unanimous vote, but Elijah Harper (New Democrat) was 
opposed, so neither the motion nor the accord was put to the vote in the legislature 
(Monahan 1991, 292; Brock 1993, 33).  According to Matthew Mendelsohn, the 
legislature was relieved that this meant the Meech Lake round was over for them (pers. 
comm. 14 November 2001).  When the deadline for enacting the accord expired on 22 
June 1990, the federal parliament and eight of ten provinces had approved it, but 
Newfoundland and Manitoba had not.  The Meech Lake Accord could not be enacted.  
Many commentators concluded that the Meech Lake amendment failed in part for 
the lack of meaningful public involvement (Brock 1991; Cohen 1991, 270-277; Russell 
1993a, 140-145, 156-157; Watts 1993, 9-10; Hurley 1996, 113-114; Cairns 1997, 60).  
That conclusion may seem harsh, given the federal parliament and five provincial 
legislatures convened eleven public hearings for a total of 124 days, heard 1,020 
individual and group witnesses, and received 1,508 additional submissions (analysis of 
Hurley 1996, 273-274).   
Québec was the first to convene a hearing.  The Québec National Assembly 
convened hearings for eight days from 12 May 1987 to consider the accord ‘in principle’ 
(Hurley 1996, 111, 273).  Elsewhere, the house of commons’ hearing in August-
September 1987 of New Brunswick’s resolution was by far the most popular with 755 
submissions and 161 witnesses over 18 days (an average of 51 submissions and 
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witnesses per day), followed by Manitoba’s hearings on the accord in April-May 1989 
which heard and received an average of 32 witnesses and submissions per day.  At the 
other end of the scale, Ontario’s hearings in February-May 1988 attracted about 16 
witnesses and submissions per day.  This is not surprising given the Ontario Liberal 
government announced it would approve the accord regardless of the outcome of public 
hearings (Nystrom and Hunter’s minority report in Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 74).  
As these NDP parliamentarians put it, “Is it any wonder that … the overwhelming 
reaction is suspicion or, worse still, disdain for the entire committee process?”. 
Without doubt, the hearings informed the public about the accord, but did 
governments consult constituents?  Governments said they could not sever any 
provisions from this package – it was a ‘seamless web’ of compromises forged by 
eleven governments over an extended period. Once the legal text was agreed, it was not 
open to amendment in response to public submissions. The Federal-Provincial Relations 
Office noted in 1990:  “A common criticism during the hearings was that the public was 
presented with a ‘done deal’ and that examination of the resolution was aimed more at 
careful scrutiny than at discussion of alternatives” (1990, 9).  Cairns concluded that the 
accord did not succeed because “it clashed with the competing constitutional visions of 
aboriginal peoples, of English-speaking Canadians who identified strongly with the 
Charter, and of supporters of a strong central government” (1991a, 18).  Brock noted 
that the commons, the senate, a special joint committee, and three provincial 
parliamentary committees all acknowledged criticisms of the process – the process was 
“hasty, undemocratic, elitist, unrepresentative, secretive, and a violation of Canadian 
political norms” (1991, 59, 83).  According to Cohen,  
In reality, there was virtually no public consultation until after the fact [finalisation of the legal 
text], and even then, half the provinces avoided public hearings.  In another era, that approach 
would have been fine.  Brian Mulroney [then Conservative prime minister] talked as if the country 
could still make constitutions the way the Fathers of Confederation had – in private, in profanity, 
plied with liquor.  ‘In Charlottetown, the boys arrived in a ship – and spent a long time in places 
other than the library,’ he said.  ‘This is the way it was done.  This is the way Confederation came 
about.  There was no great public debate;  there were no great public hearings.  It became a kind of 
tradition’ (1991, 271). 
 
At the end of 1991, the same Conservative government set such a ‘tradition’ aside and 
convened five constituent assemblies to debate its own set of proposals for formal 
constitutional change. 
The Charlottetown Accord 1990-1992 
 Even before the Meech Lake Accord lapsed on 22 June 1990, legislatures in 
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Québec, the Yukon, and Prince Edward Island had initiated further inquiries into the 
constitution.  By the time the Mulroney Conservative government announced it would 
convene assemblies to debate its proposals for reform, all of the provincial and 
territorial governments had initiated inquiries into the constitution, and with the 
exception of New Brunswick, all provinces and territories had convened public 
hearings.  Figure 5.3 on the next page illustrates the sequence of events. 
Liberals in power in Québec convened the Allaire Committee in February 1990 to 
recommend further proposals for amending the constitution, assuming that the all 
governments ratified the Meech Lake Accord.  The resolution of appointment noted, 
however, that: 
A movement opposed to the Meech Lake Accord has developed and this movement threatens to 
cause two provinces to refuse to honour their signature and ratify the Accord within the stipulated 
period;  another province threatens to rescind the support its Legislative Assembly has already 
given to the Accord (Allaire Committee 1991, VII). 
 
The committee published its report on 28 January 1991, and the Québec government 
adopted it after the Meech Lake Accord lapsed.  The report proposed a massive 
expansion of powers for Québec.  It also proposed that Québec hold a referendum in 
1992 to offer constituents a choice between a new package of reforms proposed by the 
federal government, or secession from the Canadian union (Allaire Committee 1991, 
37-40, 48-49). 
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Quebec, Allaire committee
Yukon, select committee
PEI, special committee
Quebec, Bélanger-Campeau commission
New Brunswick, select committee
Canada, Spicer commission
Manitoba, constitutional task force
Ontario, select committee
Canada, Beaudoin-Edwards SJC
BC, legislative committee
Alberta, select committee
Nova Scotia, working group
Canada, Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC
Saskatchewan, task force
Quebec, sovereignty commission (1)
Newfoundland, constitutional committee
NWT, special committee (1)
BC, special committee
Canada, renewal of Canada conferences
Canada, aboriginal conference
Quebec, offers commission (1)
Federal/provincial consultation:
 
Figure 5.3:  Public consultations about the constitution, 1990-1992 
(Sources:  Allaire Committee 1991; Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991; Bélanger-Campeau Commission 1991; Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992; Government of Canada 1992; Pal and 
Seidle 1993, 177-182; Hurley 1996, 114-131) 
 
Note 1:  The timeline shown for this consultation indicates hearing dates only;  all others show elapsed time.  No timeline is to scale. 
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On 4 September 1990, after the Meech Lake Accord lapsed, the Québec 
government convened the Bélanger-Campeau Commission to make recommendations to 
the legislature about Québec’s constitutional status.  The commission comprised 19 
parliamentarians and 17 non-parliamentarians.  It held hearings across the province, and 
received written and oral submissions from almost 1,000 groups and individuals.  Like 
the Allaire commission, it recommended either radical constitutional reform, or 
secession.  Its report of 27 March 1991 advised the government to form two special 
parliamentary commissions – one to study “accession to sovereignty”, and another to 
consider “any offer of a new partnership of a constitutional nature made by the 
Government of Canada”, provided it was binding on all governments (Bélanger-
Campeau Commission 1991, 79-82).  The report also recommended that Québec hold a 
referendum on sovereignty on 8-22 June or 12-26 October 1992;  “should the outcome 
of the referendum be positive, Québec will acquire the status of a sovereign State one 
year, day for day, after the date of the referendum”.  On 20 June 1991, Québec passed 
legislation to hold a plebiscite on sovereignty in June or October the following year 
(Hurley 1996, 119).  More than four years later – on 30 October 1995 – Québec held its 
plebiscite on sovereignty.  The result was very close – 49.42% Yes, and 50.58% No. 
The federal government began its public consultations on 1 November 1990 when 
it briefed the Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future (the Spicer Commission) to consult 
the public about Canada’s future.  The brief was as broad as it was long, at more than 
550 words.  The commission was to obtain representative views from Canadians about a 
wide range of topics, including values, identities, interests, national challenges, actions 
governments should take, relationships between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginal 
peoples, the official language policy, multiculturalism, and balancing individual and 
collective rights (Spicer Commission 1991a, “The Mandate”).  The 12 commissioners 
interpreted the brief as requiring them to “set out to collect and focus citizens’ ideas for 
their vision of the country, and to improve the climate of dialogue by lowering the level 
of distrust” (Spicer Commission 1991c, section 2).     
Over 17 weeks, the Spicer Commission directly engaged 211,454 people in the 
constitutional debate.25   Wendy Porteous – the commission’s associate executive 
director – analysed public participation in forum activities by the nature of the 
participation, representation by province, and representation by gender.  Her data 
                                                 
25
 This cannot be expressed as a proportion of the population because individuals making multiple 
submissions and phone calls, or attending more than one group discussion, are counted on each occasion. 
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showed that 94,257 people (excluding spectators) attended group discussions moderated 
by the commission’s representatives, 75,069 people rang a toll-free telephone service, 
and 41,858 people sent letters, briefs, or reports (1992, appendix 2).  Participation by 
type was 45% group discussions, 36% telephone contact, and 20% written 
submissions.26 
Analysis of Porteous’ data shows that for eight of the 12 provinces and territories, 
participation was roughly in proportion to the population (±5%), as illustrated in figure 
5.4 below. 
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Figure 5.4:  Spicer Commission, public participation by province and territory 
(Source:  analysis of Porteous 1992, Appendix 2, third to fifth pages) 
 
Under-representation of Québec is startling at –10% to –17%.  Ontarians were under-
represented at group discussions, but they were over-represented as 1-800 callers and 
authors of submissions (-10%, +11%, +4% respectively).  Otherwise, New Brunswick 
and Manitoba were over-represented at group discussions by 6% and 7% respectively.  
Except for Québec, these results are remarkably good, given that participants were self-
selected.  By contrast, Porteous’ analysis of 1-800 callers by gender showed that the 
gender deficit for women was about 12%.  The commissioners expressed regret about 
                                                 
26
 I am grateful to Alan Cairns for suggesting I look at the data this way (pers. comm. 3 November 2001), 
and to Janet Hiebert for showing me where to find the data (pers. comm. 13 November 2001).   
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the under-representation of French-speaking people from Québec and Aboriginal 
peoples, and noted that “many [Aboriginals] reacted to the Forum with suspicion as a 
people who have been ‘commissioned-out’ with no real hope of resolving their 
grievances” (Spicer Commission 1991c).  Aboriginal peoples were indeed 
“commissioned-out” when the prime minister agreed to the commission’s request to 
delete Aboriginal issues from the brief because the commissioners “had neither the time 
nor expertise to study longstanding aboriginal issues” (Spicer Commission 1991c, 
section 2).  It was, nevertheless, “the most widespread popular consultation ever held in 
Canada” (Porteous 1992, 1, 7), at a cost of $22.12 million (Privy Council figure in Pal 
and Seidle 1993, 184). 
The commission delivered its report on 27 June 1991.  The report made ten 
recommendations (Spicer Commission 1991d, section 5), and supported them with 
histograms to illustrate the range of opinions expressed (Spicer Commission 1991a). 
1. Add a preamble to “explain Canada’s past, its identity and values, and Canadians’ 
free commitment to the future”. 
2. Inform Canadians of the negative consequences of Québec secession.  The report 
argued strongly against separation of Québec.  In a statement reminiscent of Sir 
Étienne-Paschal Taché's concerns in 1866, the commissioners observed:   
Canada without Quebec would be subject to possibly intolerable pressures to fissure along 
north/south lines. And we need be in no doubt: the various provinces and regions, if driven in despair 
to join the United States, would do so as supplicants. They would be in no position to dictate terms. 
We would be foolish to expect charity.  Governments - and every Canadian - must think much more, 
and much more deeply, about all this (Spicer Commission 1991d, section 3).   
 
Most participants said they believed that separation of Québec would have a 
negative effect on both Québec and Canada.   
3. Review how the official languages policy is implemented “with a view to ensuring 
that it is fair and sensible”, and encourage children to learn both English and French 
at school.  Most participants approved of bilingualism generally, but not the 
government’s policies.  Most of the participants who participated by telephone 
expressed negative opinions on both the principles and practices. 
4. Settle Aboriginal land claims, implement Aboriginal self-government, and recognise 
the first nations officially.  An overwhelming majority of the participants supported 
settling land claims, and a smaller majority favoured Aboriginal self-government.   
5. Streamline multicultural programs, educate Canadians about the value of those 
programs, and provide a limited amount of education about Canada to migrant 
children.  Most participants approved of multiculturalism generally, but did not 
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approve the government’s policies.  Most people who participated by telephone 
expressed negative opinions on principles and policies.  
6. Broaden Canadians’ knowledge about their nation by youth travel and exchange 
programs, more affordable travel, civics education at schools, and a shared history 
curriculum for all provinces except Québec. 
7. Educate Canadians about government roles in mediating economic difficulties.  
More than 80% of discussion group participants expressed concern about the 
economy (particularly the deficit), but the rate was 40% or less for those who made 
written submissions or called the toll-free telephone service. 
8. Rationalise the federal/provincial division of powers, but protect institutions, 
national standards, and values.  Participants in every province and territory except 
Québec preferred a stronger federal government to devolving powers. 
9. Reform or abolish the senate. 
10. Improve perceptions of government leadership and democracy by modifying 
question time procedures to make it less partisan and adversarial, allowing more free 
votes, and applying the consultation methods used by the commission.  More than 
95% of participants who raised the subjects of political institutions, political 
leadership, and the prime minister’s leadership expressed negative opinions.  
Two commissioners wrote dissenting reports (Spicer Commission 1991b). 
Commissioner Cashin claimed the consultation process was shallow and contrary 
to the institutions of representative government, the analysis was flawed because it did 
not examine relationships between views expressed on different topics, and “there is a 
great preoccupation with process and personalities”.  Commissioner Normand also 
claimed that the consultation process was superficial – it was “similar to that of open-
line radio shows”.  He added that the subject of Québec was “trivialized”, the forum was 
costly and inefficient, and constructive suggestions made by participants and 
commissioners in the main report were “either too convoluted in form or too timid in 
content to be adequate for resolving the problems at hand”.  
Just one month after it convened the Spicer Commission, the government 
announced the formation of the Beaudoin-Edwards Special Joint Committee to:  
consult broadly with Canadians and inquire into and report upon the process for amending the 
Constitution of Canada, including, where appropriate, proposals for amending one or more of the 
amending formulae (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, vii).   
 
The committee comprised 10 senators and 20 MPs (16 Progressive Conservative, nine 
Liberal, three NDP, and two Conservative).  It held public hearings in all provinces and 
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territories, received more than 500 written submissions, heard 209 witnesses, and 
submitted its report on 20 June 1991 (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 9-10).  The report 
proposed new amendment rules (including basing consent on regions rather than 
provinces, and reducing the ratification period from three years to two years), opposed 
the use of constituent assemblies (as described in the second chapter), and supported the 
use of plebiscites to measure public approval of proposals for formal constitutional 
change (1991, 26-26, 31, 42).  According to Hurley (1996, 119-120), the federal 
government had already announced on 13 May 1991 that it would legislate for 
plebiscites.  The legislation was tabled on 15 May 1992 and adopted on 22 June 1992, 
by which time British Columbia, Québec, and Alberta, had done the same.  Exactly a 
year before, legislation for a plebiscite on secession to be held in June or October 1992 
was put to the Québec legislature, which passed it on 20 June 1991. 
The Beaudoin-Edwards SJC exceeded its brief in making five specific 
recommendations for amendments to:   
• require that three members of the Supreme Court are from Québec;   
• consult Aboriginal peoples about amendments that affect them, and hold 
conferences on Aboriginal issues every two years;   
• require that provinces are not created from, or extended into, a territory without the 
legislative consent of that territory;   
• provide that territories participate in constitutional conferences;  and   
• provide for the voluntary delegation of powers between the federal and provincial 
tiers (1991, 16-17, 19, 29-30).   
The committee also recommended that federal, provincial, and territorial legislatures 
change their procedural rules to require public hearings on formal constitutional 
amendments, held “early enough to allow for changes to the proposal” (1991, 55).  In 
less than six months, the federal government met this recommendation (and went 
against another) by convening five constituent assemblies to debate its embryonic 
proposals for constitutional change.  
About a week before the Beaudoin-Edwards SJC submitted its report, the federal 
government appointed the Beaudoin-Dobbie Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
the House of Commons.  Its brief was to:  
[I]nquire into and make recommendations to the Parliament on the proposals of the Government of 
Canada for a renewed Canada contained in documents to be referred to it, from time to time, by the 
Government of Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, ix).     
 
The document that was referred to the committee – Shaping Canada's Future Together 
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– contained 28 proposals for constitutional change.  The government released the 
document and referred it to the SJC on 24 September 1991 (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 
1992, 3), and published as a glossy pamphlet four days later (Hurley 1996, 120). 
The Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC visited every province and territory, convened 78 
hearings between 25 September 1991 and 11 February 1992, heard more than 700 
witnesses, and received almost 3,000 submissions (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 3; Pal 
and Seidle 1993, 181).  Its report, submitted on 1 March 1992, said that if the 
constitution and Canada was to be renewed, Canada needed to meet the “Challenge of 
Inclusion”, and “the Challenge of Vision”.  To meet the challenge of inclusion, Canada 
and its constitution needed to be inclusive of Québec, Aboriginals, the western and 
Atlantic provinces, women, and “the variety of special needs and cultural perspectives 
that are now part of the Canadian reality” (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 17-18).  On 
vision, the committee said that the constitution should include “a new provision in the 
Constitution that defines the Canadian people and their highest political values ... a new 
social contract ... important economic goals ... [and to allow it] to forge a political 
consensus, the instruments of political cohesion that could give them effect (Beaudoin-
Dobbie SJC 1992, 18-19). 
The committee reached majority agreement in favour of the following 
amendments, and provided legal drafts for almost all of them.  
1. Add a preamble to specify Canadian identity and values – one preamble 
recommended, plus two alternatives (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 23, 125-128). 
2. Amend the Canada Clause to elaborate on rights and values – one draft 
recommended, and one alternative provided (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 24, 106, 
129-130). 
3. Amend the Charter to recognize Québec as a distinct society, and the nation’s 
“linguistic duality” (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 26-27, 107). 
4. Provide for Aboriginal self-government, gender equality, and prior consultation of 
Aboriginal peoples about constitutional changes that affect them (Beaudoin-Dobbie 
SJC 1992, 28-33, 107-109). 
5. Enlarge the senate, and elect senators for fixed terms of up to six years using a PR 
system with multi-member constituencies, at elections held separate from the house 
of commons elections.  Allocate seats to the provinces and territories roughly (but 
not only) in proportion to population, with guaranteed representation for Aboriginal 
peoples if they wish it.  The senate has a 180-day veto over ordinary bills, and a 30-
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day veto over money bills.  A majority of Francophone senators can veto bills 
regarding language and culture for French communities, and the senate can veto 
some senior government appointments (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 44-58). 
6. Provide that the federal government chooses new members of the Supreme Court 
from nominations submitted by provincial governments, and three of the nine 
members are from the Québec bar (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 59-60, 109-113). 
7. Amend the division of powers to provide for concurrent federal/provincial powers 
over inland fisheries and personal bankruptcy, delegation of powers between the 
federal and provincial legislatures, clarification of shared powers over labour market 
programs, greater powers for Québec over culture and broadcasting, and 
entrenchment of federal/provincial agreements on immigration (Beaudoin-Dobbie 
SJC 1992, 66-72, 77-81, 114-120). 
8. Entrench intergovernment agreements, and compensation for provinces that opt out 
of shared-cost programs (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 69, 81-83, 116-117, 120). 
9. Entrench an economic union clause which, with certain exceptions, provides for the 
free movement of “goods, services, persons, and capital” between the provinces and 
territories, and a dispute resolution procedure (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 86-87, 
121-122). 
10. Entrench a “social covenant” which requires governments to set goals for universal 
health care, social security benefits, education, protecting the environment, and 
collective bargaining in workplaces.  Entrench an “economic union” which aims to 
improve the economy, allow the free movement of goods, services, people, and 
capital, and achieve full employment and a “reasonable standard of living” 
(Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 87-89, 122-124). 
11. Entrench annual first ministers’ conferences (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 90, 124). 
The tenth proposal for a “social covenant” (later referred to as a “social charter”) was 
not part of the federal government’s package;  it was suggested at the assembly.   
The committee did not support federal proposals to entrench property rights, 
tighten the threshold for invoking the notwithstanding clause, vary the distribution of 
residual powers, and entrench a mandate for the Bank of Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 
1992, 34-35, 83-84, 89).  Nor did it specifically approve a proposal to grant exclusive 
federal powers over “any matter that it declares to be for the efficient functioning of the 
economic union” if it was approved under the 7/50 rule with compensation for 
provinces that opt out (Government of Canada 1991, 12).  
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The committee referred back a number of proposals that it did not think should be 
pursued as formal constitutional change.  These were proposals to:  reform house of 
commons procedures;  “streamline” government, and share powers by bilateral 
agreements over tourism, forestry, mining, recreation, housing, municipal/urban affairs 
… regional development, and family policy … [and] energy”;  increase provincial 
powers over culture and broadcasting matters for provinces other than Québec;  repeal 
the declaratory power which allows the federal government to legislate for certain public 
works within provinces;  and consult provinces about appointments to the Bank of 
Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 40, 66-67, 72-74, 77, 84-85, 89).  The federal 
government also proposed to change the amending formula to extend the unanimity rule 
to provisions affecting the powers, structure, and selection of senators, MPs, and 
members of the Supreme Court.  In response, the committee provided five options, and 
suggested the government needed to consider the effect of the formation of new 
provinces on the amending formula (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 92-95).   
In December 1991, a little over two months before the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC completed 
its hearings, the government announced a further public inquiry into the constitution – 
the five constitutional conferences that are the principal subject of this thesis.27    
The assemblies’ resolutions are described in detail in the next chapter.  In brief, 
they responded to the 28 federal proposals for constitutional reform as follows. 
• Delegates supported proposals for:  recognition of Québec as a distinct society;  
Aboriginal self-government and consultation with them on constitutional matters;  a 
Canada Clause;  more free votes in federal parliament;  an “elected, effective, and 
fully representative” senate;  increased powers for Québec (but not other provinces); 
new exclusive federal powers over national or emergency matters;  and entrenching 
a requirement that three of the nine Supreme Court judges be from Québec. 
• Delegates did not support proposals for:  new federal powers to manage the 
economic union;  a process to harmonise federal/provincial economic policies;  
requiring the Bank of Canada to preserve price stability;  entrenching property 
rights;  raising the threshold to invoke the notwithstanding clause;  simultaneous 
house/senate elections;  a Council of the Federation;  providing for delegation of 
powers between federal and provincial legislatures;  and limiting new federal 
programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. 
                                                 
27
 Later the government announced it would convene a conference on Aboriginal issues on 13-15 March, 
with half the 184 delegates chosen by four peak Aboriginal organisations (Clark 1991a). 
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The assemblies did not agree on the distribution of senate seats, the senate’s veto 
powers, and a national common market clause.  Delegates expressed little interest in 
proposals to reduce the number of no-confidence votes in parliament, allow provinces 
other than Québec to nominate Supreme Court judges, repeal the federal declaratory 
power, rationalise specified government services, and change the amendment formula.  
They added three new proposals:  elect senators using a proportional representation 
system with single transferable votes but no party lists, entrench a social charter, and 
restore Québec’s veto over institutional change.  The three co-chairs submitted the 
assemblies’ reports to the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC at the end of February 1992.  
Beginning the month after the assemblies submitted their reports, the first 
ministers negotiated the Charlottetown Accord in a series of closed-door meetings held 
between 12 March and 28 August 1992.  First ministers’ meetings on the constitution 
(MMC) convened at Ottawa on 18 August and at Charlottetown on 27-28 August (CICS 
2004, 98-100).  These were large gatherings of 372 and 240 people respectively, which 
included federal, provincial, and territory first ministers, government officials, and 
representatives of peak Aboriginal groups.  On 28 August, the participants reached 
agreement on a package of constitutional reforms known as the Charlottetown Accord.  
On the same day, MMC members agreed to put the accord to constituents at two 
plebiscites on 26 October 1992 – one for Québec, and one for the rest of Canada (Hurley 
1996, 127).  According to Hurley, “As a political matter, it was agreed among leaders 
that the referendum would have to be supported in all provinces in order to pass, 
although this was not legally required” (1996, 128).  According to Brock: 
Perhaps above all the governments were attempting to address the problem of political legitimacy.  
A federal government with poor standing in the public opinion polls could not command the 
requisite authority to go forward with wholesale constitutional reform.  Public ratification deflected 
charges of elitism and illustrated the confidence of the leaders in the deal (1993, 30). 
 
Legal text for the Accord was released on 9 October, about two weeks before the vote.  
A copy of the Accord was sent to every household, and the legal text was made 
available at post offices (Hurley 1996, 128). 
The Referendum Act, SC 1992, c 30 provided for the conduct of the plebiscite and 
the plebiscite campaigns in all provinces and territories except Québec.  The federal 
government did not fund campaign committees, but it did regulate their finances.  
Individuals or groups that spent more than $5,000 on a campaign had to register with the 
Chief Electoral Officer, and expenditure by each registered committee could not exceed 
in aggregate 56.4 cents for each elector registered in the district/s covered by the 
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committee (s 15).  Committees could not accept donations from foreign governments, or 
individuals, companies, and trades unions that were not Canadian (s 14).  The 
government also compelled broadcasters to provide a set amount of free time to 
registered committees who paid a $500 deposit, and allocate time equally to Yes and No 
groups;  deposits were refunded to committees that used their allocated time (ss 21-26). 
The five-volume official report on the plebiscite published by Elections Canada 
provides a wealth of information on the process, the committees, and the results.  
Elections Canada mounted an impressive information campaign (1992a, 43-46).  It 
fielded 195,000 telephone enquiries over about 40 days (compared to just 1,480 for the 
1988 federal election), funded television, radio, and newspaper advertisements, 
produced 29 publications, and broadcast information about the plebiscite on the 
Parliamentary Channel (free-to-air television) for more than a month, 24 hours a day.  
Promotional programs were tailored to reach Anglophones, Francophones, people who 
spoke 45 of the 53 Aboriginal languages, “ethnocultural groups” who spoke 39 
languages, people with disabilities, the homeless, youth, and prisoners.   
Elections Canada also registered 241 campaign committees (205 Yes, and 36 No), 
and monitored donations and expenses (1992a, 27-31).  Almost all committees lodged 
financial returns, which showed donations were $12.6 million, expenses were $12.1 
million, and the Yes committees received and spent about ten times more than No 
committees (1992c, 29-31).  According to Hurley, the Yes committees were “poorly 
organised”, and the No committees were more effective because their criticisms were 
specific (1996, 128-129).   
Electors went to the polls on 26 October 1992 to answer Yes or No to the question 
“Do you agree that the Constitution of Canada should be renewed on the basis of the 
agreement reached on August 28, 1992?” (Elections Canada 1992a, 7).  Almost 75% 
turned out, and 55% answered No (see table 5.3 below).  Majorities in six provinces and 
one territory voted No.  The Yes vote was strong for Prince Edward Island (74%), 
Newfoundland (63%), New Brunswick (62%), and Northwest Territories (61%), but 
very close for Ontario (50.15% Yes).  The No vote was unequivocal for British 
Columbia (68%), Manitoba (62%), Alberta (60%), Québec (57%), the Yukon (56%), 
and Saskatchewan (55%), and close for Nova Scotia (51%).  Fears did not eventuate that 
Québec would vote Yes while the rest of Canada voted No.  The No vote was higher for 
Québec (57%) than for the rest of Canada (54%, median 51%).  The turnout was highest 
for Québec (83%), but so was the informal rate (2.2%, three times the next highest rate). 
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Table 5.3:  Results for the Charlottetown plebiscite 
 
    Votes cast   Valid votes 
  Turnout Total Informal  Yes No Yes % No % 
Newfoundland 53.3% 212,393 1,068 0.5%  133,583 77,742 63.2% 36.8% 
Prince Edward Island 70.5% 65,974 305 0.5%  48,541 17,128 73.9% 26.1% 
Nova Scotia 67.8% 450,722 2,065 0.5%  218,967 229,690 48.8% 51.2% 
New Brunswick 72.2% 381,996 2,642 0.7%  234,469 144,885 61.8% 38.2% 
Quebec 82.8% 4,033,021 87,832 2.2%  1,709,075 2,236,114 43.3% 56.7% 
Ontario 71.9% 4,834,742 29,564 0.6%  2,409,713 2,395,465 50.1% 49.9% 
Manitoba 70.6% 523,193 2,370 0.5%  199,905 320,918 38.4% 61.6% 
Saskatchewan 68.7% 456,610 1,644 0.4%  203,525 251,441 44.7% 55.3% 
Alberta 72.6% 1,219,887 2,958 0.2%  484,472 732,457 39.8% 60.2% 
British Columbia 76.7% 1,673,947 6,047 0.4%  528,773 1,139,127 31.7% 68.3% 
Northwest Territories 70.4% 24,172 169 0.7%  14,723 9,280 61.3% 38.7% 
Yukon Territory 70.0% 12,342 66 0.5%  5,360 6,916 43.7% 56.3% 
          
Quebec 82.8% 4,033,021 87,832 2.2%  1,709,075 2,236,114 43.3% 56.7% 
Rest of Canada 71.8% 9,855,978 48,898 0.5%  4,482,031 5,325,049 45.7% 54.3% 
Canada, total 74.6% 13,888,999 136,730 1.0%  6,191,106 7,561,163 45.0% 55.0% 
                    
 
(Sources:  Elections Canada 1992b, 3-4; Directeur Général des Élections du Québec 1992) 
 
Moving left-to-right across Canada, the Yes vote decreased, (see figure 5.5). 
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Figure 5.5:  Charlottetown Accord Yes vote by province 
(Sources:  Elections Canada 1997 3-4; Directeur Général des Élections du Québec 1992) 
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Québec held its sovereignty plebiscite on 30 October 1995, three years after the 
Charlottetown Accord plebiscite.  The question put was: 
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada 
for a new Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the Future of 
Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995? 
 
The turnout was extraordinarily high at 92%, and the result was extraordinarily close – 
50.6% No, and 49.4% Yes (Bishop 1995, 1).    
CONCLUSIONS 
Between 1867 and 1982, Britain enacted formal constitutional change in 
accordance with requests from one or both houses of the federal parliament, and more 
often than not, the consent of some provinces.  The enduring question during this period 
was whether the federal government should consult all of the provinces, and whose 
consent was required.  Britain’s role ended in 1982 when it enacted new amendment 
rules that specified clearly the circumstances in which provincial consent was required.  
Before this amendment was enacted, the Québec government argued in the courts that it 
had a unique right of veto over formal constitutional change, to no avail.   
All provincial governments approved the 1987 Meech Lake Accord for major 
constitution reform, but it lapsed in 1990 because two provincial legislatures did not 
pass legislation to signify their consent.  Governments were criticised for not consulting 
constituents about the Accord until after they had agreed to it as a package, at which 
time public dissent was not effective.  In the next two years, Canada moved from 
negotiating formal constitutional change behind closed doors, to almost full-blown 
public participation.  Between 1990 and 1992, the federal government and all but one 
sub-national government convened public hearings about new ideas for constitutional 
change – before the first ministers committed themselves to the Charlottetown Accord.  
Even so, constituents did not ratify the Accord, arguably because governments were not 
responsive to expressions of dissent before and after first ministers reached their 
agreement on the accord.  Such dissent was abundantly clear at the constituent 
assemblies.    
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CHAPTER SIX – THE CANADIAN ASSEMBLIES 1992 
 
This chapter examines the Canadian assemblies in detail to address the four thesis 
questions for Canada.  The structure of the chapter is much like the fourth chapter which 
examined the Australian case.  Initiation of the assemblies is outlined, then the 
assemblies’ brief, membership, and agenda is summarised.  Almost all of the chapter is 
devoted to presenting data, evidence, and arguments that answer the thesis questions.   
Research reported in this chapter shows that the assemblies were more representative of 
the population and electors, they generated more public interest, and they were better 
able to reach consensus on the proposals put to them than were relevant groups of 
politicians convening alone to debate constitutional change.  The question about 
partisanship could not be answered because an official record of delegates’ preferences 
was not created and retained. 
Joe Clark (federal minister for constitutional affairs) announced late in 1991 that 
the government would convene a series of five public conferences early in 1992 to 
debate its 28 proposals for constitutional change.  The aim was: 
to facilitate consultation among elected officials, constitutional experts, and the public on the 28 
proposals for constitutional change contained in the Government of Canada’s Shaping Canada’s 
Future Together; 
to increase public understanding of the proposals and/or alternative proposals for constitutional 
change; 
to stimulate specific commentary on the viability of the specific proposals, and to identify viable 
alternatives; 
to identify areas of broad agreement on principles, and to discuss possible tradeoffs; 
to involve a broad and balanced cross-section of Canadians which reflect the make-up of the 
country (Clark 1991b, 1, issued 2 December). 
 
Why did the government propose these conferences?  As Hurley explains it, the 
government convened them just in case the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC did not fulfil its brief.  
By November [1991], for a number of reasons, including logistics, the committee’s work was in 
question and – with a February 28, 1992, reporting deadline – tensions mounted.  It was not clear 
whether the committee would be able to complete its work successfully and in a timely fashion.  In 
this context, the Government decided on an initiative that would assist the committee and, if a 
report was not ultimately possible, that would provide an acceptable alternative (1996, 121-122). 
 
According to Brock, “hearings ground to a halt in Manitoba” (1993, 30).  Arthur 
Kroeger, co-ordinator of the Constitutional Conferences Secretariat, wrote: 
The difficulties experienced by the Committee in its initial set of hearings in Prince Edward Island, 
Ontario, and Manitoba were widely reported in the media, and there is no need for me to recount 
them here.  Suffice it to recall that in the first part of November the Committee returned from 
Manitoba in deadlock, and there was considerable doubt that the necessary agreements could be 
reached among the three [political] parties to permit a resumption of its hearings (1992, 1). 
 
Peter Harrison, the deputy co-ordinator, wrote: 
The Special Joint Committee (SJC) began a complex set of hearings and, in order to maximize 
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input from as many groups and individuals as possible, decided to hold sessions in a variety of 
communities across the country.  …  On one occasion during its visit to Manitoba in November 
1991, the SJC was faced with an empty hall.  The hearing was cancelled and, in a climate of 
political confusion, the Committee re-considered its plans.  Whatever the anatomy of the problem, 
the situation was sufficiently critical for the government to assess its alternatives for re-
envigorating the Parliamentary process (1992, 1). 
 
Pal and Seidle provided a comprehensive explanation, as follows. 
By early November 1991, following some experiments in consultation – including town hall 
meetings, which were abandoned after no witnesses came forward in St. Pierre Jolys, Manitoba – 
the Joint Committee was at an impasse.  … Meetings could not proceed because the Opposition 
members refused to attend.  A senior member of the Committee’s staff provided the following 
observations (confidential interview).  The idea of holding town hall meetings reflected the 
influence of the Spicer Commission’s innovations in consultation.  Town hall meetings on Prince 
Edward Island had worked well, but the organizational challenges were greater in larger provinces. 
Some of the Committee’s difficulties can be attributed to its tight timetable and constraints on 
resources.  When the Committee set its budget, it was conscious of media criticism of the Spicer 
Commission’s spending [costs were $22.12 million for Spicer and $4.2 million for the SJC].  A 
higher budget would have allowed advance work to be carried out (none was done for the 
Manitoba visit) (1993, 153, 184, and 192-193 in footnote 25). 
 
By these accounts, the federal government’s decision to hold the conferences was an 
impromptu one, and it was productive.  The members of the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC – 
who were ex-officio delegates at all five assemblies – noted that the “insightful 
discussions and vigorous debates that took place during these conferences were of 
considerable help to us” (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 4) 
 The government announced it would fund the conferences and provide a co-
ordinator and a secretariat.  Four “independent institutes” would be entirely responsible 
for choosing the delegates and running the conferences as they saw fit, as long as they 
satisfied the broad guidelines provided to them by the government.  These institutes 
were the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, the Canada West Foundation, the CD 
Howe Institute, and the Institute for Research on Public Policy (Clark 1991b, 1-2).  
According to Milne, the government initially planned to maintain control over the 
conferences, but the institutes declined to participate on this basis (1992, 30).  The 
federal government did, nevertheless, manage the final conference jointly with the four 
institutes (Harrison 1992, 5). 
Generally, the institutes could choose about 200 delegates to attend each 
conference, within these guidelines. 
(i) The Institutes are to invite to the Conferences on an ex-officio basis: 
 - all members of the Joint Parliamentary Committee [Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC]; 
- two individuals selected respectively by each of the caucuses of the three federal political 
parties with Parliamentary status; 
- two individuals from each province and territory, to be selected by the Premier/Head of 
Government;  and 
 - one representative of each of the four national Aboriginal organizations. 
(ii) The Chairpersons of the Conferences are to be eminent Canadians with no active partisan 
affiliations. 
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(iii) Experts invited by the Institutes to participate in panels and workshops must, taken together, 
represent a broad and balanced cross-section of views. 
(iv) The institutes are to ensure the substantial representation of a reasonable cross-section of 
interests, including business, labour, and non-government organizations. 
(v) The public is to be represented in a manner that reflects the major components of Canadian 
society.  Individuals selected should have a demonstrated interest in, and some knowledge of 
constitutional matters, and should have a significant record of service to their communities.  
The Institutes are responsible for determining the manner in which these individuals are 
selected (Clark 1991b, 3-4). 
 
The government authorised a Constitutional Conferences Secretariat to coordinate the 
conferences.  Arthur Kroeger led the CCS (Clark 1991b, 6,8), with Peter Harrison as his 
deputy (Harrison 1992).  Both men were senior bureaucrats.  
The five assemblies convened in five cities across the nation to debate some or all 
of the federal government’s proposals for constitutional change.  These proposals were 
published in a glossy, A4 sized magazine format with the title Shaping Canada’s Future 
Together:  proposals (Government of Canada 1991).  The timetable for the conferences, 
and the subjects they would discuss, was: 
• 17-19 January 1992 at Halifax – the division of powers; 
• 23-26 January 1992 at Calgary – institutional reform; 
• 31 January to 2 February 1992 at Montreal – the economic union; 
• 7-9 February 1992 at Toronto – identity, rights, and values;  and 
• 14-16 February 1992 at Vancouver – final conference, all proposals. 
Parliamentarians occupied about one-third of the seats because the brief required that 
the assemblies include 64 ex-officio delegates (category (i) above).  Ex-officio delegates 
were the 30 members of the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, six federal MPs chosen by the three 
parties with parliamentary status, 24 persons nominated by the first ministers of the 
provinces and territories, and four non-parliamentarians representing the first nations.  
The organisers were free to choose other delegates as experts or as members of interest 
groups (category (iii) and (iv)), or as qualified individuals (category (v)), provided they 
reflected the “views”, “interests”, and “major components of Canadian society”.   
DELEGATE SELECTION 
The organisers received about 2,900 nominations for about 700 seats that were 
available to experts, interest groups, or individuals at the first four conferences (the fifth 
conference comprised delegates selected from the first four conferences).  About 1,700 
experts or interest groups submitted nominations voluntarily, or in response to 
invitations sent by CCS to 93 peak interest groups (Kroeger 1992, 5; Harrison 1992, 
10).  More than 1,200 individuals nominated themselves to attend as ‘ordinary 
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Canadians’, largely in response to press advertisements (Kroeger 1992, 5-6; Harrison 
1992, 10).  Newspapers advertisements described the procedure as follows.     
Canadians, age 18 or over, can send a one-page letter in the official language of their choice, 
including: 
• your full name 
• the address and telephone number where you can be reached Jan. 3-6. 
• a few paragraphs describing your knowledge of and interest in constitutional issues and your 
record of community service … 
A limited number of participants will be randomly selected from the applications received.  If your 
name is selected, you will be telephoned by January 6. 
The personal expenses of participants will be paid “on request”, to ensure that costs are not a 
barrier to participation (extract from advertisement reproduced in Harrison 1992, annex III).  
 
Organisers chose 360 nominees to attend the conferences (derived from Harrison 1992, 
10-11).   
The conference report for Calgary provides a breakdown of delegate numbers by 
selection category, but the other reports do not (Government of Canada 1992, C2).28  
Figures in the conference brief and reports, and two commentaries, indicate that about 
27% of the delegates were appointed as ex-officio members, about 38% were chosen as 
experts or members of interest groups, and about 35% were selected as representative 
individuals (see table 6.1). 
Table 6.1:  Assembly delegates by selection category 
 
    Individuals 
Conference Ex-officio 
Experts/ 
Interest Groups RSPs Others Total 
      Halifax 29% 26% 19% 27% 45% 
Calgary 23% 48% 21% 7% 29% 
Montreal 28% 31% 13% 28% 41% 
Toronto 26% 40% 8% 26% 34% 
Vancouver 29% 47% 23% 1% 24% 
      Average 27% 38% 17% 18% 35% 
            
 
(Sources:  Government of Canada 1992, C2; Clark 1991b, 3-4; Harrison 1992, 11, 24; Milne 1992, 34) 
 
Notes:  
1. RSPs are randomly selected participants. 
2. Figures for Calgary are in the conference report.  The total for each conference and the number of 
RSPs are in Milne.  Figures for ex-officio delegates are from the brief.  Figures for Vancouver 
Experts/interest groups, and Others at Halifax, Montreal, and Toronto are in Harrison.  Figures for 
Experts/interest groups at Halifax, Montreal, and Toronto are deduced from other data. 
 
The ex-officio category ranged from 23% at Calgary to 29% at Halifax and Vancouver, 
whilst the figures for other categories varied widely.  Experts and members of interest 
groups ranged from 26% at Halifax to 48% at Calgary, with the latter figure including 
                                                 
28
 Each of the reports is page numbered 1-n within the Compendium.  An alphabetical character is added 
to citations to show which report is cited:  H(alifax), C(algary ), M(ontreal), T(oronto), and V(ancouver).  
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“facilitators [and] rapporteurs” as well as “advisors” (Government of Canada 1992, C2). 
The individuals category ranged from 24% at the final Vancouver conference to 45% at 
Halifax.  The proportion of individuals selected randomly from a structured sample 
(RSP delegates) ranged from 8% at Toronto to 23% at Vancouver. 
THE AGENDA 
Analysis of the conference agendas shows that the format for each conference was 
similar.  Generally, delegates heard formal presentations on a topic in plenary session, 
debated that proposal in workshops, and then returned to plenary session to hear and 
discuss a rapporteur’s summary of the outcomes.  This three-step process was repeated 
three to five times for four conferences, but at Montreal, there was only one cycle.  This 
may be because the Montreal conference debated four closely related topics.  By 
contrast, the process repeated five times at Calgary, where delegates debated six 
relatively disparate topics, and four times at Halifax, where delegates debated ten topics.  
Figure 6.1 shows that delegates spent about one-quarter of the available time in 
formal presentations, and about three-quarters of the available time in sessions devoted 
to workshop discussions or workshop reports.   
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Figure 6.1:  Use of time at the assemblies by activity 
(Source:  analysis of Government of Canada 1992, H27-29, C21-24, M23-25, T18-21, V25-28) 
 
REPRESENATION 
The rationale for examining descriptive and acting-for representation was 
explained toward the end of the second chapter.  Research for the Australian case 
included an analysis of delegates by place of birth, aboriginality, place of residence, age, 
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gender, formal education, and constitutional preferences, but not all of these indicators 
are available for the Canadian case.  
The official conference reports contained almost no information about the 
delegates.  None of the reports summarised delegates’ traits, and none provided a 
delegate list, but every report did comment on the delegates.  Set out below is a 
complete list of every statement that could be used to measure representativeness.   
The [Halifax] participant list, numbering just over 200, was made up of a diverse group of men and 
women from across Canada.  …  As organisers of the conference, APEC made a concerted effort to 
achieve a mix of participants strongly reflective of the Canadian population.  There were observers 
who expressed the view that the conference had brought together the most representative group of 
Canadians that had ever met to discuss the constitutional future of the federation (Government of 
Canada 1992, H3). 
 
[At the Calgary conference the aim was] to involve a broad and balanced cross-section of 
Canadians which reflects the regional, gender, linguistic and aboriginal make-up of the country.  … 
There were 256 participants in the Calgary conference.  Figure 1 indicates the type and number of 
participants [by selection method].  A number of techniques were used to obtain a broad and 
representative cross section of Canadians to participate in the Calgary conference … [described in 
detail].  In the selection of Conference participants care was taken to ensure regional representation 
from every province and territory, gender equity, aboriginal participation, and a balance of age and 
occupational groups.  Forty-two percent of the non-ex officio participants were women 
(Government of Canada 1992, C1-2). 
 
In choosing the [Montreal] delegates, the conference organizers took care to balance the need for a 
conference that was as representative as possible of the Canadian people with the need for a group 
with knowledge of how Canada’s economic union works (Government of Canada 1992, M4).   
 
The participants at the Toronto conference were chosen to reflect, as closely as possible, the 
composition of Canadian Society (Government of Canada 1992, T2-3). 
 
Ex-officio participants apart, half of those selected for the [Vancouver] conference were women 
(Government of Canada 1992, V4). 
 
The report for every conference except Vancouver mentioned that achieving 
representativeness was important to the organisers, but with one exception, the reports 
do not provided evidence to show how close the organisers came to achieving that goal. 
The Halifax and Vancouver reports provide the least information about delegates – these 
reports do not even say how many people attended the assemblies.  The Calgary report 
provides the most detail, namely the variables that were considered when delegates were 
selected (place of residence, gender, first language, aboriginality, occupation, and age), 
the number of delegate by selection category, and the gender ratio for delegates who 
were not ex-officio members.     
Peter Harrison and David Milne published articles that included an analysis of the 
delegates’ traits (Harrison 1992; Milne 1992), but these data are incomplete or 
inconsistent, and it was not possible to validate them against primary sources.  Harrison 
provided an analysis of Vancouver delegates by selection method (ex-officio, 
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experts/interest groups, and randomly selected).  He also presented for all five 
conference an analysis of delegates except ex-officio members by province of residence, 
language group, and gender.  Milne tabulated data for all delegates by region, language 
group, and gender, and data for the number of delegates chosen by random selection.  
He cited as his source “official summaries of invitation lists” (Milne 1992, 34-35).   
I was not able to obtain copies of these “official summaries”.  I found Harrison 
and Milne, and Dr Harrison responded to my request for help.  He could not supply any 
records, but did recall that when he was Deputy Coordinator of the Constitutional 
Conferences Secretariat in 1992, the secretariat sent all of the records to the Office of 
the Privy Council Office for archiving (pers. comm. 2 April 2005).  I lodged a request 
for information with OPC in 2005, and corresponded with OPC staff from April to 
September of 2005 (including Patrick Fafard whose work was reviewed in the second 
chapter), but OPC would neither confirm nor deny that they held relevant records.  In 
October 2005, the Australian National University made an official request on my behalf. 
That request included the following description of records sought. 
Subject:  The Renewal of Canada Conferences held during 1992 at Halifax (17-19 January), 
Calgary (23-6 January), Montreal (31 January-2 February), Toronto (7-9 February), and 
Vancouver (14-16 February). 
1. Delegate lists for each conference.  These are referred to by David Milne (1992) “Innovative 
Constitutional Processes:  Renewal of Canada Conferences, January-March 1992”, in Brown, 
Douglas L and Robert Young eds, Canada:  The State of the Federation 1992, Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations: Kingston, Ont. 27-51. 
2. Biographical data for any or all of the delegates. 
3. The number of people who attended any or all of the conferences as visitors. 
4. The number of public submissions made to any or all conferences. 
5. For any formal ballots held, the questions put and the results of the ballots. 
 6. Details of any other records that are available for the conferences.  
 
On 8 November 2005, OPC replied that Dr Fafard no longer worked there, and that: 
Unfortunately, we do not hold any archives on this issue related to Ms Kreibig’s request. … For 
information pertaining to the public consultation aspects of the Conferences, she should contact 
Reference Services at the National Archives of Canada.  They would have a record of any relevant 
government publication or relevant documents  (Anestis, pers. comm. 8 November 2005). 
   
I contacted Ian McDonald at Library and Archives Canada, and he conducted a thorough 
search of their records.  He supplied press reports and extracts from the Special Joint 
Committee’s minutes and proceedings, but otherwise could not find anything that I did 
not already have.  I am grateful to him for his endeavours.   
All possible sources are exhausted.  While it is difficult to credit that the federal 
government retained so few records on the conferences, advice from the official 
custodians of government records has to be accepted.  The task now is to analyse data 
that are available, and inform the reader how incomplete and inconsistent data are used. 
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Milne wrote that he compiled his data from “official summaries of invitation lists” 
(1992, 34-35), but total figures for four of the five conferences cannot be validated.   
• For Halifax, Milne wrote there were 221 delegates, the official report says there 
were “just over 200” delegates (Government of Canada 1992, H3), and a press 
report says there were “about 230 participants” (Beltrame 1992).   
• For Montreal, the total figures were 232 in Milne, and 234 in the Compendium 
(Government of Canada 1992, M4). 
• For Toronto, the total figures were 246 in Milne, and 254 in the Compendium 
(Government of Canada 1992, T2). 
• For Vancouver, the official report did not say how many delegates registered.  Milne 
wrote the figure was 217, whilst Harrison wrote it was 215 (1992, 24).   
As Milne’s figures for Montreal and Toronto were lower than the official tally, it is 
possible that some delegates who registered to attend did not attend.  It is also possible 
that when he analysed the data, Milne excluded delegates for whom some descriptive 
data were missing.  It is conceivable, for example, that Milne could not determine 
gender or language group for some delegates.  Harrison outlined the difficulties 
experienced in trying to assemble a representative group, as follows. 
While certain personal attributes may be easily identifiable – such as gender, which can often but 
not always be deduced from a person’s name – others are more difficult to identify.  Mother tongue 
is not always evident in a name, and ethnicity even less so.  Furthermore, it is not only indiscreet 
but could well be illegal to probe into an individual’s personal characteristics prior to inviting 
him/her to a conference (Harrison 1992, 26). 
 
This does not account for the difference between Harrison and Milne for Vancouver 
because they analyse the same traits for the same conference.  As Dr Milne did not 
respond to requests for further information, the present analysis proceeds with an 
acknowledgement that data may be missing for 10 of the 1,172 delegates (0.85%). 
Place of Residence 
Milne tabulated the number of delegates at each conference by place of residence, 
grouped under five headings:  Atlantic, Québec, Ontario, West, and North.  He did not 
say which provinces and territories were included in the regional groups, but it is 
reasonable to conclude that Atlantic is Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick, West is Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British 
Columbia, and North is the Northwest Territory and Yukon.   
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Milne concluded from his data that the disproportions in regional representation 
were “rather startling”, particularly the over-representation of western provinces. 
While the number of provinces that had to be represented by a respectable minimum dictated 
numbers of participants from both the Atlantic and western provinces (and the north) much higher 
than could possibly be justified by population, this rationale still does not explain the marked 
predominance of participants from western Canada.  In total conference participation, for example, 
the west outstripped all other regions in attendance, enjoying almost 100 more delegates than 
Ontario. … Note the total western representation at the Calgary conference that quite handsomely 
outstrips that of Ontario and Quebec combined;  indeed, the Atlantic and western regions alone 
account for more than twice the numbers of Ontario and Quebec.  These regional figures certainly 
depart sharply from Canadian population indicators, underplaying significantly Ontario’s 
representation (1992, 34). 
Milne compared conference data with population data, so the same comparisons are 
made in this thesis.  While it is more relevant to use data for electors, in this case it 
would make little difference to the results because the distribution of population and 
electors for the five regions varies by no more than 1.8% (analysis of Elections Canada 
1997;  and Duchesne, Nault, Gilmour et al. 1999, 137).   
Milne concluded that the over-representation of western provinces was 
particularly strong, but it is not clear why he does so.  His data record that the west had 
exactly 100 more delegates than did Ontario, but that produces a relatively modest 
figure for over-representation, as shown in table 6.2 below.  The west had 28.9% of the 
population, and its delegates occupied 31.8% of the seats at the assembly, so the over-
representation figure is just 2.9%.   
Table 6.2:  Geographic representation at the assemblies 
 
 
Region (row percent) 
  
North Atlantic Québec West Ontario 
            Assembly Delegates          
Halifax 4.5% 23.1% 19.9% 28.1% 24.4%
Calgary 5.5% 22.7% 15.6% 41.4% 14.8%
Montreal 3.4% 16.8% 25.9% 26.7% 27.2%
Toronto 4.5% 15.0% 24.0% 27.2% 29.3%
Vancouver 3.7% 16.1% 24.0% 35.0% 21.2%
All assemblies 4.4% 18.8% 21.8% 31.8% 23.3%
            
Population  0.3% 8.4% 25.1% 28.9% 37.3%
 
     
Disproportions  4.0% 10.4% -3.3% 2.9% -14.0%
            
 
(Sources: analysis of Milne 1992;  and population figures from Duchesne et al. 1999, 137) 
 
Under-representation of Ontario (-14.0%) and Québec (-3.3%) is not attributable to 
over-representation of the West (+2.9%).  Rather, it highlights over-representation of 
Atlantic provinces (+10.4%), and the north (+4.0%). 
Table 6.3 and figure 6.2 below compare the results for the assemblies with similar 
data for the first ministers who negotiated the accord, and the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC.   
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Table 6.3:  Geographic representation – assemblies, SJC, and first ministers 
 
(Sources: analysis of assembly data in Milne 1992;  population data in Duchesne et al. 1999, 137;  
first ministers’ biographies in Marsh 2006;  and SJC members’ biographies in Parliament of 
Canada 2006a) 
 
Disproportions for the assemblies range from –14% for Ontario to +10% for the Atlantic 
region, but disproportions for first ministers are higher in four of the five regions.  At 
the extremes, first ministers over-represented the Atlantic region by 22%, and under-
represented Ontario by almost 30%.  For the West, however, disproportions are lower 
for first ministers than assemblies, at +1.9% and +2.9% respectively.  The results are 
better for the SJC than they are for first ministers because for three of the five regions 
(North, Atlantic, and East), disproportions are lower than they are for the assemblies.  
However, the much less favourable results for the SJC in Québec and Ontario produce a 
median disproportion figure for the SJC that is higher than it is for the assemblies.  The 
median disproportions are assemblies 4.00 (North region), SJC 4.90 (Québec), and first 
ministers 15.00 (North). 
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Figure 6.2:  Geographic representation – assemblies, SJC and first ministers 
 
 
Region (row percent) 
  
North Atlantic Québec West Ontario 
            Population  0.3% 8.4% 25.1% 28.9% 37.3% 
Assemblies 4.4% 18.8% 21.8% 31.8% 23.3% 
First ministers 15.4% 30.8% 15.4% 30.8% 7.7% 
SJC members  3.3% 16.7% 30.0% 30.0% 20.0% 
            
Disproportions          
Assemblies 4.0 10.4 -3.3 2.9 -14.0 
First ministers 15.0 22.4 -9.7 1.9 -29.6 
SJC members 3.0 8.3 4.9 1.1 -17.3 
            
 
Dale Kreibig, Changing constitutions through constituent assemblies, 18 July 2007 
 
201
 
The assemblies were more representative of constituents by region than were the first 
ministers, or the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC. 
Gender 
An equitable gender balance was not achieved at any of the conferences.  The 
1992 census recorded that men comprised 49.6% of the population, and the range was 
49.3% for Québec to 52.2% for the Northwest Territory (Duchesne et al. 1999, 137).  
Analysis of Milne’s data for the assemblies (1992, 34) shows that 67.7% of the 
delegates were men – the deficit for women was a little over 18% (table 6.4 below).   
Table 6.4:  Representation of gender 
 
  
Men Women’s deficit 
Assemblies   
Halifax 67.9% 18.3% 
Calgary 68.8% 19.2% 
Montreal 73.3% 23.7% 
Toronto 67.5% 17.9% 
Vancouver 60.8% 11.3% 
All conferences 67.7% 18.2% 
Population 49.6%   
      
 
(Sources:  first ministers CICS 2004;  Marsh 2006;  Civics Channel 2006;  population Duchesne et 
al. 1999, 137;  conferences Milne 1992, 34) 
 
Analysis of gender for each assembly shows that the deficit for women ranged from 
11.3% at Vancouver to 23.7% at Montreal.  While the monopoly Cairns mentioned was 
undermined, it certainly was not redressed.   
Official reports for the Calgary and Vancouver assemblies claimed that the 
organisers aimed to achieve gender representativeness, but Milne concluded: 
Clearly, a total gender imbalance of about two to one in favour of males also existed, with only the 
Vancouver meeting deciding to choose a majority of women among non-ex officio members 
(Milne 1992, 34, emphasis added).   
 
The organisers were, however, severely handicapped by the brief.  The federal 
government instructed the organisers to invite as ex-officio delegates all 30 members of 
the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, 6 members of the federal caucus, 24 persons nominated by 
the first ministers of the provinces and territories, and four people representing 
Aboriginal organisations (Clark 1991b, 3-4).    
The results derived from an analysis by gender of the first ministers who 
negotiated the Accord, and the members of the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC who debated its 
precursor, are even less equitable.  Biographical records available from the parliament’s 
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web site shows that 12 of the 13 first ministers were men (the exception was Nellie 
Cournoyea, first minister for the Northwest Territories) hence men comprised 92.3% of 
the first ministers’ group, and the deficit for women was 42.7%.  Analysis of the 
committee’s report and biographies supplied by parliament show that 80% of the 
committee’s members were men (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992; Parliament of Canada 
2006a), which is consistent with the gender balance for parliament.  Parliamentary 
research shows that in 2006, women comprised 20.8% of the lower house and 35% of 
the senate, little changed from 1993 when women held 18% of the lower house seats 
(Cool 2006, 3).   
The assemblies were not representative of the population for gender, but the 
gender deficit for first ministers and SJC members was even greater, as illustrated in 
figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3:  Representation of gender 
 
This result for gender representation is nevertheless an improvement on past 
outcomes.  Soon after the conferences, Alan Cairns wrote:  
Canada’s recent constitutional pilgrimage has also undermined the former virtual monopoly of men 
over constitutional discourse and the agenda of constitutional change.  Yesterday's constitution, 
although this was only dimly seen by our predecessors, was male (Cairns 1993, 6).  
 
Credit is due to the conference organisers for doing what they could to redress the 
historic deficit for women, within the constraints of their brief.  The organisers could not 
have achieved gender equity overall unless they applied a strong gender bias against 
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men when they were in a position to choose delegates. 
Constitutional preferences    
It is clear from the result of the plebiscite that the first ministers did not represent 
voters’ preferences at all well.  The first ministers agreed unanimously in August 1992 
that all 35 proposals described in the Draft Legal Text should be implemented, but only 
45% of Canadian electors voted Yes when the package was put to them in October 
1992.  The question for this thesis, however, is whether delegates at the five assemblies 
better represented electors’ constitutional preferences than did the first ministers, which 
means that outcomes for the assemblies, the first ministers’ conferences, and the 
plebiscite need to be compared. 
It is difficult to compare constitutional preferences for delegates and voters 
because the two groups did not consider the same package of proposals.  For example, 
assembly delegates did not support federal proposals to entrench property rights, form a 
council of the federation, and entrench exclusive federal powers to manage the 
economic union, but these proposals were not put to voters.  On the other hand, the 
package put to voters included proposals to increase the size of the federal house of 
commons, and guarantee that Québec would hold 25% of the commons seats regardless 
of its population, but these ideas were not put to the assembly.  The second difficulty is 
that voters answered Yes or No to the entire package, which does not indicate their 
preference for each proposal.    
It is still possible to answer the thesis question using data from surveys of electors 
conducted before and after the vote.  LeDuc and Pammett concluded from their analysis 
of a telephone survey of 1,115 voters that the factor bearing most strongly on the No 
vote was the substance of the proposals, rather than perceived benefits of the package to 
particular groups, the effect of parties and politicians on voters, or any other statistically 
significant variable (1995, 31-32).  They found that at least 60% of No voters opposed 
proposals for an equal senate, delegating more powers to the provinces, Aboriginal self-
government, the distinct society clause, a larger house of commons, and the 25% 
guarantee for Québec.  As mentioned earlier, the assemblies did not debate the two 
proposals for the commons, but the results for the other four proposals can be compared.  
Assembly delegates and voters who rejected the Accord were reluctant to accept 
the proposal for an equal senate where each province has the same number of seats.  At 
the assemblies, delegates agreed the senate “must be elected, effective and fully 
representative of Canadian society”, and that smaller provinces should have more 
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senators, but only a minority of delegates supported the idea of an equal senate 
(Government of Canada 1992, V9, C10, V10).  LeDuc and Pammett found that 67% of 
those who voted No at the plebiscite disagreed with the proposal for an equal senate 
(1995, 17).  Henry’s analysis of opinion polls on senate reform since 1944 shows that 
soon after the first ministers released their Accord, support for reform of the senate 
dropped from 49% to 30% and support for not changing the senate rose to 21%, which 
was the highest result recorded for that option since 1954 (Henry 1993, 5-6).  When 
Johnston et al. surveyed 2,530 people, they found that a minority approved of the 
proposal for a triple-E senate (elected, equal, and effective) – the approval figure was 
only about 16% for Québec, and about 23% for the rest of Canada (Johnston et al. 1996, 
79).29  A clear majority of the respondents in Québec and elsewhere who did not approve 
the senate proposal preferred the status quo (about 16% and 20% respectively), abolition 
of the senate (about 47% and 40% respectively), or they did not have an opinion (about 
20% and 14% respectively).  It needs be noted, however, that very few assembly 
delegates supported abolition of the senate.  When the proposal was debated fully at 
Calgary, delegates were “united in rejecting the notion of abolishing the senate, an idea 
which was dismissed out of hand in most workshops and defended by solitary 
individuals in only a few” (Government of Canada 1992, C7).   
Delegates and voters reached similar conclusions on proposals to amend the 
division of powers.  Delegates agreed that additional powers should be granted to 
Québec, but otherwise there was little support or discussion of the proposal to grant all 
provinces exclusive powers over labour market training, immigration, culture, 
broadcasting, tourism, forestry, mining, recreation, housing, and municipal/urban affairs 
(Government of Canada 1991, 34-37; Government of Canada 1992, H13-16, V10-12).  
In their analysis of voters’ preferences, LeDuc and Pammett reported that 60% of those 
who voted No opposed the idea of granting more powers to the provinces (1995, 17).  
The package put to voters ceded to the provinces additional powers over all of the above 
subjects, plus regional development (Governments of Canada 1992c, 16-21).  
The results for the other two proposals are not consistent.  Assembly delegates 
“strongly agreed that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have the right to self-
government”, and “enthusiastically endorsed” entrenchment of that right (Government 
of Canada 1992, T11, V8).  A majority of people who contributed to the Spicer 
Commission’s inquiries also supported Aboriginal self-government (Spicer Commission 
                                                 
29
 Figures are approximate because the authors presented their results as histograms, not values. 
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1991a, 6).  According to LeDuc and Pammett, however, 66% of voters who voted No at 
the plebiscite disagreed with the proposal for Aboriginal self-government (1995, 17).   
Finally, assembly delegates and voters reacted differently to the proposal to 
recognise Québec as a distinct society.  The official report said that delegates at Toronto 
“agreed very strongly that Quebec should be recognized as a ‘Distinct Society’”, and 
that delegates agreed to both the distinct society and linguistic duality provisions, even 
though they did not like the way they were expressed (Government of Canada 1992, T8-
9, T15).  At Vancouver, delegates “enthusiastically reaffirmed the endorsement [at the 
Toronto assembly] of distinct society for Quebec” (Government of Canada 1992, V7).  
This does not compare well with LeDuc and Pammett’s conclusion that 72% of voters 
who opposed the Accord did not agree with the proposal to recognise Québec as a 
distinct society (1995, 17).  Nor does it compare well with a poll conducted by 
Environics late in 1996, which found that 52% outside Québec still opposed entrenching 
recognition of Québec as a distinct society (in Resnick 1997, 114-115).  There is, 
however, some doubt about whether the Toronto delegates supported the distinct society 
provisions “very strongly”.  Maser and Bryden (1992) wrote that delegates did agree to 
the distinct society clause, but “the endorsement was more apparent than real” because 
some delegates doubted it would satisfy Québec, some felt it went too far, some from 
Québec said it was a “hollow gesture”, and delegates from Québec and elsewhere 
disagreed with how distinct society was defined.  Christian Dufour, a politics academic 
at Laval University, said in a contemporaneous interview:  “There’s a complete 
breakdown … [delegates from Québec and elsewhere] aren’t speaking the same 
language” (as quoted by Maser and Brydon 1992).    
The Spicer Commission summarised contributions on the subject of Québec as a 
distinct society as follows. 
Forum participants are very often quite willing to recognize Quebec’s cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness;  what they cannot accept is that the provincial government of Quebec should have 
special powers deriving from this cultural distinctiveness that would have the effect of creating two 
different definitions of the rights and obligations of Canadian citizenship. … Although a minority 
would be willing to extend special treatment to Quebec to keep the province in confederation, even 
most of those Participants outside Quebec who recognize the province’s distinct society strongly 
believe that its distinctiveness must be protected within a fair and equal confederation or Quebec 
must be left to pursue its destiny alone (Spicer Commission 1991e, 12). 
 
The commission also reported that outside Québec, contributors were not happy to see 
powers devolved from the federal tier to Québec (Spicer Commission 1991e, 13).  
These results are at odds with the outcomes for the assemblies, which supported 
recognition of Québec as a distinct society, devolution of powers to Québec but not to 
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other provinces, and “restoration of Quebec’s veto on institutional change”.  
Even though there is a patchwork of agreements and disagreements between 
conference delegates and voters, there is enough evidence to reach a conclusion.  All of 
the first ministers supported all of the proposals put to voters, but a sizeable portion of 
assembly delegates and voters opposed the proposals for an equal senate, and 
transferring powers to the provinces.  These differences are sufficient, and the subjects 
are sufficiently important, to justify the conclusion that assembly delegates were more 
representative of voters’ constitutional preferences than were the first ministers.   
In brief, the assemblies were more representative of all variables for which data 
are available – place of residence, gender, and constitutional preferences. 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
The turnout rate for the October 1992 plebiscite indicates that public interest in the 
Charlottetown proposals was comparatively high.  This was the third federal plebiscite 
held since federation.  On 29 September 1898, 45% of registered electors turned out to 
cast their votes for or against the prohibition of alcohol.  Even though a slim majority 
voted Yes (51.3%), and Québec was the only province where a majority was recorded 
for No, the federal government did not impose prohibition (Boyer 1982, 51-52).  On 27 
April 1942, the Liberal government asked voters whether they agreed it could impose 
conscription, despite its promise not to do so in the 1940 election campaign;  71.3% 
turned out, the result was 64% Yes, and conscription was introduced about two years 
later (Boyer 1982, 55-56, 60).  The turnout rate for the Charlottetown plebiscite on 26 
October 1992 was 75% – the highest turnout to date, and 5-13% higher than it was for 
the five federal elections held since 1992 (figure 6.4).   
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Figure 6.4:  Voter turnout for federal elections and plebiscites, 1867-2006 
(Source:  Elections Canada 2007) 
 
These data support the idea that interest in the Charlottetown amendment was high, 
especially since Canadians are not required to attend the polls for plebiscites or 
elections.  It is not possible, however, to attribute this interest to the assemblies directly. 
Polls indicated that most Canadians said they were informed on the Charlottetown 
Accord.  A Gallup poll in May 1990 (just before the Meech Lake Accord lapsed) 
reported that 45% of respondents felt “Quite or Fairly well informed” about the package. 
When Environics put a similar question on 15 October 1992, 55% said they felt “very 
informed or somewhat informed” about the Charlottetown plebiscite (Henry 1993, 11).  
This is a commendable result for awareness, but it does not indicate interest.  
For the Australian case, data were compared for the number of submissions made 
to the assembly and inquiries, and attendance at public sessions.  This is not possible for 
the Canadian case because sources found for this thesis do not say whether the 
assemblies or the first ministers’ meetings invited or received submissions.   
Only one of the five assembly reports gave a figure for the number of people who 
attended the sessions, as follows.     
A description of the mood and dynamics of the [Calgary] Conference would not be complete 
without a mention of the 439 visitors who registered at the door to observe the proceedings in 
person.  They sat around the edges of the room in every workshop, jammed the back of the hall in 
every plenary session, and mingled with the participants at the refreshment breaks to share their 
impressions and register their concerns.  In total, they outnumbered the official conference 
participants, their presence testifying to their interest in the subject and their non-disruptive 
behaviour a symbol of the civility of the nation that we are trying to preserve (Government of 
Canada 1992, C2). 
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Peter Harrison wrote that “over 200” visitors attended the final Vancouver conference 
(1992, 24).  Neither report indicated whether the number stated was the number of 
visitors per day, or the number of visitors for the entire conference.  If the number cited 
for Calgary was a total figure, then the average daily figure would be 146, and the 
Calgary report would not then say that visitors “outnumber[ed]” the 256 delegates.  
Figures cited in the Calgary report and Harrison are therefore taken to be daily figures. 
There is no record of the number of visitors who attended the Halifax, Montreal, 
and Toronto assemblies, but these can be estimated from data for Vancouver and 
Calgary.  The population of the city where the assemblies were held would have a strong 
bearing on attendance because the larger the city, the more people there would be who 
could attend the assembly at a relatively low cost.  For Calgary and Vancouver, table 6.5 
below shows the metropolitan population, actual visitor numbers (in bold type), and 
visitor numbers per million of population for that city.  The table also shows an estimate 
of visitor numbers for Halifax, Montreal, and Toronto, which was calculated by 
multiplying the mid-point attendance for Calgary and Vancouver (266) by the 
population for those three cities.  This yields on average a daily attendance figure of 604 
for all assemblies.   
Table 6.5:  Estimate of visitors attending the assemblies 
 
Attendance 
 
Population 
(millions)  
Per day 
Per million 
population 
Halifax 0.3738 100 266 
Calgary 1.0020 439 438 
Montreal 3.5471 945 266 
Toronto 5.0204 1338 266 
Vancouver 2.1113 200 95 
   
 
 
Total 12.0546 3021 
 
Average 2.4109 604 251 
Average except Montreal & Toronto 1.1624 246 229 
    
 
 
(Sources:  Calgary, Government of Canada 1992, C2;  Vancouver, Harrison 1992, 24;  population, 
Statistics Canada 2007) 
 
Many factors other than population could affect attendance, such as the 
remoteness of a city, how convenient the assembly location was within a city, the 
subjects discussed at each assembly, and even expectations about the weather.  
Geographic remoteness could explain, for example, why the per capita attendance figure 
for Vancouver (on the east coast) and Halifax (on the west coast) were so much lower 
than they were for Calgary.  By contrast, the figures for Montreal and Toronto are so 
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high, it seems that an adjustment is necessary.  Surely if attendance was this high, the 
reports would mention it.  Further, how could organisers accommodate so many 
visitors?  The first point is stronger than the second, however, because the Australian 
assembly accommodated more than 300 visitors per hour.   
Whatever the attendance figures were for the assemblies, it would necessarily 
exceed attendance at first ministers’ meetings because those meetings are not open to 
the public.  That leaves open the broader question of whether other parliamentary 
enquiries into the constitution generated more or less interest.   
The Spicer Commission certainly stimulated extremely high levels of public 
participation (as outlined earlier in this chapter), but this inquiry is a not a suitable 
comparison because the commissioners were not parliamentarians.  Moreover, the forms 
of public participation used by Spicer are not comparable to attendance at the 
assemblies.  For example, 75,069 callers rang the commission’s 1-800 telephone 
service, but relatively little effort is required to participate in this way, compared to 
attending hearings in person.  Fortunately, the federal government also convened two 
inquiries that are suitable for present purposes.  All of the members of the Beaudoin-
Edwards and Beaudoin-Dobbie special joint committees were federal parliamentarians, 
and both committees inquired into relevant constitutional reforms.     
The Beaudoin-Edwards SJC held public hearings in 20 cities and towns across the 
nation from 19 February to 30 April 1991, heard 209 witnesses, and received more than 
500 submissions (Beaudoin-Edwards SJC 1991, 9-10).  The Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 
convened public hearings from 25 September 1991 to 11 February 1992 (Pal and Seidle 
1993, 181).  Over a period of about 227 hours, the committee heard more than 700 
witnesses at 78 public meetings, and received almost 2,000 submissions (Beaudoin-
Dobbie SJC 1992, 3).  The Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC was twice as long as the Beaudoin-
Edwards SJC, and it heard more than three times the number of witnesses, and received 
four times the number of submissions.  This is not surprising, given that its brief was 
wider:  the Beaudoin-Edwards SJC reviewed the process of amending the constitution, 
while the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC reviewed federal proposals to amend the constitution, 
including the amendment formula. 
Unfortunately, neither the official SJC reports, nor any other source found for this 
thesis reported how many people attended the hearings conducted by these committees.  
It seems that in Canada, like Australia, it is not customary to record audience numbers 
for parliamentary inquiries.  It is possible nevertheless to estimate the attendance figures 
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these committees would need to achieve to exceed attendance figures for the 
conferences.  If both committees convened hearings for one-quarter of the time set aside 
for hearings (Pal and Seidle 1993, 181), then the Beaudoin-Edwards SJC allocated 18 
days to hearings, and the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC allocated 35 days to hearings.  Looking 
back to the previous paragraph, the estimate for the Beaudoin-Edwards SJC looks to be 
about right because the report said it convened hearings in 20 cities and towns.   
To exceed the attendance figures for the conferences (excluding assembly figures 
for Montreal and Toronto altogether because they may be high), the Beaudoin-Edwards 
SJC and the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC hearings would need to attract more than 229 
visitors per day and a total of more than 4,216 and 8,022 visitors respectively.  This is 
exceedingly unlikely.  As explained earlier in this chapter, the federal government 
initiated the assemblies because it feared the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC would not fulfil its 
brief, in part because public interest in its work was limited.  No one attended its hearing 
in Manitoba, and the commentaries cited earlier reported that interest in the hearings on 
Prince Edward Island and in Ontario was also very low.  As already noted, the 
Beaudoin-Edwards SJC was less popular than the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, as measured 
by the number of witnesses heard and submissions received. 
Available evidence allows the conclusion that the Canadian assemblies generated 
more pubic interest – as demonstrated by attendance at public sessions – than did 
inquiries where parliamentarians convened alone.   
CONSENSUS  
The authors reviewed in the second chapter disagreed about whether assemblies 
were superior to parliamentarians in their ability to achieve consensus.  That question is 
answered here using a detailed analysis of agreements reached by first ministers, the 
Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, and the assemblies, which is included as table 6.7 at the end of 
this chapter.  
It seems obvious to conclude that first ministers were better able to reach 
consensus because they were unanimous in their support of all 35 proposals in the draft 
legal text (Governments of Canada 1992c).  A close reading of the Accord of 28 August 
shows, however, that the first ministers did not reach agreement on a further 11 
proposals to: 
1. entrench a common market clause in s121; 
2. allow Aboriginal peoples to participate in the selection of Supreme Court judges, 
and make submissions to the court on Aboriginal issues; 
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3. reserve house of commons seats for Aboriginal peoples; 
4. constrain federal spending in areas where provinces exercise exclusive powers; 
5. delay the justiciability of Aboriginal self-government for five years; 
6. rationalise the division of powers for drug prosecutions, wildlife conservation and 
protection, transport of dangerous goods, soil and water conservation, ferries, small 
craft harbours, financial sector regulation, unfair trade practices, and inspection 
programs; 
7. require notice to amend federal legislation for Established Programs Financing; 
8. entrench a consultation process for international treaties and agreements; 
9. entrench participation of Aboriginal peoples in first ministers’ conferences or 
intergovernment agreements on the division of powers; 
10. provide for senate by-elections;  and 
11. specify federal powers over national labour market training, or “a framework for 
compensation issues” (Governments of Canada 1992b, 6, 11-12, 15, 20, 27- 28). 
With the exception of providing for senate by-elections (item 10 above), all of these 
disagreements are about empowering Aboriginal peoples (items 2, 3, 5, and 9 above), or 
the federal/provincial division of powers (items 1, 4, 6-8, and 11 above). 
The Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC fared better, as its members were unable to agree on 
just five proposals: 
1. raising the threshold for the notwithstanding clause; 
2. entrenching the right to privacy; 
3. how to allocate senate seats across the provinces and territories; 
4. how to alter the formula for amending the constitution;  and 
5. how to provide for the formation of new provinces from territories in the amending 
formula (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, pages 36, 37, 51, 94, and 95 respectively). 
These disagreements are doubly noteworthy because most SJC members represented the 
government which proposed the amendments. The political composition of the 
committee was 16 Progressive Conservative, nine Liberal, three NDP, and two 
Conservative (Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 1; Parliament of Canada 2006b). 
The five assemblies were also unable to agree on five proposals, including two 
that are listed above for the SJC: 
1. entrenching a social charter, though they agreed there should be one; 
2. repealing the federal declaratory power; 
3. allocating senate seats across the provinces and territories; 
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4. altering the formula for amending the constitution;  and 
5. entrenching a common market clause (Government of Canada 1992, pages V13-14, 
H15, C10 and V10, C4, and M7 respectively). 
Neither the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC nor the assemblies were able to agree about the 
distribution of senate seats, and the rules for amending the constitution.  It should be 
noted that the SJC had a much longer time in which it could debate the proposals.  Most 
assembly delegates had the opportunity to discuss the proposals for about three days, 
and delegates selected to attend the final conference could do so for about six days.  The 
Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC convened for three months, and the first ministers convened over 
a period of about five months.   
Statistical analysis of all outcomes for the three groups shows that the assemblies 
were better able to reach consensus, by a margin of just 0.7% (table 6.6 below). 
Table 6.6:  Consensus for the assemblies, SJC, and first ministers 
 
 Assemblies SJC First ministers 
Number of proposals considered 44.0 46.0 64.0 
- Number approved 27.5 31.5 49.5 
- Number rejected 12.0 9.5 4.5 
- Number not agreed 4.5 5.0 10.0 
    
Consensus (approved plus rejected) 39.5 41.0 54.0 
    
Consensus % 89.8% 89.1% 84.4% 
 
(Sources:  analysis of Government of Canada 1992; Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992; Governments of 
Canada 1992b; Governments of Canada 1992c) 
 
Note:  tallies are fractional when groups resolved part of a proposal differently, for example split 
results for Aboriginal self-government and delaying justiciability in federal proposal #4. 
 
While it may appear that this result is ‘too close to call’, consideration of the special 
advantages afforded to the first ministers and the SJC dictate otherwise. 
 The political composition of the SJC inflates its score.  It made recommendations 
based on majority agreement, and a majority of its members were parliamentarians who 
represented the governing party.  The report noted minority dissent by non-government 
members on five proposals, but this was not enough to change a majority resolution 
(Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992, 35, 36, 37, 54-55, 74). 
There was no party majority to help the first ministers reach consensus.  To the 
contrary, the political composition of the first ministers’ group was four Progressive 
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Conservative, four Liberal, four NDP, and one independent.30  The consensus figure for 
the first ministers is inflated, nevertheless, by their agreement on nine matters that were 
not put to the assemblies: 
• broaden construction of the name Canada to mean “Canada as constituted under the 
Constitution of Canada”;  
• change the phrase “an Upper House styled the Senate” to “the Senate” in s.17; 
• simplify the expression of the Governor General’s power to summon senators; 
• define senate sitting day to mean a day on which the house sits; 
• use gender-neutral language when referring to the governor general and royal assent; 
• modernise provisions for royal assent to bills; 
• capitalise the word Aboriginal; 
• broaden the definition of the Canadian constitution to include “any other amendment 
to the Constitution of Canada”;  and 
• broaden the definition of constitution acts to include “any amendments thereto” 
(Governments of Canada 1992c, provisions number 2, 3, 4, 6, 28, 34, and 35). 
None of these amendments is controversial, so it is exceedingly likely that the 
assemblies would have approved them, given the chance.  This would increase the 
consensus score for the assemblies. 
The advantages afforded to first ministers and the SJC in reaching agreements 
strengthens the conclusion that the assemblies were better able to reach consensus about 
constitutional change than were parliamentarians convening alone. 
PARTISANSHIP 
The question of whether constituent assemblies are less partisan was answered for 
the Australian case by examining how frequently assembly delegates and 
parliamentarians changed their expressed preferences when they voted at the assembly.  
Unfortunately, there are no equivalent records for the Canadian assemblies, the 
Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, or the first ministers’ meetings. 
The co-convenor at Calgary wrote that 63% of the delegates at Halifax changed 
their minds during the course of the debates (Government of Canada 1992, C16), and 
Beltrame (1992) claimed that no ex-officio or expert delegate who spoke on the last day 
said they had changed their views.  While this scant evidence might suggest that non-
parliamentarians were more likely to change their views, it is insufficient grounds on 
                                                 
30
 The independent was the first minister of the Northwest Territories.  All NWT legislators were 
independent because the legislature used a consensus system (Legislative Assembly of the Northwest 
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which to reach a conclusion on the question of partisanship. 
DISCUSSION 
The high consensus scores for the assemblies, the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, and the 
first ministers suggest there the three groups were largely in agreement.  A comparative 
reading of outcomes across table 6.7 (at the end of this chapter) shows that the three 
groups did agree to these ten amendments:   
• recognise Québec is a distinct society; 
• recognise Canada’s linguistic duality; 
• entrench Aboriginal self-government, consult Aboriginals about constitutional 
change that affects them, and guarantee representation of Aboriginals in the senate;  
• entrench a Canada Clause;  
• legislation for language and culture matters does not pass the senate unless a 
majority of Francophone senators approves it;  
• new supreme court judges are appointed from among provincial nominees, and three 
of the nine judges are from Québec;  and 
• entrench annual first ministers’ conferences and enforcement of intergovernment 
agreements. 
The assemblies and the SJC did not approve the following six proposals, and the first 
ministers abandoned them: 
• entrench property rights; 
• raise the threshold for invoking the notwithstanding clause; 
• form a new Council of the Federation (the SJC made no comment); 
• require that the Bank of Canada act to preserve price stability; 
• change the provision for residual powers;  and 
• provide for legislative inter-delegation between governments. 
First ministers were responsive also in adopting four new proposals that were initiated 
by the assemblies, and supported by the SJC:   
• entrench gender equality rights for Aboriginals;   
• consider the formation of new provinces in the amending formula;   
• entrench a social charter;  and  
• devolve powers over regional development, by inter-government agreement. 
This means that the assemblies, first ministers, and the SJC agreed on 20 subjects. 
 
Territories 2006, 1). 
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By contrast, the first ministers ignored three recommendations made by the 
assemblies and the SJC to:  choose senators by direct election;  hold house and senate 
elections separately;  and consider population distribution when allocating senate seats 
to the provinces.  The first ministers also ignored the assemblies’ acceptance of the 
federal proposal for the senate to have an absolute veto over ordinary legislation. 
The first ministers were responsive to the preferences expressed by the assemblies 
and the SJC in that they acted against just four of 24 recommendations.  Once again, 
however, this purely quantitative analysis is misleading because it does not consider the 
relative importance of each proposal, or interrelationships between the proposals. 
The triple-E senate (elected, equal, and effective) became a single-E senate (equal) 
in the course of the first minister’s negotiations.  Ironically, the one feature retained in 
the first ministers’ agreement – equal representation of the provinces in the senate – was 
the feature opposed by the assemblies and the SJC.   
The federal government initially proposed a “directly elected Senate” 
(Government of Canada 1991, 17), and the assemblies and the SJC supported that 
proposal unequivocally (Government of Canada 1992, C7, V9; Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 
1992, 45).  However, the first ministers agreed only that the federal parliament “may 
provide for all matters relating to the election of senators”, and that provincial 
legislatures “may provide for the indirect election of senators … and all matters relating 
thereto” (Governments of Canada 1992c, 3, emphasis added).  As all provincial 
legislatures are unicameral, this meant that provincial governments, rather than the 
federal government, could appoint senators. 
The government proposed that the senate have an absolute veto over “ordinary 
bills” (Government of Canada 1991, 20), and the assemblies supported that proposal 
unequivocally (Government of Canada 1992, C8, V9), but a majority of the SJC agreed 
that the senate should have a 180-day veto only (Liberals dissenting).  The first 
ministers’ accord proposed that the senate would have an absolute veto over three types 
of bills, being bills that:  “contain provisions that would result in fundamental tax policy 
changes that are directly related to natural resources or electrical energy”;  “materially 
affect the French language or culture in Canada”;  or “amend[s] the Constitution of 
Canada in relation to the Senate or the House of Commons” (Governments of Canada 
1992c, 10, 11, and 7 respectively).  Reconciliation committees, and a simple majority 
vote of joint sittings, would resolve deadlocks on all other legislation (Governments of 
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Canada 1992c, 6-8).31  Such joint sittings would favour the government and the house 
because the first ministers also agreed to increase the size of the house from 295 to 337 
seats (and 345 in 1996), and to reduce the size of the senate from 112 to 62 seats 
(Governments of Canada 1992c, 3, 31).  This raises the house share of a joint sitting 
from 72.5% to 84.5%, which means that a government could override a senate veto with 
a 5% majority in the house, and just 23% of the senate seats.  The proposals to change 
the size of the house and the senate were not put to the assemblies or the SJC.   
The senate’s effectiveness was thus symbolic only.  The triple-E senate would be 
equal, but it would not be elected or effective.  As noted earlier, voter dissatisfaction 
with the first ministers’ proposals for senate reform was a major factor in their decision 
to vote No to the accord.  
                                                 
31
 Since 1982, the senate has had an absolute veto over changing provisions for the senate or house that 
are not mentioned elsewhere in the amendment rules (1982 constitution, s.44, 47).  On appropriation and 
tax bills, since 1867 the constitution has provided that such bills become law if the governor general 
recommends them, and the house then passes them by a majority vote (1867 constitution ss 53-57).   
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CONCLUSIONS 
The assemblies were more representative of constituents’ constitutional 
preferences than were the first ministers or the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, and the 
assemblies were more representative of constituents for place of residence and gender.  
Further, the assemblies generated more public interest, and they were better able to 
reach consensus on the proposals put to them.  The thesis question about whether the 
assemblies were less partisan is not answered, for want of sufficient evidence. 
Content was one of the main reasons voters did not support the Charlottetown 
Accord.  The assemblies, the Beaudoin-Edwards SJC, and members of the public who 
made submissions to hearings raised similar objections to the proposed amendments, 
but governments were unresponsive.  The broad questions about whether governments 
should be responsive to constituents, and how responsive they should be, are hotly 
contested.  Arguments for and against more responsive government are similar to 
arguments for and against constituent assemblies.   
About five months after the Meech Lake Accord lapsed – at a time when calls for 
more public participation and more responsive government were strong – about 50 
academics and commentators convened at Toronto to discuss how Canada’s 
constitutional debates could be resolved.  Richard Simeon opened the conference with 
these words:  “We must consider all options.  We must break the mould.  We must seek 
new ways of identifying issues and new language for discussing them” (1991, 1).  A 
“brain-storming session” titled “The Political Dynamics of Future Constitutional 
Discussion” debated public participation in constitutional debates (PP), and the need for 
responsive government.  A précis of key points made in the transcript of discussion is 
set out below.  The speaker sequence was changed to draw themes together, and the tag 
“cf.” is used to highlight arguments against public participation.   
• Public participation (PP) will not diminish politicians’ roles (Brock) 
• cf. Government “has the moral responsibility to speak for Canada or resign” (Laidler) 
• cf.  “When did parliamentary democracy become such a defective alternative to plebiscites?” (Dupré) 
• PP needs to occur before first ministers reach agreement (Bredt) 
• cf. Politicians control the process;  hearings “are stage shows” (Côte) 
• cf. Need “at least a public perception of broad participation” (Monahan)  
• PP is democracy, politicians should not refuse to change their proposals (Breton);   
• Politicians need to explain and justify their proposals, and show they listened (Brock, Crispo) 
• cf. We can ignore the “higher volume of discord” in constitutional debates (Watson). 
• cf. More PP will “overload” the agenda (Gibbins)  
 
• There is a “profound legitimacy crisis”, in Canada and elsewhere (Whitaker) 
• PP can add legitimacy (Pritchard, Meekison, Whitaker) 
• cf. PP will “give legitimacy to darker voices” (Gibbins) 
 
• Constitutional change via executive federalism is no longer acceptable (Dupré, Hartle, Schwartz) 
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• cf. Negotiations must be conducted in private (Crispo)   
• Need something more responsive than representative government (Greschner);  a “more democratic 
process of representation” (Whitaker) 
• Need a legislative “nonconstitutional constituent assembly” to tell Québec what ROC wants (Scott) 
• Need an “elected constituent assembly” of legislators and local government (Hartle) 
• “We still do not seem to have a sense of how to forge a consensus” (Abrams). 
 
Participants agreed that Canada needed something more than executive federalism, and 
that public participation in constitutional debates was higher now and would remain 
high, but they disagreed about whether public participation was desirable, and whether it 
could be accommodated safely.  For some speakers, public participation could add 
legitimacy, but to achieve that, parliamentarians needed to engage in a dialogue with 
constituents about their proposals.  For others, public participation threatened the 
institutions of representative government unnecessarily, it could “overload” the agenda, 
and it could “give legitimacy to darker voices”.  For one speaker, the louder public 
voices could be safely ignored, and for another, demand for public participation could 
be satisfied by “a public perception of broad participation” (emphasis added).  
Suggestions on ways to improve the chance of achieving formal constitutional 
change in future included a “nonconstitutional constituent assembly”, a constituent 
assembly whose members would represent the legislatures and local government, and 
convening hearings before the first ministers reached agreement about constitutional 
change.  There was no agreement on what process should be adopted, or whether 
governments needed to be more responsive.
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Table 6.7:  Agreements reached by assemblies, SJC, and first ministers 
 
Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
IDENTITY, RIGHTS, AND VALUES 
Property rights:  guarantee 
property rights (proposal #1.1). 
“[O]verwhelmingly rejected” (T15). Government members agreed, 
opposition members dissented (35). 
Agreed “not to pursue” (Accord, 27). 
Notwithstanding clause (s33): 
 raise threshold for invoking it 
from majority to 60% (#1.2). 
“Majority” favoured the clause, but “many” 
thought increasing the threshold would make 
little difference to “preventing abuse” (T17). 
Recommended postponing discussion 
of this issue.  NDP members agreed at 
least s15(1) should be exempt (36). 
Agreed “not to pursue” (Accord, 27). 
Québec & linguistic duality: 
amend Charter to recognise 
Québec as a distinct society, and 
interpret Charter to preserve 
linguistic duality (#2.1). 
“[A] general will” to recognise Québec’s 
differences (H10).  “Agreed very strongly” on 
linguistic duality clause (T8).  
[E]nthusiastically reaffirmed the endorsement 
of distinct society for Quebec” (V7-8). 
Recommended amending the Charter to 
recognise Québec as a distinct society, 
and linguistic duality (26). 
Agreed to include in the Canada clause recognition of 
Québec as a distinct society with a French-speaking 
majority, and official language minority communities 
throughout Canada (Text #1). 
Aboriginal self-government:  
entrench the right to Aboriginal 
self-government in the Charter, 
enforceable in 10 years (#4). 
“[S]trongly agreed that the Aboriginal peoples 
of Canada have the right to self-government” 
(T11).  “Enthusiastically endorsed” 
entrenchment;  “overwhelming commitment to 
the principle” (V8). 
Recommended entrenchment of 
“inherent right of aboriginal peoples to 
self-government” and “a transition 
process”, but not delay justiciability 
(28-31). 
Agreed to entrench the “inherent right of self-
government within Canada” (Text #18,29). 
Did not agree about whether to delay justiciability for 
five years (Accord, 20). 
Consultation with Aboriginals 
peoples:  include Aboriginal 
peoples in current constitutional 
negotiations and entrench 
provisions for future 
consultations (#3,5). 
“[O]verwhelming commitment … to a 
process” for achieving Aboriginal self-
government (V8). 
Agreed Aboriginal peoples should be 
included in future constitutional 
discussions that directly affect them, 
and a conference on Aboriginal issues 
should be convened two years after 
self-government is entrenched (32-33). 
Agreed to entrench consultation with Aboriginals, 
and to hold four conferences on Aboriginal issues, the 
first by 1996 (Text #29).  Did not agree on 
entrenching their participation in first ministers’ 
conferences or intergovernment agreements re the 
division of powers (Accord, 28).   
      Agreed the Charter and notwithstanding clause 
applies to Aboriginal legislatures (Text #26,27). 
  “Generally endorsed” application of the 
Charter to Aboriginal governments (V8). 
Agreed gender equality rights should 
apply to Aboriginal peoples (31). 
Agreed to entrench equal rights for Aboriginal men 
and women (Text #29). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
      Agreed to entrench protection of Aboriginal 
“languages, cultures or traditions” (Text #25). 
    Agreed land rights should extend to the 
Métis, and a “small bureau” should 
administer treaty obligations, fiduciary 
and trust responsibilities (31-32). 
Agreed federal powers over Aboriginal lands to 
include all Aboriginals, and “Indians” should read 
“all the Aboriginal peoples of Canada” (Text #8). 
Canada Clause:  entrench a 
statement of national values 
(#7). 
Agreed there should be a Canada clause;  “a 
majority felt strongly ... [it] should ‘have 
teeth’ … [with] specific protections and 
rights” (T7), and it should be “brief and 
inspirational” (V14). 
Agreed there should be a Canada 
clause which recognises the 
contribution of Aboriginal peoples, 
their cultures, rights, and 
responsibilities (23,34).   
Agreed to a judiciable Canada clause, including 
recognition of Québec as a “distinct society”, 
Aboriginal peoples (not their contributions), and 
protections and rights for all Canadians (Text #1). 
    “Some government members” agreed 
right to privacy should be entrenched; 
 opposition members disagreed (37). 
  
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
House of Commons:  allow 
MPs more free votes, and have 
fewer votes of confidence (#8). 
“Strong support” for more free votes;  votes of 
confidence not mentioned (C3).   
Agreed that this topic should be 
pursued in the house, not by formal 
constitutional change (40). 
  
  Wanted reform of question time, and a less 
adversarial parliament (C3). 
    
      Agreed to guarantee Québec 25% of the house seats, 
and allocate other seats by population.  Under the 
new rules no province has fewer seats than it did on 
17 April 1982, none loses more than one seat or has 
fewer seats than a less populous province.  Territory 
allocations do not reduce (Text #5). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
      Agreed to increase house to 337 seats, and add 8 
seats after the 1996 census (Text #19).   
Did not reach agreement on representation of 
Aboriginals in the house (Accord, 12). 
Senate:  directly elected;  
special joint committee to 
consider senate reforms in detail 
(#9.1,10). 
“Virtually unanimous in recommending a 
reformed senate” (C8);  “overwhelmingly 
preferred … direct election” (C7);  senate 
“must be elected, effective and fully 
representative of Canadian society” (V9).   
Agreed the senate should be directly 
elected (45).   
Agreed to an elected senate;  parliament to decide 
election methods;  and provinces may elect senators 
indirectly, set gender quotas, and decide electoral 
boundaries (Text #4).  Did not agree on provisions 
for by-elections (Accord, 28).   
Simultaneous house/senate 
elections (#9.2). 
“[S]trong preference” of about 90% for stand-
alone senate elections;  strong preference for 
fixed terms (C8). 
Opposed (48). Agreed to simultaneous house/senate elections (Text 
#4,20). 
Senate with “much more 
equitable provincial and 
territorial representation”  
(#9.3). 
“Supported greater [but not equal] 
representation for provinces with small 
populations”.  No agreement on distribution of 
seats (C10, V10). 
Agreed the distribution of seats should 
be “equitable” (not equal).  Provided 
two options for seat distribution (51). 
Agreed to a smaller senate of 62 members 
(6/province, 1/territory) plus an undetermined 
number of Aboriginal senators (Text #4). 
Guaranteed representation of 
Aboriginals in senate (#6,9.6). 
Agreed there should be quotas for Aboriginal 
peoples (C14,V10). 
Agreed to quotas for Aboriginal 
peoples, if they desire it (33,52). 
Agreed to provide an unspecified number of seats for 
Aboriginal peoples (Text #4). 
Federal legislation requires 
majority approval of both 
houses (#9.4), except:   
Agreed (C8,V9);  see further under #9.4.3 
below. 
Agreed senate should have a 180-day 
suspensive veto over “normal bills”, 
then house can override deadlocks.  
Liberals for an absolute veto (54-55). 
Agreed to resolve deadlocks on ordinary bills by 
“reconciliation committees”, and simple majority 
votes at joint sittings.  Both houses must approve bills 
that amend constitutional provisions for the house or 
senate (Text #4). 
(a) double majority for passage 
of “language and culture” 
matters in the senate (#9.4.1). 
Eight 8 of 15 groups supported a double 
majority for language and culture matters;  no 
group opposed it (C9). 
Agreed to a double majority 
requirement for language and culture 
matters (57). 
Agreed (Text #4). 
(b) for matters of national 
importance, six-month 
suspensive veto only (#9.4.2). 
“Opposed” (C10, V9). Opposed;  favoured a house override 
with a special majority (54). 
Agreed to a senate veto on natural resources tax 
policy (Text #4). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
(c) no powers to legislate for 
appropriation or borrowing 
(#9.4.3). 
“Generally” wanted a more a powerful senate 
that could not defeat the government with a 
confidence vote.  2 workshops wanted an 
absolute veto, 4 wanted an absolute veto for 
ordinary bills, 1 wanted a special majority, 
and 1 supported the federal proposal (C8-9). 
Agreed the senate should have a 30-day 
suspensive veto over supply bills (56). 
Agreed the senate would have only a 30-day 
suspensive veto over money bills (Text #4). 
Senate continues to conduct 
special inquiries (#9.5). 
Not mentioned in reports. Not mentioned in report. Not mentioned in Accord or Text. 
Senate ratifies appointments to 
certain regulatory boards and 
agencies (#11). 
Not mentioned in reports except for 
appointment of the Reserve Bank’s governor 
(see proposal #17 below). 
Agreed the senate should be able to 
ratify appointments to the Bank of 
Canada and other agencies (58). 
Agreed the parliament can provide that any 
appointment is subject to senate approval (Text #4). 
  Vancouver delegates, and 12 of 15 Calgary 
groups, opposed quotas for women and 
minorities other than Aboriginals (V10, C14). 
  
    
  “Clear support” for PR & MMC with STV 
(not lists);  no support for FPTP (C8).  
“Preferred” election methods are PR and 
STV, not party lists or FPTP (V10). 
Agreed senators should be elected with 
a PR electoral system and multi-
member constituencies (46-47). 
[Election method to be determined by federal and 
provincial legislatures under federal proposal #9.1 
above.] 
  “[S]trong preference” for 6-8 year terms, 
half-senate elections every 3-4 years (C8). 
Agreed senators should serve a fixed 
term of up to six years (49). 
[This option excluded by agreement to simultaneous 
elections, federal proposal #9.2 above.] 
      Also agreed to: 
1. change the phrase “an Upper House styled the 
Senate” in s17 to “the Senate” (Text #3); 
2. reduce senate quorum from 15 to 10, and resolve 
tied votes by speaker’s vote [speaker votes now, 
and tied votes are negatived] (Text #4); 
3. simplify the expression of the Governor 
General’s power to summon senators (Text #4). 
4. define senate sitting day to mean a day on which 
the house sits (Text #4);  
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
5. federal ministers and house/assembly members 
may not be senators (Text #4); 
6. speaker is appointed by senate vote, not 
nomination by the governor general (Text #4); 
7. amend restrictions on passage of money bills in 
provincial legislatures (Text #7). 
Supreme Court:  (a) judges 
nominated by provinces and 
territories;  (b) three of the nine 
judges are from Québec (#12). 
(a) “Substantial support”, but “little interest” 
(C4). 
(b) “considerable support” (C4). 
Agreed to both proposals (60). Agreed to both proposals (Text #13-15).   
Did not agree on whether Aboriginal peoples can 
participate in this process, or make submissions to 
the court on Aboriginal issues (Accord, 11). 
Amending formula:  extend 
requirement for unanimity to 
provisions for the Supreme 
Court, the selection, 
composition and powers of the 
two houses of parliament, and   
compensate provinces that opt 
out of federal programs (#13). 
“[N]o broad interest and no general discussion 
of options, but support for a Quebec veto” 
over institutional change (C4). 
Suggested five options and urged first 
ministers to consider them.  Noted “it 
should be a matter of the highest 
priority during this round of 
constitutional negotiations to find an 
amending formula that meets the needs 
of Quebec” (94). 
Agreed to change the rules to:  compensate provinces 
when powers are transferred from some provinces to 
the federal tier;  require unanimous federal/provincial 
agreement to change provisions for the senate, house 
size relative to the senate, use of English and French 
languages, Supreme Court composition, forming new 
provinces, and changing the amending formula;   
require 7/50 agreements to alter how Supreme Court 
judges are selected, but not amendments that affect 
one province;  and exclude new provinces from this 
new formula (Text #32).  Both houses must approve 
changes to house or senate provisions (Text #4). 
    Agreed should not enact an 
amendment that affects Aboriginal 
peoples without their consent (32). 
Agreed Aboriginal peoples can propose amendments 
that directly affect them, which will not pass without 
“substantial consent” from them (Text #33).  
  “Some delegates were concerned that the 
existing amending formula unduly hampers 
the aspirations of the northern territories 
eventually to become provinces” (V9). 
Urged the government to consider the 
relationship between the amending 
formula and formation of new 
provinces from territories (95). 
Agreed the parliament can form new provinces in a 
territory if the territory’s legislature agrees (Text 
#21-22). 
  Constitution should include “restoration of 
Quebec’s veto on institutional change” (V7). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
Council of the Federation: 
entrench new federal/provincial 
body to coordinate policies, 
subject to 7/50 rule (#28). 
“Little support” (C5) Not mentioned in report. Not mentioned in Accord or Text. 
ECONOMIC UNION 
Common market clause:  
broaden s121provisions for free 
inter-provincial trade except as 
approved under 7/50 rule (#14). 
“There were those who strongly endorsed … 
Others strongly opposed … others … had 
questions and concerns about the scope of the 
proposal” (M7).   
Agreed the constitution should require 
governments to cooperate to achieve 
the free movement of people, goods, 
services, and capital  (88-89).  Replace 
s121 as suggested, with some 
exceptions, and entrench a dispute 
resolution mechanism (86-87).   
Did not reach agreement about entrenching a 
common market clause in s121 (Accord, 6). 
Agreed to include in s36(3)(b) provision for “the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital”  
(Text #31). 
Power to manage the 
economic union:  exclusive 
federal powers over “any matter 
that it declares to be for the 
efficient functioning of the 
economic union”, subject to 
7/50 rule.  Provinces may opt 
out for three years if 60% of its 
legislature agrees (#15). 
“Virtually unanimous rejection … few, if any 
… were prepared to grant ... an open-ended, 
general new power” (M10);  “Preservation of 
the Canadian political union” more important 
now (M3).  “Many … strongly supported the 
principle … many had serious misgivings … 
many sought, at the least, a clarification” 
(V12-13). 
  
  
“The need ... [for] a social charter ... arose 
repeatedly” (C12).  “Many participants 
agreed on the principle of a social charter 
(M16);  “no agreement” about whether 
protection of social programs should be 
entrenched (V13-14). 
Agreed the constitution should include 
provision for a “social covenant” to 
commit governments to:  provide 
health care, social services, welfare, 
and education;  maintain the “integrity 
of the environment”, full employment, 
and a “reasonable standard of living”; 
and allow collective bargaining in 
workplaces (87-88). 
Agreed to:  commit governments to provide specified 
public goods and services;  protect workers’ 
collective bargaining rights and the environment;  
entrench a commitment to “preservation and 
development of the Canadian social and economic 
union” and monitor achievement of it;  and provide 
“reasonably comparable economic infrastructure”, 
equalization payments, and consultation (Text #30-
31). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
Economic policies:  entrench   
a federal/ provincial process to 
harmonise fiscal policies with 
federal monetary policies (#16). 
“Almost unanimously held view” amendment 
not needed (M14).  “Much support” to 
entrench annual first ministers’ meetings, and 
enforcing intergovernment agreements (M12). 
Agreed an annual first ministers’ 
conference should be entrenched (90). 
Agreed to entrench:  an annual first ministers’ 
conference, and enforceable intergovernment 
agreements renewable every five years (Text #17,31). 
Bank of Canada:   
(a) bank required to preserve 
price stability 
(b) consult provinces and 
territories on board membership 
(c) senate to ratify appointment 
of the bank’s Governor (#17). 
(a) “opposed” (C4);  “with almost no 
exception the view was ... Bank’s mandate ... 
should be left broad” (M17) 
(b) “widespread support” (C4);  
(c) little “specific discussion” (C4). 
”Unequivocal answer” that these ideas should 
not be entrenched (M17). 
(a) Agreed the proposed mandate 
should not be entrenched (89). 
(b) Agreed on consultation (89). 
(c) Agreed under proposal #11 above. 
(a) Not mentioned in Accord or Text. 
(b) Not mentioned in Accord or Text. 
(c) Agreed to afford the senate a 30-day suspensive 
veto on the appointment of the Bank of Canada 
governor (Text #4). 
DIVISION OF POWERS 
Labour market training:  an 
exclusive provincial power 
(#18). 
Agreed:  provinces should have 
exclusive powers over labour market 
training on request;  federal funds 
should be allocated by need;  and 
federal tier should retain power over 
“unemployment insurance and any 
other head of power” (71). 
Agreed to grant to provinces power over labour 
market development and training, with federal power 
over unemployment insurance and federal labour 
programs (Text #9).   
Did not agree on federal powers over national policy 
(Accord, 15), or “a framework for compensation 
issues” (Accord, 28). 
Immigration:  provinces 
empowered to negotiate special 
agreements with the federal 
government (#19). 
Agreed (81). Agreed to entrench federal/provincial agreements on 
immigration and aliens, provided they are consistent 
with federal legislation and Charter, and  approved by 
federal and provincial parliaments (Text #12). 
Culture:  provinces empowered 
to negotiate agreements with the 
federal government (#20). 
Agreed that the government should 
reconsider this proposal, except as it 
applies to Québec (77-78). 
Agreed to grant provinces exclusive powers over 
culture, with federal power over national matters and 
grants (Text #10). 
Broadcasting: provincial role 
in licensing, broadcasting, and 
selecting CRTC commissioners 
(#21). 
At Halifax:  labour market training, “some 
support”, provided there were national 
standards (H13-14);  “general support for 
[immigration] proposal, but not to entrench it 
(H14);  “strong view that the proposal [for 
culture matters] was desirable for Quebec but 
not for other provinces” (H14);  “not much 
discussion ... and very little concern” about 
broadcasting powers (H14-15).   
The final conference “strongly and clearly 
reaffirmed the results of the Halifax 
conference” e.g., wider powers for Québec 
only.  “Broad agreement that at a minimum it 
would include labour force training, 
unemployment insurance, communications ... 
clear majority [resolved that there should be] 
national, collaboratively-set standards, strong 
central government, and powers uniquely 
exercised by Quebec” (V10-12). 
Agreed the government should 
reconsider this proposal, except as it 
applies to Québec (77,79). 
Agreed to entrench inter-government negotiation of 
agreements on telecommunications regulation (Text 
#10). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
Residual power:  exclusive 
federal power over national or 
emergency matters.  Provinces 
exercise the remaining residual 
powers (#22). 
Supported by “most”, but “a generally 
acknowledged uncertainty about the 
significance and implications of changes to 
this power” (H15). 
Agreed should not change residual 
power (84). 
Agreed not to pursue (Accord, 27). 
Declaratory power:  repeal 
federal power to declare 
provincial works are “for the 
general advantage” of Canada 
or other province/s (#23). 
“Little discussion”, “general lack of 
understanding about the significance and 
implications ... The strongest view ... seemed 
to be in favour of leaving it in the 
Constitution” (H15). 
Agreed to repeal the declaratory power 
(85). 
Agreed to provide that the federal government can 
make or rescind declarations with the explicit consent 
of the relevant provincial assembly (Text #9). 
Tourism, forestry, mining, 
recreation, housing, and 
municipal/urban affairs:  to be 
exclusive provincial powers 
(#24). 
“Limited support” (H16).  Strong view that 
there should be wider powers for Québec 
(V10-12). 
Agreed powers over tourism, forestry, 
mining, recreation, housing, and 
municipal/urban affairs should be 
devolved by bilateral agreement, with 
agreements enforced by proposal 27 
below (74). 
Agreed to grant to provinces these six areas as 
exclusive powers, with equality for territories (Text 
#11). 
Did not agree on a process for constraining federal 
spending in these areas (Accord, 15). 
Legislative delegation:  allow 
referral of powers between 
federal and provincial tiers by 
consent (#25). 
“Reaction was largely negative” (H16). Agreed that referral powers should be 
entrenched, but expressed some 
concerns (68). 
Agreed “not to pursue” (Accord, 27). 
Rationalize government 
powers over drug prosecutions, 
wildlife conservation and 
protection, transport of 
dangerous goods, soil and water 
conservation, ferries, small craft 
harbours, financial sector 
regulation, bankruptcy law, 
unfair trade practices, and 
inspection programs (#26). 
“Limited discussion … general support for the 
principle … of little concern” (H17,24). 
Agreed that powers over inland 
fisheries and personal bankruptcy 
should be concurrent.  Otherwise, 
federal/provincial governments should 
rationalise government services without 
resorting to formal constitutional 
change (66). 
Agreed not to pursue altering the division of powers 
for “personal bankruptcy and insolvency, intellectual 
property, interjurisdictional immunity, inland 
fisheries, marriage and divorce,  ... appointment of 
[provincial] judges, ... taxation of federal and 
provincial governments, ... export of natural 
resources, notice for changes to ... equalization 
payments, ... implementation of international 
treaties” (Accord, 27).  No comment on the other 
nine powers 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
Federal programs in exclusive 
provincial jurisdiction:  
entrench a commitment to not 
introduce new programs without 
7/50 approval, and provide 
opting out compensation (#27). 
“Appeared not to favour particular elements 
… a general acceptance of a need to retain the 
power of the federal government to spend 
money as necessary, there is also a concern 
that this power not be exercised arbitrarily” 
(H17,18). 
Agreed intergovernment agreements 
should be entrenched to add certainty 
and protection (69).  Agreed should 
entrench compensation, but not 
“blanket restrictions on the use of 
federal spending power” (81). 
Agreed to entrench a process to monitor federal 
expenditure in areas of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction, and compensation for provinces that opt 
out of national shared-cost programs (Text #31,16). 
  
Broad agreement that powers over regional 
economic development should devolve to 
Québec (V11). 
Agreed that regional development 
could be devolved to provinces by 
agreement;  Liberal dissent (74). 
Agreed to entrench regional development agreements 
between federal and provincial or territorial 
governments (Text #10). 
  
  Agreed could devolve powers over 
family policy and energy development 
by inter-government agreement (74). 
  
OTHER PROPOSALS 
      Also agreed to: 
1. broaden the word Canada to mean “Canada as 
constituted under the Constitution of Canada” 
(Text #2); 
2. use gender-neutral language in provisions for 
the governor general and royal assent (Text #6); 
3. simplify the expression of provisions for royal 
assent to bills (Text #6); 
4. simplify expression of  passage and assent for 
money bills in provincial legislatures (Text #7); 
5. entrench the right to vote in provincial elections 
(Text #24); 
6.  capitalise Aboriginal (Text #28); 
7.  broaden the definition of the Canadian 
constitution to include “any other amendment to 
the Constitution of Canada” (Text #34); 
8. broaden the definition of references to 
constitution acts to include “any amendments 
thereto” (Text #35). 
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Federal government Assemblies Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC First Ministers 
      Did not agree about:  “requiring notice for changes 
to federal legislation respecting Established 
Programs Financing” (Accord, 27);  and  processes 
for negotiating and implementing international 
treaties and agreements (Accord, 27-28). 
 
(Sources:  federal proposals in Government of Canada 1991;  assembly resolutions in Government of Canada 1992; Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC 1992;  and first ministers’ resolutions 
in the Accord Governments of Canada 1992b;  and in the final legal text Governments of Canada 1992c) 
Notes: 
1. Pinpoint citations use the proposal number for the original federal government proposals, page numbers for the assembly reports (with an alphabetical prefix to indicate which 
report is cited), page numbers for the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, subject numbers for the first ministers’ legal text, and page numbers for the first ministers’ Accord. 
2. Italics indicate that the proposal was not part of the original federal proposal.   
3. This table does not include two amendments proposed as bilateral agreements:  recognition of Métis in the Alberta Act (Text #23), and entrenchment of language rights for 
New Brunswick (Text #36). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate whether including constituents directly in 
negotiating proposals for formal constitutional change at constituent assemblies could 
improve the rate of formal change in Australia and Canada.  Examination of two 
assemblies – the Australian Constitutional Convention 1998 and the Renewal of Canada 
Conferences 1992 – showed that they were superior for representation, public interest, 
and consensus, compared to parliamentarians convening alone.  The research also 
showed that governments were unresponsive to a number of assembly recommendations 
that subsequently were cited by voters as crucial factors in their decision to vote No 
during the ratification phase. 
In the first chapter, Lutz’ quantitative method was used to establish that the rate of 
formal constitutional change in Australia and Canada was low, compared to 29 other 
nations.  It was argued that informal constitutional change is no substitute for changing 
the text of the constitution, because it lacks the force and permanency of formal 
amendments.  Further, heavy reliance on informal constitutional change can produce 
uncertainty, and a less stable political environment. 
Even so, some Australian and Canadian analysts concluded that there was little or 
no need for formal constitutional change (Sawer, Geoffrey 1973, 213; Russell 1993b, 
37; Galligan 1995, 118, 120-132).  Galligan and Russell wrote: 
There is little need for change in Australia’s constitutional system since governments can do just 
about all they want to do under existing constitutional arrangements [through judicial interpretation 
and informal agreements].  … Perhaps more curious is the unreflective reformist mindset that 
persists in advocating or expecting constitutional reform even though there is not much apparent 
need for change … progressive elites and federal governments should stop pestering the Australian 
people with referendum proposals that are unnecessary (Galligan 1995, 118, 132). 
 
It will be no more easy for politicians [in Canada] to break from these practices [of seeking formal 
constitutional change] than for the intelligentsia to abandon its predilection for constitutional 
solutions to every national problem (Russell 1993b, 37).  
 
Others concluded that the lack of formal constitutional change was a problem (Sharman 
1990; Cook 1994, 23; Watts 1999, 13; Saunders 2000, 4-5).  According to Cook, the 
“Canadian leadership still has the assignment to present Canadians with a proper 
constitution” (1994, 23).  Watts wrote:  
Experience in federations elsewhere … indicates that the repeated refusal to resolve basic problems 
… may accentuate internal grievances and frustrations cumulatively to the point where eventually 
disintegration may become unavoidable. … [T]he incremental approach is not likely to move 
sufficiently quickly to meet the urgent concerns  … nonconstitutional adjustment cannot provide 
the … assurance of constitutional safeguards that formal constitutional amendments would (1999, 
12-13). 
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In Australia, 44 proposals for formal constitutional change were put to referenda 
between 1906 and 1999, and only eight proposals were ratified.  Analysis of the 
literature about why constitutional referenda rarely pass in Australia showed there were 
no compelling answers to this question, and that relatively little attention was given to 
the process used to negotiate change.  According to Saunders, “In a system of 
representative government, the existence of such a gap merits inquiry and appropriate 
remedial action”;  the solution is not to do away with public involvement in ratifying 
constitutional change, but to find better ways for parliaments and electors to work 
together (2000, 25, 4).   
Analysts writing on both sides of the argument about the need for formal 
constitutional change agreed that Australia and Canada needed to find new ways to 
debate proposals (Spicer Commission 1991d, 13; Brock 1991; Russell 1991b, 147; 
Warhurst 1995, 40, 45, 48; Cairns 1997, 51, 61; Resnick 1997, 120; Watts 1999, 15; 
McKenna 2000, 11; Saunders 2000, 4, 28; Winterton 2001).  In the 1990s, the 
Australian and Canadian federal governments departed from usual practice and 
convened the 1998 Constitutional Convention and the 1992 Renewal of Canada 
Conferences.  These constituent assemblies (or mini constituent assemblies) debated the 
merits of proposals for major constitutional reforms.   
A review of the literature about the value of constituent assemblies (chapter two) 
showed that authors disagreed about whether, compared to parliamentarians convening 
alone to debate formal constitutional change, constituent assemblies were:   
• more representative of constituents;   
• better able to generate public interest;   
• better able to reach consensus;  and  
• less partisan.   
This thesis addressed these four questions.  The review also showed that authors 
disagreed about what the term constituent assembly meant.  For this thesis, a constituent 
assembly is:   
• a special-purpose group authorised by government to debate and recommend 
constitutional change;  where  
• all delegates are empowered to act as equal participants at the assembly;  and  
• at least half of the delegates are chosen by constituents, rather than by serving 
politicians.   
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The cases selected for this thesis are constituent assemblies, according to that definition, 
and according to definitions provided by Fafard and Reid (1991, 5-6, 11-17).  According 
to Elster’s definition, however, 34% of the Australian delegates and 63% of the 
Canadian delegates may not qualify as delegates to an assembly because they were not 
directly elected to the assembly (2006, 182-183).  It is possible that Elster would allow 
that these are assemblies if governments had a mandate to negotiate formal 
constitutional change, to choose delegates, and to authorise others to choose delegates 
on their behalf.  I cited two conservative analysts who wrote that the Renewal of Canada 
Conferences were “mini constituent assemblies” (Russell 1993a, 177), or that they 
“served almost as mini-constituent assemblies” (Watts 1999, 6). 
The Australian and Canadian cases may be mini constituent assemblies, rather 
than constituent assemblies.  They were “mini” in the sense that they convened for a 
short time, and four of the five Canadian assemblies considered only some of the federal 
government’s proposals for constitutional reform.  They were, nonetheless, landmarks in 
the evolution of procedures for amending the Australian and Canadian constitutions.  
For the first time in Canada, and for the first time since Australia drafted its first 
constitution in 1878-89, parliamentarians, experts, and ‘ordinary citizens’ came together 
formally as equals to debate constitutional change.  Questions about the value of 
constituent assemblies are relevant to them, and answering those questions may help to 
find ways for parliamentarians and constituents to work together in future to achieve 
formal constitutional change. 
Authors writing about the value of constituent assemblies rarely wrote what they 
meant by representativeness, public interest, consensus, and partisanship, so these terms 
were defined in a testable form, and the way these qualities were measured was 
explained and justified. 
• Representation:  I reviewed contrasting views about what the word representation 
means in politics (Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1995; Przeworski 1997; Sawer, Marian 
1999), and explained why I measured representativeness using the acting-for 
conception for constitutional preferences, and the descriptive conception for place of 
residence, place of birth, aboriginality, age, gender, and formal education.   
• Public interest:  I explained why I chose to measure public interest by comparing 
specific behaviours, rather than self-reported levels of interest in the constitutional 
debates.  I gave weight to making submissions and attending assembly sessions 
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because these forms of public participation require more commitment and effort 
than, say, ringing the Spicer Commission toll-free line.     
• Consensus:  I explored literal and specialist interpretations of the word consensus, 
and explained why I measured consensus by comparing the extent to which 
parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians agreed or disagreed.   
• Partisanship:  I explored literal and specialist uses of the word partisan and 
partisanship, and explained why I measured partisanship by examining how often 
parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians appeared to change their views on 
constitutional issues when they were at the assemblies.  I also expressed reservations 
about this method. 
The remainder of the thesis examined the two case studies. 
The third chapter examined the way federation was achieved in Australia in 1901, 
the rules for amending the constitution, and the process of formal constitutional change 
from 1901 to 1999.  The discussion of federation showed that public participation was 
pivotal in achieving federation, through activism, informal conferences in 1893 and 
1896 (which kept the subject of federation on the agenda), the elected constituent 
assembly of 1897-98, and referenda.  The rest of the chapter examined the process of 
formal constitutional change in the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the initiation 
and negotiation stages.  Analysis of 14 ad-hoc inquiries convened by the federal 
parliament showed that their recommendations were rarely put to referenda, but when 
they were, proposals recommended by inquiries were twice as likely to pass, compared 
to recommendations initiated by parliamentarians alone.  It also showed that if the 
success of an inquiry was measured by how many of its recommendations were put to 
referenda, then the 1998 Constitutional Convention (the constituent assembly) was the 
clear leader because it recommended that two questions be put to referendum, and both 
questions were put.   
The Australian assembly was described and examined in detail in the fourth 
chapter.  To answer the question about representativeness, formal ballots were analysed, 
delegates’ constitutional preferences were identified, and demographic indicators were 
compiled.  When these variables were compared to similar data for constituents and the 
population, analysis showed that the non-parliamentarians were more representative for 
constitutional preference, place of residence, gender, formal education, aboriginality, 
and place of birth, while parliamentarians were slightly more representative for age 
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(women parliamentarians were representative for age).  Almost the same proportion of 
elected delegates and constituents voting at the referendum supported the republic 
model that was put (44.7% and 45.1% respectively).  This is a remarkably good result 
for representativeness, given the turnout for the assembly election was just 49.6%.   
The assembly generated more public interest than did comparable parliamentary 
inquiries, as evidenced by the number of submissions made.  Further, turnout for the 
referendum was relatively high at 95.1%, and the informal rate was the lowest ever 
recorded for Australian referenda.   
The results for consensus and partisanship were mixed.  Preliminary analysis 
showed that a majority of the parliamentary delegates agreed in the third to eighth 
ballots to support the model that was put to referendum, and a majority agreed to a 
republic rather than the status quo, transitional provisions, and a referendum.  By 
contrast, at no time did a majority of the elected delegates support any one constitutional 
option – their preferences were diverse.  A more comprehensive examination of support 
and dissent showed that it was the non-parliamentarians who were better able to reach 
consensus, but the results for individual ballots were often very close.  For six of the 17 
ballot outcomes examined, the consensus scores for parliamentarians, elected delegates, 
and community representatives varied by no more than 3%.   
Further examination of the ballots showed that parliamentarians appeared to be 
less partisan than non-parliamentarians, in that more of them changed their votes.  In 
this case, the difference margin was distinct:  26% of the parliamentary delegates 
changed their votes, compared to 16% of the non-parliamentary delegates – a difference 
of 10%.  However, evidence from the debates suggested strongly that Coalition 
parliamentarians did not vote in accordance with their preferences in the early ballots.  
Instead, they followed their prime minister’s urgings to support a republic model of 
some kind, even if they preferred constitutional monarchy or status quo.  Analysis of 
votes for Labor parliamentarians showed 31% of that group changed their votes.  The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of why the Turnbull republic model was put to a 
referendum when a majority of the delegates did not vote for it in the final ballot.   
Canada’s pre-federation history was outlined briefly in the fifth chapter to indicate 
some of the sources of continuing conflict between Anglophone and Francophone 
constituents.  The federation process was covered briefly too, because there was little 
public involvement.  The fifth chapter was devoted almost entirely to examining the 
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process of formal constitutional change from 1867 to 1999 with an emphasis on inter-
government consultation and consent, because that is a contentious and divisive issue in 
Canada, especially for Québec.  The analysis could not begin without first knowing how 
many times the constitution had been amended, which was exceedingly difficult to 
establish.  An annotated constitution (Department of Justice Canada 2001) was 
compared with commentaries written by Gérin-Lajoie (1950), Favreau (1965) and 
Russell (1988), the differences were reconciled and explained, and it was concluded that 
the text of the Canadian constitutions 1867 and 1982 was amended 26 times between 
1867 and 1999.  The rest of the chapter examined the way those 26 amendments were 
enacted.   
Britain amended Canada’s constitution unilaterally in 1893 and 1950, but these 
amendments were not controversial because they repealed obsolete or spent provisions.  
The Canadian parliament enacted two amendments in 1965 and 1986 without consulting 
Britain or the provinces, as it was empowered to do.  By contrast, the federal 
government did not consult the parliament when it enacted an amendment in 1875, and 
it enacted an amendment in 1997 without the senate’s consent.  The record for 
consulting provinces about amendments was more complex.  Setting aside the four 
uncontroversial amendments just mentioned, the federal government did not seek 
provincial consent for eight of 22 amendments.  Québec did not consent to amendments 
in 1946, 1949, 1982, and 1984, and when an amendment was enacted for Québec in 
1997, Québec’s proclamation said it did not recognise the 1982 constitution because it 
was enacted without its consent. Québec took the issue of provincial consent to the 
Supreme Court to challenge the 1982 amendment before it was enacted, but did not 
succeed.  The court ruled that Québec did not demonstrate it had acquired a right of veto 
over certain amendments, either by informal agreement, or by the principle of duality. 
The last section of the fifth chapter described in more detail the procedural aspects 
of two proposals that did not proceed to enactment in Canada – the Meech Lake Accord 
1987-90 and the Charlottetown Accord 1990-92.  The Meech Lake Accord lapsed on 22 
June 1990 because not all provinces passed enabling legislation.  Many commentators 
concluded that it did not succeed, in part, for want of meaningful public involvement 
(Brock 1991; Cohen 1991, 270-277; Russell 1993a, 140-145, 156-157; Watts 1993, 9-
10; Hurley 1996, 113-114; Cairns 1997, 60).  The Charlottetown round was different in 
some respects.  By the time the federal government announced in December 1991 that it 
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would convene five assemblies to debate its proposals for reform, all but one of the 
provincial and territorial governments had initiated public hearings about the 
constitution.  The assemblies provided their report to the federal government in 
February 1992, and the first ministers negotiated the final text of the Accord behind 
closed doors between March and August 1992.  Procedurally, the point of contrast for 
the two accords is that public consultations for Meech occurred after the first ministers 
agreed on the Accord, whilst public consultations for Charlottetown were held before 
the first ministers negotiated their final package.  However, neither of the accords was 
open to amendment in response to public input.   
The Canadian assemblies were described and examined in the sixth and last 
chapter, where three of the four thesis questions were answered.  This was relatively 
difficult to do because very little authoritative information was available, compared to 
the Australian case.  To answer the question of representativeness, demographic and 
preference data were compared for parliamentary delegates, non-parliamentary 
delegates, first ministers, the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, constituents, and the population, 
but fewer comparisons could be drawn because data were not available.  Even so, there 
were enough data to conclude that the assemblies were more representative than 
parliamentarians for constitutional preferences, place of residence, and gender.   
The question about public interest was answered for the Australian case by 
comparing data for submissions and attendance, but this could not be done for Canada 
because there was no official record of submissions to first ministers’ meetings or the 
assemblies, attendance figures were available for only two of the five assemblies, and 
two particularly relevant parliamentary inquiries did not publish attendance figures.  It 
was possible, nevertheless, to estimate attendance for three assemblies, and to show it 
was exceedingly unlikely that comparable parliamentary inquiries attracted more visitors 
than did the assemblies. 
The last section of chapter six established that the assemblies were better able to 
reach consensus than were parliamentarians.  Unlike the Australian case, there were no 
formal records of ballots at the assemblies, the first ministers’ meetings, or the 
Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, so the question was answered by analysing official texts that 
described agreements reached by those three groups.  A simple statistical analysis of the 
outcomes showed that the assemblies were better able to reach consensus, but the 
margin of difference was very small.  The assemblies agreed on 89.8% of the subjects 
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put to them, compared to 89.1% for the Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, and 84.4% for the first 
ministers.  That conclusion is robust, nevertheless, because special advantages were 
afforded to the SJC and the first ministers.  The SJC made its recommendations by 
majority agreement, and a majority of its members were parliamentarians who 
represented the government.  The consensus figure for the first ministers was inflated by 
their agreement to nine uncontroversial amendments that were not put to the assemblies. 
The question about partisanship was not answered because an official record of 
delegates’ individual preferences was not created and retained. 
 
Despite the favourable results for the assemblies, and unprecedented public 
participation in the Australian and Canadian constitutional debates in the 1990s, 
constituents did not approve the proposals put to them at the polls.   
Australia returned to its procedural roots in 1998 when parliamentarians and 
constituents came together to debate constitutional change, as they had in 1897-98 to 
debate federation.  The founders were more successful at their constituent assembly, but 
this is not surprising given the advantageous circumstances.  In 1998, delegates 
convened for two weeks without recess, and their agenda was restricted.  By contrast, 
the founders convened for 17 weeks between March 1897 and March 1898, lengthy 
adjournments allowed for reflection, discussion, negotiations, and feedback from 
constituents, and the agenda was broad.  Much more recently, the parliamentary 
Australian Constitutional Convention convened for four weeks in six sessions held 
between 1973 and 1985 (chapter three).  If the 1998 assembly had convened for four 
weeks with adjournments, it may have found a way to blend the Turnbull and Gallop 
models to provide a stronger role for constituents in choosing their president, and to 
examine further the question of codifying the president’s powers. 
Canada made a quantum leap from negotiating formal constitutional change 
behind closed doors, using the techniques of executive federalism, to almost full-scale 
public participation in the 1990s (cf. Cairns 1991a, 17-20, 26).  Until the mid-1980s, 
provincial consultation and consent was the primary concern (see chapter five).  Now 
public consultation and consent was important as well.  Governments invited 
constituents to participate in the constitutional debates, and to deliver their judgment on 
the first ministers’ accord at a plebiscite in 1992.   Delegates to the 1992 Canadian 
assemblies, like their counterparts in Australia, convened for a relatively short time 
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without recess (three to six days for each delegate), and for most delegates the agenda 
was restricted to debating only some of the 28 federal proposals.  By contrast, the 
Canadian founders convened with a broad agenda, they debated federation formally for 
five weeks at two sessions between 1864 and 1866, and they devoted a further seven 
weeks to negotiations and drafting in Britain in 1866-87 (chapter five).  In 1992, The 
Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC convened for six months to debate the 28 federal proposals.  First 
ministers reached their agreement on the Charlottetown Accord over a period of about 
five months.   
The timing and quality of public consultations in Australia and Canada may have 
increased public dissent.  Once governments agreed to the Meech Lake Accord and the 
Charlottetown Accord, constituents were invited to express their opinions at public 
hearings, but the accords were not open to amendment.  Governments proposed senate 
reforms that were contrary to recommendations made by the assemblies and the 
Beaudoin-Dobbie SJC, and added new reforms like the 25% commons guarantee for 
Québec, which had not been broached with the assembly, the SJC, or constituents.  In 
Australia, the federal government put to referendum a republic model that was not 
supported by a majority of the assembly delegates, and the prime minister took it upon 
himself to write a new preamble which did not include many important elements 
recommended by the assembly (chapter four).  Moreover, Australian governments of all 
kinds have a long history of ignoring recommendations made to them by inquiries they 
appoint to consider formal constitutional change (chapter three).   
The two constituent assemblies examined in this thesis demonstrated that 
parliamentarians and constituents can come together as equals and debate proposals for 
formal constitutional change constructively.  This is one answer to Saunders’ challenge 
to find ways to forge a closer partnership between parliamentarians and voters (chapter 
one).  The assembly delegates are due praise for achieving superior outcomes for 
representativeness, public interest, and consensus, but even perfect scores are 
meaningless if governments are unresponsive. 
 
Questions about the quality of debates at the assemblies and the responsiveness of 
governments to assembly agreements were not examined in this thesis because these 
questions did not arise from the literature about constituent assemblies that was 
reviewed in chapter 2.   
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Elster and Uhr did write that constituent assemblies were more deliberative, but 
this was not sufficient to justify a separate question on that topic, even given the logical 
relationship between consensus, partisanship, and deliberative democracy.  The subject 
is, nevertheless, highly relevant to the broader question of whether constituent 
assemblies might be a more productive way to achieve formal constitutional change.  
The ideal that citizens can productively come together as interested, informed, equals 
and agree on the rules by which they are governed is not new, and the debate about 
whether citizens are competent to participate in this way is a perennial one (Kreibig 
2000).  In brief, Socrates argued that only those who were selected and trained to rule 
should rule, and a just state was one in which “each of our three classes [workers, 
military, and guardians] … does its own job and minds its own business” (as cited in 
Plato 1987 [c. 375BC], 434c).  By contrast, Pericles said at about the same time: 
Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the 
whole people … we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds 
his own business;  we say that he has no business here at all (as cited in Thucydides 1972 [c. 400 
BC], 147).   
 
In 1774, Edmund Burke told his constituents “Your representative owes you, not his 
industry only, but his judgement;  and he betrays you, instead of serving you, if he 
sacrifices it to your opinion” (1774, 11).  Less than 20 years later, Rousseau wrote that 
freedom is “obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself”, and “the moment a people 
adopts representatives it is no longer free” (1968 [1792], 65, 143).  In 1861, John Stuart 
Mill concluded, nevertheless, that representative government was the best form of 
government. 
[I]t is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state 
is one in which the whole people participate;  that any participation, even in the smallest public 
function, is useful;  that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of 
improvement of the community will allow;  and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than 
the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state.  But since all cannot, in a 
community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor 
portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of perfect government must be 
representative (1993 [1861], 234).  
 
One of the best known contemporary works on deliberative democracy is James 
Fishkin’s The Voice of the People (1995), in which he advocated a stronger role for 
citizens in public decision-making.  There is now a wealth of contemporary literature 
about deliberative democracy, some of which raises doubts about the prospects for 
modern deliberative democracy.  For example, Fishkin wrote that when participants 
change their views during deliberations, that change may be short-term (1995, 188, 
221).  Elster warned that public deliberation could cause grandstanding and rhetoric (see 
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chapter 2), and Gambetta (1998) cautioned against implementing standard deliberative 
techniques in “‘Claro!’ culture” environments, where individuals tend to have strong 
opinions, and seek first to win arguments, rather than deliberate with others.   Finally, if 
for most citizens public participation in deliberations is limited to observing their 
representatives being selected randomly from a structured sample, and witnessing some 
of the debates, then the outcomes may be quite limited for public interest, knowledge, 
partisanship, and consensus if citizens then vote at referenda and plebiscites. 
On responsiveness, future case studies of constituent assemblies should examine 
the subject, not only because unresponsive governments can ignore assembly outcomes, 
but also because different ideas about responsive government are at the heart of 
disagreements about public participation in general, and the value of constituent 
assemblies.   
The first challenge would be to define what responsiveness means within a system 
of representative government, and there is a wealth of literature on that topic.  Saward 
wrote that in a democracy, responsiveness is about outcomes rather than the process, 
and “responsive rule … [requires] a necessary correspondence between acts of 
governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to those acts” 
(1998, 50-52).  A call for more public participation in constitutional debates is a call for 
something more than traditional representative government, but it is not a call to 
dismantle representative government.  Saward defined democracy and responsive rule in 
terms of thresholds and a continuum, with many points between representative 
government and direct democracy (1998, esp. 144-154).  Proposals for greater public 
participation in constitutional debates do challenge traditional models of representative 
government and representative democracy, but they do not demand that representatives 
as trustees become delegates, to use Riemer’s stereotypes (see page 67).  There are many 
shades of grey between conceptions of representatives acting as delegates, doing their 
constituents’ bidding, and representatives acting as trustees, serving what they perceive 
to be constituents’ best interest. 
After the Meech Lake Accord lapsed in Canada, Cairns concluded that public 
participation had to involve more than tallying the preferences of active interest group 
members because that “does not satisfy the representational requirements of a legitimate 
process” (1991a, 28-29).  After Charlottetown, he concluded that if governments 
proposed packages that could not be altered, then the public role “lacks substance” 
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(Cairns 1997, 53).  Brock wrote that public consultation and public ratification was now 
required for major constitutional reforms, and governments needed to be responsive to 
public input (1993, 32).  Politicians needed to consider the strength and nature of 
“public concerns”, consider the recommendations of inquiries when they negotiate 
reforms, and justify their proposals normatively and practically. 
Leaders must be responsive to public demands but willing to make independent decisions and then 
to defend those decisions before the public in terms that are meaningful to them.  This is a much 
more challenging form of leadership than one which tabulates preferences and then defends them 
on that basis while abdicating responsibility for those decisions or the direction of reform (Brock 
1993, 32).   
 
For Russell, however, the responsibility for negotiating constitutional change must 
remain with legislatures, albeit in the hands of a larger, and more representative group 
of legislators. 
If we must indulge in constitutional politics we will have to find a new constitutional process – one 
that is compatible with the democratic ethos of our times. … [at] the negotiating stage, the First 
Ministers [sic] Conference will have to be replaced by a forum with a more democratic legitimacy 
… the best bet, I think, is a conference attended by all-party delegations from the constituent 
legislative assemblies with the results to be ratified by the legislatures (1991a, 67-68). 
 
In Australia, Winterton argued that the parliament “should honour the [1998] 
Convention’s resolutions – adopted, after all, by the people’s representatives especially 
elected for that task – but some refinement, especially to any codified presidential 
reserve powers, may be essential” (2001, 25).  Others continued to argue that 
negotiating formal constitutional change was necessarily an ‘elite’ process. 
Resnick advised those who argued for more public participation to remember 
“The question is not one of unlimited direct democracy, of non-stop participation by 
members of society in political affairs” (1990, 261, 258).  According to Resnick:   
Parliamentary (and legislative) sovereignty has come to mean the right of prime ministers and 
premiers, with no explicit mandate from their constituents, to undertake fundamental 
constitutional change.  The legitimacy of their actions derives from a Burkean-type notion of the 
privileged knowledge, judgment, and power that legislators, unlike the mere mortals who elect 
them, enjoy …  
We can aspire to greater participation and democratic practice, but we cannot forfeit other 
objectives – functioning political authority, an extensive division of labour, a vibrant familial and 
private sphere – in the process (1990, 94, 262 respectively). 
 
According to Resnick, representative government suits large nation-states, and satisfies 
the need for governability.  Those who advocate greater public participation in public 
policy debates need to find a balance between democracy as practiced (by the few) in 
ancient city-states and the liberal form of representative government (Resnick 1990, 37). 
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Constituents also need to be responsive to governments and their proposals for 
formal constitutional change.  This could include a commitment by constituents to be 
well informed on the proposals put to them, to consider the preferences of others 
(including parliamentarians), and to express dissent in a way that encourages 
constructive debates.  According to Russell, however, that would not be enough.   
[T]he Canadian people have at this point in the odyssey clearly established their constitutional 
sovereignty.  They are the country’s highest constitutional authority. … But the Canadian people 
may have become constitutionally sovereign without having constituted themselves as a people.  
The Canadian people or peoples have not explicitly affirmed a common understanding of the 
political community they share.  They would have done had they endorsed the Charlottetown 
Accord.  … But if for some time they carry on together developing a common constitutional 
tradition, it will turn out that they are after all the people of Edmund Burke, not John Locke, and 
that their social contract is essentially organic, not covenantal.  Some of us might settle for that 
(Russell 1993a, 234-235).  
 
I struggle to accept that the No vote in 1992 means that the Canadian people have not 
“constituted themselves as a people”, any more than I would accept that Australians 
have not “constituted themselves as a people” because they voted No to a republic and a 
new preamble in 1999.  Perhaps the process was not sufficiently responsive to allow it. 
This thesis has argued that proposals for a republic in Australia and the 
Charlottetown Accord in Canada were not ratified largely because of the content of the 
proposals, and the way they were negotiated.  The constituent assemblies delivered on 
their promise to be more representative of constituents, their promise to generate more 
public interest, and their promise to generate a higher level of consensus, but 
governments were unresponsive to critical recommendations made by the assemblies.   
It remains to be seen whether other studies validate and replicate the conclusions 
reached in this thesis.  In the meantime, it is to be hoped that Australia and Canada will 
not need to wait for a crisis before more is done to close the gap that exists between 
parliamentarians and constituents when they debate proposals for formal constitutional 
change.  If we do wait, then a crisis can induce “threat based bargaining” in place of 
constructive deliberation (Elster 1995, 394).  Better that responsible and responsive 
parliamentarians, and responsible and responsive constituents, find peaceful ways to 
agree on the rules that bind them all, together.   
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